1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * ALSA sequencer Memory Manager * Copyright (c) 1998 by Frank van de Pol <fvdpol@coil.demon.nl> */ #ifndef __SND_SEQ_MEMORYMGR_H #define __SND_SEQ_MEMORYMGR_H #include <sound/seq_kernel.h> #include <linux/poll.h> struct snd_info_buffer; /* container for sequencer event (internal use) */ struct snd_seq_event_cell { struct snd_seq_event event; struct snd_seq_pool *pool; /* used pool */ struct snd_seq_event_cell *next; /* next cell */ }; /* design note: the pool is a contiguous block of memory, if we dynamicly want to add additional cells to the pool be better store this in another pool as we need to know the base address of the pool when releasing memory. */ struct snd_seq_pool { struct snd_seq_event_cell *ptr; /* pointer to first event chunk */ struct snd_seq_event_cell *free; /* pointer to the head of the free list */ int total_elements; /* pool size actually allocated */ atomic_t counter; /* cells free */ int size; /* pool size to be allocated */ int room; /* watermark for sleep/wakeup */ int closing; /* statistics */ int max_used; int event_alloc_nopool; int event_alloc_failures; int event_alloc_success; /* Write locking */ wait_queue_head_t output_sleep; /* Pool lock */ spinlock_t lock; }; void snd_seq_cell_free(struct snd_seq_event_cell *cell); int snd_seq_event_dup(struct snd_seq_pool *pool, struct snd_seq_event *event, struct snd_seq_event_cell **cellp, int nonblock, struct file *file, struct mutex *mutexp); /* return number of unused (free) cells */ static inline int snd_seq_unused_cells(struct snd_seq_pool *pool) { return pool ? pool->total_elements - atomic_read(&pool->counter) : 0; } /* return total number of allocated cells */ static inline int snd_seq_total_cells(struct snd_seq_pool *pool) { return pool ? pool->total_elements : 0; } /* init pool - allocate events */ int snd_seq_pool_init(struct snd_seq_pool *pool); /* done pool - free events */ void snd_seq_pool_mark_closing(struct snd_seq_pool *pool); int snd_seq_pool_done(struct snd_seq_pool *pool); /* create pool */ struct snd_seq_pool *snd_seq_pool_new(int poolsize); /* remove pool */ int snd_seq_pool_delete(struct snd_seq_pool **pool); /* polling */ int snd_seq_pool_poll_wait(struct snd_seq_pool *pool, struct file *file, poll_table *wait); void snd_seq_info_pool(struct snd_info_buffer *buffer, struct snd_seq_pool *pool, char *space); #endif
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static void rtc_timer_remove(struct rtc_device *rtc, struct rtc_timer *timer); static void rtc_add_offset(struct rtc_device *rtc, struct rtc_time *tm) { time64_t secs; if (!rtc->offset_secs) return; secs = rtc_tm_to_time64(tm); /* * Since the reading time values from RTC device are always in the RTC * original valid range, but we need to skip the overlapped region * between expanded range and original range, which is no need to add * the offset. */ if ((rtc->start_secs > rtc->range_min && secs >= rtc->start_secs) || (rtc->start_secs < rtc->range_min && secs <= (rtc->start_secs + rtc->range_max - rtc->range_min))) return; rtc_time64_to_tm(secs + rtc->offset_secs, tm); } static void rtc_subtract_offset(struct rtc_device *rtc, struct rtc_time *tm) { time64_t secs; if (!rtc->offset_secs) return; secs = rtc_tm_to_time64(tm); /* * If the setting time values are in the valid range of RTC hardware * device, then no need to subtract the offset when setting time to RTC * device. Otherwise we need to subtract the offset to make the time * values are valid for RTC hardware device. */ if (secs >= rtc->range_min && secs <= rtc->range_max) return; rtc_time64_to_tm(secs - rtc->offset_secs, tm); } static int rtc_valid_range(struct rtc_device *rtc, struct rtc_time *tm) { if (rtc->range_min != rtc->range_max) { time64_t time = rtc_tm_to_time64(tm); time64_t range_min = rtc->set_start_time ? rtc->start_secs : rtc->range_min; timeu64_t range_max = rtc->set_start_time ? (rtc->start_secs + rtc->range_max - rtc->range_min) : rtc->range_max; if (time < range_min || time > range_max) return -ERANGE; } return 0; } static int __rtc_read_time(struct rtc_device *rtc, struct rtc_time *tm) { int err; if (!rtc->ops) { err = -ENODEV; } else if (!rtc->ops->read_time) { err = -EINVAL; } else { memset(tm, 0, sizeof(struct rtc_time)); err = rtc->ops->read_time(rtc->dev.parent, tm); if (err < 0) { dev_dbg(&rtc->dev, "read_time: fail to read: %d\n", err); return err; } rtc_add_offset(rtc, tm); err = rtc_valid_tm(tm); if (err < 0) dev_dbg(&rtc->dev, "read_time: rtc_time isn't valid\n"); } return err; } int rtc_read_time(struct rtc_device *rtc, struct rtc_time *tm) { int err; err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&rtc->ops_lock); if (err) return err; err = __rtc_read_time(rtc, tm); mutex_unlock(&rtc->ops_lock); trace_rtc_read_time(rtc_tm_to_time64(tm), err); return err; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rtc_read_time); int rtc_set_time(struct rtc_device *rtc, struct rtc_time *tm) { int err, uie; err = rtc_valid_tm(tm); if (err != 0) return err; err = rtc_valid_range(rtc, tm); if (err) return err; rtc_subtract_offset(rtc, tm); #ifdef CONFIG_RTC_INTF_DEV_UIE_EMUL uie = rtc->uie_rtctimer.enabled || rtc->uie_irq_active; #else uie = rtc->uie_rtctimer.enabled; #endif if (uie) { err = rtc_update_irq_enable(rtc, 0); if (err) return err; } err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&rtc->ops_lock); if (err) return err; if (!rtc->ops) err = -ENODEV; else if (rtc->ops->set_time) err = rtc->ops->set_time(rtc->dev.parent, tm); else err = -EINVAL; pm_stay_awake(rtc->dev.parent); mutex_unlock(&rtc->ops_lock); /* A timer might have just expired */ schedule_work(&rtc->irqwork); if (uie) { err = rtc_update_irq_enable(rtc, 1); if (err) return err; } trace_rtc_set_time(rtc_tm_to_time64(tm), err); return err; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rtc_set_time); static int rtc_read_alarm_internal(struct rtc_device *rtc, struct rtc_wkalrm *alarm) { int err; err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&rtc->ops_lock); if (err) return err; if (!rtc->ops) { err = -ENODEV; } else if (!rtc->ops->read_alarm) { err = -EINVAL; } else { alarm->enabled = 0; alarm->pending = 0; alarm->time.tm_sec = -1; alarm->time.tm_min = -1; alarm->time.tm_hour = -1; alarm->time.tm_mday = -1; alarm->time.tm_mon = -1; alarm->time.tm_year = -1; alarm->time.tm_wday = -1; alarm->time.tm_yday = -1; alarm->time.tm_isdst = -1; err = rtc->ops->read_alarm(rtc->dev.parent, alarm); } mutex_unlock(&rtc->ops_lock); trace_rtc_read_alarm(rtc_tm_to_time64(&alarm->time), err); return err; } int __rtc_read_alarm(struct rtc_device *rtc, struct rtc_wkalrm *alarm) { int err; struct rtc_time before, now; int first_time = 1; time64_t t_now, t_alm; enum { none, day, month, year } missing = none; unsigned int days; /* The lower level RTC driver may return -1 in some fields, * creating invalid alarm->time values, for reasons like: * * - The hardware may not be capable of filling them in; * many alarms match only on time-of-day fields, not * day/month/year calendar data. * * - Some hardware uses illegal values as "wildcard" match * values, which non-Linux firmware (like a BIOS) may try * to set up as e.g. "alarm 15 minutes after each hour". * Linux uses only oneshot alarms. * * When we see that here, we deal with it by using values from * a current RTC timestamp for any missing (-1) values. The * RTC driver prevents "periodic alarm" modes. * * But this can be racey, because some fields of the RTC timestamp * may have wrapped in the interval since we read the RTC alarm, * which would lead to us inserting inconsistent values in place * of the -1 fields. * * Reading the alarm and timestamp in the reverse sequence * would have the same race condition, and not solve the issue. * * So, we must first read the RTC timestamp, * then read the RTC alarm value, * and then read a second RTC timestamp. * * If any fields of the second timestamp have changed * when compared with the first timestamp, then we know * our timestamp may be inconsistent with that used by * the low-level rtc_read_alarm_internal() function. * * So, when the two timestamps disagree, we just loop and do * the process again to get a fully consistent set of values. * * This could all instead be done in the lower level driver, * but since more than one lower level RTC implementation needs it, * then it's probably best best to do it here instead of there.. */ /* Get the "before" timestamp */ err = rtc_read_time(rtc, &before); if (err < 0) return err; do { if (!first_time) memcpy(&before, &now, sizeof(struct rtc_time)); first_time = 0; /* get the RTC alarm values, which may be incomplete */ err = rtc_read_alarm_internal(rtc, alarm); if (err) return err; /* full-function RTCs won't have such missing fields */ if (rtc_valid_tm(&alarm->time) == 0) { rtc_add_offset(rtc, &alarm->time); return 0; } /* get the "after" timestamp, to detect wrapped fields */ err = rtc_read_time(rtc, &now); if (err < 0) return err; /* note that tm_sec is a "don't care" value here: */ } while (before.tm_min != now.tm_min || before.tm_hour != now.tm_hour || before.tm_mon != now.tm_mon || before.tm_year != now.tm_year); /* Fill in the missing alarm fields using the timestamp; we * know there's at least one since alarm->time is invalid. */ if (alarm->time.tm_sec == -1) alarm->time.tm_sec = now.tm_sec; if (alarm->time.tm_min == -1) alarm->time.tm_min = now.tm_min; if (alarm->time.tm_hour == -1) alarm->time.tm_hour = now.tm_hour; /* For simplicity, only support date rollover for now */ if (alarm->time.tm_mday < 1 || alarm->time.tm_mday > 31) { alarm->time.tm_mday = now.tm_mday; missing = day; } if ((unsigned int)alarm->time.tm_mon >= 12) { alarm->time.tm_mon = now.tm_mon; if (missing == none) missing = month; } if (alarm->time.tm_year == -1) { alarm->time.tm_year = now.tm_year; if (missing == none) missing = year; } /* Can't proceed if alarm is still invalid after replacing * missing fields. */ err = rtc_valid_tm(&alarm->time); if (err) goto done; /* with luck, no rollover is needed */ t_now = rtc_tm_to_time64(&now); t_alm = rtc_tm_to_time64(&alarm->time); if (t_now < t_alm) goto done; switch (missing) { /* 24 hour rollover ... if it's now 10am Monday, an alarm that * that will trigger at 5am will do so at 5am Tuesday, which * could also be in the next month or year. This is a common * case, especially for PCs. */ case day: dev_dbg(&rtc->dev, "alarm rollover: %s\n", "day"); t_alm += 24 * 60 * 60; rtc_time64_to_tm(t_alm, &alarm->time); break; /* Month rollover ... if it's the 31th, an alarm on the 3rd will * be next month. An alarm matching on the 30th, 29th, or 28th * may end up in the month after that! Many newer PCs support * this type of alarm. */ case month: dev_dbg(&rtc->dev, "alarm rollover: %s\n", "month"); do { if (alarm->time.tm_mon < 11) { alarm->time.tm_mon++; } else { alarm->time.tm_mon = 0; alarm->time.tm_year++; } days = rtc_month_days(alarm->time.tm_mon, alarm->time.tm_year); } while (days < alarm->time.tm_mday); break; /* Year rollover ... easy except for leap years! */ case year: dev_dbg(&rtc->dev, "alarm rollover: %s\n", "year"); do { alarm->time.tm_year++; } while (!is_leap_year(alarm->time.tm_year + 1900) && rtc_valid_tm(&alarm->time) != 0); break; default: dev_warn(&rtc->dev, "alarm rollover not handled\n"); } err = rtc_valid_tm(&alarm->time); done: if (err) dev_warn(&rtc->dev, "invalid alarm value: %ptR\n", &alarm->time); return err; } int rtc_read_alarm(struct rtc_device *rtc, struct rtc_wkalrm *alarm) { int err; err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&rtc->ops_lock); if (err) return err; if (!rtc->ops) { err = -ENODEV; } else if (!rtc->ops->read_alarm) { err = -EINVAL; } else { memset(alarm, 0, sizeof(struct rtc_wkalrm)); alarm->enabled = rtc->aie_timer.enabled; alarm->time = rtc_ktime_to_tm(rtc->aie_timer.node.expires); } mutex_unlock(&rtc->ops_lock); trace_rtc_read_alarm(rtc_tm_to_time64(&alarm->time), err); return err; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rtc_read_alarm); static int __rtc_set_alarm(struct rtc_device *rtc, struct rtc_wkalrm *alarm) { struct rtc_time tm; time64_t now, scheduled; int err; err = rtc_valid_tm(&alarm->time); if (err) return err; scheduled = rtc_tm_to_time64(&alarm->time); /* Make sure we're not setting alarms in the past */ err = __rtc_read_time(rtc, &tm); if (err) return err; now = rtc_tm_to_time64(&tm); if (scheduled <= now) return -ETIME; /* * XXX - We just checked to make sure the alarm time is not * in the past, but there is still a race window where if * the is alarm set for the next second and the second ticks * over right here, before we set the alarm. */ rtc_subtract_offset(rtc, &alarm->time); if (!rtc->ops) err = -ENODEV; else if (!rtc->ops->set_alarm) err = -EINVAL; else err = rtc->ops->set_alarm(rtc->dev.parent, alarm); trace_rtc_set_alarm(rtc_tm_to_time64(&alarm->time), err); return err; } int rtc_set_alarm(struct rtc_device *rtc, struct rtc_wkalrm *alarm) { int err; if (!rtc->ops) return -ENODEV; else if (!rtc->ops->set_alarm) return -EINVAL; err = rtc_valid_tm(&alarm->time); if (err != 0) return err; err = rtc_valid_range(rtc, &alarm->time); if (err) return err; err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&rtc->ops_lock); if (err) return err; if (rtc->aie_timer.enabled) rtc_timer_remove(rtc, &rtc->aie_timer); rtc->aie_timer.node.expires = rtc_tm_to_ktime(alarm->time); rtc->aie_timer.period = 0; if (alarm->enabled) err = rtc_timer_enqueue(rtc, &rtc->aie_timer); mutex_unlock(&rtc->ops_lock); return err; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rtc_set_alarm); /* Called once per device from rtc_device_register */ int rtc_initialize_alarm(struct rtc_device *rtc, struct rtc_wkalrm *alarm) { int err; struct rtc_time now; err = rtc_valid_tm(&alarm->time); if (err != 0) return err; err = rtc_read_time(rtc, &now); if (err) return err; err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&rtc->ops_lock); if (err) return err; rtc->aie_timer.node.expires = rtc_tm_to_ktime(alarm->time); rtc->aie_timer.period = 0; /* Alarm has to be enabled & in the future for us to enqueue it */ if (alarm->enabled && (rtc_tm_to_ktime(now) < rtc->aie_timer.node.expires)) { rtc->aie_timer.enabled = 1; timerqueue_add(&rtc->timerqueue, &rtc->aie_timer.node); trace_rtc_timer_enqueue(&rtc->aie_timer); } mutex_unlock(&rtc->ops_lock); return err; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rtc_initialize_alarm); int rtc_alarm_irq_enable(struct rtc_device *rtc, unsigned int enabled) { int err; err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&rtc->ops_lock); if (err) return err; if (rtc->aie_timer.enabled != enabled) { if (enabled) err = rtc_timer_enqueue(rtc, &rtc->aie_timer); else rtc_timer_remove(rtc, &rtc->aie_timer); } if (err) /* nothing */; else if (!rtc->ops) err = -ENODEV; else if (!rtc->ops->alarm_irq_enable) err = -EINVAL; else err = rtc->ops->alarm_irq_enable(rtc->dev.parent, enabled); mutex_unlock(&rtc->ops_lock); trace_rtc_alarm_irq_enable(enabled, err); return err; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rtc_alarm_irq_enable); int rtc_update_irq_enable(struct rtc_device *rtc, unsigned int enabled) { int rc = 0, err; err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&rtc->ops_lock); if (err) return err; #ifdef CONFIG_RTC_INTF_DEV_UIE_EMUL if (enabled == 0 && rtc->uie_irq_active) { mutex_unlock(&rtc->ops_lock); return rtc_dev_update_irq_enable_emul(rtc, 0); } #endif /* make sure we're changing state */ if (rtc->uie_rtctimer.enabled == enabled) goto out; if (rtc->uie_unsupported) { err = -EINVAL; goto out; } if (enabled) { struct rtc_time tm; ktime_t now, onesec; rc = __rtc_read_time(rtc, &tm); if (rc) goto out; onesec = ktime_set(1, 0); now = rtc_tm_to_ktime(tm); rtc->uie_rtctimer.node.expires = ktime_add(now, onesec); rtc->uie_rtctimer.period = ktime_set(1, 0); err = rtc_timer_enqueue(rtc, &rtc->uie_rtctimer); } else { rtc_timer_remove(rtc, &rtc->uie_rtctimer); } out: mutex_unlock(&rtc->ops_lock); /* * __rtc_read_time() failed, this probably means that the RTC time has * never been set or less probably there is a transient error on the * bus. In any case, avoid enabling emulation has this will fail when * reading the time too. */ if (rc) return rc; #ifdef CONFIG_RTC_INTF_DEV_UIE_EMUL /* * Enable emulation if the driver returned -EINVAL to signal that it has * been configured without interrupts or they are not available at the * moment. */ if (err == -EINVAL) err = rtc_dev_update_irq_enable_emul(rtc, enabled); #endif return err; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rtc_update_irq_enable); /** * rtc_handle_legacy_irq - AIE, UIE and PIE event hook * @rtc: pointer to the rtc device * @num: number of occurence of the event * @mode: type of the event, RTC_AF, RTC_UF of RTC_PF * * This function is called when an AIE, UIE or PIE mode interrupt * has occurred (or been emulated). * */ void rtc_handle_legacy_irq(struct rtc_device *rtc, int num, int mode) { unsigned long flags; /* mark one irq of the appropriate mode */ spin_lock_irqsave(&rtc->irq_lock, flags); rtc->irq_data = (rtc->irq_data + (num << 8)) | (RTC_IRQF | mode); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rtc->irq_lock, flags); wake_up_interruptible(&rtc->irq_queue); kill_fasync(&rtc->async_queue, SIGIO, POLL_IN); } /** * rtc_aie_update_irq - AIE mode rtctimer hook * @rtc: pointer to the rtc_device * * This functions is called when the aie_timer expires. */ void rtc_aie_update_irq(struct rtc_device *rtc) { rtc_handle_legacy_irq(rtc, 1, RTC_AF); } /** * rtc_uie_update_irq - UIE mode rtctimer hook * @rtc: pointer to the rtc_device * * This functions is called when the uie_timer expires. */ void rtc_uie_update_irq(struct rtc_device *rtc) { rtc_handle_legacy_irq(rtc, 1, RTC_UF); } /** * rtc_pie_update_irq - PIE mode hrtimer hook * @timer: pointer to the pie mode hrtimer * * This function is used to emulate PIE mode interrupts * using an hrtimer. This function is called when the periodic * hrtimer expires. */ enum hrtimer_restart rtc_pie_update_irq(struct hrtimer *timer) { struct rtc_device *rtc; ktime_t period; u64 count; rtc = container_of(timer, struct rtc_device, pie_timer); period = NSEC_PER_SEC / rtc->irq_freq; count = hrtimer_forward_now(timer, period); rtc_handle_legacy_irq(rtc, count, RTC_PF); return HRTIMER_RESTART; } /** * rtc_update_irq - Triggered when a RTC interrupt occurs. * @rtc: the rtc device * @num: how many irqs are being reported (usually one) * @events: mask of RTC_IRQF with one or more of RTC_PF, RTC_AF, RTC_UF * Context: any */ void rtc_update_irq(struct rtc_device *rtc, unsigned long num, unsigned long events) { if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(rtc)) return; pm_stay_awake(rtc->dev.parent); schedule_work(&rtc->irqwork); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rtc_update_irq); struct rtc_device *rtc_class_open(const char *name) { struct device *dev; struct rtc_device *rtc = NULL; dev = class_find_device_by_name(rtc_class, name); if (dev) rtc = to_rtc_device(dev); if (rtc) { if (!try_module_get(rtc->owner)) { put_device(dev); rtc = NULL; } } return rtc; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rtc_class_open); void rtc_class_close(struct rtc_device *rtc) { module_put(rtc->owner); put_device(&rtc->dev); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rtc_class_close); static int rtc_update_hrtimer(struct rtc_device *rtc, int enabled) { /* * We always cancel the timer here first, because otherwise * we could run into BUG_ON(timer->state != HRTIMER_STATE_CALLBACK); * when we manage to start the timer before the callback * returns HRTIMER_RESTART. * * We cannot use hrtimer_cancel() here as a running callback * could be blocked on rtc->irq_task_lock and hrtimer_cancel() * would spin forever. */ if (hrtimer_try_to_cancel(&rtc->pie_timer) < 0) return -1; if (enabled) { ktime_t period = NSEC_PER_SEC / rtc->irq_freq; hrtimer_start(&rtc->pie_timer, period, HRTIMER_MODE_REL); } return 0; } /** * rtc_irq_set_state - enable/disable 2^N Hz periodic IRQs * @rtc: the rtc device * @enabled: true to enable periodic IRQs * Context: any * * Note that rtc_irq_set_freq() should previously have been used to * specify the desired frequency of periodic IRQ. */ int rtc_irq_set_state(struct rtc_device *rtc, int enabled) { int err = 0; while (rtc_update_hrtimer(rtc, enabled) < 0) cpu_relax(); rtc->pie_enabled = enabled; trace_rtc_irq_set_state(enabled, err); return err; } /** * rtc_irq_set_freq - set 2^N Hz periodic IRQ frequency for IRQ * @rtc: the rtc device * @freq: positive frequency * Context: any * * Note that rtc_irq_set_state() is used to enable or disable the * periodic IRQs. */ int rtc_irq_set_freq(struct rtc_device *rtc, int freq) { int err = 0; if (freq <= 0 || freq > RTC_MAX_FREQ) return -EINVAL; rtc->irq_freq = freq; while (rtc->pie_enabled && rtc_update_hrtimer(rtc, 1) < 0) cpu_relax(); trace_rtc_irq_set_freq(freq, err); return err; } /** * rtc_timer_enqueue - Adds a rtc_timer to the rtc_device timerqueue * @rtc: rtc device * @timer: timer being added. * * Enqueues a timer onto the rtc devices timerqueue and sets * the next alarm event appropriately. * * Sets the enabled bit on the added timer. * * Must hold ops_lock for proper serialization of timerqueue */ static int rtc_timer_enqueue(struct rtc_device *rtc, struct rtc_timer *timer) { struct timerqueue_node *next = timerqueue_getnext(&rtc->timerqueue); struct rtc_time tm; ktime_t now; timer->enabled = 1; __rtc_read_time(rtc, &tm); now = rtc_tm_to_ktime(tm); /* Skip over expired timers */ while (next) { if (next->expires >= now) break; next = timerqueue_iterate_next(next); } timerqueue_add(&rtc->timerqueue, &timer->node); trace_rtc_timer_enqueue(timer); if (!next || ktime_before(timer->node.expires, next->expires)) { struct rtc_wkalrm alarm; int err; alarm.time = rtc_ktime_to_tm(timer->node.expires); alarm.enabled = 1; err = __rtc_set_alarm(rtc, &alarm); if (err == -ETIME) { pm_stay_awake(rtc->dev.parent); schedule_work(&rtc->irqwork); } else if (err) { timerqueue_del(&rtc->timerqueue, &timer->node); trace_rtc_timer_dequeue(timer); timer->enabled = 0; return err; } } return 0; } static void rtc_alarm_disable(struct rtc_device *rtc) { if (!rtc->ops || !rtc->ops->alarm_irq_enable) return; rtc->ops->alarm_irq_enable(rtc->dev.parent, false); trace_rtc_alarm_irq_enable(0, 0); } /** * rtc_timer_remove - Removes a rtc_timer from the rtc_device timerqueue * @rtc: rtc device * @timer: timer being removed. * * Removes a timer onto the rtc devices timerqueue and sets * the next alarm event appropriately. * * Clears the enabled bit on the removed timer. * * Must hold ops_lock for proper serialization of timerqueue */ static void rtc_timer_remove(struct rtc_device *rtc, struct rtc_timer *timer) { struct timerqueue_node *next = timerqueue_getnext(&rtc->timerqueue); timerqueue_del(&rtc->timerqueue, &timer->node); trace_rtc_timer_dequeue(timer); timer->enabled = 0; if (next == &timer->node) { struct rtc_wkalrm alarm; int err; next = timerqueue_getnext(&rtc->timerqueue); if (!next) { rtc_alarm_disable(rtc); return; } alarm.time = rtc_ktime_to_tm(next->expires); alarm.enabled = 1; err = __rtc_set_alarm(rtc, &alarm); if (err == -ETIME) { pm_stay_awake(rtc->dev.parent); schedule_work(&rtc->irqwork); } } } /** * rtc_timer_do_work - Expires rtc timers * @work: work item * * Expires rtc timers. Reprograms next alarm event if needed. * Called via worktask. * * Serializes access to timerqueue via ops_lock mutex */ void rtc_timer_do_work(struct work_struct *work) { struct rtc_timer *timer; struct timerqueue_node *next; ktime_t now; struct rtc_time tm; struct rtc_device *rtc = container_of(work, struct rtc_device, irqwork); mutex_lock(&rtc->ops_lock); again: __rtc_read_time(rtc, &tm); now = rtc_tm_to_ktime(tm); while ((next = timerqueue_getnext(&rtc->timerqueue))) { if (next->expires > now) break; /* expire timer */ timer = container_of(next, struct rtc_timer, node); timerqueue_del(&rtc->timerqueue, &timer->node); trace_rtc_timer_dequeue(timer); timer->enabled = 0; if (timer->func) timer->func(timer->rtc); trace_rtc_timer_fired(timer); /* Re-add/fwd periodic timers */ if (ktime_to_ns(timer->period)) { timer->node.expires = ktime_add(timer->node.expires, timer->period); timer->enabled = 1; timerqueue_add(&rtc->timerqueue, &timer->node); trace_rtc_timer_enqueue(timer); } } /* Set next alarm */ if (next) { struct rtc_wkalrm alarm; int err; int retry = 3; alarm.time = rtc_ktime_to_tm(next->expires); alarm.enabled = 1; reprogram: err = __rtc_set_alarm(rtc, &alarm); if (err == -ETIME) { goto again; } else if (err) { if (retry-- > 0) goto reprogram; timer = container_of(next, struct rtc_timer, node); timerqueue_del(&rtc->timerqueue, &timer->node); trace_rtc_timer_dequeue(timer); timer->enabled = 0; dev_err(&rtc->dev, "__rtc_set_alarm: err=%d\n", err); goto again; } } else { rtc_alarm_disable(rtc); } pm_relax(rtc->dev.parent); mutex_unlock(&rtc->ops_lock); } /* rtc_timer_init - Initializes an rtc_timer * @timer: timer to be intiialized * @f: function pointer to be called when timer fires * @rtc: pointer to the rtc_device * * Kernel interface to initializing an rtc_timer. */ void rtc_timer_init(struct rtc_timer *timer, void (*f)(struct rtc_device *r), struct rtc_device *rtc) { timerqueue_init(&timer->node); timer->enabled = 0; timer->func = f; timer->rtc = rtc; } /* rtc_timer_start - Sets an rtc_timer to fire in the future * @ rtc: rtc device to be used * @ timer: timer being set * @ expires: time at which to expire the timer * @ period: period that the timer will recur * * Kernel interface to set an rtc_timer */ int rtc_timer_start(struct rtc_device *rtc, struct rtc_timer *timer, ktime_t expires, ktime_t period) { int ret = 0; mutex_lock(&rtc->ops_lock); if (timer->enabled) rtc_timer_remove(rtc, timer); timer->node.expires = expires; timer->period = period; ret = rtc_timer_enqueue(rtc, timer); mutex_unlock(&rtc->ops_lock); return ret; } /* rtc_timer_cancel - Stops an rtc_timer * @ rtc: rtc device to be used * @ timer: timer being set * * Kernel interface to cancel an rtc_timer */ void rtc_timer_cancel(struct rtc_device *rtc, struct rtc_timer *timer) { mutex_lock(&rtc->ops_lock); if (timer->enabled) rtc_timer_remove(rtc, timer); mutex_unlock(&rtc->ops_lock); } /** * rtc_read_offset - Read the amount of rtc offset in parts per billion * @rtc: rtc device to be used * @offset: the offset in parts per billion * * see below for details. * * Kernel interface to read rtc clock offset * Returns 0 on success, or a negative number on error. * If read_offset() is not implemented for the rtc, return -EINVAL */ int rtc_read_offset(struct rtc_device *rtc, long *offset) { int ret; if (!rtc->ops) return -ENODEV; if (!rtc->ops->read_offset) return -EINVAL; mutex_lock(&rtc->ops_lock); ret = rtc->ops->read_offset(rtc->dev.parent, offset); mutex_unlock(&rtc->ops_lock); trace_rtc_read_offset(*offset, ret); return ret; } /** * rtc_set_offset - Adjusts the duration of the average second * @rtc: rtc device to be used * @offset: the offset in parts per billion * * Some rtc's allow an adjustment to the average duration of a second * to compensate for differences in the actual clock rate due to temperature, * the crystal, capacitor, etc. * * The adjustment applied is as follows: * t = t0 * (1 + offset * 1e-9) * where t0 is the measured length of 1 RTC second with offset = 0 * * Kernel interface to adjust an rtc clock offset. * Return 0 on success, or a negative number on error. * If the rtc offset is not setable (or not implemented), return -EINVAL */ int rtc_set_offset(struct rtc_device *rtc, long offset) { int ret; if (!rtc->ops) return -ENODEV; if (!rtc->ops->set_offset) return -EINVAL; mutex_lock(&rtc->ops_lock); ret = rtc->ops->set_offset(rtc->dev.parent, offset); mutex_unlock(&rtc->ops_lock); trace_rtc_set_offset(offset, ret); return ret; }
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #undef TRACE_SYSTEM #define TRACE_SYSTEM io_uring #if !defined(_TRACE_IO_URING_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ) #define _TRACE_IO_URING_H #include <linux/tracepoint.h> struct io_wq_work; /** * io_uring_create - called after a new io_uring context was prepared * * @fd: corresponding file descriptor * @ctx: pointer to a ring context structure * @sq_entries: actual SQ size * @cq_entries: actual CQ size * @flags: SQ ring flags, provided to io_uring_setup(2) * * Allows to trace io_uring creation and provide pointer to a context, that can * be used later to find correlated events. */ TRACE_EVENT(io_uring_create, TP_PROTO(int fd, void *ctx, u32 sq_entries, u32 cq_entries, u32 flags), TP_ARGS(fd, ctx, sq_entries, cq_entries, flags), TP_STRUCT__entry ( __field( int, fd ) __field( void *, ctx ) __field( u32, sq_entries ) __field( u32, cq_entries ) __field( u32, flags ) ), TP_fast_assign( __entry->fd = fd; __entry->ctx = ctx; __entry->sq_entries = sq_entries; __entry->cq_entries = cq_entries; __entry->flags = flags; ), TP_printk("ring %p, fd %d sq size %d, cq size %d, flags %d", __entry->ctx, __entry->fd, __entry->sq_entries, __entry->cq_entries, __entry->flags) ); /** * io_uring_register - called after a buffer/file/eventfd was succesfully * registered for a ring * * @ctx: pointer to a ring context structure * @opcode: describes which operation to perform * @nr_user_files: number of registered files * @nr_user_bufs: number of registered buffers * @cq_ev_fd: whether eventfs registered or not * @ret: return code * * Allows to trace fixed files/buffers/eventfds, that could be registered to * avoid an overhead of getting references to them for every operation. This * event, together with io_uring_file_get, can provide a full picture of how * much overhead one can reduce via fixing. */ TRACE_EVENT(io_uring_register, TP_PROTO(void *ctx, unsigned opcode, unsigned nr_files, unsigned nr_bufs, bool eventfd, long ret), TP_ARGS(ctx, opcode, nr_files, nr_bufs, eventfd, ret), TP_STRUCT__entry ( __field( void *, ctx ) __field( unsigned, opcode ) __field( unsigned, nr_files ) __field( unsigned, nr_bufs ) __field( bool, eventfd ) __field( long, ret ) ), TP_fast_assign( __entry->ctx = ctx; __entry->opcode = opcode; __entry->nr_files = nr_files; __entry->nr_bufs = nr_bufs; __entry->eventfd = eventfd; __entry->ret = ret; ), TP_printk("ring %p, opcode %d, nr_user_files %d, nr_user_bufs %d, " "eventfd %d, ret %ld", __entry->ctx, __entry->opcode, __entry->nr_files, __entry->nr_bufs, __entry->eventfd, __entry->ret) ); /** * io_uring_file_get - called before getting references to an SQE file * * @ctx: pointer to a ring context structure * @fd: SQE file descriptor * * Allows to trace out how often an SQE file reference is obtained, which can * help figuring out if it makes sense to use fixed files, or check that fixed * files are used correctly. */ TRACE_EVENT(io_uring_file_get, TP_PROTO(void *ctx, int fd), TP_ARGS(ctx, fd), TP_STRUCT__entry ( __field( void *, ctx ) __field( int, fd ) ), TP_fast_assign( __entry->ctx = ctx; __entry->fd = fd; ), TP_printk("ring %p, fd %d", __entry->ctx, __entry->fd) ); /** * io_uring_queue_async_work - called before submitting a new async work * * @ctx: pointer to a ring context structure * @hashed: type of workqueue, hashed or normal * @req: pointer to a submitted request * @work: pointer to a submitted io_wq_work * * Allows to trace asynchronous work submission. */ TRACE_EVENT(io_uring_queue_async_work, TP_PROTO(void *ctx, int rw, void * req, struct io_wq_work *work, unsigned int flags), TP_ARGS(ctx, rw, req, work, flags), TP_STRUCT__entry ( __field( void *, ctx ) __field( int, rw ) __field( void *, req ) __field( struct io_wq_work *, work ) __field( unsigned int, flags ) ), TP_fast_assign( __entry->ctx = ctx; __entry->rw = rw; __entry->req = req; __entry->work = work; __entry->flags = flags; ), TP_printk("ring %p, request %p, flags %d, %s queue, work %p", __entry->ctx, __entry->req, __entry->flags, __entry->rw ? "hashed" : "normal", __entry->work) ); /** * io_uring_defer - called when an io_uring request is deferred * * @ctx: pointer to a ring context structure * @req: pointer to a deferred request * @user_data: user data associated with the request * * Allows to track deferred requests, to get an insight about what requests are * not started immediately. */ TRACE_EVENT(io_uring_defer, TP_PROTO(void *ctx, void *req, unsigned long long user_data), TP_ARGS(ctx, req, user_data), TP_STRUCT__entry ( __field( void *, ctx ) __field( void *, req ) __field( unsigned long long, data ) ), TP_fast_assign( __entry->ctx = ctx; __entry->req = req; __entry->data = user_data; ), TP_printk("ring %p, request %p user_data %llu", __entry->ctx, __entry->req, __entry->data) ); /** * io_uring_link - called before the io_uring request added into link_list of * another request * * @ctx: pointer to a ring context structure * @req: pointer to a linked request * @target_req: pointer to a previous request, that would contain @req * * Allows to track linked requests, to understand dependencies between requests * and how does it influence their execution flow. */ TRACE_EVENT(io_uring_link, TP_PROTO(void *ctx, void *req, void *target_req), TP_ARGS(ctx, req, target_req), TP_STRUCT__entry ( __field( void *, ctx ) __field( void *, req ) __field( void *, target_req ) ), TP_fast_assign( __entry->ctx = ctx; __entry->req = req; __entry->target_req = target_req; ), TP_printk("ring %p, request %p linked after %p", __entry->ctx, __entry->req, __entry->target_req) ); /** * io_uring_cqring_wait - called before start waiting for an available CQE * * @ctx: pointer to a ring context structure * @min_events: minimal number of events to wait for * * Allows to track waiting for CQE, so that we can e.g. troubleshoot * situations, when an application wants to wait for an event, that never * comes. */ TRACE_EVENT(io_uring_cqring_wait, TP_PROTO(void *ctx, int min_events), TP_ARGS(ctx, min_events), TP_STRUCT__entry ( __field( void *, ctx ) __field( int, min_events ) ), TP_fast_assign( __entry->ctx = ctx; __entry->min_events = min_events; ), TP_printk("ring %p, min_events %d", __entry->ctx, __entry->min_events) ); /** * io_uring_fail_link - called before failing a linked request * * @req: request, which links were cancelled * @link: cancelled link * * Allows to track linked requests cancellation, to see not only that some work * was cancelled, but also which request was the reason. */ TRACE_EVENT(io_uring_fail_link, TP_PROTO(void *req, void *link), TP_ARGS(req, link), TP_STRUCT__entry ( __field( void *, req ) __field( void *, link ) ), TP_fast_assign( __entry->req = req; __entry->link = link; ), TP_printk("request %p, link %p", __entry->req, __entry->link) ); /** * io_uring_complete - called when completing an SQE * * @ctx: pointer to a ring context structure * @user_data: user data associated with the request * @res: result of the request * */ TRACE_EVENT(io_uring_complete, TP_PROTO(void *ctx, u64 user_data, long res), TP_ARGS(ctx, user_data, res), TP_STRUCT__entry ( __field( void *, ctx ) __field( u64, user_data ) __field( long, res ) ), TP_fast_assign( __entry->ctx = ctx; __entry->user_data = user_data; __entry->res = res; ), TP_printk("ring %p, user_data 0x%llx, result %ld", __entry->ctx, (unsigned long long)__entry->user_data, __entry->res) ); /** * io_uring_submit_sqe - called before submitting one SQE * * @ctx: pointer to a ring context structure * @opcode: opcode of request * @user_data: user data associated with the request * @force_nonblock: whether a context blocking or not * @sq_thread: true if sq_thread has submitted this SQE * * Allows to track SQE submitting, to understand what was the source of it, SQ * thread or io_uring_enter call. */ TRACE_EVENT(io_uring_submit_sqe, TP_PROTO(void *ctx, u8 opcode, u64 user_data, bool force_nonblock, bool sq_thread), TP_ARGS(ctx, opcode, user_data, force_nonblock, sq_thread), TP_STRUCT__entry ( __field( void *, ctx ) __field( u8, opcode ) __field( u64, user_data ) __field( bool, force_nonblock ) __field( bool, sq_thread ) ), TP_fast_assign( __entry->ctx = ctx; __entry->opcode = opcode; __entry->user_data = user_data; __entry->force_nonblock = force_nonblock; __entry->sq_thread = sq_thread; ), TP_printk("ring %p, op %d, data 0x%llx, non block %d, sq_thread %d", __entry->ctx, __entry->opcode, (unsigned long long) __entry->user_data, __entry->force_nonblock, __entry->sq_thread) ); TRACE_EVENT(io_uring_poll_arm, TP_PROTO(void *ctx, u8 opcode, u64 user_data, int mask, int events), TP_ARGS(ctx, opcode, user_data, mask, events), TP_STRUCT__entry ( __field( void *, ctx ) __field( u8, opcode ) __field( u64, user_data ) __field( int, mask ) __field( int, events ) ), TP_fast_assign( __entry->ctx = ctx; __entry->opcode = opcode; __entry->user_data = user_data; __entry->mask = mask; __entry->events = events; ), TP_printk("ring %p, op %d, data 0x%llx, mask 0x%x, events 0x%x", __entry->ctx, __entry->opcode, (unsigned long long) __entry->user_data, __entry->mask, __entry->events) ); TRACE_EVENT(io_uring_poll_wake, TP_PROTO(void *ctx, u8 opcode, u64 user_data, int mask), TP_ARGS(ctx, opcode, user_data, mask), TP_STRUCT__entry ( __field( void *, ctx ) __field( u8, opcode ) __field( u64, user_data ) __field( int, mask ) ), TP_fast_assign( __entry->ctx = ctx; __entry->opcode = opcode; __entry->user_data = user_data; __entry->mask = mask; ), TP_printk("ring %p, op %d, data 0x%llx, mask 0x%x", __entry->ctx, __entry->opcode, (unsigned long long) __entry->user_data, __entry->mask) ); TRACE_EVENT(io_uring_task_add, TP_PROTO(void *ctx, u8 opcode, u64 user_data, int mask), TP_ARGS(ctx, opcode, user_data, mask), TP_STRUCT__entry ( __field( void *, ctx ) __field( u8, opcode ) __field( u64, user_data ) __field( int, mask ) ), TP_fast_assign( __entry->ctx = ctx; __entry->opcode = opcode; __entry->user_data = user_data; __entry->mask = mask; ), TP_printk("ring %p, op %d, data 0x%llx, mask %x", __entry->ctx, __entry->opcode, (unsigned long long) __entry->user_data, __entry->mask) ); TRACE_EVENT(io_uring_task_run, TP_PROTO(void *ctx, u8 opcode, u64 user_data), TP_ARGS(ctx, opcode, user_data), TP_STRUCT__entry ( __field( void *, ctx ) __field( u8, opcode ) __field( u64, user_data ) ), TP_fast_assign( __entry->ctx = ctx; __entry->opcode = opcode; __entry->user_data = user_data; ), TP_printk("ring %p, op %d, data 0x%llx", __entry->ctx, __entry->opcode, (unsigned long long) __entry->user_data) ); #endif /* _TRACE_IO_URING_H */ /* This part must be outside protection */ #include <trace/define_trace.h>
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SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef _LINUX_MM_H #define _LINUX_MM_H #include <linux/errno.h> #ifdef __KERNEL__ #include <linux/mmdebug.h> #include <linux/gfp.h> #include <linux/bug.h> #include <linux/list.h> #include <linux/mmzone.h> #include <linux/rbtree.h> #include <linux/atomic.h> #include <linux/debug_locks.h> #include <linux/mm_types.h> #include <linux/mmap_lock.h> #include <linux/range.h> #include <linux/pfn.h> #include <linux/percpu-refcount.h> #include <linux/bit_spinlock.h> #include <linux/shrinker.h> #include <linux/resource.h> #include <linux/page_ext.h> #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/page-flags.h> #include <linux/page_ref.h> #include <linux/memremap.h> #include <linux/overflow.h> #include <linux/sizes.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/pgtable.h> struct mempolicy; struct anon_vma; struct anon_vma_chain; struct file_ra_state; struct user_struct; struct writeback_control; struct bdi_writeback; struct pt_regs; extern int sysctl_page_lock_unfairness; void init_mm_internals(void); #ifndef CONFIG_NEED_MULTIPLE_NODES /* Don't use mapnrs, do it properly */ extern unsigned long max_mapnr; static inline void set_max_mapnr(unsigned long limit) { max_mapnr = limit; } #else static inline void set_max_mapnr(unsigned long limit) { } #endif extern atomic_long_t _totalram_pages; static inline unsigned long totalram_pages(void) { return (unsigned long)atomic_long_read(&_totalram_pages); } static inline void totalram_pages_inc(void) { atomic_long_inc(&_totalram_pages); } static inline void totalram_pages_dec(void) { atomic_long_dec(&_totalram_pages); } static inline void totalram_pages_add(long count) { atomic_long_add(count, &_totalram_pages); } extern void * high_memory; extern int page_cluster; #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL extern int sysctl_legacy_va_layout; #else #define sysctl_legacy_va_layout 0 #endif #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS extern const int mmap_rnd_bits_min; extern const int mmap_rnd_bits_max; extern int mmap_rnd_bits __read_mostly; #endif #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS extern const int mmap_rnd_compat_bits_min; extern const int mmap_rnd_compat_bits_max; extern int mmap_rnd_compat_bits __read_mostly; #endif #include <asm/page.h> #include <asm/processor.h> /* * Architectures that support memory tagging (assigning tags to memory regions, * embedding these tags into addresses that point to these memory regions, and * checking that the memory and the pointer tags match on memory accesses) * redefine this macro to strip tags from pointers. * It's defined as noop for arcitectures that don't support memory tagging. */ #ifndef untagged_addr #define untagged_addr(addr) (addr) #endif #ifndef __pa_symbol #define __pa_symbol(x) __pa(RELOC_HIDE((unsigned long)(x), 0)) #endif #ifndef page_to_virt #define page_to_virt(x) __va(PFN_PHYS(page_to_pfn(x))) #endif #ifndef lm_alias #define lm_alias(x) __va(__pa_symbol(x)) #endif /* * To prevent common memory management code establishing * a zero page mapping on a read fault. * This macro should be defined within <asm/pgtable.h>. * s390 does this to prevent multiplexing of hardware bits * related to the physical page in case of virtualization. */ #ifndef mm_forbids_zeropage #define mm_forbids_zeropage(X) (0) #endif /* * On some architectures it is expensive to call memset() for small sizes. * If an architecture decides to implement their own version of * mm_zero_struct_page they should wrap the defines below in a #ifndef and * define their own version of this macro in <asm/pgtable.h> */ #if BITS_PER_LONG == 64 /* This function must be updated when the size of struct page grows above 80 * or reduces below 56. The idea that compiler optimizes out switch() * statement, and only leaves move/store instructions. Also the compiler can * combine write statments if they are both assignments and can be reordered, * this can result in several of the writes here being dropped. */ #define mm_zero_struct_page(pp) __mm_zero_struct_page(pp) static inline void __mm_zero_struct_page(struct page *page) { unsigned long *_pp = (void *)page; /* Check that struct page is either 56, 64, 72, or 80 bytes */ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct page) & 7); BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct page) < 56); BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct page) > 80); switch (sizeof(struct page)) { case 80: _pp[9] = 0; fallthrough; case 72: _pp[8] = 0; fallthrough; case 64: _pp[7] = 0; fallthrough; case 56: _pp[6] = 0; _pp[5] = 0; _pp[4] = 0; _pp[3] = 0; _pp[2] = 0; _pp[1] = 0; _pp[0] = 0; } } #else #define mm_zero_struct_page(pp) ((void)memset((pp), 0, sizeof(struct page))) #endif /* * Default maximum number of active map areas, this limits the number of vmas * per mm struct. Users can overwrite this number by sysctl but there is a * problem. * * When a program's coredump is generated as ELF format, a section is created * per a vma. In ELF, the number of sections is represented in unsigned short. * This means the number of sections should be smaller than 65535 at coredump. * Because the kernel adds some informative sections to a image of program at * generating coredump, we need some margin. The number of extra sections is * 1-3 now and depends on arch. We use "5" as safe margin, here. * * ELF extended numbering allows more than 65535 sections, so 16-bit bound is * not a hard limit any more. Although some userspace tools can be surprised by * that. */ #define MAPCOUNT_ELF_CORE_MARGIN (5) #define DEFAULT_MAX_MAP_COUNT (USHRT_MAX - MAPCOUNT_ELF_CORE_MARGIN) extern int sysctl_max_map_count; extern unsigned long sysctl_user_reserve_kbytes; extern unsigned long sysctl_admin_reserve_kbytes; extern int sysctl_overcommit_memory; extern int sysctl_overcommit_ratio; extern unsigned long sysctl_overcommit_kbytes; int overcommit_ratio_handler(struct ctl_table *, int, void *, size_t *, loff_t *); int overcommit_kbytes_handler(struct ctl_table *, int, void *, size_t *, loff_t *); int overcommit_policy_handler(struct ctl_table *, int, void *, size_t *, loff_t *); #define nth_page(page,n) pfn_to_page(page_to_pfn((page)) + (n)) /* to align the pointer to the (next) page boundary */ #define PAGE_ALIGN(addr) ALIGN(addr, PAGE_SIZE) /* test whether an address (unsigned long or pointer) is aligned to PAGE_SIZE */ #define PAGE_ALIGNED(addr) IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)(addr), PAGE_SIZE) #define lru_to_page(head) (list_entry((head)->prev, struct page, lru)) /* * Linux kernel virtual memory manager primitives. * The idea being to have a "virtual" mm in the same way * we have a virtual fs - giving a cleaner interface to the * mm details, and allowing different kinds of memory mappings * (from shared memory to executable loading to arbitrary * mmap() functions). */ struct vm_area_struct *vm_area_alloc(struct mm_struct *); struct vm_area_struct *vm_area_dup(struct vm_area_struct *); void vm_area_free(struct vm_area_struct *); #ifndef CONFIG_MMU extern struct rb_root nommu_region_tree; extern struct rw_semaphore nommu_region_sem; extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp); #endif /* * vm_flags in vm_area_struct, see mm_types.h. * When changing, update also include/trace/events/mmflags.h */ #define VM_NONE 0x00000000 #define VM_READ 0x00000001 /* currently active flags */ #define VM_WRITE 0x00000002 #define VM_EXEC 0x00000004 #define VM_SHARED 0x00000008 /* mprotect() hardcodes VM_MAYREAD >> 4 == VM_READ, and so for r/w/x bits. */ #define VM_MAYREAD 0x00000010 /* limits for mprotect() etc */ #define VM_MAYWRITE 0x00000020 #define VM_MAYEXEC 0x00000040 #define VM_MAYSHARE 0x00000080 #define VM_GROWSDOWN 0x00000100 /* general info on the segment */ #define VM_UFFD_MISSING 0x00000200 /* missing pages tracking */ #define VM_PFNMAP 0x00000400 /* Page-ranges managed without "struct page", just pure PFN */ #define VM_DENYWRITE 0x00000800 /* ETXTBSY on write attempts.. */ #define VM_UFFD_WP 0x00001000 /* wrprotect pages tracking */ #define VM_LOCKED 0x00002000 #define VM_IO 0x00004000 /* Memory mapped I/O or similar */ /* Used by sys_madvise() */ #define VM_SEQ_READ 0x00008000 /* App will access data sequentially */ #define VM_RAND_READ 0x00010000 /* App will not benefit from clustered reads */ #define VM_DONTCOPY 0x00020000 /* Do not copy this vma on fork */ #define VM_DONTEXPAND 0x00040000 /* Cannot expand with mremap() */ #define VM_LOCKONFAULT 0x00080000 /* Lock the pages covered when they are faulted in */ #define VM_ACCOUNT 0x00100000 /* Is a VM accounted object */ #define VM_NORESERVE 0x00200000 /* should the VM suppress accounting */ #define VM_HUGETLB 0x00400000 /* Huge TLB Page VM */ #define VM_SYNC 0x00800000 /* Synchronous page faults */ #define VM_ARCH_1 0x01000000 /* Architecture-specific flag */ #define VM_WIPEONFORK 0x02000000 /* Wipe VMA contents in child. */ #define VM_DONTDUMP 0x04000000 /* Do not include in the core dump */ #ifdef CONFIG_MEM_SOFT_DIRTY # define VM_SOFTDIRTY 0x08000000 /* Not soft dirty clean area */ #else # define VM_SOFTDIRTY 0 #endif #define VM_MIXEDMAP 0x10000000 /* Can contain "struct page" and pure PFN pages */ #define VM_HUGEPAGE 0x20000000 /* MADV_HUGEPAGE marked this vma */ #define VM_NOHUGEPAGE 0x40000000 /* MADV_NOHUGEPAGE marked this vma */ #define VM_MERGEABLE 0x80000000 /* KSM may merge identical pages */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0 32 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */ #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_1 33 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */ #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2 34 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */ #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3 35 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */ #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4 36 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */ #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_0 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0) #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_1 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_1) #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_2 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2) #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_3 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3) #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_4 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4) #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS # define VM_PKEY_SHIFT VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0 # define VM_PKEY_BIT0 VM_HIGH_ARCH_0 /* A protection key is a 4-bit value */ # define VM_PKEY_BIT1 VM_HIGH_ARCH_1 /* on x86 and 5-bit value on ppc64 */ # define VM_PKEY_BIT2 VM_HIGH_ARCH_2 # define VM_PKEY_BIT3 VM_HIGH_ARCH_3 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC # define VM_PKEY_BIT4 VM_HIGH_ARCH_4 #else # define VM_PKEY_BIT4 0 #endif #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */ #if defined(CONFIG_X86) # define VM_PAT VM_ARCH_1 /* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */ #elif defined(CONFIG_PPC) # define VM_SAO VM_ARCH_1 /* Strong Access Ordering (powerpc) */ #elif defined(CONFIG_PARISC) # define VM_GROWSUP VM_ARCH_1 #elif defined(CONFIG_IA64) # define VM_GROWSUP VM_ARCH_1 #elif defined(CONFIG_SPARC64) # define VM_SPARC_ADI VM_ARCH_1 /* Uses ADI tag for access control */ # define VM_ARCH_CLEAR VM_SPARC_ADI #elif defined(CONFIG_ARM64) # define VM_ARM64_BTI VM_ARCH_1 /* BTI guarded page, a.k.a. GP bit */ # define VM_ARCH_CLEAR VM_ARM64_BTI #elif !defined(CONFIG_MMU) # define VM_MAPPED_COPY VM_ARCH_1 /* T if mapped copy of data (nommu mmap) */ #endif #if defined(CONFIG_ARM64_MTE) # define VM_MTE VM_HIGH_ARCH_0 /* Use Tagged memory for access control */ # define VM_MTE_ALLOWED VM_HIGH_ARCH_1 /* Tagged memory permitted */ #else # define VM_MTE VM_NONE # define VM_MTE_ALLOWED VM_NONE #endif #ifndef VM_GROWSUP # define VM_GROWSUP VM_NONE #endif /* Bits set in the VMA until the stack is in its final location */ #define VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP (VM_RAND_READ | VM_SEQ_READ) #define TASK_EXEC ((current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) ? VM_EXEC : 0) /* Common data flag combinations */ #define VM_DATA_FLAGS_TSK_EXEC (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | TASK_EXEC | \ VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC) #define VM_DATA_FLAGS_NON_EXEC (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_MAYREAD | \ VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC) #define VM_DATA_FLAGS_EXEC (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \ VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC) #ifndef VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS /* arch can override this */ #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS VM_DATA_FLAGS_EXEC #endif #ifndef VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS /* arch can override this */ #define VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS #endif #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP #define VM_STACK VM_GROWSUP #else #define VM_STACK VM_GROWSDOWN #endif #define VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_STACK | VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS | VM_ACCOUNT) /* VMA basic access permission flags */ #define VM_ACCESS_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC) /* * Special vmas that are non-mergable, non-mlock()able. */ #define VM_SPECIAL (VM_IO | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_PFNMAP | VM_MIXEDMAP) /* This mask prevents VMA from being scanned with khugepaged */ #define VM_NO_KHUGEPAGED (VM_SPECIAL | VM_HUGETLB) /* This mask defines which mm->def_flags a process can inherit its parent */ #define VM_INIT_DEF_MASK VM_NOHUGEPAGE /* This mask is used to clear all the VMA flags used by mlock */ #define VM_LOCKED_CLEAR_MASK (~(VM_LOCKED | VM_LOCKONFAULT)) /* Arch-specific flags to clear when updating VM flags on protection change */ #ifndef VM_ARCH_CLEAR # define VM_ARCH_CLEAR VM_NONE #endif #define VM_FLAGS_CLEAR (ARCH_VM_PKEY_FLAGS | VM_ARCH_CLEAR) /* * mapping from the currently active vm_flags protection bits (the * low four bits) to a page protection mask.. */ extern pgprot_t protection_map[16]; /** * Fault flag definitions. * * @FAULT_FLAG_WRITE: Fault was a write fault. * @FAULT_FLAG_MKWRITE: Fault was mkwrite of existing PTE. * @FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY: Allow to retry the fault if blocked. * @FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT: Don't drop mmap_lock and wait when retrying. * @FAULT_FLAG_KILLABLE: The fault task is in SIGKILL killable region. * @FAULT_FLAG_TRIED: The fault has been tried once. * @FAULT_FLAG_USER: The fault originated in userspace. * @FAULT_FLAG_REMOTE: The fault is not for current task/mm. * @FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION: The fault was during an instruction fetch. * @FAULT_FLAG_INTERRUPTIBLE: The fault can be interrupted by non-fatal signals. * * About @FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY and @FAULT_FLAG_TRIED: we can specify * whether we would allow page faults to retry by specifying these two * fault flags correctly. Currently there can be three legal combinations: * * (a) ALLOW_RETRY and !TRIED: this means the page fault allows retry, and * this is the first try * * (b) ALLOW_RETRY and TRIED: this means the page fault allows retry, and * we've already tried at least once * * (c) !ALLOW_RETRY and !TRIED: this means the page fault does not allow retry * * The unlisted combination (!ALLOW_RETRY && TRIED) is illegal and should never * be used. Note that page faults can be allowed to retry for multiple times, * in which case we'll have an initial fault with flags (a) then later on * continuous faults with flags (b). We should always try to detect pending * signals before a retry to make sure the continuous page faults can still be * interrupted if necessary. */ #define FAULT_FLAG_WRITE 0x01 #define FAULT_FLAG_MKWRITE 0x02 #define FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY 0x04 #define FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT 0x08 #define FAULT_FLAG_KILLABLE 0x10 #define FAULT_FLAG_TRIED 0x20 #define FAULT_FLAG_USER 0x40 #define FAULT_FLAG_REMOTE 0x80 #define FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION 0x100 #define FAULT_FLAG_INTERRUPTIBLE 0x200 /* * The default fault flags that should be used by most of the * arch-specific page fault handlers. */ #define FAULT_FLAG_DEFAULT (FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY | \ FAULT_FLAG_KILLABLE | \ FAULT_FLAG_INTERRUPTIBLE) /** * fault_flag_allow_retry_first - check ALLOW_RETRY the first time * * This is mostly used for places where we want to try to avoid taking * the mmap_lock for too long a time when waiting for another condition * to change, in which case we can try to be polite to release the * mmap_lock in the first round to avoid potential starvation of other * processes that would also want the mmap_lock. * * Return: true if the page fault allows retry and this is the first * attempt of the fault handling; false otherwise. */ static inline bool fault_flag_allow_retry_first(unsigned int flags) { return (flags & FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY) && (!(flags & FAULT_FLAG_TRIED)); } #define FAULT_FLAG_TRACE \ { FAULT_FLAG_WRITE, "WRITE" }, \ { FAULT_FLAG_MKWRITE, "MKWRITE" }, \ { FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY, "ALLOW_RETRY" }, \ { FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT, "RETRY_NOWAIT" }, \ { FAULT_FLAG_KILLABLE, "KILLABLE" }, \ { FAULT_FLAG_TRIED, "TRIED" }, \ { FAULT_FLAG_USER, "USER" }, \ { FAULT_FLAG_REMOTE, "REMOTE" }, \ { FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION, "INSTRUCTION" }, \ { FAULT_FLAG_INTERRUPTIBLE, "INTERRUPTIBLE" } /* * vm_fault is filled by the pagefault handler and passed to the vma's * ->fault function. The vma's ->fault is responsible for returning a bitmask * of VM_FAULT_xxx flags that give details about how the fault was handled. * * MM layer fills up gfp_mask for page allocations but fault handler might * alter it if its implementation requires a different allocation context. * * pgoff should be used in favour of virtual_address, if possible. */ struct vm_fault { struct vm_area_struct *vma; /* Target VMA */ unsigned int flags; /* FAULT_FLAG_xxx flags */ gfp_t gfp_mask; /* gfp mask to be used for allocations */ pgoff_t pgoff; /* Logical page offset based on vma */ unsigned long address; /* Faulting virtual address */ pmd_t *pmd; /* Pointer to pmd entry matching * the 'address' */ pud_t *pud; /* Pointer to pud entry matching * the 'address' */ pte_t orig_pte; /* Value of PTE at the time of fault */ struct page *cow_page; /* Page handler may use for COW fault */ struct page *page; /* ->fault handlers should return a * page here, unless VM_FAULT_NOPAGE * is set (which is also implied by * VM_FAULT_ERROR). */ /* These three entries are valid only while holding ptl lock */ pte_t *pte; /* Pointer to pte entry matching * the 'address'. NULL if the page * table hasn't been allocated. */ spinlock_t *ptl; /* Page table lock. * Protects pte page table if 'pte' * is not NULL, otherwise pmd. */ pgtable_t prealloc_pte; /* Pre-allocated pte page table. * vm_ops->map_pages() calls * alloc_set_pte() from atomic context. * do_fault_around() pre-allocates * page table to avoid allocation from * atomic context. */ }; /* page entry size for vm->huge_fault() */ enum page_entry_size { PE_SIZE_PTE = 0, PE_SIZE_PMD, PE_SIZE_PUD, }; /* * These are the virtual MM functions - opening of an area, closing and * unmapping it (needed to keep files on disk up-to-date etc), pointer * to the functions called when a no-page or a wp-page exception occurs. */ struct vm_operations_struct { void (*open)(struct vm_area_struct * area); void (*close)(struct vm_area_struct * area); int (*split)(struct vm_area_struct * area, unsigned long addr); int (*mremap)(struct vm_area_struct * area); vm_fault_t (*fault)(struct vm_fault *vmf); vm_fault_t (*huge_fault)(struct vm_fault *vmf, enum page_entry_size pe_size); void (*map_pages)(struct vm_fault *vmf, pgoff_t start_pgoff, pgoff_t end_pgoff); unsigned long (*pagesize)(struct vm_area_struct * area); /* notification that a previously read-only page is about to become * writable, if an error is returned it will cause a SIGBUS */ vm_fault_t (*page_mkwrite)(struct vm_fault *vmf); /* same as page_mkwrite when using VM_PFNMAP|VM_MIXEDMAP */ vm_fault_t (*pfn_mkwrite)(struct vm_fault *vmf); /* called by access_process_vm when get_user_pages() fails, typically * for use by special VMAs that can switch between memory and hardware */ int (*access)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, void *buf, int len, int write); /* Called by the /proc/PID/maps code to ask the vma whether it * has a special name. Returning non-NULL will also cause this * vma to be dumped unconditionally. */ const char *(*name)(struct vm_area_struct *vma); #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA /* * set_policy() op must add a reference to any non-NULL @new mempolicy * to hold the policy upon return. Caller should pass NULL @new to * remove a policy and fall back to surrounding context--i.e. do not * install a MPOL_DEFAULT policy, nor the task or system default * mempolicy. */ int (*set_policy)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct mempolicy *new); /* * get_policy() op must add reference [mpol_get()] to any policy at * (vma,addr) marked as MPOL_SHARED. The shared policy infrastructure * in mm/mempolicy.c will do this automatically. * get_policy() must NOT add a ref if the policy at (vma,addr) is not * marked as MPOL_SHARED. vma policies are protected by the mmap_lock. * If no [shared/vma] mempolicy exists at the addr, get_policy() op * must return NULL--i.e., do not "fallback" to task or system default * policy. */ struct mempolicy *(*get_policy)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr); #endif /* * Called by vm_normal_page() for special PTEs to find the * page for @addr. This is useful if the default behavior * (using pte_page()) would not find the correct page. */ struct page *(*find_special_page)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr); }; static inline void vma_init(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct mm_struct *mm) { static const struct vm_operations_struct dummy_vm_ops = {}; memset(vma, 0, sizeof(*vma)); vma->vm_mm = mm; vma->vm_ops = &dummy_vm_ops; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vma->anon_vma_chain); } static inline void vma_set_anonymous(struct vm_area_struct *vma) { vma->vm_ops = NULL; } static inline bool vma_is_anonymous(struct vm_area_struct *vma) { return !vma->vm_ops; } static inline bool vma_is_temporary_stack(struct vm_area_struct *vma) { int maybe_stack = vma->vm_flags & (VM_GROWSDOWN | VM_GROWSUP); if (!maybe_stack) return false; if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP) == VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP) return true; return false; } static inline bool vma_is_foreign(struct vm_area_struct *vma) { if (!current->mm) return true; if (current->mm != vma->vm_mm) return true; return false; } static inline bool vma_is_accessible(struct vm_area_struct *vma) { return vma->vm_flags & VM_ACCESS_FLAGS; } #ifdef CONFIG_SHMEM /* * The vma_is_shmem is not inline because it is used only by slow * paths in userfault. */ bool vma_is_shmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma); #else static inline bool vma_is_shmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma) { return false; } #endif int vma_is_stack_for_current(struct vm_area_struct *vma); /* flush_tlb_range() takes a vma, not a mm, and can care about flags */ #define TLB_FLUSH_VMA(mm,flags) { .vm_mm = (mm), .vm_flags = (flags) } struct mmu_gather; struct inode; #include <linux/huge_mm.h> /* * Methods to modify the page usage count. * * What counts for a page usage: * - cache mapping (page->mapping) * - private data (page->private) * - page mapped in a task's page tables, each mapping * is counted separately * * Also, many kernel routines increase the page count before a critical * routine so they can be sure the page doesn't go away from under them. */ /* * Drop a ref, return true if the refcount fell to zero (the page has no users) */ static inline int put_page_testzero(struct page *page) { VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_ref_count(page) == 0, page); return page_ref_dec_and_test(page); } /* * Try to grab a ref unless the page has a refcount of zero, return false if * that is the case. * This can be called when MMU is off so it must not access * any of the virtual mappings. */ static inline int get_page_unless_zero(struct page *page) { return page_ref_add_unless(page, 1, 0); } extern int page_is_ram(unsigned long pfn); enum { REGION_INTERSECTS, REGION_DISJOINT, REGION_MIXED, }; int region_intersects(resource_size_t offset, size_t size, unsigned long flags, unsigned long desc); /* Support for virtually mapped pages */ struct page *vmalloc_to_page(const void *addr); unsigned long vmalloc_to_pfn(const void *addr); /* * Determine if an address is within the vmalloc range * * On nommu, vmalloc/vfree wrap through kmalloc/kfree directly, so there * is no special casing required. */ #ifndef is_ioremap_addr #define is_ioremap_addr(x) is_vmalloc_addr(x) #endif #ifdef CONFIG_MMU extern bool is_vmalloc_addr(const void *x); extern int is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(const void *x); #else static inline bool is_vmalloc_addr(const void *x) { return false; } static inline int is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(const void *x) { return 0; } #endif extern void *kvmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node); static inline void *kvmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) { return kvmalloc_node(size, flags, NUMA_NO_NODE); } static inline void *kvzalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) { return kvmalloc_node(size, flags | __GFP_ZERO, node); } static inline void *kvzalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) { return kvmalloc(size, flags | __GFP_ZERO); } static inline void *kvmalloc_array(size_t n, size_t size, gfp_t flags) { size_t bytes; if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(n, size, &bytes))) return NULL; return kvmalloc(bytes, flags); } static inline void *kvcalloc(size_t n, size_t size, gfp_t flags) { return kvmalloc_array(n, size, flags | __GFP_ZERO); } extern void kvfree(const void *addr); extern void kvfree_sensitive(const void *addr, size_t len); static inline int head_compound_mapcount(struct page *head) { return atomic_read(compound_mapcount_ptr(head)) + 1; } /* * Mapcount of compound page as a whole, does not include mapped sub-pages. * * Must be called only for compound pages or any their tail sub-pages. */ static inline int compound_mapcount(struct page *page) { VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageCompound(page), page); page = compound_head(page); return head_compound_mapcount(page); } /* * The atomic page->_mapcount, starts from -1: so that transitions * both from it and to it can be tracked, using atomic_inc_and_test * and atomic_add_negative(-1). */ static inline void page_mapcount_reset(struct page *page) { atomic_set(&(page)->_mapcount, -1); } int __page_mapcount(struct page *page); /* * Mapcount of 0-order page; when compound sub-page, includes * compound_mapcount(). * * Result is undefined for pages which cannot be mapped into userspace. * For example SLAB or special types of pages. See function page_has_type(). * They use this place in struct page differently. */ static inline int page_mapcount(struct page *page) { if (unlikely(PageCompound(page))) return __page_mapcount(page); return atomic_read(&page->_mapcount) + 1; } #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE int total_mapcount(struct page *page); int page_trans_huge_mapcount(struct page *page, int *total_mapcount); #else static inline int total_mapcount(struct page *page) { return page_mapcount(page); } static inline int page_trans_huge_mapcount(struct page *page, int *total_mapcount) { int mapcount = page_mapcount(page); if (total_mapcount) *total_mapcount = mapcount; return mapcount; } #endif static inline struct page *virt_to_head_page(const void *x) { struct page *page = virt_to_page(x); return compound_head(page); } void __put_page(struct page *page); void put_pages_list(struct list_head *pages); void split_page(struct page *page, unsigned int order); /* * Compound pages have a destructor function. Provide a * prototype for that function and accessor functions. * These are _only_ valid on the head of a compound page. */ typedef void compound_page_dtor(struct page *); /* Keep the enum in sync with compound_page_dtors array in mm/page_alloc.c */ enum compound_dtor_id { NULL_COMPOUND_DTOR, COMPOUND_PAGE_DTOR, #ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE HUGETLB_PAGE_DTOR, #endif #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE TRANSHUGE_PAGE_DTOR, #endif NR_COMPOUND_DTORS, }; extern compound_page_dtor * const compound_page_dtors[NR_COMPOUND_DTORS]; static inline void set_compound_page_dtor(struct page *page, enum compound_dtor_id compound_dtor) { VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(compound_dtor >= NR_COMPOUND_DTORS, page); page[1].compound_dtor = compound_dtor; } static inline void destroy_compound_page(struct page *page) { VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page[1].compound_dtor >= NR_COMPOUND_DTORS, page); compound_page_dtors[page[1].compound_dtor](page); } static inline unsigned int compound_order(struct page *page) { if (!PageHead(page)) return 0; return page[1].compound_order; } static inline bool hpage_pincount_available(struct page *page) { /* * Can the page->hpage_pinned_refcount field be used? That field is in * the 3rd page of the compound page, so the smallest (2-page) compound * pages cannot support it. */ page = compound_head(page); return PageCompound(page) && compound_order(page) > 1; } static inline int head_compound_pincount(struct page *head) { return atomic_read(compound_pincount_ptr(head)); } static inline int compound_pincount(struct page *page) { VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!hpage_pincount_available(page), page); page = compound_head(page); return head_compound_pincount(page); } static inline void set_compound_order(struct page *page, unsigned int order) { page[1].compound_order = order; page[1].compound_nr = 1U << order; } /* Returns the number of pages in this potentially compound page. */ static inline unsigned long compound_nr(struct page *page) { if (!PageHead(page)) return 1; return page[1].compound_nr; } /* Returns the number of bytes in this potentially compound page. */ static inline unsigned long page_size(struct page *page) { return PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page); } /* Returns the number of bits needed for the number of bytes in a page */ static inline unsigned int page_shift(struct page *page) { return PAGE_SHIFT + compound_order(page); } void free_compound_page(struct page *page); #ifdef CONFIG_MMU /* * Do pte_mkwrite, but only if the vma says VM_WRITE. We do this when * servicing faults for write access. In the normal case, do always want * pte_mkwrite. But get_user_pages can cause write faults for mappings * that do not have writing enabled, when used by access_process_vm. */ static inline pte_t maybe_mkwrite(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma) { if (likely(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) pte = pte_mkwrite(pte); return pte; } vm_fault_t alloc_set_pte(struct vm_fault *vmf, struct page *page); vm_fault_t finish_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf); vm_fault_t finish_mkwrite_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf); #endif /* * Multiple processes may "see" the same page. E.g. for untouched * mappings of /dev/null, all processes see the same page full of * zeroes, and text pages of executables and shared libraries have * only one copy in memory, at most, normally. * * For the non-reserved pages, page_count(page) denotes a reference count. * page_count() == 0 means the page is free. page->lru is then used for * freelist management in the buddy allocator. * page_count() > 0 means the page has been allocated. * * Pages are allocated by the slab allocator in order to provide memory * to kmalloc and kmem_cache_alloc. In this case, the management of the * page, and the fields in 'struct page' are the responsibility of mm/slab.c * unless a particular usage is carefully commented. (the responsibility of * freeing the kmalloc memory is the caller's, of course). * * A page may be used by anyone else who does a __get_free_page(). * In this case, page_count still tracks the references, and should only * be used through the normal accessor functions. The top bits of page->flags * and page->virtual store page management information, but all other fields * are unused and could be used privately, carefully. The management of this * page is the responsibility of the one who allocated it, and those who have * subsequently been given references to it. * * The other pages (we may call them "pagecache pages") are completely * managed by the Linux memory manager: I/O, buffers, swapping etc. * The following discussion applies only to them. * * A pagecache page contains an opaque `private' member, which belongs to the * page's address_space. Usually, this is the address of a circular list of * the page's disk buffers. PG_private must be set to tell the VM to call * into the filesystem to release these pages. * * A page may belong to an inode's memory mapping. In this case, page->mapping * is the pointer to the inode, and page->index is the file offset of the page, * in units of PAGE_SIZE. * * If pagecache pages are not associated with an inode, they are said to be * anonymous pages. These may become associated with the swapcache, and in that * case PG_swapcache is set, and page->private is an offset into the swapcache. * * In either case (swapcache or inode backed), the pagecache itself holds one * reference to the page. Setting PG_private should also increment the * refcount. The each user mapping also has a reference to the page. * * The pagecache pages are stored in a per-mapping radix tree, which is * rooted at mapping->i_pages, and indexed by offset. * Where 2.4 and early 2.6 kernels kept dirty/clean pages in per-address_space * lists, we instead now tag pages as dirty/writeback in the radix tree. * * All pagecache pages may be subject to I/O: * - inode pages may need to be read from disk, * - inode pages which have been modified and are MAP_SHARED may need * to be written back to the inode on disk, * - anonymous pages (including MAP_PRIVATE file mappings) which have been * modified may need to be swapped out to swap space and (later) to be read * back into memory. */ /* * The zone field is never updated after free_area_init_core() * sets it, so none of the operations on it need to be atomic. */ /* Page flags: | [SECTION] | [NODE] | ZONE | [LAST_CPUPID] | ... | FLAGS | */ #define SECTIONS_PGOFF ((sizeof(unsigned long)*8) - SECTIONS_WIDTH) #define NODES_PGOFF (SECTIONS_PGOFF - NODES_WIDTH) #define ZONES_PGOFF (NODES_PGOFF - ZONES_WIDTH) #define LAST_CPUPID_PGOFF (ZONES_PGOFF - LAST_CPUPID_WIDTH) #define KASAN_TAG_PGOFF (LAST_CPUPID_PGOFF - KASAN_TAG_WIDTH) /* * Define the bit shifts to access each section. For non-existent * sections we define the shift as 0; that plus a 0 mask ensures * the compiler will optimise away reference to them. */ #define SECTIONS_PGSHIFT (SECTIONS_PGOFF * (SECTIONS_WIDTH != 0)) #define NODES_PGSHIFT (NODES_PGOFF * (NODES_WIDTH != 0)) #define ZONES_PGSHIFT (ZONES_PGOFF * (ZONES_WIDTH != 0)) #define LAST_CPUPID_PGSHIFT (LAST_CPUPID_PGOFF * (LAST_CPUPID_WIDTH != 0)) #define KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT (KASAN_TAG_PGOFF * (KASAN_TAG_WIDTH != 0)) /* NODE:ZONE or SECTION:ZONE is used to ID a zone for the buddy allocator */ #ifdef NODE_NOT_IN_PAGE_FLAGS #define ZONEID_SHIFT (SECTIONS_SHIFT + ZONES_SHIFT) #define ZONEID_PGOFF ((SECTIONS_PGOFF < ZONES_PGOFF)? \ SECTIONS_PGOFF : ZONES_PGOFF) #else #define ZONEID_SHIFT (NODES_SHIFT + ZONES_SHIFT) #define ZONEID_PGOFF ((NODES_PGOFF < ZONES_PGOFF)? \ NODES_PGOFF : ZONES_PGOFF) #endif #define ZONEID_PGSHIFT (ZONEID_PGOFF * (ZONEID_SHIFT != 0)) #define ZONES_MASK ((1UL << ZONES_WIDTH) - 1) #define NODES_MASK ((1UL << NODES_WIDTH) - 1) #define SECTIONS_MASK ((1UL << SECTIONS_WIDTH) - 1) #define LAST_CPUPID_MASK ((1UL << LAST_CPUPID_SHIFT) - 1) #define KASAN_TAG_MASK ((1UL << KASAN_TAG_WIDTH) - 1) #define ZONEID_MASK ((1UL << ZONEID_SHIFT) - 1) static inline enum zone_type page_zonenum(const struct page *page) { ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_BITS(page->flags, ZONES_MASK << ZONES_PGSHIFT); return (page->flags >> ZONES_PGSHIFT) & ZONES_MASK; } #ifdef CONFIG_ZONE_DEVICE static inline bool is_zone_device_page(const struct page *page) { return page_zonenum(page) == ZONE_DEVICE; } extern void memmap_init_zone_device(struct zone *, unsigned long, unsigned long, struct dev_pagemap *); #else static inline bool is_zone_device_page(const struct page *page) { return false; } #endif #ifdef CONFIG_DEV_PAGEMAP_OPS void free_devmap_managed_page(struct page *page); DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(devmap_managed_key); static inline bool page_is_devmap_managed(struct page *page) { if (!static_branch_unlikely(&devmap_managed_key)) return false; if (!is_zone_device_page(page)) return false; switch (page->pgmap->type) { case MEMORY_DEVICE_PRIVATE: case MEMORY_DEVICE_FS_DAX: return true; default: break; } return false; } void put_devmap_managed_page(struct page *page); #else /* CONFIG_DEV_PAGEMAP_OPS */ static inline bool page_is_devmap_managed(struct page *page) { return false; } static inline void put_devmap_managed_page(struct page *page) { } #endif /* CONFIG_DEV_PAGEMAP_OPS */ static inline bool is_device_private_page(const struct page *page) { return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEV_PAGEMAP_OPS) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEVICE_PRIVATE) && is_zone_device_page(page) && page->pgmap->type == MEMORY_DEVICE_PRIVATE; } static inline bool is_pci_p2pdma_page(const struct page *page) { return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEV_PAGEMAP_OPS) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PCI_P2PDMA) && is_zone_device_page(page) && page->pgmap->type == MEMORY_DEVICE_PCI_P2PDMA; } /* 127: arbitrary random number, small enough to assemble well */ #define page_ref_zero_or_close_to_overflow(page) \ ((unsigned int) page_ref_count(page) + 127u <= 127u) static inline void get_page(struct page *page) { page = compound_head(page); /* * Getting a normal page or the head of a compound page * requires to already have an elevated page->_refcount. */ VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_ref_zero_or_close_to_overflow(page), page); page_ref_inc(page); } bool __must_check try_grab_page(struct page *page, unsigned int flags); static inline __must_check bool try_get_page(struct page *page) { page = compound_head(page); if (WARN_ON_ONCE(page_ref_count(page) <= 0)) return false; page_ref_inc(page); return true; } static inline void put_page(struct page *page) { page = compound_head(page); /* * For devmap managed pages we need to catch refcount transition from * 2 to 1, when refcount reach one it means the page is free and we * need to inform the device driver through callback. See * include/linux/memremap.h and HMM for details. */ if (page_is_devmap_managed(page)) { put_devmap_managed_page(page); return; } if (put_page_testzero(page)) __put_page(page); } /* * GUP_PIN_COUNTING_BIAS, and the associated functions that use it, overload * the page's refcount so that two separate items are tracked: the original page * reference count, and also a new count of how many pin_user_pages() calls were * made against the page. ("gup-pinned" is another term for the latter). * * With this scheme, pin_user_pages() becomes special: such pages are marked as * distinct from normal pages. As such, the unpin_user_page() call (and its * variants) must be used in order to release gup-pinned pages. * * Choice of value: * * By making GUP_PIN_COUNTING_BIAS a power of two, debugging of page reference * counts with respect to pin_user_pages() and unpin_user_page() becomes * simpler, due to the fact that adding an even power of two to the page * refcount has the effect of using only the upper N bits, for the code that * counts up using the bias value. This means that the lower bits are left for * the exclusive use of the original code that increments and decrements by one * (or at least, by much smaller values than the bias value). * * Of course, once the lower bits overflow into the upper bits (and this is * OK, because subtraction recovers the original values), then visual inspection * no longer suffices to directly view the separate counts. However, for normal * applications that don't have huge page reference counts, this won't be an * issue. * * Locking: the lockless algorithm described in page_cache_get_speculative() * and page_cache_gup_pin_speculative() provides safe operation for * get_user_pages and page_mkclean and other calls that race to set up page * table entries. */ #define GUP_PIN_COUNTING_BIAS (1U << 10) void unpin_user_page(struct page *page); void unpin_user_pages_dirty_lock(struct page **pages, unsigned long npages, bool make_dirty); void unpin_user_pages(struct page **pages, unsigned long npages); /** * page_maybe_dma_pinned() - report if a page is pinned for DMA. * * This function checks if a page has been pinned via a call to * pin_user_pages*(). * * For non-huge pages, the return value is partially fuzzy: false is not fuzzy, * because it means "definitely not pinned for DMA", but true means "probably * pinned for DMA, but possibly a false positive due to having at least * GUP_PIN_COUNTING_BIAS worth of normal page references". * * False positives are OK, because: a) it's unlikely for a page to get that many * refcounts, and b) all the callers of this routine are expected to be able to * deal gracefully with a false positive. * * For huge pages, the result will be exactly correct. That's because we have * more tracking data available: the 3rd struct page in the compound page is * used to track the pincount (instead using of the GUP_PIN_COUNTING_BIAS * scheme). * * For more information, please see Documentation/core-api/pin_user_pages.rst. * * @page: pointer to page to be queried. * @Return: True, if it is likely that the page has been "dma-pinned". * False, if the page is definitely not dma-pinned. */ static inline bool page_maybe_dma_pinned(struct page *page) { if (hpage_pincount_available(page)) return compound_pincount(page) > 0; /* * page_ref_count() is signed. If that refcount overflows, then * page_ref_count() returns a negative value, and callers will avoid * further incrementing the refcount. * * Here, for that overflow case, use the signed bit to count a little * bit higher via unsigned math, and thus still get an accurate result. */ return ((unsigned int)page_ref_count(compound_head(page))) >= GUP_PIN_COUNTING_BIAS; } #if defined(CONFIG_SPARSEMEM) && !defined(CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP) #define SECTION_IN_PAGE_FLAGS #endif /* * The identification function is mainly used by the buddy allocator for * determining if two pages could be buddies. We are not really identifying * the zone since we could be using the section number id if we do not have * node id available in page flags. * We only guarantee that it will return the same value for two combinable * pages in a zone. */ static inline int page_zone_id(struct page *page) { return (page->flags >> ZONEID_PGSHIFT) & ZONEID_MASK; } #ifdef NODE_NOT_IN_PAGE_FLAGS extern int page_to_nid(const struct page *page); #else static inline int page_to_nid(const struct page *page) { struct page *p = (struct page *)page; return (PF_POISONED_CHECK(p)->flags >> NODES_PGSHIFT) & NODES_MASK; } #endif #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING static inline int cpu_pid_to_cpupid(int cpu, int pid) { return ((cpu & LAST__CPU_MASK) << LAST__PID_SHIFT) | (pid & LAST__PID_MASK); } static inline int cpupid_to_pid(int cpupid) { return cpupid & LAST__PID_MASK; } static inline int cpupid_to_cpu(int cpupid) { return (cpupid >> LAST__PID_SHIFT) & LAST__CPU_MASK; } static inline int cpupid_to_nid(int cpupid) { return cpu_to_node(cpupid_to_cpu(cpupid)); } static inline bool cpupid_pid_unset(int cpupid) { return cpupid_to_pid(cpupid) == (-1 & LAST__PID_MASK); } static inline bool cpupid_cpu_unset(int cpupid) { return cpupid_to_cpu(cpupid) == (-1 & LAST__CPU_MASK); } static inline bool __cpupid_match_pid(pid_t task_pid, int cpupid) { return (task_pid & LAST__PID_MASK) == cpupid_to_pid(cpupid); } #define cpupid_match_pid(task, cpupid) __cpupid_match_pid(task->pid, cpupid) #ifdef LAST_CPUPID_NOT_IN_PAGE_FLAGS static inline int page_cpupid_xchg_last(struct page *page, int cpupid) { return xchg(&page->_last_cpupid, cpupid & LAST_CPUPID_MASK); } static inline int page_cpupid_last(struct page *page) { return page->_last_cpupid; } static inline void page_cpupid_reset_last(struct page *page) { page->_last_cpupid = -1 & LAST_CPUPID_MASK; } #else static inline int page_cpupid_last(struct page *page) { return (page->flags >> LAST_CPUPID_PGSHIFT) & LAST_CPUPID_MASK; } extern int page_cpupid_xchg_last(struct page *page, int cpupid); static inline void page_cpupid_reset_last(struct page *page) { page->flags |= LAST_CPUPID_MASK << LAST_CPUPID_PGSHIFT; } #endif /* LAST_CPUPID_NOT_IN_PAGE_FLAGS */ #else /* !CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING */ static inline int page_cpupid_xchg_last(struct page *page, int cpupid) { return page_to_nid(page); /* XXX */ } static inline int page_cpupid_last(struct page *page) { return page_to_nid(page); /* XXX */ } static inline int cpupid_to_nid(int cpupid) { return -1; } static inline int cpupid_to_pid(int cpupid) { return -1; } static inline int cpupid_to_cpu(int cpupid) { return -1; } static inline int cpu_pid_to_cpupid(int nid, int pid) { return -1; } static inline bool cpupid_pid_unset(int cpupid) { return true; } static inline void page_cpupid_reset_last(struct page *page) { } static inline bool cpupid_match_pid(struct task_struct *task, int cpupid) { return false; } #endif /* CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING */ #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS /* * KASAN per-page tags are stored xor'ed with 0xff. This allows to avoid * setting tags for all pages to native kernel tag value 0xff, as the default * value 0x00 maps to 0xff. */ static inline u8 page_kasan_tag(const struct page *page) { u8 tag; tag = (page->flags >> KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT) & KASAN_TAG_MASK; tag ^= 0xff; return tag; } static inline void page_kasan_tag_set(struct page *page, u8 tag) { tag ^= 0xff; page->flags &= ~(KASAN_TAG_MASK << KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT); page->flags |= (tag & KASAN_TAG_MASK) << KASAN_TAG_PGSHIFT; } static inline void page_kasan_tag_reset(struct page *page) { page_kasan_tag_set(page, 0xff); } #else static inline u8 page_kasan_tag(const struct page *page) { return 0xff; } static inline void page_kasan_tag_set(struct page *page, u8 tag) { } static inline void page_kasan_tag_reset(struct page *page) { } #endif static inline struct zone *page_zone(const struct page *page) { return &NODE_DATA(page_to_nid(page))->node_zones[page_zonenum(page)]; } static inline pg_data_t *page_pgdat(const struct page *page) { return NODE_DATA(page_to_nid(page)); } #ifdef SECTION_IN_PAGE_FLAGS static inline void set_page_section(struct page *page, unsigned long section) { page->flags &= ~(SECTIONS_MASK << SECTIONS_PGSHIFT); page->flags |= (section & SECTIONS_MASK) << SECTIONS_PGSHIFT; } static inline unsigned long page_to_section(const struct page *page) { return (page->flags >> SECTIONS_PGSHIFT) & SECTIONS_MASK; } #endif static inline void set_page_zone(struct page *page, enum zone_type zone) { page->flags &= ~(ZONES_MASK << ZONES_PGSHIFT); page->flags |= (zone & ZONES_MASK) << ZONES_PGSHIFT; } static inline void set_page_node(struct page *page, unsigned long node) { page->flags &= ~(NODES_MASK << NODES_PGSHIFT); page->flags |= (node & NODES_MASK) << NODES_PGSHIFT; } static inline void set_page_links(struct page *page, enum zone_type zone, unsigned long node, unsigned long pfn) { set_page_zone(page, zone); set_page_node(page, node); #ifdef SECTION_IN_PAGE_FLAGS set_page_section(page, pfn_to_section_nr(pfn)); #endif } #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG static inline struct mem_cgroup *page_memcg(struct page *page) { return page->mem_cgroup; } static inline struct mem_cgroup *page_memcg_rcu(struct page *page) { WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held()); return READ_ONCE(page->mem_cgroup); } #else static inline struct mem_cgroup *page_memcg(struct page *page) { return NULL; } static inline struct mem_cgroup *page_memcg_rcu(struct page *page) { WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held()); return NULL; } #endif /* * Some inline functions in vmstat.h depend on page_zone() */ #include <linux/vmstat.h> static __always_inline void *lowmem_page_address(const struct page *page) { return page_to_virt(page); } #if defined(CONFIG_HIGHMEM) && !defined(WANT_PAGE_VIRTUAL) #define HASHED_PAGE_VIRTUAL #endif #if defined(WANT_PAGE_VIRTUAL) static inline void *page_address(const struct page *page) { return page->virtual; } static inline void set_page_address(struct page *page, void *address) { page->virtual = address; } #define page_address_init() do { } while(0) #endif #if defined(HASHED_PAGE_VIRTUAL) void *page_address(const struct page *page); void set_page_address(struct page *page, void *virtual); void page_address_init(void); #endif #if !defined(HASHED_PAGE_VIRTUAL) && !defined(WANT_PAGE_VIRTUAL) #define page_address(page) lowmem_page_address(page) #define set_page_address(page, address) do { } while(0) #define page_address_init() do { } while(0) #endif extern void *page_rmapping(struct page *page); extern struct anon_vma *page_anon_vma(struct page *page); extern struct address_space *page_mapping(struct page *page); extern struct address_space *__page_file_mapping(struct page *); static inline struct address_space *page_file_mapping(struct page *page) { if (unlikely(PageSwapCache(page))) return __page_file_mapping(page); return page->mapping; } extern pgoff_t __page_file_index(struct page *page); /* * Return the pagecache index of the passed page. Regular pagecache pages * use ->index whereas swapcache pages use swp_offset(->private) */ static inline pgoff_t page_index(struct page *page) { if (unlikely(PageSwapCache(page))) return __page_file_index(page); return page->index; } bool page_mapped(struct page *page); struct address_space *page_mapping(struct page *page); struct address_space *page_mapping_file(struct page *page); /* * Return true only if the page has been allocated with * ALLOC_NO_WATERMARKS and the low watermark was not * met implying that the system is under some pressure. */ static inline bool page_is_pfmemalloc(struct page *page) { /* * Page index cannot be this large so this must be * a pfmemalloc page. */ return page->index == -1UL; } /* * Only to be called by the page allocator on a freshly allocated * page. */ static inline void set_page_pfmemalloc(struct page *page) { page->index = -1UL; } static inline void clear_page_pfmemalloc(struct page *page) { page->index = 0; } /* * Can be called by the pagefault handler when it gets a VM_FAULT_OOM. */ extern void pagefault_out_of_memory(void); #define offset_in_page(p) ((unsigned long)(p) & ~PAGE_MASK) #define offset_in_thp(page, p) ((unsigned long)(p) & (thp_size(page) - 1)) /* * Flags passed to show_mem() and show_free_areas() to suppress output in * various contexts. */ #define SHOW_MEM_FILTER_NODES (0x0001u) /* disallowed nodes */ extern void show_free_areas(unsigned int flags, nodemask_t *nodemask); #ifdef CONFIG_MMU extern bool can_do_mlock(void); #else static inline bool can_do_mlock(void) { return false; } #endif extern int user_shm_lock(size_t, struct user_struct *); extern void user_shm_unlock(size_t, struct user_struct *); /* * Parameter block passed down to zap_pte_range in exceptional cases. */ struct zap_details { struct address_space *check_mapping; /* Check page->mapping if set */ pgoff_t first_index; /* Lowest page->index to unmap */ pgoff_t last_index; /* Highest page->index to unmap */ struct page *single_page; /* Locked page to be unmapped */ }; struct page *vm_normal_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, pte_t pte); struct page *vm_normal_page_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, pmd_t pmd); void zap_vma_ptes(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, unsigned long size); void zap_page_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, unsigned long size); void unmap_vmas(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *start_vma, unsigned long start, unsigned long end); struct mmu_notifier_range; void free_pgd_range(struct mmu_gather *tlb, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end, unsigned long floor, unsigned long ceiling); int copy_page_range(struct vm_area_struct *dst_vma, struct vm_area_struct *src_vma); int follow_invalidate_pte(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address, struct mmu_notifier_range *range, pte_t **ptepp, pmd_t **pmdpp, spinlock_t **ptlp); int follow_pte(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address, pte_t **ptepp, spinlock_t **ptlp); int follow_pfn(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, unsigned long *pfn); int follow_phys(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, unsigned int flags, unsigned long *prot, resource_size_t *phys); int generic_access_phys(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, void *buf, int len, int write); extern void truncate_pagecache(struct inode *inode, loff_t new); extern void truncate_setsize(struct inode *inode, loff_t newsize); void pagecache_isize_extended(struct inode *inode, loff_t from, loff_t to); void truncate_pagecache_range(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, loff_t end); int truncate_inode_page(struct address_space *mapping, struct page *page); int generic_error_remove_page(struct address_space *mapping, struct page *page); int invalidate_inode_page(struct page *page); #ifdef CONFIG_MMU extern vm_fault_t handle_mm_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, unsigned int flags, struct pt_regs *regs); extern int fixup_user_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address, unsigned int fault_flags, bool *unlocked); void unmap_mapping_page(struct page *page); void unmap_mapping_pages(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t start, pgoff_t nr, bool even_cows); void unmap_mapping_range(struct address_space *mapping, loff_t const holebegin, loff_t const holelen, int even_cows); #else static inline vm_fault_t handle_mm_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, unsigned int flags, struct pt_regs *regs) { /* should never happen if there's no MMU */ BUG(); return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; } static inline int fixup_user_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address, unsigned int fault_flags, bool *unlocked) { /* should never happen if there's no MMU */ BUG(); return -EFAULT; } static inline void unmap_mapping_page(struct page *page) { } static inline void unmap_mapping_pages(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t start, pgoff_t nr, bool even_cows) { } static inline void unmap_mapping_range(struct address_space *mapping, loff_t const holebegin, loff_t const holelen, int even_cows) { } #endif static inline void unmap_shared_mapping_range(struct address_space *mapping, loff_t const holebegin, loff_t const holelen) { unmap_mapping_range(mapping, holebegin, holelen, 0); } extern int access_process_vm(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr, void *buf, int len, unsigned int gup_flags); extern int access_remote_vm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, void *buf, int len, unsigned int gup_flags); extern int __access_remote_vm(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, void *buf, int len, unsigned int gup_flags); long get_user_pages_remote(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages, unsigned int gup_flags, struct page **pages, struct vm_area_struct **vmas, int *locked); long pin_user_pages_remote(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages, unsigned int gup_flags, struct page **pages, struct vm_area_struct **vmas, int *locked); long get_user_pages(unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages, unsigned int gup_flags, struct page **pages, struct vm_area_struct **vmas); long pin_user_pages(unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages, unsigned int gup_flags, struct page **pages, struct vm_area_struct **vmas); long get_user_pages_locked(unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages, unsigned int gup_flags, struct page **pages, int *locked); long pin_user_pages_locked(unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages, unsigned int gup_flags, struct page **pages, int *locked); long get_user_pages_unlocked(unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages, struct page **pages, unsigned int gup_flags); long pin_user_pages_unlocked(unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages, struct page **pages, unsigned int gup_flags); int get_user_pages_fast(unsigned long start, int nr_pages, unsigned int gup_flags, struct page **pages); int pin_user_pages_fast(unsigned long start, int nr_pages, unsigned int gup_flags, struct page **pages); int account_locked_vm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long pages, bool inc); int __account_locked_vm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long pages, bool inc, struct task_struct *task, bool bypass_rlim); /* Container for pinned pfns / pages */ struct frame_vector { unsigned int nr_allocated; /* Number of frames we have space for */ unsigned int nr_frames; /* Number of frames stored in ptrs array */ bool got_ref; /* Did we pin pages by getting page ref? */ bool is_pfns; /* Does array contain pages or pfns? */ void *ptrs[]; /* Array of pinned pfns / pages. Use * pfns_vector_pages() or pfns_vector_pfns() * for access */ }; struct frame_vector *frame_vector_create(unsigned int nr_frames); void frame_vector_destroy(struct frame_vector *vec); int get_vaddr_frames(unsigned long start, unsigned int nr_pfns, unsigned int gup_flags, struct frame_vector *vec); void put_vaddr_frames(struct frame_vector *vec); int frame_vector_to_pages(struct frame_vector *vec); void frame_vector_to_pfns(struct frame_vector *vec); static inline unsigned int frame_vector_count(struct frame_vector *vec) { return vec->nr_frames; } static inline struct page **frame_vector_pages(struct frame_vector *vec) { if (vec->is_pfns) { int err = frame_vector_to_pages(vec); if (err) return ERR_PTR(err); } return (struct page **)(vec->ptrs); } static inline unsigned long *frame_vector_pfns(struct frame_vector *vec) { if (!vec->is_pfns) frame_vector_to_pfns(vec); return (unsigned long *)(vec->ptrs); } struct kvec; int get_kernel_pages(const struct kvec *iov, int nr_pages, int write, struct page **pages); int get_kernel_page(unsigned long start, int write, struct page **pages); struct page *get_dump_page(unsigned long addr); extern int try_to_release_page(struct page * page, gfp_t gfp_mask); extern void do_invalidatepage(struct page *page, unsigned int offset, unsigned int length); void __set_page_dirty(struct page *, struct address_space *, int warn); int __set_page_dirty_nobuffers(struct page *page); int __set_page_dirty_no_writeback(struct page *page); int redirty_page_for_writepage(struct writeback_control *wbc, struct page *page); void account_page_dirtied(struct page *page, struct address_space *mapping); void account_page_cleaned(struct page *page, struct address_space *mapping, struct bdi_writeback *wb); int set_page_dirty(struct page *page); int set_page_dirty_lock(struct page *page); void __cancel_dirty_page(struct page *page); static inline void cancel_dirty_page(struct page *page) { /* Avoid atomic ops, locking, etc. when not actually needed. */ if (PageDirty(page)) __cancel_dirty_page(page); } int clear_page_dirty_for_io(struct page *page); int get_cmdline(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer, int buflen); extern unsigned long move_page_tables(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long old_addr, struct vm_area_struct *new_vma, unsigned long new_addr, unsigned long len, bool need_rmap_locks); /* * Flags used by change_protection(). For now we make it a bitmap so * that we can pass in multiple flags just like parameters. However * for now all the callers are only use one of the flags at the same * time. */ /* Whether we should allow dirty bit accounting */ #define MM_CP_DIRTY_ACCT (1UL << 0) /* Whether this protection change is for NUMA hints */ #define MM_CP_PROT_NUMA (1UL << 1) /* Whether this change is for write protecting */ #define MM_CP_UFFD_WP (1UL << 2) /* do wp */ #define MM_CP_UFFD_WP_RESOLVE (1UL << 3) /* Resolve wp */ #define MM_CP_UFFD_WP_ALL (MM_CP_UFFD_WP | \ MM_CP_UFFD_WP_RESOLVE) extern unsigned long change_protection(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, pgprot_t newprot, unsigned long cp_flags); extern int mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags); /* * doesn't attempt to fault and will return short. */ int get_user_pages_fast_only(unsigned long start, int nr_pages, unsigned int gup_flags, struct page **pages); int pin_user_pages_fast_only(unsigned long start, int nr_pages, unsigned int gup_flags, struct page **pages); static inline bool get_user_page_fast_only(unsigned long addr, unsigned int gup_flags, struct page **pagep) { return get_user_pages_fast_only(addr, 1, gup_flags, pagep) == 1; } /* * per-process(per-mm_struct) statistics. */ static inline unsigned long get_mm_counter(struct mm_struct *mm, int member) { long val = atomic_long_read(&mm->rss_stat.count[member]); #ifdef SPLIT_RSS_COUNTING /* * counter is updated in asynchronous manner and may go to minus. * But it's never be expected number for users. */ if (val < 0) val = 0; #endif return (unsigned long)val; } void mm_trace_rss_stat(struct mm_struct *mm, int member, long count); static inline void add_mm_counter(struct mm_struct *mm, int member, long value) { long count = atomic_long_add_return(value, &mm->rss_stat.count[member]); mm_trace_rss_stat(mm, member, count); } static inline void inc_mm_counter(struct mm_struct *mm, int member) { long count = atomic_long_inc_return(&mm->rss_stat.count[member]); mm_trace_rss_stat(mm, member, count); } static inline void dec_mm_counter(struct mm_struct *mm, int member) { long count = atomic_long_dec_return(&mm->rss_stat.count[member]); mm_trace_rss_stat(mm, member, count); } /* Optimized variant when page is already known not to be PageAnon */ static inline int mm_counter_file(struct page *page) { if (PageSwapBacked(page)) return MM_SHMEMPAGES; return MM_FILEPAGES; } static inline int mm_counter(struct page *page) { if (PageAnon(page)) return MM_ANONPAGES; return mm_counter_file(page); } static inline unsigned long get_mm_rss(struct mm_struct *mm) { return get_mm_counter(mm, MM_FILEPAGES) + get_mm_counter(mm, MM_ANONPAGES) + get_mm_counter(mm, MM_SHMEMPAGES); } static inline unsigned long get_mm_hiwater_rss(struct mm_struct *mm) { return max(mm->hiwater_rss, get_mm_rss(mm)); } static inline unsigned long get_mm_hiwater_vm(struct mm_struct *mm) { return max(mm->hiwater_vm, mm->total_vm); } static inline void update_hiwater_rss(struct mm_struct *mm) { unsigned long _rss = get_mm_rss(mm); if ((mm)->hiwater_rss < _rss) (mm)->hiwater_rss = _rss; } static inline void update_hiwater_vm(struct mm_struct *mm) { if (mm->hiwater_vm < mm->total_vm) mm->hiwater_vm = mm->total_vm; } static inline void reset_mm_hiwater_rss(struct mm_struct *mm) { mm->hiwater_rss = get_mm_rss(mm); } static inline void setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(unsigned long *maxrss, struct mm_struct *mm) { unsigned long hiwater_rss = get_mm_hiwater_rss(mm); if (*maxrss < hiwater_rss) *maxrss = hiwater_rss; } #if defined(SPLIT_RSS_COUNTING) void sync_mm_rss(struct mm_struct *mm); #else static inline void sync_mm_rss(struct mm_struct *mm) { } #endif #ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL static inline int pte_special(pte_t pte) { return 0; } static inline pte_t pte_mkspecial(pte_t pte) { return pte; } #endif #ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PTE_DEVMAP static inline int pte_devmap(pte_t pte) { return 0; } #endif int vma_wants_writenotify(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pgprot_t vm_page_prot); extern pte_t *__get_locked_pte(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, spinlock_t **ptl); static inline pte_t *get_locked_pte(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, spinlock_t **ptl) { pte_t *ptep; __cond_lock(*ptl, ptep = __get_locked_pte(mm, addr, ptl)); return ptep; } #ifdef __PAGETABLE_P4D_FOLDED static inline int __p4d_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long address) { return 0; } #else int __p4d_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long address); #endif #if defined(__PAGETABLE_PUD_FOLDED) || !defined(CONFIG_MMU) static inline int __pud_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm, p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long address) { return 0; } static inline void mm_inc_nr_puds(struct mm_struct *mm) {} static inline void mm_dec_nr_puds(struct mm_struct *mm) {} #else int __pud_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm, p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long address); static inline void mm_inc_nr_puds(struct mm_struct *mm) { if (mm_pud_folded(mm)) return; atomic_long_add(PTRS_PER_PUD * sizeof(pud_t), &mm->pgtables_bytes); } static inline void mm_dec_nr_puds(struct mm_struct *mm) { if (mm_pud_folded(mm)) return; atomic_long_sub(PTRS_PER_PUD * sizeof(pud_t), &mm->pgtables_bytes); } #endif #if defined(__PAGETABLE_PMD_FOLDED) || !defined(CONFIG_MMU) static inline int __pmd_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm, pud_t *pud, unsigned long address) { return 0; } static inline void mm_inc_nr_pmds(struct mm_struct *mm) {} static inline void mm_dec_nr_pmds(struct mm_struct *mm) {} #else int __pmd_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm, pud_t *pud, unsigned long address); static inline void mm_inc_nr_pmds(struct mm_struct *mm) { if (mm_pmd_folded(mm)) return; atomic_long_add(PTRS_PER_PMD * sizeof(pmd_t), &mm->pgtables_bytes); } static inline void mm_dec_nr_pmds(struct mm_struct *mm) { if (mm_pmd_folded(mm)) return; atomic_long_sub(PTRS_PER_PMD * sizeof(pmd_t), &mm->pgtables_bytes); } #endif #ifdef CONFIG_MMU static inline void mm_pgtables_bytes_init(struct mm_struct *mm) { atomic_long_set(&mm->pgtables_bytes, 0); } static inline unsigned long mm_pgtables_bytes(const struct mm_struct *mm) { return atomic_long_read(&mm->pgtables_bytes); } static inline void mm_inc_nr_ptes(struct mm_struct *mm) { atomic_long_add(PTRS_PER_PTE * sizeof(pte_t), &mm->pgtables_bytes); } static inline void mm_dec_nr_ptes(struct mm_struct *mm) { atomic_long_sub(PTRS_PER_PTE * sizeof(pte_t), &mm->pgtables_bytes); } #else static inline void mm_pgtables_bytes_init(struct mm_struct *mm) {} static inline unsigned long mm_pgtables_bytes(const struct mm_struct *mm) { return 0; } static inline void mm_inc_nr_ptes(struct mm_struct *mm) {} static inline void mm_dec_nr_ptes(struct mm_struct *mm) {} #endif int __pte_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmd); int __pte_alloc_kernel(pmd_t *pmd); #if defined(CONFIG_MMU) static inline p4d_t *p4d_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long address) { return (unlikely(pgd_none(*pgd)) && __p4d_alloc(mm, pgd, address)) ? NULL : p4d_offset(pgd, address); } static inline pud_t *pud_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm, p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long address) { return (unlikely(p4d_none(*p4d)) && __pud_alloc(mm, p4d, address)) ? NULL : pud_offset(p4d, address); } static inline pmd_t *pmd_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm, pud_t *pud, unsigned long address) { return (unlikely(pud_none(*pud)) && __pmd_alloc(mm, pud, address))? NULL: pmd_offset(pud, address); } #endif /* CONFIG_MMU */ #if USE_SPLIT_PTE_PTLOCKS #if ALLOC_SPLIT_PTLOCKS void __init ptlock_cache_init(void); extern bool ptlock_alloc(struct page *page); extern void ptlock_free(struct page *page); static inline spinlock_t *ptlock_ptr(struct page *page) { return page->ptl; } #else /* ALLOC_SPLIT_PTLOCKS */ static inline void ptlock_cache_init(void) { } static inline bool ptlock_alloc(struct page *page) { return true; } static inline void ptlock_free(struct page *page) { } static inline spinlock_t *ptlock_ptr(struct page *page) { return &page->ptl; } #endif /* ALLOC_SPLIT_PTLOCKS */ static inline spinlock_t *pte_lockptr(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmd) { return ptlock_ptr(pmd_page(*pmd)); } static inline bool ptlock_init(struct page *page) { /* * prep_new_page() initialize page->private (and therefore page->ptl) * with 0. Make sure nobody took it in use in between. * * It can happen if arch try to use slab for page table allocation: * slab code uses page->slab_cache, which share storage with page->ptl. */ VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(*(unsigned long *)&page->ptl, page); if (!ptlock_alloc(page)) return false; spin_lock_init(ptlock_ptr(page)); return true; } #else /* !USE_SPLIT_PTE_PTLOCKS */ /* * We use mm->page_table_lock to guard all pagetable pages of the mm. */ static inline spinlock_t *pte_lockptr(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmd) { return &mm->page_table_lock; } static inline void ptlock_cache_init(void) {} static inline bool ptlock_init(struct page *page) { return true; } static inline void ptlock_free(struct page *page) {} #endif /* USE_SPLIT_PTE_PTLOCKS */ static inline void pgtable_init(void) { ptlock_cache_init(); pgtable_cache_init(); } static inline bool pgtable_pte_page_ctor(struct page *page) { if (!ptlock_init(page)) return false; __SetPageTable(page); inc_zone_page_state(page, NR_PAGETABLE); return true; } static inline void pgtable_pte_page_dtor(struct page *page) { ptlock_free(page); __ClearPageTable(page); dec_zone_page_state(page, NR_PAGETABLE); } #define pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, address, ptlp) \ ({ \ spinlock_t *__ptl = pte_lockptr(mm, pmd); \ pte_t *__pte = pte_offset_map(pmd, address); \ *(ptlp) = __ptl; \ spin_lock(__ptl); \ __pte; \ }) #define pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl) do { \ spin_unlock(ptl); \ pte_unmap(pte); \ } while (0) #define pte_alloc(mm, pmd) (unlikely(pmd_none(*(pmd))) && __pte_alloc(mm, pmd)) #define pte_alloc_map(mm, pmd, address) \ (pte_alloc(mm, pmd) ? NULL : pte_offset_map(pmd, address)) #define pte_alloc_map_lock(mm, pmd, address, ptlp) \ (pte_alloc(mm, pmd) ? \ NULL : pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, address, ptlp)) #define pte_alloc_kernel(pmd, address) \ ((unlikely(pmd_none(*(pmd))) && __pte_alloc_kernel(pmd))? \ NULL: pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address)) #if USE_SPLIT_PMD_PTLOCKS static struct page *pmd_to_page(pmd_t *pmd) { unsigned long mask = ~(PTRS_PER_PMD * sizeof(pmd_t) - 1); return virt_to_page((void *)((unsigned long) pmd & mask)); } static inline spinlock_t *pmd_lockptr(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmd) { return ptlock_ptr(pmd_to_page(pmd)); } static inline bool pmd_ptlock_init(struct page *page) { #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE page->pmd_huge_pte = NULL; #endif return ptlock_init(page); } static inline void pmd_ptlock_free(struct page *page) { #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page->pmd_huge_pte, page); #endif ptlock_free(page); } #define pmd_huge_pte(mm, pmd) (pmd_to_page(pmd)->pmd_huge_pte) #else static inline spinlock_t *pmd_lockptr(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmd) { return &mm->page_table_lock; } static inline bool pmd_ptlock_init(struct page *page) { return true; } static inline void pmd_ptlock_free(struct page *page) {} #define pmd_huge_pte(mm, pmd) ((mm)->pmd_huge_pte) #endif static inline spinlock_t *pmd_lock(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmd) { spinlock_t *ptl = pmd_lockptr(mm, pmd); spin_lock(ptl); return ptl; } static inline bool pgtable_pmd_page_ctor(struct page *page) { if (!pmd_ptlock_init(page)) return false; __SetPageTable(page); inc_zone_page_state(page, NR_PAGETABLE); return true; } static inline void pgtable_pmd_page_dtor(struct page *page) { pmd_ptlock_free(page); __ClearPageTable(page); dec_zone_page_state(page, NR_PAGETABLE); } /* * No scalability reason to split PUD locks yet, but follow the same pattern * as the PMD locks to make it easier if we decide to. The VM should not be * considered ready to switch to split PUD locks yet; there may be places * which need to be converted from page_table_lock. */ static inline spinlock_t *pud_lockptr(struct mm_struct *mm, pud_t *pud) { return &mm->page_table_lock; } static inline spinlock_t *pud_lock(struct mm_struct *mm, pud_t *pud) { spinlock_t *ptl = pud_lockptr(mm, pud); spin_lock(ptl); return ptl; } extern void __init pagecache_init(void); extern void __init free_area_init_memoryless_node(int nid); extern void free_initmem(void); /* * Free reserved pages within range [PAGE_ALIGN(start), end & PAGE_MASK) * into the buddy system. The freed pages will be poisoned with pattern * "poison" if it's within range [0, UCHAR_MAX]. * Return pages freed into the buddy system. */ extern unsigned long free_reserved_area(void *start, void *end, int poison, const char *s); #ifdef CONFIG_HIGHMEM /* * Free a highmem page into the buddy system, adjusting totalhigh_pages * and totalram_pages. */ extern void free_highmem_page(struct page *page); #endif extern void adjust_managed_page_count(struct page *page, long count); extern void mem_init_print_info(const char *str); extern void reserve_bootmem_region(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_t end); /* Free the reserved page into the buddy system, so it gets managed. */ static inline void __free_reserved_page(struct page *page) { ClearPageReserved(page); init_page_count(page); __free_page(page); } static inline void free_reserved_page(struct page *page) { __free_reserved_page(page); adjust_managed_page_count(page, 1); } static inline void mark_page_reserved(struct page *page) { SetPageReserved(page); adjust_managed_page_count(page, -1); } /* * Default method to free all the __init memory into the buddy system. * The freed pages will be poisoned with pattern "poison" if it's within * range [0, UCHAR_MAX]. * Return pages freed into the buddy system. */ static inline unsigned long free_initmem_default(int poison) { extern char __init_begin[], __init_end[]; return free_reserved_area(&__init_begin, &__init_end, poison, "unused kernel"); } static inline unsigned long get_num_physpages(void) { int nid; unsigned long phys_pages = 0; for_each_online_node(nid) phys_pages += node_present_pages(nid); return phys_pages; } /* * Using memblock node mappings, an architecture may initialise its * zones, allocate the backing mem_map and account for memory holes in an * architecture independent manner. * * An architecture is expected to register range of page frames backed by * physical memory with memblock_add[_node]() before calling * free_area_init() passing in the PFN each zone ends at. At a basic * usage, an architecture is expected to do something like * * unsigned long max_zone_pfns[MAX_NR_ZONES] = {max_dma, max_normal_pfn, * max_highmem_pfn}; * for_each_valid_physical_page_range() * memblock_add_node(base, size, nid) * free_area_init(max_zone_pfns); */ void free_area_init(unsigned long *max_zone_pfn); unsigned long node_map_pfn_alignment(void); unsigned long __absent_pages_in_range(int nid, unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long end_pfn); extern unsigned long absent_pages_in_range(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long end_pfn); extern void get_pfn_range_for_nid(unsigned int nid, unsigned long *start_pfn, unsigned long *end_pfn); extern unsigned long find_min_pfn_with_active_regions(void); #ifndef CONFIG_NEED_MULTIPLE_NODES static inline int early_pfn_to_nid(unsigned long pfn) { return 0; } #else /* please see mm/page_alloc.c */ extern int __meminit early_pfn_to_nid(unsigned long pfn); /* there is a per-arch backend function. */ extern int __meminit __early_pfn_to_nid(unsigned long pfn, struct mminit_pfnnid_cache *state); #endif extern void set_dma_reserve(unsigned long new_dma_reserve); extern void memmap_init_zone(unsigned long, int, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, enum meminit_context, struct vmem_altmap *, int migratetype); extern void setup_per_zone_wmarks(void); extern int __meminit init_per_zone_wmark_min(void); extern void mem_init(void); extern void __init mmap_init(void); extern void show_mem(unsigned int flags, nodemask_t *nodemask); extern long si_mem_available(void); extern void si_meminfo(struct sysinfo * val); extern void si_meminfo_node(struct sysinfo *val, int nid); #ifdef __HAVE_ARCH_RESERVED_KERNEL_PAGES extern unsigned long arch_reserved_kernel_pages(void); #endif extern __printf(3, 4) void warn_alloc(gfp_t gfp_mask, nodemask_t *nodemask, const char *fmt, ...); extern void setup_per_cpu_pageset(void); /* page_alloc.c */ extern int min_free_kbytes; extern int watermark_boost_factor; extern int watermark_scale_factor; extern bool arch_has_descending_max_zone_pfns(void); /* nommu.c */ extern atomic_long_t mmap_pages_allocated; extern int nommu_shrink_inode_mappings(struct inode *, size_t, size_t); /* interval_tree.c */ void vma_interval_tree_insert(struct vm_area_struct *node, struct rb_root_cached *root); void vma_interval_tree_insert_after(struct vm_area_struct *node, struct vm_area_struct *prev, struct rb_root_cached *root); void vma_interval_tree_remove(struct vm_area_struct *node, struct rb_root_cached *root); struct vm_area_struct *vma_interval_tree_iter_first(struct rb_root_cached *root, unsigned long start, unsigned long last); struct vm_area_struct *vma_interval_tree_iter_next(struct vm_area_struct *node, unsigned long start, unsigned long last); #define vma_interval_tree_foreach(vma, root, start, last) \ for (vma = vma_interval_tree_iter_first(root, start, last); \ vma; vma = vma_interval_tree_iter_next(vma, start, last)) void anon_vma_interval_tree_insert(struct anon_vma_chain *node, struct rb_root_cached *root); void anon_vma_interval_tree_remove(struct anon_vma_chain *node, struct rb_root_cached *root); struct anon_vma_chain * anon_vma_interval_tree_iter_first(struct rb_root_cached *root, unsigned long start, unsigned long last); struct anon_vma_chain *anon_vma_interval_tree_iter_next( struct anon_vma_chain *node, unsigned long start, unsigned long last); #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_RB void anon_vma_interval_tree_verify(struct anon_vma_chain *node); #endif #define anon_vma_interval_tree_foreach(avc, root, start, last) \ for (avc = anon_vma_interval_tree_iter_first(root, start, last); \ avc; avc = anon_vma_interval_tree_iter_next(avc, start, last)) /* mmap.c */ extern int __vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages, int cap_sys_admin); extern int __vma_adjust(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, pgoff_t pgoff, struct vm_area_struct *insert, struct vm_area_struct *expand); static inline int vma_adjust(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, pgoff_t pgoff, struct vm_area_struct *insert) { return __vma_adjust(vma, start, end, pgoff, insert, NULL); } extern struct vm_area_struct *vma_merge(struct mm_struct *, struct vm_area_struct *prev, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end, unsigned long vm_flags, struct anon_vma *, struct file *, pgoff_t, struct mempolicy *, struct vm_userfaultfd_ctx); extern struct anon_vma *find_mergeable_anon_vma(struct vm_area_struct *); extern int __split_vma(struct mm_struct *, struct vm_area_struct *, unsigned long addr, int new_below); extern int split_vma(struct mm_struct *, struct vm_area_struct *, unsigned long addr, int new_below); extern int insert_vm_struct(struct mm_struct *, struct vm_area_struct *); extern void __vma_link_rb(struct mm_struct *, struct vm_area_struct *, struct rb_node **, struct rb_node *); extern void unlink_file_vma(struct vm_area_struct *); extern struct vm_area_struct *copy_vma(struct vm_area_struct **, unsigned long addr, unsigned long len, pgoff_t pgoff, bool *need_rmap_locks); extern void exit_mmap(struct mm_struct *); static inline int check_data_rlimit(unsigned long rlim, unsigned long new, unsigned long start, unsigned long end_data, unsigned long start_data) { if (rlim < RLIM_INFINITY) { if (((new - start) + (end_data - start_data)) > rlim) return -ENOSPC; } return 0; } extern int mm_take_all_locks(struct mm_struct *mm); extern void mm_drop_all_locks(struct mm_struct *mm); extern void set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct file *new_exe_file); extern struct file *get_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm); extern struct file *get_task_exe_file(struct task_struct *task); extern bool may_expand_vm(struct mm_struct *, vm_flags_t, unsigned long npages); extern void vm_stat_account(struct mm_struct *, vm_flags_t, long npages); extern bool vma_is_special_mapping(const struct vm_area_struct *vma, const struct vm_special_mapping *sm); extern struct vm_area_struct *_install_special_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, unsigned long len, unsigned long flags, const struct vm_special_mapping *spec); /* This is an obsolete alternative to _install_special_mapping. */ extern int install_special_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, unsigned long len, unsigned long flags, struct page **pages); unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top); extern unsigned long get_unmapped_area(struct file *, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long); extern unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, unsigned long len, vm_flags_t vm_flags, unsigned long pgoff, struct list_head *uf); extern unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, unsigned long len, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long *populate, struct list_head *uf); extern int __do_munmap(struct mm_struct *, unsigned long, size_t, struct list_head *uf, bool downgrade); extern int do_munmap(struct mm_struct *, unsigned long, size_t, struct list_head *uf); extern int do_madvise(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, size_t len_in, int behavior); #ifdef CONFIG_MMU extern int __mm_populate(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len, int ignore_errors); static inline void mm_populate(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len) { /* Ignore errors */ (void) __mm_populate(addr, len, 1); } #else static inline void mm_populate(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len) {} #endif /* These take the mm semaphore themselves */ extern int __must_check vm_brk(unsigned long, unsigned long); extern int __must_check vm_brk_flags(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long); extern int vm_munmap(unsigned long, size_t); extern unsigned long __must_check vm_mmap(struct file *, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long); struct vm_unmapped_area_info { #define VM_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN 1 unsigned long flags; unsigned long length; unsigned long low_limit; unsigned long high_limit; unsigned long align_mask; unsigned long align_offset; }; extern unsigned long vm_unmapped_area(struct vm_unmapped_area_info *info); /* truncate.c */ extern void truncate_inode_pages(struct address_space *, loff_t); extern void truncate_inode_pages_range(struct address_space *, loff_t lstart, loff_t lend); extern void truncate_inode_pages_final(struct address_space *); /* generic vm_area_ops exported for stackable file systems */ extern vm_fault_t filemap_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf); extern void filemap_map_pages(struct vm_fault *vmf, pgoff_t start_pgoff, pgoff_t end_pgoff); extern vm_fault_t filemap_page_mkwrite(struct vm_fault *vmf); /* mm/page-writeback.c */ int __must_check write_one_page(struct page *page); void task_dirty_inc(struct task_struct *tsk); extern unsigned long stack_guard_gap; /* Generic expand stack which grows the stack according to GROWS{UP,DOWN} */ extern int expand_stack(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address); /* CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP still needs to grow downwards at some places */ extern int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address); #if VM_GROWSUP extern int expand_upwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address); #else #define expand_upwards(vma, address) (0) #endif /* Look up the first VMA which satisfies addr < vm_end, NULL if none. */ extern struct vm_area_struct * find_vma(struct mm_struct * mm, unsigned long addr); extern struct vm_area_struct * find_vma_prev(struct mm_struct * mm, unsigned long addr, struct vm_area_struct **pprev); /* Look up the first VMA which intersects the interval start_addr..end_addr-1, NULL if none. Assume start_addr < end_addr. */ static inline struct vm_area_struct * find_vma_intersection(struct mm_struct * mm, unsigned long start_addr, unsigned long end_addr) { struct vm_area_struct * vma = find_vma(mm,start_addr); if (vma && end_addr <= vma->vm_start) vma = NULL; return vma; } static inline unsigned long vm_start_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma) { unsigned long vm_start = vma->vm_start; if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN) { vm_start -= stack_guard_gap; if (vm_start > vma->vm_start) vm_start = 0; } return vm_start; } static inline unsigned long vm_end_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma) { unsigned long vm_end = vma->vm_end; if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSUP) { vm_end += stack_guard_gap; if (vm_end < vma->vm_end) vm_end = -PAGE_SIZE; } return vm_end; } static inline unsigned long vma_pages(struct vm_area_struct *vma) { return (vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT; } /* Look up the first VMA which exactly match the interval vm_start ... vm_end */ static inline struct vm_area_struct *find_exact_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long vm_start, unsigned long vm_end) { struct vm_area_struct *vma = find_vma(mm, vm_start); if (vma && (vma->vm_start != vm_start || vma->vm_end != vm_end)) vma = NULL; return vma; } static inline bool range_in_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start, unsigned long end) { return (vma && vma->vm_start <= start && end <= vma->vm_end); } #ifdef CONFIG_MMU pgprot_t vm_get_page_prot(unsigned long vm_flags); void vma_set_page_prot(struct vm_area_struct *vma); #else static inline pgprot_t vm_get_page_prot(unsigned long vm_flags) { return __pgprot(0); } static inline void vma_set_page_prot(struct vm_area_struct *vma) { vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags); } #endif #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING unsigned long change_prot_numa(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start, unsigned long end); #endif struct vm_area_struct *find_extend_vma(struct mm_struct *, unsigned long addr); int remap_pfn_range(struct vm_area_struct *, unsigned long addr, unsigned long pfn, unsigned long size, pgprot_t); int vm_insert_page(struct vm_area_struct *, unsigned long addr, struct page *); int vm_insert_pages(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, struct page **pages, unsigned long *num); int vm_map_pages(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct page **pages, unsigned long num); int vm_map_pages_zero(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct page **pages, unsigned long num); vm_fault_t vmf_insert_pfn(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, unsigned long pfn); vm_fault_t vmf_insert_pfn_prot(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, unsigned long pfn, pgprot_t pgprot); vm_fault_t vmf_insert_mixed(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, pfn_t pfn); vm_fault_t vmf_insert_mixed_prot(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, pfn_t pfn, pgprot_t pgprot); vm_fault_t vmf_insert_mixed_mkwrite(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, pfn_t pfn); int vm_iomap_memory(struct vm_area_struct *vma, phys_addr_t start, unsigned long len); static inline vm_fault_t vmf_insert_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, struct page *page) { int err = vm_insert_page(vma, addr, page); if (err == -ENOMEM) return VM_FAULT_OOM; if (err < 0 && err != -EBUSY) return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE; } #ifndef io_remap_pfn_range static inline int io_remap_pfn_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, unsigned long pfn, unsigned long size, pgprot_t prot) { return remap_pfn_range(vma, addr, pfn, size, pgprot_decrypted(prot)); } #endif static inline vm_fault_t vmf_error(int err) { if (err == -ENOMEM) return VM_FAULT_OOM; return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; } struct page *follow_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, unsigned int foll_flags); #define FOLL_WRITE 0x01 /* check pte is writable */ #define FOLL_TOUCH 0x02 /* mark page accessed */ #define FOLL_GET 0x04 /* do get_page on page */ #define FOLL_DUMP 0x08 /* give error on hole if it would be zero */ #define FOLL_FORCE 0x10 /* get_user_pages read/write w/o permission */ #define FOLL_NOWAIT 0x20 /* if a disk transfer is needed, start the IO * and return without waiting upon it */ #define FOLL_POPULATE 0x40 /* fault in page */ #define FOLL_SPLIT 0x80 /* don't return transhuge pages, split them */ #define FOLL_HWPOISON 0x100 /* check page is hwpoisoned */ #define FOLL_NUMA 0x200 /* force NUMA hinting page fault */ #define FOLL_MIGRATION 0x400 /* wait for page to replace migration entry */ #define FOLL_TRIED 0x800 /* a retry, previous pass started an IO */ #define FOLL_MLOCK 0x1000 /* lock present pages */ #define FOLL_REMOTE 0x2000 /* we are working on non-current tsk/mm */ #define FOLL_COW 0x4000 /* internal GUP flag */ #define FOLL_ANON 0x8000 /* don't do file mappings */ #define FOLL_LONGTERM 0x10000 /* mapping lifetime is indefinite: see below */ #define FOLL_SPLIT_PMD 0x20000 /* split huge pmd before returning */ #define FOLL_PIN 0x40000 /* pages must be released via unpin_user_page */ #define FOLL_FAST_ONLY 0x80000 /* gup_fast: prevent fall-back to slow gup */ /* * FOLL_PIN and FOLL_LONGTERM may be used in various combinations with each * other. Here is what they mean, and how to use them: * * FOLL_LONGTERM indicates that the page will be held for an indefinite time * period _often_ under userspace control. This is in contrast to * iov_iter_get_pages(), whose usages are transient. * * FIXME: For pages which are part of a filesystem, mappings are subject to the * lifetime enforced by the filesystem and we need guarantees that longterm * users like RDMA and V4L2 only establish mappings which coordinate usage with * the filesystem. Ideas for this coordination include revoking the longterm * pin, delaying writeback, bounce buffer page writeback, etc. As FS DAX was * added after the problem with filesystems was found FS DAX VMAs are * specifically failed. Filesystem pages are still subject to bugs and use of * FOLL_LONGTERM should be avoided on those pages. * * FIXME: Also NOTE that FOLL_LONGTERM is not supported in every GUP call. * Currently only get_user_pages() and get_user_pages_fast() support this flag * and calls to get_user_pages_[un]locked are specifically not allowed. This * is due to an incompatibility with the FS DAX check and * FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY. * * In the CMA case: long term pins in a CMA region would unnecessarily fragment * that region. And so, CMA attempts to migrate the page before pinning, when * FOLL_LONGTERM is specified. * * FOLL_PIN indicates that a special kind of tracking (not just page->_refcount, * but an additional pin counting system) will be invoked. This is intended for * anything that gets a page reference and then touches page data (for example, * Direct IO). This lets the filesystem know that some non-file-system entity is * potentially changing the pages' data. In contrast to FOLL_GET (whose pages * are released via put_page()), FOLL_PIN pages must be released, ultimately, by * a call to unpin_user_page(). * * FOLL_PIN is similar to FOLL_GET: both of these pin pages. They use different * and separate refcounting mechanisms, however, and that means that each has * its own acquire and release mechanisms: * * FOLL_GET: get_user_pages*() to acquire, and put_page() to release. * * FOLL_PIN: pin_user_pages*() to acquire, and unpin_user_pages to release. * * FOLL_PIN and FOLL_GET are mutually exclusive for a given function call. * (The underlying pages may experience both FOLL_GET-based and FOLL_PIN-based * calls applied to them, and that's perfectly OK. This is a constraint on the * callers, not on the pages.) * * FOLL_PIN should be set internally by the pin_user_pages*() APIs, never * directly by the caller. That's in order to help avoid mismatches when * releasing pages: get_user_pages*() pages must be released via put_page(), * while pin_user_pages*() pages must be released via unpin_user_page(). * * Please see Documentation/core-api/pin_user_pages.rst for more information. */ static inline int vm_fault_to_errno(vm_fault_t vm_fault, int foll_flags) { if (vm_fault & VM_FAULT_OOM) return -ENOMEM; if (vm_fault & (VM_FAULT_HWPOISON | VM_FAULT_HWPOISON_LARGE)) return (foll_flags & FOLL_HWPOISON) ? -EHWPOISON : -EFAULT; if (vm_fault & (VM_FAULT_SIGBUS | VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV)) return -EFAULT; return 0; } typedef int (*pte_fn_t)(pte_t *pte, unsigned long addr, void *data); extern int apply_to_page_range(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address, unsigned long size, pte_fn_t fn, void *data); extern int apply_to_existing_page_range(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address, unsigned long size, pte_fn_t fn, void *data); #ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING extern bool page_poisoning_enabled(void); extern void kernel_poison_pages(struct page *page, int numpages, int enable); #else static inline bool page_poisoning_enabled(void) { return false; } static inline void kernel_poison_pages(struct page *page, int numpages, int enable) { } #endif #ifdef CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(init_on_alloc); #else DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(init_on_alloc); #endif static inline bool want_init_on_alloc(gfp_t flags) { if (static_branch_unlikely(&init_on_alloc) && !page_poisoning_enabled()) return true; return flags & __GFP_ZERO; } #ifdef CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(init_on_free); #else DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(init_on_free); #endif static inline bool want_init_on_free(void) { return static_branch_unlikely(&init_on_free) && !page_poisoning_enabled(); } #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC extern void init_debug_pagealloc(void); #else static inline void init_debug_pagealloc(void) {} #endif extern bool _debug_pagealloc_enabled_early; DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(_debug_pagealloc_enabled); static inline bool debug_pagealloc_enabled(void) { return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC) && _debug_pagealloc_enabled_early; } /* * For use in fast paths after init_debug_pagealloc() has run, or when a * false negative result is not harmful when called too early. */ static inline bool debug_pagealloc_enabled_static(void) { if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC)) return false; return static_branch_unlikely(&_debug_pagealloc_enabled); } #if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC) || defined(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP) extern void __kernel_map_pages(struct page *page, int numpages, int enable); /* * When called in DEBUG_PAGEALLOC context, the call should most likely be * guarded by debug_pagealloc_enabled() or debug_pagealloc_enabled_static() */ static inline void kernel_map_pages(struct page *page, int numpages, int enable) { __kernel_map_pages(page, numpages, enable); } #ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATION extern bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page); #endif /* CONFIG_HIBERNATION */ #else /* CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC || CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP */ static inline void kernel_map_pages(struct page *page, int numpages, int enable) {} #ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATION static inline bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page) { return true; } #endif /* CONFIG_HIBERNATION */ #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC || CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP */ #ifdef __HAVE_ARCH_GATE_AREA extern struct vm_area_struct *get_gate_vma(struct mm_struct *mm); extern int in_gate_area_no_mm(unsigned long addr); extern int in_gate_area(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr); #else static inline struct vm_area_struct *get_gate_vma(struct mm_struct *mm) { return NULL; } static inline int in_gate_area_no_mm(unsigned long addr) { return 0; } static inline int in_gate_area(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr) { return 0; } #endif /* __HAVE_ARCH_GATE_AREA */ extern bool process_shares_mm(struct task_struct *p, struct mm_struct *mm); #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL extern int sysctl_drop_caches; int drop_caches_sysctl_handler(struct ctl_table *, int, void *, size_t *, loff_t *); #endif void drop_slab(void); void drop_slab_node(int nid); #ifndef CONFIG_MMU #define randomize_va_space 0 #else extern int randomize_va_space; #endif const char * arch_vma_name(struct vm_area_struct *vma); #ifdef CONFIG_MMU void print_vma_addr(char *prefix, unsigned long rip); #else static inline void print_vma_addr(char *prefix, unsigned long rip) { } #endif void *sparse_buffer_alloc(unsigned long size); struct page * __populate_section_memmap(unsigned long pfn, unsigned long nr_pages, int nid, struct vmem_altmap *altmap); pgd_t *vmemmap_pgd_populate(unsigned long addr, int node); p4d_t *vmemmap_p4d_populate(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long addr, int node); pud_t *vmemmap_pud_populate(p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long addr, int node); pmd_t *vmemmap_pmd_populate(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr, int node); pte_t *vmemmap_pte_populate(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr, int node, struct vmem_altmap *altmap); void *vmemmap_alloc_block(unsigned long size, int node); struct vmem_altmap; void *vmemmap_alloc_block_buf(unsigned long size, int node, struct vmem_altmap *altmap); void vmemmap_verify(pte_t *, int, unsigned long, unsigned long); int vmemmap_populate_basepages(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, int node, struct vmem_altmap *altmap); int vmemmap_populate(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, int node, struct vmem_altmap *altmap); void vmemmap_populate_print_last(void); #ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG void vmemmap_free(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, struct vmem_altmap *altmap); #endif void register_page_bootmem_memmap(unsigned long section_nr, struct page *map, unsigned long nr_pages); enum mf_flags { MF_COUNT_INCREASED = 1 << 0, MF_ACTION_REQUIRED = 1 << 1, MF_MUST_KILL = 1 << 2, MF_SOFT_OFFLINE = 1 << 3, }; extern int memory_failure(unsigned long pfn, int flags); extern void memory_failure_queue(unsigned long pfn, int flags); extern void memory_failure_queue_kick(int cpu); extern int unpoison_memory(unsigned long pfn); extern int sysctl_memory_failure_early_kill; extern int sysctl_memory_failure_recovery; extern void shake_page(struct page *p, int access); extern atomic_long_t num_poisoned_pages __read_mostly; extern int soft_offline_page(unsigned long pfn, int flags); /* * Error handlers for various types of pages. */ enum mf_result { MF_IGNORED, /* Error: cannot be handled */ MF_FAILED, /* Error: handling failed */ MF_DELAYED, /* Will be handled later */ MF_RECOVERED, /* Successfully recovered */ }; enum mf_action_page_type { MF_MSG_KERNEL, MF_MSG_KERNEL_HIGH_ORDER, MF_MSG_SLAB, MF_MSG_DIFFERENT_COMPOUND, MF_MSG_POISONED_HUGE, MF_MSG_HUGE, MF_MSG_FREE_HUGE, MF_MSG_NON_PMD_HUGE, MF_MSG_UNMAP_FAILED, MF_MSG_DIRTY_SWAPCACHE, MF_MSG_CLEAN_SWAPCACHE, MF_MSG_DIRTY_MLOCKED_LRU, MF_MSG_CLEAN_MLOCKED_LRU, MF_MSG_DIRTY_UNEVICTABLE_LRU, MF_MSG_CLEAN_UNEVICTABLE_LRU, MF_MSG_DIRTY_LRU, MF_MSG_CLEAN_LRU, MF_MSG_TRUNCATED_LRU, MF_MSG_BUDDY, MF_MSG_BUDDY_2ND, MF_MSG_DAX, MF_MSG_UNSPLIT_THP, MF_MSG_UNKNOWN, }; #if defined(CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE) || defined(CONFIG_HUGETLBFS) extern void clear_huge_page(struct page *page, unsigned long addr_hint, unsigned int pages_per_huge_page); extern void copy_user_huge_page(struct page *dst, struct page *src, unsigned long addr_hint, struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned int pages_per_huge_page); extern long copy_huge_page_from_user(struct page *dst_page, const void __user *usr_src, unsigned int pages_per_huge_page, bool allow_pagefault); /** * vma_is_special_huge - Are transhuge page-table entries considered special? * @vma: Pointer to the struct vm_area_struct to consider * * Whether transhuge page-table entries are considered "special" following * the definition in vm_normal_page(). * * Return: true if transhuge page-table entries should be considered special, * false otherwise. */ static inline bool vma_is_special_huge(const struct vm_area_struct *vma) { return vma_is_dax(vma) || (vma->vm_file && (vma->vm_flags & (VM_PFNMAP | VM_MIXEDMAP))); } #endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE || CONFIG_HUGETLBFS */ #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC extern unsigned int _debug_guardpage_minorder; DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(_debug_guardpage_enabled); static inline unsigned int debug_guardpage_minorder(void) { return _debug_guardpage_minorder; } static inline bool debug_guardpage_enabled(void) { return static_branch_unlikely(&_debug_guardpage_enabled); } static inline bool page_is_guard(struct page *page) { if (!debug_guardpage_enabled()) return false; return PageGuard(page); } #else static inline unsigned int debug_guardpage_minorder(void) { return 0; } static inline bool debug_guardpage_enabled(void) { return false; } static inline bool page_is_guard(struct page *page) { return false; } #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC */ #if MAX_NUMNODES > 1 void __init setup_nr_node_ids(void); #else static inline void setup_nr_node_ids(void) {} #endif extern int memcmp_pages(struct page *page1, struct page *page2); static inline int pages_identical(struct page *page1, struct page *page2) { return !memcmp_pages(page1, page2); } #ifdef CONFIG_MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS unsigned long clean_record_shared_mapping_range(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t first_index, pgoff_t nr, pgoff_t bitmap_pgoff, unsigned long *bitmap, pgoff_t *start, pgoff_t *end); unsigned long wp_shared_mapping_range(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t first_index, pgoff_t nr); #endif extern int sysctl_nr_trim_pages; /** * seal_check_future_write - Check for F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE flag and handle it * @seals: the seals to check * @vma: the vma to operate on * * Check whether F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE is set; if so, do proper check/handling on * the vma flags. Return 0 if check pass, or <0 for errors. */ static inline int seal_check_future_write(int seals, struct vm_area_struct *vma) { if (seals & F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE) { /* * New PROT_WRITE and MAP_SHARED mmaps are not allowed when * "future write" seal active. */ if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) return -EPERM; /* * Since an F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE sealed memfd can be mapped as * MAP_SHARED and read-only, take care to not allow mprotect to * revert protections on such mappings. Do this only for shared * mappings. For private mappings, don't need to mask * VM_MAYWRITE as we still want them to be COW-writable. */ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) vma->vm_flags &= ~(VM_MAYWRITE); } return 0; } #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ #endif /* _LINUX_MM_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * Routines to manage notifier chains for passing status changes to any * interested routines. We need this instead of hard coded call lists so * that modules can poke their nose into the innards. The network devices * needed them so here they are for the rest of you. * * Alan Cox <Alan.Cox@linux.org> */ #ifndef _LINUX_NOTIFIER_H #define _LINUX_NOTIFIER_H #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/rwsem.h> #include <linux/srcu.h> /* * Notifier chains are of four types: * * Atomic notifier chains: Chain callbacks run in interrupt/atomic * context. Callouts are not allowed to block. * Blocking notifier chains: Chain callbacks run in process context. * Callouts are allowed to block. * Raw notifier chains: There are no restrictions on callbacks, * registration, or unregistration. All locking and protection * must be provided by the caller. * SRCU notifier chains: A variant of blocking notifier chains, with * the same restrictions. * * atomic_notifier_chain_register() may be called from an atomic context, * but blocking_notifier_chain_register() and srcu_notifier_chain_register() * must be called from a process context. Ditto for the corresponding * _unregister() routines. * * atomic_notifier_chain_unregister(), blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(), * and srcu_notifier_chain_unregister() _must not_ be called from within * the call chain. * * SRCU notifier chains are an alternative form of blocking notifier chains. * They use SRCU (Sleepable Read-Copy Update) instead of rw-semaphores for * protection of the chain links. This means there is _very_ low overhead * in srcu_notifier_call_chain(): no cache bounces and no memory barriers. * As compensation, srcu_notifier_chain_unregister() is rather expensive. * SRCU notifier chains should be used when the chain will be called very * often but notifier_blocks will seldom be removed. */ struct notifier_block; typedef int (*notifier_fn_t)(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long action, void *data); struct notifier_block { notifier_fn_t notifier_call; struct notifier_block __rcu *next; int priority; }; struct atomic_notifier_head { spinlock_t lock; struct notifier_block __rcu *head; }; struct blocking_notifier_head { struct rw_semaphore rwsem; struct notifier_block __rcu *head; }; struct raw_notifier_head { struct notifier_block __rcu *head; }; struct srcu_notifier_head { struct mutex mutex; struct srcu_struct srcu; struct notifier_block __rcu *head; }; #define ATOMIC_INIT_NOTIFIER_HEAD(name) do { \ spin_lock_init(&(name)->lock); \ (name)->head = NULL; \ } while (0) #define BLOCKING_INIT_NOTIFIER_HEAD(name) do { \ init_rwsem(&(name)->rwsem); \ (name)->head = NULL; \ } while (0) #define RAW_INIT_NOTIFIER_HEAD(name) do { \ (name)->head = NULL; \ } while (0) /* srcu_notifier_heads must be cleaned up dynamically */ extern void srcu_init_notifier_head(struct srcu_notifier_head *nh); #define srcu_cleanup_notifier_head(name) \ cleanup_srcu_struct(&(name)->srcu); #define ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_INIT(name) { \ .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(name.lock), \ .head = NULL } #define BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_INIT(name) { \ .rwsem = __RWSEM_INITIALIZER((name).rwsem), \ .head = NULL } #define RAW_NOTIFIER_INIT(name) { \ .head = NULL } #define SRCU_NOTIFIER_INIT(name, pcpu) \ { \ .mutex = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(name.mutex), \ .head = NULL, \ .srcu = __SRCU_STRUCT_INIT(name.srcu, pcpu), \ } #define ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(name) \ struct atomic_notifier_head name = \ ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_INIT(name) #define BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(name) \ struct blocking_notifier_head name = \ BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_INIT(name) #define RAW_NOTIFIER_HEAD(name) \ struct raw_notifier_head name = \ RAW_NOTIFIER_INIT(name) #ifdef CONFIG_TREE_SRCU #define _SRCU_NOTIFIER_HEAD(name, mod) \ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct srcu_data, name##_head_srcu_data); \ mod struct srcu_notifier_head name = \ SRCU_NOTIFIER_INIT(name, name##_head_srcu_data) #else #define _SRCU_NOTIFIER_HEAD(name, mod) \ mod struct srcu_notifier_head name = \ SRCU_NOTIFIER_INIT(name, name) #endif #define SRCU_NOTIFIER_HEAD(name) \ _SRCU_NOTIFIER_HEAD(name, /* not static */) #define SRCU_NOTIFIER_HEAD_STATIC(name) \ _SRCU_NOTIFIER_HEAD(name, static) #ifdef __KERNEL__ extern int atomic_notifier_chain_register(struct atomic_notifier_head *nh, struct notifier_block *nb); extern int blocking_notifier_chain_register(struct blocking_notifier_head *nh, struct notifier_block *nb); extern int raw_notifier_chain_register(struct raw_notifier_head *nh, struct notifier_block *nb); extern int srcu_notifier_chain_register(struct srcu_notifier_head *nh, struct notifier_block *nb); extern int atomic_notifier_chain_unregister(struct atomic_notifier_head *nh, struct notifier_block *nb); extern int blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(struct blocking_notifier_head *nh, struct notifier_block *nb); extern int raw_notifier_chain_unregister(struct raw_notifier_head *nh, struct notifier_block *nb); extern int srcu_notifier_chain_unregister(struct srcu_notifier_head *nh, struct notifier_block *nb); extern int atomic_notifier_call_chain(struct atomic_notifier_head *nh, unsigned long val, void *v); extern int blocking_notifier_call_chain(struct blocking_notifier_head *nh, unsigned long val, void *v); extern int raw_notifier_call_chain(struct raw_notifier_head *nh, unsigned long val, void *v); extern int srcu_notifier_call_chain(struct srcu_notifier_head *nh, unsigned long val, void *v); extern int atomic_notifier_call_chain_robust(struct atomic_notifier_head *nh, unsigned long val_up, unsigned long val_down, void *v); extern int blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust(struct blocking_notifier_head *nh, unsigned long val_up, unsigned long val_down, void *v); extern int raw_notifier_call_chain_robust(struct raw_notifier_head *nh, unsigned long val_up, unsigned long val_down, void *v); #define NOTIFY_DONE 0x0000 /* Don't care */ #define NOTIFY_OK 0x0001 /* Suits me */ #define NOTIFY_STOP_MASK 0x8000 /* Don't call further */ #define NOTIFY_BAD (NOTIFY_STOP_MASK|0x0002) /* Bad/Veto action */ /* * Clean way to return from the notifier and stop further calls. */ #define NOTIFY_STOP (NOTIFY_OK|NOTIFY_STOP_MASK) /* Encapsulate (negative) errno value (in particular, NOTIFY_BAD <=> EPERM). */ static inline int notifier_from_errno(int err) { if (err) return NOTIFY_STOP_MASK | (NOTIFY_OK - err); return NOTIFY_OK; } /* Restore (negative) errno value from notify return value. */ static inline int notifier_to_errno(int ret) { ret &= ~NOTIFY_STOP_MASK; return ret > NOTIFY_OK ? NOTIFY_OK - ret : 0; } /* * Declared notifiers so far. I can imagine quite a few more chains * over time (eg laptop power reset chains, reboot chain (to clean * device units up), device [un]mount chain, module load/unload chain, * low memory chain, screenblank chain (for plug in modular screenblankers) * VC switch chains (for loadable kernel svgalib VC switch helpers) etc... */ /* CPU notfiers are defined in include/linux/cpu.h. */ /* netdevice notifiers are defined in include/linux/netdevice.h */ /* reboot notifiers are defined in include/linux/reboot.h. */ /* Hibernation and suspend events are defined in include/linux/suspend.h. */ /* Virtual Terminal events are defined in include/linux/vt.h. */ #define NETLINK_URELEASE 0x0001 /* Unicast netlink socket released */ /* Console keyboard events. * Note: KBD_KEYCODE is always sent before KBD_UNBOUND_KEYCODE, KBD_UNICODE and * KBD_KEYSYM. */ #define KBD_KEYCODE 0x0001 /* Keyboard keycode, called before any other */ #define KBD_UNBOUND_KEYCODE 0x0002 /* Keyboard keycode which is not bound to any other */ #define KBD_UNICODE 0x0003 /* Keyboard unicode */ #define KBD_KEYSYM 0x0004 /* Keyboard keysym */ #define KBD_POST_KEYSYM 0x0005 /* Called after keyboard keysym interpretation */ extern struct blocking_notifier_head reboot_notifier_list; #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ #endif /* _LINUX_NOTIFIER_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 #ifndef _LINUX_UNALIGNED_PACKED_STRUCT_H #define _LINUX_UNALIGNED_PACKED_STRUCT_H #include <linux/kernel.h> struct __una_u16 { u16 x; } __packed; struct __una_u32 { u32 x; } __packed; struct __una_u64 { u64 x; } __packed; static inline u16 __get_unaligned_cpu16(const void *p) { const struct __una_u16 *ptr = (const struct __una_u16 *)p; return ptr->x; } static inline u32 __get_unaligned_cpu32(const void *p) { const struct __una_u32 *ptr = (const struct __una_u32 *)p; return ptr->x; } static inline u64 __get_unaligned_cpu64(const void *p) { const struct __una_u64 *ptr = (const struct __una_u64 *)p; return ptr->x; } static inline void __put_unaligned_cpu16(u16 val, void *p) { struct __una_u16 *ptr = (struct __una_u16 *)p; ptr->x = val; } static inline void __put_unaligned_cpu32(u32 val, void *p) { struct __una_u32 *ptr = (struct __una_u32 *)p; ptr->x = val; } static inline void __put_unaligned_cpu64(u64 val, void *p) { struct __una_u64 *ptr = (struct __una_u64 *)p; ptr->x = val; } #endif /* _LINUX_UNALIGNED_PACKED_STRUCT_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 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= 0, CPUHP_CREATE_THREADS, CPUHP_PERF_PREPARE, CPUHP_PERF_X86_PREPARE, CPUHP_PERF_X86_AMD_UNCORE_PREP, CPUHP_PERF_POWER, CPUHP_PERF_SUPERH, CPUHP_X86_HPET_DEAD, CPUHP_X86_APB_DEAD, CPUHP_X86_MCE_DEAD, CPUHP_VIRT_NET_DEAD, CPUHP_SLUB_DEAD, CPUHP_DEBUG_OBJ_DEAD, CPUHP_MM_WRITEBACK_DEAD, CPUHP_MM_VMSTAT_DEAD, CPUHP_SOFTIRQ_DEAD, CPUHP_NET_MVNETA_DEAD, CPUHP_CPUIDLE_DEAD, CPUHP_ARM64_FPSIMD_DEAD, CPUHP_ARM_OMAP_WAKE_DEAD, CPUHP_IRQ_POLL_DEAD, CPUHP_BLOCK_SOFTIRQ_DEAD, CPUHP_ACPI_CPUDRV_DEAD, CPUHP_S390_PFAULT_DEAD, CPUHP_BLK_MQ_DEAD, CPUHP_FS_BUFF_DEAD, CPUHP_PRINTK_DEAD, CPUHP_MM_MEMCQ_DEAD, CPUHP_PERCPU_CNT_DEAD, CPUHP_RADIX_DEAD, CPUHP_PAGE_ALLOC_DEAD, CPUHP_NET_DEV_DEAD, CPUHP_PCI_XGENE_DEAD, CPUHP_IOMMU_INTEL_DEAD, CPUHP_LUSTRE_CFS_DEAD, CPUHP_AP_ARM_CACHE_B15_RAC_DEAD, CPUHP_PADATA_DEAD, CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP, CPUHP_POWER_NUMA_PREPARE, CPUHP_HRTIMERS_PREPARE, CPUHP_PROFILE_PREPARE, CPUHP_X2APIC_PREPARE, CPUHP_SMPCFD_PREPARE, CPUHP_RELAY_PREPARE, CPUHP_SLAB_PREPARE, CPUHP_MD_RAID5_PREPARE, CPUHP_RCUTREE_PREP, CPUHP_CPUIDLE_COUPLED_PREPARE, CPUHP_POWERPC_PMAC_PREPARE, CPUHP_POWERPC_MMU_CTX_PREPARE, CPUHP_XEN_PREPARE, CPUHP_XEN_EVTCHN_PREPARE, CPUHP_ARM_SHMOBILE_SCU_PREPARE, CPUHP_SH_SH3X_PREPARE, CPUHP_NET_FLOW_PREPARE, CPUHP_TOPOLOGY_PREPARE, CPUHP_NET_IUCV_PREPARE, CPUHP_ARM_BL_PREPARE, CPUHP_TRACE_RB_PREPARE, CPUHP_MM_ZS_PREPARE, CPUHP_MM_ZSWP_MEM_PREPARE, CPUHP_MM_ZSWP_POOL_PREPARE, CPUHP_KVM_PPC_BOOK3S_PREPARE, CPUHP_ZCOMP_PREPARE, CPUHP_TIMERS_PREPARE, CPUHP_MIPS_SOC_PREPARE, CPUHP_BP_PREPARE_DYN, CPUHP_BP_PREPARE_DYN_END = CPUHP_BP_PREPARE_DYN + 20, CPUHP_BRINGUP_CPU, CPUHP_AP_IDLE_DEAD, CPUHP_AP_OFFLINE, CPUHP_AP_SCHED_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_RCUTREE_DYING, CPUHP_AP_CPU_PM_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_IRQ_GIC_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_IRQ_HIP04_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_IRQ_ARMADA_XP_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_IRQ_BCM2836_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_IRQ_MIPS_GIC_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_IRQ_RISCV_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_IRQ_SIFIVE_PLIC_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_ARM_MVEBU_COHERENCY, CPUHP_AP_MICROCODE_LOADER, CPUHP_AP_PERF_X86_AMD_UNCORE_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_PERF_X86_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_PERF_X86_AMD_IBS_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_PERF_X86_CQM_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_PERF_X86_CSTATE_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_PERF_XTENSA_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_MIPS_OP_LOONGSON3_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_ARM_SDEI_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_ARM_VFP_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_ARM64_DEBUG_MONITORS_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_PERF_ARM_HW_BREAKPOINT_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_PERF_ARM_ACPI_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_PERF_ARM_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_ARM_L2X0_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_EXYNOS4_MCT_TIMER_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_ARM_ARCH_TIMER_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_ARM_GLOBAL_TIMER_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_JCORE_TIMER_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_ARM_TWD_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_QCOM_TIMER_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_TEGRA_TIMER_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_ARMADA_TIMER_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_MARCO_TIMER_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_MIPS_GIC_TIMER_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_ARC_TIMER_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_RISCV_TIMER_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_CLINT_TIMER_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_CSKY_TIMER_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_TI_GP_TIMER_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_HYPERV_TIMER_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_KVM_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_KVM_ARM_VGIC_INIT_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_KVM_ARM_VGIC_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_KVM_ARM_TIMER_STARTING, /* Must be the last timer callback */ CPUHP_AP_DUMMY_TIMER_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_ARM_XEN_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_ARM_CORESIGHT_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_ARM_CORESIGHT_CTI_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_ARM64_ISNDEP_STARTING, CPUHP_AP_SMPCFD_DYING, CPUHP_AP_X86_TBOOT_DYING, CPUHP_AP_ARM_CACHE_B15_RAC_DYING, CPUHP_AP_ONLINE, CPUHP_TEARDOWN_CPU, CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_IDLE, CPUHP_AP_SMPBOOT_THREADS, CPUHP_AP_X86_VDSO_VMA_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_IRQ_AFFINITY_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_BLK_MQ_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_ARM_MVEBU_SYNC_CLOCKS, CPUHP_AP_X86_INTEL_EPB_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_PERF_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_PERF_X86_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_PERF_X86_UNCORE_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_PERF_X86_AMD_UNCORE_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_PERF_X86_AMD_POWER_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_PERF_X86_RAPL_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_PERF_X86_CQM_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_PERF_X86_CSTATE_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_PERF_S390_CF_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_PERF_S390_SF_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_PERF_ARM_CCI_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_PERF_ARM_CCN_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_PERF_ARM_HISI_DDRC_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_PERF_ARM_HISI_HHA_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_PERF_ARM_HISI_L3_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_PERF_ARM_L2X0_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_PERF_ARM_QCOM_L2_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_PERF_ARM_QCOM_L3_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_PERF_ARM_APM_XGENE_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_PERF_ARM_CAVIUM_TX2_UNCORE_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_PERF_POWERPC_NEST_IMC_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_PERF_POWERPC_CORE_IMC_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_PERF_POWERPC_THREAD_IMC_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_PERF_POWERPC_TRACE_IMC_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_PERF_POWERPC_HV_24x7_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_PERF_POWERPC_HV_GPCI_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_WATCHDOG_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_WORKQUEUE_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_RCUTREE_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_BASE_CACHEINFO_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN_END = CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN + 30, CPUHP_AP_X86_HPET_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_X86_KVM_CLK_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_ACTIVE, CPUHP_ONLINE, }; int __cpuhp_setup_state(enum cpuhp_state state, const char *name, bool invoke, int (*startup)(unsigned int cpu), int (*teardown)(unsigned int cpu), bool multi_instance); int __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked(enum cpuhp_state state, const char *name, bool invoke, int (*startup)(unsigned int cpu), int (*teardown)(unsigned int cpu), bool multi_instance); /** * cpuhp_setup_state - Setup hotplug state callbacks with calling the callbacks * @state: The state for which the calls are installed * @name: Name of the callback (will be used in debug output) * @startup: startup callback function * @teardown: teardown callback function * * Installs the callback functions and invokes the startup callback on * the present cpus which have already reached the @state. */ static inline int cpuhp_setup_state(enum cpuhp_state state, const char *name, int (*startup)(unsigned int cpu), int (*teardown)(unsigned int cpu)) { return __cpuhp_setup_state(state, name, true, startup, teardown, false); } static inline int cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked(enum cpuhp_state state, const char *name, int (*startup)(unsigned int cpu), int (*teardown)(unsigned int cpu)) { return __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked(state, name, true, startup, teardown, false); } /** * cpuhp_setup_state_nocalls - Setup hotplug state callbacks without calling the * callbacks * @state: The state for which the calls are installed * @name: Name of the callback. * @startup: startup callback function * @teardown: teardown callback function * * Same as @cpuhp_setup_state except that no calls are executed are invoked * during installation of this callback. NOP if SMP=n or HOTPLUG_CPU=n. */ static inline int cpuhp_setup_state_nocalls(enum cpuhp_state state, const char *name, int (*startup)(unsigned int cpu), int (*teardown)(unsigned int cpu)) { return __cpuhp_setup_state(state, name, false, startup, teardown, false); } static inline int cpuhp_setup_state_nocalls_cpuslocked(enum cpuhp_state state, const char *name, int (*startup)(unsigned int cpu), int (*teardown)(unsigned int cpu)) { return __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked(state, name, false, startup, teardown, false); } /** * cpuhp_setup_state_multi - Add callbacks for multi state * @state: The state for which the calls are installed * @name: Name of the callback. * @startup: startup callback function * @teardown: teardown callback function * * Sets the internal multi_instance flag and prepares a state to work as a multi * instance callback. No callbacks are invoked at this point. The callbacks are * invoked once an instance for this state are registered via * @cpuhp_state_add_instance or @cpuhp_state_add_instance_nocalls. */ static inline int cpuhp_setup_state_multi(enum cpuhp_state state, const char *name, int (*startup)(unsigned int cpu, struct hlist_node *node), int (*teardown)(unsigned int cpu, struct hlist_node *node)) { return __cpuhp_setup_state(state, name, false, (void *) startup, (void *) teardown, true); } int __cpuhp_state_add_instance(enum cpuhp_state state, struct hlist_node *node, bool invoke); int __cpuhp_state_add_instance_cpuslocked(enum cpuhp_state state, struct hlist_node *node, bool invoke); /** * cpuhp_state_add_instance - Add an instance for a state and invoke startup * callback. * @state: The state for which the instance is installed * @node: The node for this individual state. * * Installs the instance for the @state and invokes the startup callback on * the present cpus which have already reached the @state. The @state must have * been earlier marked as multi-instance by @cpuhp_setup_state_multi. */ static inline int cpuhp_state_add_instance(enum cpuhp_state state, struct hlist_node *node) { return __cpuhp_state_add_instance(state, node, true); } /** * cpuhp_state_add_instance_nocalls - Add an instance for a state without * invoking the startup callback. * @state: The state for which the instance is installed * @node: The node for this individual state. * * Installs the instance for the @state The @state must have been earlier * marked as multi-instance by @cpuhp_setup_state_multi. */ static inline int cpuhp_state_add_instance_nocalls(enum cpuhp_state state, struct hlist_node *node) { return __cpuhp_state_add_instance(state, node, false); } static inline int cpuhp_state_add_instance_nocalls_cpuslocked(enum cpuhp_state state, struct hlist_node *node) { return __cpuhp_state_add_instance_cpuslocked(state, node, false); } void __cpuhp_remove_state(enum cpuhp_state state, bool invoke); void __cpuhp_remove_state_cpuslocked(enum cpuhp_state state, bool invoke); /** * cpuhp_remove_state - Remove hotplug state callbacks and invoke the teardown * @state: The state for which the calls are removed * * Removes the callback functions and invokes the teardown callback on * the present cpus which have already reached the @state. */ static inline void cpuhp_remove_state(enum cpuhp_state state) { __cpuhp_remove_state(state, true); } /** * cpuhp_remove_state_nocalls - Remove hotplug state callbacks without invoking * teardown * @state: The state for which the calls are removed */ static inline void cpuhp_remove_state_nocalls(enum cpuhp_state state) { __cpuhp_remove_state(state, false); } static inline void cpuhp_remove_state_nocalls_cpuslocked(enum cpuhp_state state) { __cpuhp_remove_state_cpuslocked(state, false); } /** * cpuhp_remove_multi_state - Remove hotplug multi state callback * @state: The state for which the calls are removed * * Removes the callback functions from a multi state. This is the reverse of * cpuhp_setup_state_multi(). All instances should have been removed before * invoking this function. */ static inline void cpuhp_remove_multi_state(enum cpuhp_state state) { __cpuhp_remove_state(state, false); } int __cpuhp_state_remove_instance(enum cpuhp_state state, struct hlist_node *node, bool invoke); /** * cpuhp_state_remove_instance - Remove hotplug instance from state and invoke * the teardown callback * @state: The state from which the instance is removed * @node: The node for this individual state. * * Removes the instance and invokes the teardown callback on the present cpus * which have already reached the @state. */ static inline int cpuhp_state_remove_instance(enum cpuhp_state state, struct hlist_node *node) { return __cpuhp_state_remove_instance(state, node, true); } /** * cpuhp_state_remove_instance_nocalls - Remove hotplug instance from state * without invoking the reatdown callback * @state: The state from which the instance is removed * @node: The node for this individual state. * * Removes the instance without invoking the teardown callback. */ static inline int cpuhp_state_remove_instance_nocalls(enum cpuhp_state state, struct hlist_node *node) { return __cpuhp_state_remove_instance(state, node, false); } #ifdef CONFIG_SMP void cpuhp_online_idle(enum cpuhp_state state); #else static inline void cpuhp_online_idle(enum cpuhp_state state) { } #endif #endif
2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef _ASM_X86_CURRENT_H #define _ASM_X86_CURRENT_H #include <linux/compiler.h> #include <asm/percpu.h> #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ struct task_struct; DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct task_struct *, current_task); static __always_inline struct task_struct *get_current(void) { return this_cpu_read_stable(current_task); } #define current get_current() #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CURRENT_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ /* * net busy poll support * Copyright(c) 2013 Intel Corporation. * * Author: Eliezer Tamir * * Contact Information: * e1000-devel Mailing List <e1000-devel@lists.sourceforge.net> */ #ifndef _LINUX_NET_BUSY_POLL_H #define _LINUX_NET_BUSY_POLL_H #include <linux/netdevice.h> #include <linux/sched/clock.h> #include <linux/sched/signal.h> #include <net/ip.h> /* 0 - Reserved to indicate value not set * 1..NR_CPUS - Reserved for sender_cpu * NR_CPUS+1..~0 - Region available for NAPI IDs */ #define MIN_NAPI_ID ((unsigned int)(NR_CPUS + 1)) #ifdef CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL struct napi_struct; extern unsigned int sysctl_net_busy_read __read_mostly; extern unsigned int sysctl_net_busy_poll __read_mostly; static inline bool net_busy_loop_on(void) { return sysctl_net_busy_poll; } static inline bool sk_can_busy_loop(const struct sock *sk) { return READ_ONCE(sk->sk_ll_usec) && !signal_pending(current); } bool sk_busy_loop_end(void *p, unsigned long start_time); void napi_busy_loop(unsigned int napi_id, bool (*loop_end)(void *, unsigned long), void *loop_end_arg); #else /* CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL */ static inline unsigned long net_busy_loop_on(void) { return 0; } static inline bool sk_can_busy_loop(struct sock *sk) { return false; } #endif /* CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL */ static inline unsigned long busy_loop_current_time(void) { #ifdef CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL return (unsigned long)(local_clock() >> 10); #else return 0; #endif } /* in poll/select we use the global sysctl_net_ll_poll value */ static inline bool busy_loop_timeout(unsigned long start_time) { #ifdef CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL unsigned long bp_usec = READ_ONCE(sysctl_net_busy_poll); if (bp_usec) { unsigned long end_time = start_time + bp_usec; unsigned long now = busy_loop_current_time(); return time_after(now, end_time); } #endif return true; } static inline bool sk_busy_loop_timeout(struct sock *sk, unsigned long start_time) { #ifdef CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL unsigned long bp_usec = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_ll_usec); if (bp_usec) { unsigned long end_time = start_time + bp_usec; unsigned long now = busy_loop_current_time(); return time_after(now, end_time); } #endif return true; } static inline void sk_busy_loop(struct sock *sk, int nonblock) { #ifdef CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL unsigned int napi_id = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_napi_id); if (napi_id >= MIN_NAPI_ID) napi_busy_loop(napi_id, nonblock ? NULL : sk_busy_loop_end, sk); #endif } /* used in the NIC receive handler to mark the skb */ static inline void skb_mark_napi_id(struct sk_buff *skb, struct napi_struct *napi) { #ifdef CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL /* If the skb was already marked with a valid NAPI ID, avoid overwriting * it. */ if (skb->napi_id < MIN_NAPI_ID) skb->napi_id = napi->napi_id; #endif } /* used in the protocol hanlder to propagate the napi_id to the socket */ static inline void sk_mark_napi_id(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb) { #ifdef CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_napi_id, skb->napi_id); #endif sk_rx_queue_set(sk, skb); } /* variant used for unconnected sockets */ static inline void sk_mark_napi_id_once(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb) { #ifdef CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL if (!READ_ONCE(sk->sk_napi_id)) WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_napi_id, skb->napi_id); #endif } #endif /* _LINUX_NET_BUSY_POLL_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef _LINUX_SIGNAL_H #define _LINUX_SIGNAL_H #include <linux/bug.h> #include <linux/signal_types.h> #include <linux/string.h> struct task_struct; /* for sysctl */ extern int print_fatal_signals; static inline void copy_siginfo(kernel_siginfo_t *to, const kernel_siginfo_t *from) { memcpy(to, from, sizeof(*to)); } static inline void clear_siginfo(kernel_siginfo_t *info) { memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info)); } #define SI_EXPANSION_SIZE (sizeof(struct siginfo) - sizeof(struct kernel_siginfo)) static inline void copy_siginfo_to_external(siginfo_t *to, const kernel_siginfo_t *from) { memcpy(to, from, sizeof(*from)); memset(((char *)to) + sizeof(struct kernel_siginfo), 0, SI_EXPANSION_SIZE); } int copy_siginfo_to_user(siginfo_t __user *to, const kernel_siginfo_t *from); int copy_siginfo_from_user(kernel_siginfo_t *to, const siginfo_t __user *from); enum siginfo_layout { SIL_KILL, SIL_TIMER, SIL_POLL, SIL_FAULT, SIL_FAULT_MCEERR, SIL_FAULT_BNDERR, SIL_FAULT_PKUERR, SIL_CHLD, SIL_RT, SIL_SYS, }; enum siginfo_layout siginfo_layout(unsigned sig, int si_code); /* * Define some primitives to manipulate sigset_t. */ #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_SIG_BITOPS #include <linux/bitops.h> /* We don't use <linux/bitops.h> for these because there is no need to be atomic. */ static inline void sigaddset(sigset_t *set, int _sig) { unsigned long sig = _sig - 1; if (_NSIG_WORDS == 1) set->sig[0] |= 1UL << sig; else set->sig[sig / _NSIG_BPW] |= 1UL << (sig % _NSIG_BPW); } static inline void sigdelset(sigset_t *set, int _sig) { unsigned long sig = _sig - 1; if (_NSIG_WORDS == 1) set->sig[0] &= ~(1UL << sig); else set->sig[sig / _NSIG_BPW] &= ~(1UL << (sig % _NSIG_BPW)); } static inline int sigismember(sigset_t *set, int _sig) { unsigned long sig = _sig - 1; if (_NSIG_WORDS == 1) return 1 & (set->sig[0] >> sig); else return 1 & (set->sig[sig / _NSIG_BPW] >> (sig % _NSIG_BPW)); } #endif /* __HAVE_ARCH_SIG_BITOPS */ static inline int sigisemptyset(sigset_t *set) { switch (_NSIG_WORDS) { case 4: return (set->sig[3] | set->sig[2] | set->sig[1] | set->sig[0]) == 0; case 2: return (set->sig[1] | set->sig[0]) == 0; case 1: return set->sig[0] == 0; default: BUILD_BUG(); return 0; } } static inline int sigequalsets(const sigset_t *set1, const sigset_t *set2) { switch (_NSIG_WORDS) { case 4: return (set1->sig[3] == set2->sig[3]) && (set1->sig[2] == set2->sig[2]) && (set1->sig[1] == set2->sig[1]) && (set1->sig[0] == set2->sig[0]); case 2: return (set1->sig[1] == set2->sig[1]) && (set1->sig[0] == set2->sig[0]); case 1: return set1->sig[0] == set2->sig[0]; } return 0; } #define sigmask(sig) (1UL << ((sig) - 1)) #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_SIG_SETOPS #include <linux/string.h> #define _SIG_SET_BINOP(name, op) \ static inline void name(sigset_t *r, const sigset_t *a, const sigset_t *b) \ { \ unsigned long a0, a1, a2, a3, b0, b1, b2, b3; \ \ switch (_NSIG_WORDS) { \ case 4: \ a3 = a->sig[3]; a2 = a->sig[2]; \ b3 = b->sig[3]; b2 = b->sig[2]; \ r->sig[3] = op(a3, b3); \ r->sig[2] = op(a2, b2); \ fallthrough; \ case 2: \ a1 = a->sig[1]; b1 = b->sig[1]; \ r->sig[1] = op(a1, b1); \ fallthrough; \ case 1: \ a0 = a->sig[0]; b0 = b->sig[0]; \ r->sig[0] = op(a0, b0); \ break; \ default: \ BUILD_BUG(); \ } \ } #define _sig_or(x,y) ((x) | (y)) _SIG_SET_BINOP(sigorsets, _sig_or) #define _sig_and(x,y) ((x) & (y)) _SIG_SET_BINOP(sigandsets, _sig_and) #define _sig_andn(x,y) ((x) & ~(y)) _SIG_SET_BINOP(sigandnsets, _sig_andn) #undef _SIG_SET_BINOP #undef _sig_or #undef _sig_and #undef _sig_andn #define _SIG_SET_OP(name, op) \ static inline void name(sigset_t *set) \ { \ switch (_NSIG_WORDS) { \ case 4: set->sig[3] = op(set->sig[3]); \ set->sig[2] = op(set->sig[2]); \ fallthrough; \ case 2: set->sig[1] = op(set->sig[1]); \ fallthrough; \ case 1: set->sig[0] = op(set->sig[0]); \ break; \ default: \ BUILD_BUG(); \ } \ } #define _sig_not(x) (~(x)) _SIG_SET_OP(signotset, _sig_not) #undef _SIG_SET_OP #undef _sig_not static inline void sigemptyset(sigset_t *set) { switch (_NSIG_WORDS) { default: memset(set, 0, sizeof(sigset_t)); break; case 2: set->sig[1] = 0; fallthrough; case 1: set->sig[0] = 0; break; } } static inline void sigfillset(sigset_t *set) { switch (_NSIG_WORDS) { default: memset(set, -1, sizeof(sigset_t)); break; case 2: set->sig[1] = -1; fallthrough; case 1: set->sig[0] = -1; break; } } /* Some extensions for manipulating the low 32 signals in particular. */ static inline void sigaddsetmask(sigset_t *set, unsigned long mask) { set->sig[0] |= mask; } static inline void sigdelsetmask(sigset_t *set, unsigned long mask) { set->sig[0] &= ~mask; } static inline int sigtestsetmask(sigset_t *set, unsigned long mask) { return (set->sig[0] & mask) != 0; } static inline void siginitset(sigset_t *set, unsigned long mask) { set->sig[0] = mask; switch (_NSIG_WORDS) { default: memset(&set->sig[1], 0, sizeof(long)*(_NSIG_WORDS-1)); break; case 2: set->sig[1] = 0; break; case 1: ; } } static inline void siginitsetinv(sigset_t *set, unsigned long mask) { set->sig[0] = ~mask; switch (_NSIG_WORDS) { default: memset(&set->sig[1], -1, sizeof(long)*(_NSIG_WORDS-1)); break; case 2: set->sig[1] = -1; break; case 1: ; } } #endif /* __HAVE_ARCH_SIG_SETOPS */ static inline void init_sigpending(struct sigpending *sig) { sigemptyset(&sig->signal); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sig->list); } extern void flush_sigqueue(struct sigpending *queue); /* Test if 'sig' is valid signal. Use this instead of testing _NSIG directly */ static inline int valid_signal(unsigned long sig) { return sig <= _NSIG ? 1 : 0; } struct timespec; struct pt_regs; enum pid_type; extern int next_signal(struct sigpending *pending, sigset_t *mask); extern int do_send_sig_info(int sig, struct kernel_siginfo *info, struct task_struct *p, enum pid_type type); extern int group_send_sig_info(int sig, struct kernel_siginfo *info, struct task_struct *p, enum pid_type type); extern int __group_send_sig_info(int, struct kernel_siginfo *, struct task_struct *); extern int sigprocmask(int, sigset_t *, sigset_t *); extern void set_current_blocked(sigset_t *); extern void __set_current_blocked(const sigset_t *); extern int show_unhandled_signals; extern bool get_signal(struct ksignal *ksig); extern void signal_setup_done(int failed, struct ksignal *ksig, int stepping); extern void exit_signals(struct task_struct *tsk); extern void kernel_sigaction(int, __sighandler_t); #define SIG_KTHREAD ((__force __sighandler_t)2) #define SIG_KTHREAD_KERNEL ((__force __sighandler_t)3) static inline void allow_signal(int sig) { /* * Kernel threads handle their own signals. Let the signal code * know it'll be handled, so that they don't get converted to * SIGKILL or just silently dropped. */ kernel_sigaction(sig, SIG_KTHREAD); } static inline void allow_kernel_signal(int sig) { /* * Kernel threads handle their own signals. Let the signal code * know signals sent by the kernel will be handled, so that they * don't get silently dropped. */ kernel_sigaction(sig, SIG_KTHREAD_KERNEL); } static inline void disallow_signal(int sig) { kernel_sigaction(sig, SIG_IGN); } extern struct kmem_cache *sighand_cachep; extern bool unhandled_signal(struct task_struct *tsk, int sig); /* * In POSIX a signal is sent either to a specific thread (Linux task) * or to the process as a whole (Linux thread group). How the signal * is sent determines whether it's to one thread or the whole group, * which determines which signal mask(s) are involved in blocking it * from being delivered until later. When the signal is delivered, * either it's caught or ignored by a user handler or it has a default * effect that applies to the whole thread group (POSIX process). * * The possible effects an unblocked signal set to SIG_DFL can have are: * ignore - Nothing Happens * terminate - kill the process, i.e. all threads in the group, * similar to exit_group. The group leader (only) reports * WIFSIGNALED status to its parent. * coredump - write a core dump file describing all threads using * the same mm and then kill all those threads * stop - stop all the threads in the group, i.e. TASK_STOPPED state * * SIGKILL and SIGSTOP cannot be caught, blocked, or ignored. * Other signals when not blocked and set to SIG_DFL behaves as follows. * The job control signals also have other special effects. * * +--------------------+------------------+ * | POSIX signal | default action | * +--------------------+------------------+ * | SIGHUP | terminate | * | SIGINT | terminate | * | SIGQUIT | coredump | * | SIGILL | coredump | * | SIGTRAP | coredump | * | SIGABRT/SIGIOT | coredump | * | SIGBUS | coredump | * | SIGFPE | coredump | * | SIGKILL | terminate(+) | * | SIGUSR1 | terminate | * | SIGSEGV | coredump | * | SIGUSR2 | terminate | * | SIGPIPE | terminate | * | SIGALRM | terminate | * | SIGTERM | terminate | * | SIGCHLD | ignore | * | SIGCONT | ignore(*) | * | SIGSTOP | stop(*)(+) | * | SIGTSTP | stop(*) | * | SIGTTIN | stop(*) | * | SIGTTOU | stop(*) | * | SIGURG | ignore | * | SIGXCPU | coredump | * | SIGXFSZ | coredump | * | SIGVTALRM | terminate | * | SIGPROF | terminate | * | SIGPOLL/SIGIO | terminate | * | SIGSYS/SIGUNUSED | coredump | * | SIGSTKFLT | terminate | * | SIGWINCH | ignore | * | SIGPWR | terminate | * | SIGRTMIN-SIGRTMAX | terminate | * +--------------------+------------------+ * | non-POSIX signal | default action | * +--------------------+------------------+ * | SIGEMT | coredump | * +--------------------+------------------+ * * (+) For SIGKILL and SIGSTOP the action is "always", not just "default". * (*) Special job control effects: * When SIGCONT is sent, it resumes the process (all threads in the group) * from TASK_STOPPED state and also clears any pending/queued stop signals * (any of those marked with "stop(*)"). This happens regardless of blocking, * catching, or ignoring SIGCONT. When any stop signal is sent, it clears * any pending/queued SIGCONT signals; this happens regardless of blocking, * catching, or ignored the stop signal, though (except for SIGSTOP) the * default action of stopping the process may happen later or never. */ #ifdef SIGEMT #define SIGEMT_MASK rt_sigmask(SIGEMT) #else #define SIGEMT_MASK 0 #endif #if SIGRTMIN > BITS_PER_LONG #define rt_sigmask(sig) (1ULL << ((sig)-1)) #else #define rt_sigmask(sig) sigmask(sig) #endif #define siginmask(sig, mask) \ ((sig) > 0 && (sig) < SIGRTMIN && (rt_sigmask(sig) & (mask))) #define SIG_KERNEL_ONLY_MASK (\ rt_sigmask(SIGKILL) | rt_sigmask(SIGSTOP)) #define SIG_KERNEL_STOP_MASK (\ rt_sigmask(SIGSTOP) | rt_sigmask(SIGTSTP) | \ rt_sigmask(SIGTTIN) | rt_sigmask(SIGTTOU) ) #define SIG_KERNEL_COREDUMP_MASK (\ rt_sigmask(SIGQUIT) | rt_sigmask(SIGILL) | \ rt_sigmask(SIGTRAP) | rt_sigmask(SIGABRT) | \ rt_sigmask(SIGFPE) | rt_sigmask(SIGSEGV) | \ rt_sigmask(SIGBUS) | rt_sigmask(SIGSYS) | \ rt_sigmask(SIGXCPU) | rt_sigmask(SIGXFSZ) | \ SIGEMT_MASK ) #define SIG_KERNEL_IGNORE_MASK (\ rt_sigmask(SIGCONT) | rt_sigmask(SIGCHLD) | \ rt_sigmask(SIGWINCH) | rt_sigmask(SIGURG) ) #define SIG_SPECIFIC_SICODES_MASK (\ rt_sigmask(SIGILL) | rt_sigmask(SIGFPE) | \ rt_sigmask(SIGSEGV) | rt_sigmask(SIGBUS) | \ rt_sigmask(SIGTRAP) | rt_sigmask(SIGCHLD) | \ rt_sigmask(SIGPOLL) | rt_sigmask(SIGSYS) | \ SIGEMT_MASK ) #define sig_kernel_only(sig) siginmask(sig, SIG_KERNEL_ONLY_MASK) #define sig_kernel_coredump(sig) siginmask(sig, SIG_KERNEL_COREDUMP_MASK) #define sig_kernel_ignore(sig) siginmask(sig, SIG_KERNEL_IGNORE_MASK) #define sig_kernel_stop(sig) siginmask(sig, SIG_KERNEL_STOP_MASK) #define sig_specific_sicodes(sig) siginmask(sig, SIG_SPECIFIC_SICODES_MASK) #define sig_fatal(t, signr) \ (!siginmask(signr, SIG_KERNEL_IGNORE_MASK|SIG_KERNEL_STOP_MASK) && \ (t)->sighand->action[(signr)-1].sa.sa_handler == SIG_DFL) void signals_init(void); int restore_altstack(const stack_t __user *); int __save_altstack(stack_t __user *, unsigned long); #define unsafe_save_altstack(uss, sp, label) do { \ stack_t __user *__uss = uss; \ struct task_struct *t = current; \ unsafe_put_user((void __user *)t->sas_ss_sp, &__uss->ss_sp, label); \ unsafe_put_user(t->sas_ss_flags, &__uss->ss_flags, label); \ unsafe_put_user(t->sas_ss_size, &__uss->ss_size, label); \ if (t->sas_ss_flags & SS_AUTODISARM) \ sas_ss_reset(t); \ } while (0); #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS struct seq_file; extern void render_sigset_t(struct seq_file *, const char *, sigset_t *); #endif #endif /* _LINUX_SIGNAL_H */
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7419 7420 7421 7422 7423 7424 7425 7426 7427 7428 7429 7430 7431 7432 7433 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only /* * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module * * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations. * * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com> * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com> * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> * * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd. * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp> * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies */ #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/kd.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h> #include <linux/tracehook.h> #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/sched/signal.h> #include <linux/sched/task.h> #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <linux/xattr.h> #include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/unistd.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/mman.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/pagemap.h> #include <linux/proc_fs.h> #include <linux/swap.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/dcache.h> #include <linux/file.h> #include <linux/fdtable.h> #include <linux/namei.h> #include <linux/mount.h> #include <linux/fs_context.h> #include <linux/fs_parser.h> #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h> #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h> #include <linux/tty.h> #include <net/icmp.h> #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */ #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */ #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h> #include <net/net_namespace.h> #include <net/netlabel.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <asm/ioctls.h> #include <linux/atomic.h> #include <linux/bitops.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */ #include <net/netlink.h> #include <linux/tcp.h> #include <linux/udp.h> #include <linux/dccp.h> #include <linux/sctp.h> #include <net/sctp/structs.h> #include <linux/quota.h> #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */ #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */ #include <linux/parser.h> #include <linux/nfs_mount.h> #include <net/ipv6.h> #include <linux/hugetlb.h> #include <linux/personality.h> #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/posix-timers.h> #include <linux/syslog.h> #include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/msg.h> #include <linux/shm.h> #include <linux/bpf.h> #include <linux/kernfs.h> #include <linux/stringhash.h> /* for hashlen_string() */ #include <uapi/linux/mount.h> #include <linux/fsnotify.h> #include <linux/fanotify.h> #include "avc.h" #include "objsec.h" #include "netif.h" #include "netnode.h" #include "netport.h" #include "ibpkey.h" #include "xfrm.h" #include "netlabel.h" #include "audit.h" #include "avc_ss.h" struct selinux_state selinux_state; /* SECMARK reference count */ static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP static int selinux_enforcing_boot __initdata; static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str) { unsigned long enforcing; if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing)) selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0; return 1; } __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup); #else #define selinux_enforcing_boot 1 #endif int selinux_enabled_boot __initdata = 1; #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str) { unsigned long enabled; if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled)) selinux_enabled_boot = enabled ? 1 : 0; return 1; } __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup); #endif static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE; static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str) { unsigned long checkreqprot; if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) { selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0; if (checkreqprot) pr_warn("SELinux: checkreqprot set to 1 via kernel parameter. This is deprecated and will be rejected in a future kernel release.\n"); } return 1; } __setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup); /** * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled * * Description: * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled. * */ static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void) { return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount)); } /** * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled * * Description: * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling * is always considered enabled. * */ static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void) { return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()); } static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event) { if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) { sel_netif_flush(); sel_netnode_flush(); sel_netport_flush(); synchronize_net(); } return 0; } static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event) { if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) { sel_ib_pkey_flush(); call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL); } return 0; } /* * initialise the security for the init task */ static void cred_init_security(void) { struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred; struct task_security_struct *tsec; tsec = selinux_cred(cred); tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; } /* * get the security ID of a set of credentials */ static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec; tsec = selinux_cred(cred); return tsec->sid; } /* * get the objective security ID of a task */ static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task) { u32 sid; rcu_read_lock(); sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task)); rcu_read_unlock(); return sid; } static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry); /* * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is * invalid. The @dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode. */ static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry, bool may_sleep) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); might_sleep_if(may_sleep); if (selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) && isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) { if (!may_sleep) return -ECHILD; /* * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be * found; in that case, continue using the old label. */ inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry); } return 0; } static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode) { return selinux_inode(inode); } static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu) { int error; error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu); if (error) return ERR_PTR(error); return selinux_inode(inode); } /* * Get the security label of an inode. */ static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode) { __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true); return selinux_inode(inode); } static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); return selinux_inode(inode); } /* * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode. */ static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true); return selinux_inode(inode); } static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; if (!isec) return; sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; /* * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste * time taking a lock doing nothing. * * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once. * It should not be possible for this function to be called with * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here. */ if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) { spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); list_del_init(&isec->list); spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); } } static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; sb->s_security = NULL; kfree(sbsec); } struct selinux_mnt_opts { const char *fscontext, *context, *rootcontext, *defcontext; }; static void selinux_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts) { struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts; kfree(opts->fscontext); kfree(opts->context); kfree(opts->rootcontext); kfree(opts->defcontext); kfree(opts); } enum { Opt_error = -1, Opt_context = 0, Opt_defcontext = 1, Opt_fscontext = 2, Opt_rootcontext = 3, Opt_seclabel = 4, }; #define A(s, has_arg) {#s, sizeof(#s) - 1, Opt_##s, has_arg} static struct { const char *name; int len; int opt; bool has_arg; } tokens[] = { A(context, true), A(fscontext, true), A(defcontext, true), A(rootcontext, true), A(seclabel, false), }; #undef A static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg) { int i; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) { size_t len = tokens[i].len; if (len > l || memcmp(s, tokens[i].name, len)) continue; if (tokens[i].has_arg) { if (len == l || s[len] != '=') continue; *arg = s + len + 1; } else if (len != l) continue; return tokens[i].opt; } return Opt_error; } #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n" static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid, struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, const struct cred *cred) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred); int rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); if (rc) return rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL); return rc; } static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid, struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, const struct cred *cred) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred); int rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); if (rc) return rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL); return rc; } static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb) { /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */ return !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") || (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() && (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))); } static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; /* * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new * SECURITY_FS_USE_* definition! */ BUILD_BUG_ON(SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX != 7); switch (sbsec->behavior) { case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR: case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS: case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK: case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE: return 1; case SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS: return selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(sb); /* Never allow relabeling on context mounts */ case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT: case SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE: default: return 0; } } static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; struct dentry *root = sb->s_root; struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root); int rc = 0; if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */ if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) { pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no " "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; goto out; } rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) { if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type " "%s) has no security xattr handler\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); else pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type " "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, -rc); goto out; } } sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED; /* * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared. */ if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb)) sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT; else sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT; /* Initialize the root inode. */ rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root); /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g. inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly populates itself. */ spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); while (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = list_first_entry(&sbsec->isec_head, struct inode_security_struct, list); struct inode *inode = isec->inode; list_del_init(&isec->list); spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); inode = igrab(inode); if (inode) { if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode)) inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL); iput(inode); } spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); } spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); out: return rc; } static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag, u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid) { char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK; /* check if the old mount command had the same options */ if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) || (old_sid != new_sid)) return 1; /* check if we were passed the same options twice, * aka someone passed context=a,context=b */ if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) if (mnt_flags & flag) return 1; return 0; } static int parse_sid(struct super_block *sb, const char *s, u32 *sid) { int rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, s, sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid" "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", s, sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc); return rc; } /* * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point * labeling information. */ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts, unsigned long kern_flags, unsigned long *set_kern_flags) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root; struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts; struct inode_security_struct *root_isec; u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0; u32 defcontext_sid = 0; int rc = 0; mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock); if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) { if (!opts) { /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, after the initial policy is loaded and the security server is ready to handle calls. */ goto out; } rc = -EINVAL; pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options " "before the security server is initialized\n"); goto out; } if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) { /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to * place the results is not allowed */ rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } /* * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs. * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data * we need to skip the double mount verification. * * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options * will be used for both mounts) */ if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) && !opts) goto out; root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root); /* * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids. * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more * than once with different security options. */ if (opts) { if (opts->fscontext) { rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &fscontext_sid); if (rc) goto out; if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, fscontext_sid)) goto out_double_mount; sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT; } if (opts->context) { rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &context_sid); if (rc) goto out; if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, context_sid)) goto out_double_mount; sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT; } if (opts->rootcontext) { rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &rootcontext_sid); if (rc) goto out; if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, rootcontext_sid)) goto out_double_mount; sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT; } if (opts->defcontext) { rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &defcontext_sid); if (rc) goto out; if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, defcontext_sid)) goto out_double_mount; sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT; } } if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) { /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */ if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !opts) goto out_double_mount; rc = 0; goto out; } if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0) sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS; if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore")) sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS; if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")) sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR; if (!sbsec->behavior) { /* * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this * filesystem type. */ rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, sb); if (rc) { pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n", __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc); goto out; } } /* * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command * line and security labels must be ignored. */ if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns && strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") && strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") && strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts")) { if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid || defcontext_sid) { rc = -EACCES; goto out; } if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT; rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, current_sid(), current_sid(), SECCLASS_FILE, NULL, &sbsec->mntpoint_sid); if (rc) goto out; } goto out_set_opts; } /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */ if (fscontext_sid) { rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred); if (rc) goto out; sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid; } /* * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior. * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set * the superblock context if not already set. */ if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) { sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE; *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS; } if (context_sid) { if (!fscontext_sid) { rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, cred); if (rc) goto out; sbsec->sid = context_sid; } else { rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, cred); if (rc) goto out; } if (!rootcontext_sid) rootcontext_sid = context_sid; sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid; sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT; } if (rootcontext_sid) { rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, cred); if (rc) goto out; root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid; root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; } if (defcontext_sid) { if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) { rc = -EINVAL; pr_warn("SELinux: defcontext option is " "invalid for this filesystem type\n"); goto out; } if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) { rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid, sbsec, cred); if (rc) goto out; } sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid; } out_set_opts: rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb); out: mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock); return rc; out_double_mount: rc = -EINVAL; pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different " "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); goto out; } static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb, const struct super_block *newsb) { struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security; struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security; char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK; char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK; if (oldflags != newflags) goto mismatch; if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid) goto mismatch; if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid) goto mismatch; if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid) goto mismatch; if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) { struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root); struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root); if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid) goto mismatch; } return 0; mismatch: pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, " "different security settings for (dev %s, " "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name); return -EBUSY; } static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, struct super_block *newsb, unsigned long kern_flags, unsigned long *set_kern_flags) { int rc = 0; const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security; struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security; int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT); int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT); int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT); /* * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later */ if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) return 0; /* * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to * place the results is not allowed. */ if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) return -EINVAL; /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */ BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)); /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */ if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) { if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS; return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb); } mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock); newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags; newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid; newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid; newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior; if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE && !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) { rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, newsb); if (rc) goto out; } if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) { newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE; *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS; } if (set_context) { u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid; if (!set_fscontext) newsbsec->sid = sid; if (!set_rootcontext) { struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root); newisec->sid = sid; } newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid; } if (set_rootcontext) { const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root); struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root); newisec->sid = oldisec->sid; } sb_finish_set_opts(newsb); out: mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock); return rc; } static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts) { struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts; if (token == Opt_seclabel) /* eaten and completely ignored */ return 0; if (!opts) { opts = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL); if (!opts) return -ENOMEM; *mnt_opts = opts; } if (!s) return -ENOMEM; switch (token) { case Opt_context: if (opts->context || opts->defcontext) goto Einval; opts->context = s; break; case Opt_fscontext: if (opts->fscontext) goto Einval; opts->fscontext = s; break; case Opt_rootcontext: if (opts->rootcontext) goto Einval; opts->rootcontext = s; break; case Opt_defcontext: if (opts->context || opts->defcontext) goto Einval; opts->defcontext = s; break; } return 0; Einval: pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); return -EINVAL; } static int selinux_add_mnt_opt(const char *option, const char *val, int len, void **mnt_opts) { int token = Opt_error; int rc, i; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) { if (strcmp(option, tokens[i].name) == 0) { token = tokens[i].opt; break; } } if (token == Opt_error) return -EINVAL; if (token != Opt_seclabel) { val = kmemdup_nul(val, len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!val) { rc = -ENOMEM; goto free_opt; } } rc = selinux_add_opt(token, val, mnt_opts); if (unlikely(rc)) { kfree(val); goto free_opt; } return rc; free_opt: if (*mnt_opts) { selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts); *mnt_opts = NULL; } return rc; } static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid) { char *context = NULL; u32 len; int rc; rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, &context, &len); if (!rc) { bool has_comma = context && strchr(context, ','); seq_putc(m, '='); if (has_comma) seq_putc(m, '\"'); seq_escape(m, context, "\"\n\\"); if (has_comma) seq_putc(m, '\"'); } kfree(context); return rc; } static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; int rc; if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) return 0; if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) return 0; if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) { seq_putc(m, ','); seq_puts(m, FSCONTEXT_STR); rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->sid); if (rc) return rc; } if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) { seq_putc(m, ','); seq_puts(m, CONTEXT_STR); rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->mntpoint_sid); if (rc) return rc; } if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) { seq_putc(m, ','); seq_puts(m, DEFCONTEXT_STR); rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->def_sid); if (rc) return rc; } if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) { struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root; struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root); seq_putc(m, ','); seq_puts(m, ROOTCONTEXT_STR); rc = show_sid(m, isec->sid); if (rc) return rc; } if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) { seq_putc(m, ','); seq_puts(m, SECLABEL_STR); } return 0; } static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode) { switch (mode & S_IFMT) { case S_IFSOCK: return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE; case S_IFLNK: return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE; case S_IFREG: return SECCLASS_FILE; case S_IFBLK: return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE; case S_IFDIR: return SECCLASS_DIR; case S_IFCHR: return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE; case S_IFIFO: return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE; } return SECCLASS_FILE; } static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol) { return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP); } static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol) { return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP); } static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol) { int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass(); switch (family) { case PF_UNIX: switch (type) { case SOCK_STREAM: case SOCK_SEQPACKET: return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET; case SOCK_DGRAM: case SOCK_RAW: return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET; } break; case PF_INET: case PF_INET6: switch (type) { case SOCK_STREAM: case SOCK_SEQPACKET: if (default_protocol_stream(protocol)) return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET; else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP) return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET; else return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; case SOCK_DGRAM: if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol)) return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET; else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP || protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6)) return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET; else return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; case SOCK_DCCP: return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET; default: return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; } break; case PF_NETLINK: switch (protocol) { case NETLINK_ROUTE: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET; case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET; case NETLINK_NFLOG: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET; case NETLINK_XFRM: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET; case NETLINK_SELINUX: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET; case NETLINK_ISCSI: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET; case NETLINK_AUDIT: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET; case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET; case NETLINK_CONNECTOR: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET; case NETLINK_NETFILTER: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET; case NETLINK_DNRTMSG: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET; case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET; case NETLINK_GENERIC: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET; case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET; case NETLINK_RDMA: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET; case NETLINK_CRYPTO: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET; default: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET; } case PF_PACKET: return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET; case PF_KEY: return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET; case PF_APPLETALK: return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET; } if (extsockclass) { switch (family) { case PF_AX25: return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET; case PF_IPX: return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET; case PF_NETROM: return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET; case PF_ATMPVC: return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET; case PF_X25: return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET; case PF_ROSE: return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET; case PF_DECnet: return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET; case PF_ATMSVC: return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET; case PF_RDS: return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET; case PF_IRDA: return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET; case PF_PPPOX: return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET; case PF_LLC: return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET; case PF_CAN: return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET; case PF_TIPC: return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET; case PF_BLUETOOTH: return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET; case PF_IUCV: return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET; case PF_RXRPC: return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET; case PF_ISDN: return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET; case PF_PHONET: return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET; case PF_IEEE802154: return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET; case PF_CAIF: return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET; case PF_ALG: return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET; case PF_NFC: return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET; case PF_VSOCK: return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET; case PF_KCM: return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET; case PF_QIPCRTR: return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET; case PF_SMC: return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET; case PF_XDP: return SECCLASS_XDP_SOCKET; #if PF_MAX > 45 #error New address family defined, please update this function. #endif } } return SECCLASS_SOCKET; } static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry, u16 tclass, u16 flags, u32 *sid) { int rc; struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb; char *buffer, *path; buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); if (!buffer) return -ENOMEM; path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE); if (IS_ERR(path)) rc = PTR_ERR(path); else { if (flags & SE_SBPROC) { /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling. * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */ while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') { path[1] = '/'; path++; } } rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name, path, tclass, sid); if (rc == -ENOENT) { /* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */ *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; rc = 0; } } free_page((unsigned long)buffer); return rc; } static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry, u32 def_sid, u32 *sid) { #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255 char *context; unsigned int len; int rc; len = INITCONTEXTLEN; context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS); if (!context) return -ENOMEM; context[len] = '\0'; rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len); if (rc == -ERANGE) { kfree(context); /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */ rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); if (rc < 0) return rc; len = rc; context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS); if (!context) return -ENOMEM; context[len] = '\0'; rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len); } if (rc < 0) { kfree(context); if (rc != -ENODATA) { pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); return rc; } *sid = def_sid; return 0; } rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state, context, rc, sid, def_sid, GFP_NOFS); if (rc) { char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id; unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino; if (rc == -EINVAL) { pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context); } else { pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino); } } kfree(context); return 0; } /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL; struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); u32 task_sid, sid = 0; u16 sclass; struct dentry *dentry; int rc = 0; if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED) return 0; spin_lock(&isec->lock); if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED) goto out_unlock; if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE) isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) { /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, after the initial policy is loaded and the security server is ready to handle calls. */ spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); if (list_empty(&isec->list)) list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head); spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); goto out_unlock; } sclass = isec->sclass; task_sid = isec->task_sid; sid = isec->sid; isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING; spin_unlock(&isec->lock); switch (sbsec->behavior) { case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE: break; case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR: if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) { sid = sbsec->def_sid; break; } /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one. Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */ if (opt_dentry) { /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */ dentry = dget(opt_dentry); } else { /* * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try * that first. We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in * two, depending upon that... */ dentry = d_find_alias(inode); if (!dentry) dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode); } if (!dentry) { /* * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we * may find inodes that have no dentry on the * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these * will get fixed up the next time we go through * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could * be used again by userspace. */ goto out_invalid; } rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid, &sid); dput(dentry); if (rc) goto out; break; case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK: sid = task_sid; break; case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS: /* Default to the fs SID. */ sid = sbsec->sid; /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */ rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, task_sid, sid, sclass, NULL, &sid); if (rc) goto out; break; case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT: sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid; break; default: /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */ sid = sbsec->sid; if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) && (!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) || selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks())) { /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on * procfs inodes */ if (opt_dentry) { /* Called from d_instantiate or * d_splice_alias. */ dentry = dget(opt_dentry); } else { /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to * find a dentry. Some filesystems really want * a connected one, so try that first. */ dentry = d_find_alias(inode); if (!dentry) dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode); } /* * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we * may find inodes that have no dentry on the * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as * these will get fixed up the next time we go through * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes * could be used again by userspace. */ if (!dentry) goto out_invalid; rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass, sbsec->flags, &sid); if (rc) { dput(dentry); goto out; } if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) && (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) { rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sid, &sid); if (rc) { dput(dentry); goto out; } } dput(dentry); } break; } out: spin_lock(&isec->lock); if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) { if (rc) { isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID; goto out_unlock; } isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; isec->sid = sid; } out_unlock: spin_unlock(&isec->lock); return rc; out_invalid: spin_lock(&isec->lock); if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) { isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID; isec->sid = sid; } spin_unlock(&isec->lock); return 0; } /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */ static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig) { u32 perm = 0; switch (sig) { case SIGCHLD: /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */ perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD; break; case SIGKILL: /* Cannot be caught or ignored */ perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL; break; case SIGSTOP: /* Cannot be caught or ignored */ perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP; break; default: /* All other signals. */ perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL; break; } return perm; } #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63. #endif /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred, int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns) { struct common_audit_data ad; struct av_decision avd; u16 sclass; u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap); int rc; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP; ad.u.cap = cap; switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) { case 0: sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS; break; case 1: sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS; break; default: pr_err("SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap); BUG(); return -EINVAL; } rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state, sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd); if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) { int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state, sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0); if (rc2) return rc2; } return rc; } /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode. The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct inode *inode, u32 perms, struct common_audit_data *adp) { struct inode_security_struct *isec; u32 sid; validate_creds(cred); if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return 0; sid = cred_sid(cred); isec = selinux_inode(inode); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp); } /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the pathname if needed. */ static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct dentry *dentry, u32 av) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct common_audit_data ad; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true); return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); } /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the pathname if needed. */ static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, const struct path *path, u32 av) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry); struct common_audit_data ad; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; ad.u.path = *path; __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true); return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); } /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */ static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, u32 av) { struct common_audit_data ad; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; ad.u.file = file; return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad); } #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid); #endif /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to access an inode in a given way. Check access to the descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to check a particular permission to the file. Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, u32 av) { struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file); struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); int rc; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; ad.u.file = file; if (sid != fsec->sid) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad); if (rc) goto out; } #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred)); if (rc) return rc; #endif /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */ rc = 0; if (av) rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); out: return rc; } /* * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned. */ static int selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass, u32 *_new_isid) { const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) { *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid; } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) && tsec->create_sid) { *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid; } else { const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir); return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass, name, _new_isid); } return 0; } /* Check whether a task can create a file. */ static int may_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, u16 tclass) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); struct inode_security_struct *dsec; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; u32 sid, newsid; struct common_audit_data ad; int rc; dsec = inode_security(dir); sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; sid = tsec->sid; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad); if (rc) return rc; rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass, &newsid); if (rc) return rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad); if (rc) return rc; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, newsid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); } #define MAY_LINK 0 #define MAY_UNLINK 1 #define MAY_RMDIR 2 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */ static int may_link(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int kind) { struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); u32 av; int rc; dsec = inode_security(dir); isec = backing_inode_security(dentry); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; av = DIR__SEARCH; av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME); rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad); if (rc) return rc; switch (kind) { case MAY_LINK: av = FILE__LINK; break; case MAY_UNLINK: av = FILE__UNLINK; break; case MAY_RMDIR: av = DIR__RMDIR; break; default: pr_warn("SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n", __func__, kind); return 0; } rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad); return rc; } static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) { struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); u32 av; int old_is_dir, new_is_dir; int rc; old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir); old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry); old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry); new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = old_dentry; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad); if (rc) return rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, old_isec->sid, old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad); if (rc) return rc; if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, old_isec->sid, old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad); if (rc) return rc; } ad.u.dentry = new_dentry; av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH; if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad); if (rc) return rc; if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) { new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry); new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry); rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, new_isec->sid, new_isec->sclass, (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad); if (rc) return rc; } return 0; } /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */ static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct super_block *sb, u32 perms, struct common_audit_data *ad) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); sbsec = sb->s_security; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad); } /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */ static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask) { u32 av = 0; if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) { if (mask & MAY_EXEC) av |= FILE__EXECUTE; if (mask & MAY_READ) av |= FILE__READ; if (mask & MAY_APPEND) av |= FILE__APPEND; else if (mask & MAY_WRITE) av |= FILE__WRITE; } else { if (mask & MAY_EXEC) av |= DIR__SEARCH; if (mask & MAY_WRITE) av |= DIR__WRITE; if (mask & MAY_READ) av |= DIR__READ; } return av; } /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */ static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file) { u32 av = 0; if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) av |= FILE__READ; if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) { if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND) av |= FILE__APPEND; else av |= FILE__WRITE; } if (!av) { /* * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use. */ av = FILE__IOCTL; } return av; } /* * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct * open permission. */ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file) { u32 av = file_to_av(file); struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); if (selinux_policycap_openperm() && inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC) av |= FILE__OPEN; return av; } /* Hook functions begin here. */ static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr) { u32 mysid = current_sid(); u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL); } static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from, struct task_struct *to) { u32 mysid = current_sid(); u32 fromsid = task_sid(from); u32 tosid = task_sid(to); int rc; if (mysid != fromsid) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL); if (rc) return rc; } return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL, NULL); } static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from, struct task_struct *to) { u32 fromsid = task_sid(from); u32 tosid = task_sid(to); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER, NULL); } static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from, struct task_struct *to, struct file *file) { u32 sid = task_sid(to); struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file); struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry; struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; int rc; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; ad.u.path = file->f_path; if (sid != fsec->sid) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad); if (rc) return rc; } #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid); if (rc) return rc; #endif if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; isec = backing_inode_security(dentry); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file), &ad); } static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) { u32 sid = current_sid(); u32 csid = task_sid(child); if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); } static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, task_sid(parent), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); } static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL); } static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, const kernel_cap_t *effective, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *permitted) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL); } /* * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook, * which was removed). * * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook. */ static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, unsigned int opts) { return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns); } static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); int rc = 0; if (!sb) return 0; switch (cmds) { case Q_SYNC: case Q_QUOTAON: case Q_QUOTAOFF: case Q_SETINFO: case Q_SETQUOTA: case Q_XQUOTAOFF: case Q_XQUOTAON: case Q_XSETQLIM: rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL); break; case Q_GETFMT: case Q_GETINFO: case Q_GETQUOTA: case Q_XGETQUOTA: case Q_XGETQSTAT: case Q_XGETQSTATV: case Q_XGETNEXTQUOTA: rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL); break; default: rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */ break; } return rc; } static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON); } static int selinux_syslog(int type) { switch (type) { case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */ case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL); case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */ case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */ /* Set level of messages printed to console */ case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL: return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE, NULL); } /* All other syslog types */ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL); } /* * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not. * * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all * processes that allocate mappings. */ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) { int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0; rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true); if (rc == 0) cap_sys_admin = 1; return cap_sys_admin; } /* binprm security operations */ static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void) { u32 sid = 0; struct task_struct *tracer; rcu_read_lock(); tracer = ptrace_parent(current); if (tracer) sid = task_sid(tracer); rcu_read_unlock(); return sid; } static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec, const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec) { int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS); int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt); int rc; u32 av; if (!nnp && !nosuid) return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */ if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) return 0; /* No change in credentials */ /* * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability, * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the * policy allows the corresponding permission between * the old and new contexts. */ if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) { av = 0; if (nnp) av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION; if (nosuid) av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL); if (!rc) return 0; } /* * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs, * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset * of the permissions of the current SID. */ rc = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid); if (!rc) return 0; /* * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid. * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller. * nosuid: Permission denied to file. */ if (nnp) return -EPERM; return -EACCES; } static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec; struct task_security_struct *new_tsec; struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file); int rc; /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not * the script interpreter */ old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred); isec = inode_security(inode); /* Default to the current task SID. */ new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid; new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid; /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */ new_tsec->create_sid = 0; new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0; new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0; if (old_tsec->exec_sid) { new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid; /* Reset exec SID on execve. */ new_tsec->exec_sid = 0; /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */ rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec); if (rc) return rc; } else { /* Check for a default transition on this program. */ rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL, &new_tsec->sid); if (rc) return rc; /* * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed * transition. */ rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec); if (rc) new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid; } ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; ad.u.file = bprm->file; if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad); if (rc) return rc; } else { /* Check permissions for the transition. */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad); if (rc) return rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, new_tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad); if (rc) return rc; /* Check for shared state */ if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE, NULL); if (rc) return -EPERM; } /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */ if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) { u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid(); if (ptsid != 0) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, ptsid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); if (rc) return -EPERM; } } /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */ bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless the noatsecure permission is granted between the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL); bprm->secureexec |= !!rc; } return 0; } static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd) { return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0; } /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, struct files_struct *files) { struct file *file, *devnull = NULL; struct tty_struct *tty; int drop_tty = 0; unsigned n; tty = get_current_tty(); if (tty) { spin_lock(&tty->files_lock); if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) { struct tty_file_private *file_priv; /* Revalidate access to controlling tty. Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular open file may belong to another process and we are only interested in the inode-based check here. */ file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct tty_file_private, list); file = file_priv->file; if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE)) drop_tty = 1; } spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock); tty_kref_put(tty); } /* Reset controlling tty. */ if (drop_tty) no_tty(); /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */ n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred); if (!n) /* none found? */ return; devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred); if (IS_ERR(devnull)) devnull = NULL; /* replace all the matching ones with this */ do { replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0); } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0); if (devnull) fput(devnull); } /* * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec */ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { struct task_security_struct *new_tsec; struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim; int rc, i; new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred); if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid) return; /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */ flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files); /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */ current->pdeath_signal = 0; /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit. * * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK. */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL); if (rc) { /* protect against do_prlimit() */ task_lock(current); for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) { rlim = current->signal->rlim + i; initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i; rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur); } task_unlock(current); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS)) update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU)); } } /* * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials * due to exec */ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); u32 osid, sid; int rc; osid = tsec->osid; sid = tsec->sid; if (sid == osid) return; /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID. * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and * flush and unblock signals. * * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID. */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL); if (rc) { clear_itimer(); spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock); if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) { flush_sigqueue(&current->pending); flush_sigqueue(&current->signal->shared_pending); flush_signal_handlers(current, 1); sigemptyset(&current->blocked); recalc_sigpending(); } spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock); } /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck * wait permission to the new task SID. */ read_lock(&tasklist_lock); __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent); read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); } /* superblock security operations */ static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); if (!sbsec) return -ENOMEM; mutex_init(&sbsec->lock); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head); spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock); sbsec->sb = sb; sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE; sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; sb->s_security = sbsec; return 0; } static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb) { superblock_free_security(sb); } static inline int opt_len(const char *s) { bool open_quote = false; int len; char c; for (len = 0; (c = s[len]) != '\0'; len++) { if (c == '"') open_quote = !open_quote; if (c == ',' && !open_quote) break; } return len; } static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts) { char *from = options; char *to = options; bool first = true; int rc; while (1) { int len = opt_len(from); int token; char *arg = NULL; token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg); if (token != Opt_error) { char *p, *q; /* strip quotes */ if (arg) { for (p = q = arg; p < from + len; p++) { char c = *p; if (c != '"') *q++ = c; } arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, q - arg, GFP_KERNEL); if (!arg) { rc = -ENOMEM; goto free_opt; } } rc = selinux_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts); if (unlikely(rc)) { kfree(arg); goto free_opt; } } else { if (!first) { // copy with preceding comma from--; len++; } if (to != from) memmove(to, from, len); to += len; first = false; } if (!from[len]) break; from += len + 1; } *to = '\0'; return 0; free_opt: if (*mnt_opts) { selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts); *mnt_opts = NULL; } return rc; } static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts) { struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; u32 sid; int rc; if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) return 0; if (!opts) return 0; if (opts->fscontext) { rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &sid); if (rc) return rc; if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid)) goto out_bad_option; } if (opts->context) { rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &sid); if (rc) return rc; if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid)) goto out_bad_option; } if (opts->rootcontext) { struct inode_security_struct *root_isec; root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root); rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &sid); if (rc) return rc; if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid)) goto out_bad_option; } if (opts->defcontext) { rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &sid); if (rc) return rc; if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid)) goto out_bad_option; } return 0; out_bad_option: pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options " "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); return -EINVAL; } static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct common_audit_data ad; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root; return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad); } static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct common_audit_data ad; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root; return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad); } static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL); else return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON); } static int selinux_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, const struct path *to_path) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return path_has_perm(cred, to_path, FILE__MOUNTON); } static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb, FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL); } static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc) { const struct selinux_mnt_opts *src = src_fc->security; struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts; if (!src) return 0; fc->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL); if (!fc->security) return -ENOMEM; opts = fc->security; if (src->fscontext) { opts->fscontext = kstrdup(src->fscontext, GFP_KERNEL); if (!opts->fscontext) return -ENOMEM; } if (src->context) { opts->context = kstrdup(src->context, GFP_KERNEL); if (!opts->context) return -ENOMEM; } if (src->rootcontext) { opts->rootcontext = kstrdup(src->rootcontext, GFP_KERNEL); if (!opts->rootcontext) return -ENOMEM; } if (src->defcontext) { opts->defcontext = kstrdup(src->defcontext, GFP_KERNEL); if (!opts->defcontext) return -ENOMEM; } return 0; } static const struct fs_parameter_spec selinux_fs_parameters[] = { fsparam_string(CONTEXT_STR, Opt_context), fsparam_string(DEFCONTEXT_STR, Opt_defcontext), fsparam_string(FSCONTEXT_STR, Opt_fscontext), fsparam_string(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, Opt_rootcontext), fsparam_flag (SECLABEL_STR, Opt_seclabel), {} }; static int selinux_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param) { struct fs_parse_result result; int opt, rc; opt = fs_parse(fc, selinux_fs_parameters, param, &result); if (opt < 0) return opt; rc = selinux_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security); if (!rc) { param->string = NULL; rc = 1; } return rc; } /* inode security operations */ static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); u32 sid = current_sid(); spin_lock_init(&isec->lock); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list); isec->inode = inode; isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE; isec->task_sid = sid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID; return 0; } static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) { inode_free_security(inode); } static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, const struct qstr *name, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) { u32 newsid; int rc; rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()), d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode), &newsid); if (rc) return rc; return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen); } static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, struct qstr *name, const struct cred *old, struct cred *new) { u32 newsid; int rc; struct task_security_struct *tsec; rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old), d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode), &newsid); if (rc) return rc; tsec = selinux_cred(new); tsec->create_sid = newsid; return 0; } static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name, void **value, size_t *len) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; u32 newsid, clen; int rc; char *context; sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; newsid = tsec->create_sid; rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, qstr, inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode), &newsid); if (rc) return rc; /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */ if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); isec->sid = newsid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; } if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (name) *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX; if (value && len) { rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid, &context, &clen); if (rc) return rc; *value = context; *len = clen; } return 0; } static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) { return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE); } static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) { return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK); } static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) { return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK); } static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) { return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE); } static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask) { return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR); } static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) { return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR); } static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev) { return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode)); } static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry) { return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry); } static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ); } static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, bool rcu) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct common_audit_data ad; struct inode_security_struct *isec; u32 sid; validate_creds(cred); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; sid = cred_sid(cred); isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu); if (IS_ERR(isec)) return PTR_ERR(isec); return avc_has_perm_flags(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad, rcu ? MAY_NOT_BLOCK : 0); } static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result) { struct common_audit_data ad; struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); int rc; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE; ad.u.inode = inode; rc = slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state, current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, audited, denied, result, &ad); if (rc) return rc; return 0; } static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); u32 perms; bool from_access; bool no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK; struct inode_security_struct *isec; u32 sid; struct av_decision avd; int rc, rc2; u32 audited, denied; from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS; mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND); /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ if (!mask) return 0; validate_creds(cred); if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return 0; perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask); sid = cred_sid(cred); isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, no_block); if (IS_ERR(isec)) return PTR_ERR(isec); rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, no_block ? AVC_NONBLOCKING : 0, &avd); audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc, from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0, &denied); if (likely(!audited)) return rc; /* fall back to ref-walk if we have to generate audit */ if (no_block) return -ECHILD; rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc); if (rc2) return rc2; return rc; } static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid; __u32 av = FILE__WRITE; /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */ if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) { ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE | ATTR_FORCE); if (!ia_valid) return 0; } if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID | ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET)) return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); if (selinux_policycap_openperm() && inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) && !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE)) av |= FILE__OPEN; return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av); } static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) { return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR); } static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); unsigned int opts = audit ? CAP_OPT_NONE : CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT; if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts)) return false; if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true)) return false; return true; } static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 newsid, sid = current_sid(); int rc = 0; if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); if (rc) return rc; /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the ordinary setattr permission. */ return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR); } if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) return (inode_owner_or_capable(inode) ? 0 : -EPERM); sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode)) return -EPERM; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; isec = backing_inode_security(dentry); rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad); if (rc) return rc; rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc == -EINVAL) { if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) { struct audit_buffer *ab; size_t audit_size; /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the * context contains a nul and we should audit that */ if (value) { const char *str = value; if (str[size - 1] == '\0') audit_size = size - 1; else audit_size = size; } else { audit_size = 0; } ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR); audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context="); audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size); audit_log_end(ab); return rc; } rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid); } if (rc) return rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, newsid, isec->sclass, FILE__RELABELTO, &ad); if (rc) return rc; rc = security_validate_transition(&selinux_state, isec->sid, newsid, sid, isec->sclass); if (rc) return rc; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, newsid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); } static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct inode_security_struct *isec; u32 newsid; int rc; if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */ return; } if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) { /* If we haven't even been initialized, then we can't validate * against a policy, so leave the label as invalid. It may * resolve to a valid label on the next revalidation try if * we've since initialized. */ return; } rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid); if (rc) { pr_err("SELinux: unable to map context to SID" "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n", inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc); return; } isec = backing_inode_security(dentry); spin_lock(&isec->lock); isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); isec->sid = newsid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; spin_unlock(&isec->lock); return; } static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); } static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); } static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) { if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); if (rc) return rc; /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the ordinary setattr permission. */ return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR); } if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) return 0; /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label. You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */ return -EACCES; } static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask, unsigned int obj_type) { int ret; u32 perm; struct common_audit_data ad; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; ad.u.path = *path; /* * Set permission needed based on the type of mark being set. * Performs an additional check for sb watches. */ switch (obj_type) { case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT: perm = FILE__WATCH_MOUNT; break; case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB: perm = FILE__WATCH_SB; ret = superblock_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__WATCH, &ad); if (ret) return ret; break; case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE: perm = FILE__WATCH; break; default: return -EINVAL; } /* blocking watches require the file:watch_with_perm permission */ if (mask & (ALL_FSNOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS)) perm |= FILE__WATCH_WITH_PERM; /* watches on read-like events need the file:watch_reads permission */ if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_ACCESS_PERM | FS_CLOSE_NOWRITE)) perm |= FILE__WATCH_READS; return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, perm); } /* * Copy the inode security context value to the user. * * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook. */ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) { u32 size; int error; char *context = NULL; struct inode_security_struct *isec; /* * If we're not initialized yet, then we can't validate contexts, so * just let vfs_getxattr fall back to using the on-disk xattr. */ if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) || strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; /* * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise, * use the in-core value under current policy. * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the * in-core context value, not a denial. */ isec = inode_security(inode); if (has_cap_mac_admin(false)) error = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, isec->sid, &context, &size); else error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid, &context, &size); if (error) return error; error = size; if (alloc) { *buffer = context; goto out_nofree; } kfree(context); out_nofree: return error; } static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode); struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; u32 newsid; int rc; if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (!value || !size) return -EACCES; rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) return rc; spin_lock(&isec->lock); isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); isec->sid = newsid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; spin_unlock(&isec->lock); return 0; } static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) { const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX); if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) return 0; if (buffer && len <= buffer_size) memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len); return len; } static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode); *secid = isec->sid; } static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) { u32 sid; struct task_security_struct *tsec; struct cred *new_creds = *new; if (new_creds == NULL) { new_creds = prepare_creds(); if (!new_creds) return -ENOMEM; } tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds); /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */ selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid); tsec->create_sid = sid; *new = new_creds; return 0; } static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) { /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower * xattrs up. Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs. */ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0) return 1; /* Discard */ /* * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported * by selinux. */ return -EOPNOTSUPP; } /* kernfs node operations */ static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, struct kernfs_node *kn) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen; int rc; char *context; rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); if (rc == -ENODATA) return 0; else if (rc < 0) return rc; clen = (u32)rc; context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL); if (!context) return -ENOMEM; rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen); if (rc < 0) { kfree(context); return rc; } rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, context, clen, &parent_sid, GFP_KERNEL); kfree(context); if (rc) return rc; if (tsec->create_sid) { newsid = tsec->create_sid; } else { u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode); struct qstr q; q.name = kn->name; q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name); rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, parent_sid, secclass, &q, &newsid); if (rc) return rc; } rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid, &context, &clen); if (rc) return rc; rc = kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen, XATTR_CREATE); kfree(context); return rc; } /* file security operations */ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */ if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE)) mask |= MAY_APPEND; return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask)); } static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file); struct inode_security_struct *isec; u32 sid = current_sid(); if (!mask) /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ return 0; isec = inode_security(inode); if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state)) /* No change since file_open check. */ return 0; return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask); } static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) { struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file); u32 sid = current_sid(); fsec->sid = sid; fsec->fown_sid = sid; return 0; } /* * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd * operation to an inode. */ static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, u32 requested, u16 cmd) { struct common_audit_data ad; struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file); struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl; u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred); int rc; u8 driver = cmd >> 8; u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP; ad.u.op = &ioctl; ad.u.op->cmd = cmd; ad.u.op->path = file->f_path; if (ssid != fsec->sid) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, ssid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad); if (rc) goto out; } if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return 0; isec = inode_security(inode); rc = avc_has_extended_perms(&selinux_state, ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, requested, driver, xperm, &ad); out: return rc; } static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); int error = 0; switch (cmd) { case FIONREAD: case FIBMAP: case FIGETBSZ: case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS: case FS_IOC_GETVERSION: error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR); break; case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS: case FS_IOC_SETVERSION: error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR); break; /* sys_ioctl() checks */ case FIONBIO: case FIOASYNC: error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0); break; case KDSKBENT: case KDSKBSENT: error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG, CAP_OPT_NONE, true); break; /* default case assumes that the command will go * to the file's ioctl() function. */ default: error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd); } return error; } static int default_noexec __ro_after_init; static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); int rc = 0; if (default_noexec && (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) { /* * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a * private file mapping that will also be writable. * This has an additional check. */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL); if (rc) goto error; } if (file) { /* read access is always possible with a mapping */ u32 av = FILE__READ; /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */ if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)) av |= FILE__WRITE; if (prot & PROT_EXEC) av |= FILE__EXECUTE; return file_has_perm(cred, file, av); } error: return rc; } static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) { int rc = 0; if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) { u32 sid = current_sid(); rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT, MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL); } return rc; } static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) { struct common_audit_data ad; int rc; if (file) { ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; ad.u.file = file; rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file), FILE__MAP, &ad); if (rc) return rc; } if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state)) prot = reqprot; return file_map_prot_check(file, prot, (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED); } static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state)) prot = reqprot; if (default_noexec && (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) { int rc = 0; if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk && vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL); } else if (!vma->vm_file && ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack && vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) || vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL); } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) { /* * We are making executable a file mapping that has * had some COW done. Since pages might have been * written, check ability to execute the possibly * modified content. This typically should only * occur for text relocations. */ rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD); } if (rc) return rc; } return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED); } static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK); } static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); int err = 0; switch (cmd) { case F_SETFL: if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) { err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE); break; } fallthrough; case F_SETOWN: case F_SETSIG: case F_GETFL: case F_GETOWN: case F_GETSIG: case F_GETOWNER_UIDS: /* Just check FD__USE permission */ err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0); break; case F_GETLK: case F_SETLK: case F_SETLKW: case F_OFD_GETLK: case F_OFD_SETLK: case F_OFD_SETLKW: #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32 case F_GETLK64: case F_SETLK64: case F_SETLKW64: #endif err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK); break; } return err; } static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) { struct file_security_struct *fsec; fsec = selinux_file(file); fsec->fown_sid = current_sid(); } static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, struct fown_struct *fown, int signum) { struct file *file; u32 sid = task_sid(tsk); u32 perm; struct file_security_struct *fsec; /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */ file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner); fsec = selinux_file(file); if (!signum) perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */ else perm = signal_to_av(signum); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, fsec->fown_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); } static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file)); } static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file) { struct file_security_struct *fsec; struct inode_security_struct *isec; fsec = selinux_file(file); isec = inode_security(file_inode(file)); /* * Save inode label and policy sequence number * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission * can determine whether revalidation is necessary. * Task label is already saved in the file security * struct as its SID. */ fsec->isid = isec->sid; fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state); /* * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted. * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the * new inode label or new policy. * This check is not redundant - do not remove. */ return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file)); } /* task security operations */ static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags) { u32 sid = current_sid(); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL); } /* * prepare a new set of credentials for modification */ static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) { const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old); struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); *tsec = *old_tsec; return 0; } /* * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds */ static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) { const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old); struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); *tsec = *old_tsec; } static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) { *secid = cred_sid(c); } /* * set the security data for a kernel service * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled */ static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) { struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); u32 sid = current_sid(); int ret; ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, secid, SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE, KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE, NULL); if (ret == 0) { tsec->sid = secid; tsec->create_sid = 0; tsec->keycreate_sid = 0; tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0; } return ret; } /* * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the * objective context of the specified inode */ static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode); struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); u32 sid = current_sid(); int ret; ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE, KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS, NULL); if (ret == 0) tsec->create_sid = isec->sid; return ret; } static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) { struct common_audit_data ad; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD; ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad); } static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file) { struct common_audit_data ad; struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct file_security_struct *fsec; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; /* init_module */ if (file == NULL) return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL); /* finit_module */ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; ad.u.file = file; fsec = selinux_file(file); if (sid != fsec->sid) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad); if (rc) return rc; } isec = inode_security(file_inode(file)); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad); } static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, bool contents) { int rc = 0; switch (id) { case READING_MODULE: rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(contents ? file : NULL); break; default: break; } return rc; } static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) { int rc = 0; switch (id) { case LOADING_MODULE: rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL); default: break; } return rc; } static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL); } static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL); } static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL); } static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) { *secid = task_sid(p); } static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL); } static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL); } static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL); } static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred, unsigned int flags) { u32 av = 0; if (!flags) return 0; if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE) av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT; if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ) av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred), SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL); } static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) { struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource; /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */ if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max) return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL); return 0; } static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL); } static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL); } static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL); } static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info, int sig, const struct cred *cred) { u32 secid; u32 perm; if (!sig) perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */ else perm = signal_to_av(sig); if (!cred) secid = current_sid(); else secid = cred_sid(cred); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); } static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); u32 sid = task_sid(p); spin_lock(&isec->lock); isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); isec->sid = sid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; spin_unlock(&isec->lock); } /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto) { int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL; struct iphdr _iph, *ih; offset = skb_network_offset(skb); ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph); if (ih == NULL) goto out; ihlen = ih->ihl * 4; if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph)) goto out; ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr; ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr; ret = 0; if (proto) *proto = ih->protocol; switch (ih->protocol) { case IPPROTO_TCP: { struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) break; offset += ihlen; th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph); if (th == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = th->source; ad->u.net->dport = th->dest; break; } case IPPROTO_UDP: { struct udphdr _udph, *uh; if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) break; offset += ihlen; uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph); if (uh == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = uh->source; ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest; break; } case IPPROTO_DCCP: { struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh; if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) break; offset += ihlen; dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph); if (dh == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport; ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport; break; } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP) case IPPROTO_SCTP: { struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh; if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) break; offset += ihlen; sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph); if (sh == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = sh->source; ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest; break; } #endif default: break; } out: return ret; } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto) { u8 nexthdr; int ret = -EINVAL, offset; struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6; __be16 frag_off; offset = skb_network_offset(skb); ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h); if (ip6 == NULL) goto out; ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr; ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr; ret = 0; nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr; offset += sizeof(_ipv6h); offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off); if (offset < 0) goto out; if (proto) *proto = nexthdr; switch (nexthdr) { case IPPROTO_TCP: { struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph); if (th == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = th->source; ad->u.net->dport = th->dest; break; } case IPPROTO_UDP: { struct udphdr _udph, *uh; uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph); if (uh == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = uh->source; ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest; break; } case IPPROTO_DCCP: { struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh; dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph); if (dh == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport; ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport; break; } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP) case IPPROTO_SCTP: { struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh; sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph); if (sh == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = sh->source; ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest; break; } #endif /* includes fragments */ default: break; } out: return ret; } #endif /* IPV6 */ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad, char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto) { char *addrp; int ret; switch (ad->u.net->family) { case PF_INET: ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto); if (ret) goto parse_error; addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr : &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr); goto okay; #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) case PF_INET6: ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto); if (ret) goto parse_error; addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr : &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr); goto okay; #endif /* IPV6 */ default: addrp = NULL; goto okay; } parse_error: pr_warn( "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb()," " unable to parse packet\n"); return ret; okay: if (_addrp) *_addrp = addrp; return 0; } /** * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet * @skb: the packet * @family: protocol family * @sid: the packet's peer label SID * * Description: * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL) * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different * peer labels. * */ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid) { int err; u32 xfrm_sid; u32 nlbl_sid; u32 nlbl_type; err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid); if (unlikely(err)) return -EACCES; err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid); if (unlikely(err)) return -EACCES; err = security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state, nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid); if (unlikely(err)) { pr_warn( "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid()," " unable to determine packet's peer label\n"); return -EACCES; } return 0; } /** * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID * @skb_sid: the packet's SID * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID * * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then @conn_sid is simply a copy * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure. * */ static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid) { int err = 0; if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL) err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid); else *conn_sid = sk_sid; return err; } /* socket security operations */ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec, u16 secclass, u32 *socksid) { if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) { *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid; return 0; } return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL, socksid); } static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL) return 0; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sk = sk; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad); } static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); u32 newsid; u16 secclass; int rc; if (kern) return 0; secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid); if (rc) return rc; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL); } static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock)); struct sk_security_struct *sksec; u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; int err = 0; if (!kern) { err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid); if (err) return err; } isec->sclass = sclass; isec->sid = sid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; if (sock->sk) { sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; sksec->sclass = sclass; sksec->sid = sid; /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */ if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET; err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family); } return err; } static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security; sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid; sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid; return 0; } /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind. Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind permission check between the socket and the port number. */ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; u16 family; int err; err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND); if (err) goto out; /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */ family = sk->sk_family; if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) { char *addrp; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; u16 family_sa; unsigned short snum; u32 sid, node_perm; /* * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect() * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET. */ if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family)) return -EINVAL; family_sa = address->sa_family; switch (family_sa) { case AF_UNSPEC: case AF_INET: if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) return -EINVAL; addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address; if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) { /* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY */ if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY)) goto err_af; family_sa = AF_INET; } snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port); addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr; break; case AF_INET6: if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) return -EINVAL; addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port); addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr; break; default: goto err_af; } ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum); ad.u.net->family = family_sa; if (snum) { int low, high; inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high); if (inet_port_requires_bind_service(sock_net(sk), snum) || snum < low || snum > high) { err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid); if (err) goto out; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad); if (err) goto out; } } switch (sksec->sclass) { case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET: node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; break; case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET: node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; break; case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET: node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; break; case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET: node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; break; default: node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; break; } err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid); if (err) goto out; if (family_sa == AF_INET) ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr; else ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad); if (err) goto out; } out: return err; err_af: /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */ if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) return -EINVAL; return -EAFNOSUPPORT; } /* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3) * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/SCTP.rst */ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; int err; err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT); if (err) return err; if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family)) return -EINVAL; /* connect(AF_UNSPEC) has special handling, as it is a documented * way to disconnect the socket */ if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) return 0; /* * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission * for the port. */ if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET || sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET || sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) { struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; unsigned short snum; u32 sid, perm; /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect() * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET. */ switch (address->sa_family) { case AF_INET: addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address; if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) return -EINVAL; snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port); break; case AF_INET6: addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) return -EINVAL; snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port); break; default: /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT. */ if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) return -EINVAL; else return -EAFNOSUPPORT; } err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid); if (err) return err; switch (sksec->sclass) { case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET: perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT; break; case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET: perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT; break; case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET: perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT; break; } ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum); ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad); if (err) return err; } return 0; } /* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { int err; struct sock *sk = sock->sk; err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen); if (err) return err; return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address); } static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) { return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN); } static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) { int err; struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct inode_security_struct *newisec; u16 sclass; u32 sid; err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT); if (err) return err; isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock)); spin_lock(&isec->lock); sclass = isec->sclass; sid = isec->sid; spin_unlock(&isec->lock); newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock)); newisec->sclass = sclass; newisec->sid = sid; newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; return 0; } static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size) { return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE); } static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags) { return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ); } static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) { return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR); } static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) { return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR); } static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) { int err; err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT); if (err) return err; return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname); } static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) { return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT); } static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) { return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN); } static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; int err; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sk = other; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid, sksec_other->sclass, UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad); if (err) return err; /* server child socket */ sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid; err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid); if (err) return err; /* connecting socket */ sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid; return 0; } static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) { struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sk = other->sk; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad); } static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid, struct common_audit_data *ad) { int err; u32 if_sid; u32 node_sid; err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid); if (err) return err; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, peer_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad); if (err) return err; err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid); if (err) return err; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, peer_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad); } static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family) { int err = 0; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; char *addrp; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; ad.u.net->family = family; err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL); if (err) return err; if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) { err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RECV, &ad); if (err) return err; } err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad); if (err) return err; err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad); return err; } static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { int err; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; u16 family = sk->sk_family; u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; char *addrp; u8 secmark_active; u8 peerlbl_active; if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6) return 0; /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) family = PF_INET; /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function * as fast and as clean as possible. */ if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer()) return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family); secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) return 0; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; ad.u.net->family = family; err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL); if (err) return err; if (peerlbl_active) { u32 peer_sid; err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid); if (err) return err; err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif, addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad); if (err) { selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0); return err; } err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad); if (err) { selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0); return err; } } if (secmark_active) { err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RECV, &ad); if (err) return err; } return err; } static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen, unsigned len) { int err = 0; char *scontext; u32 scontext_len; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL; if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET || sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET || sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid; if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) return -ENOPROTOOPT; err = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len); if (err) return err; if (scontext_len > len) { err = -ERANGE; goto out_len; } if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len)) err = -EFAULT; out_len: if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen)) err = -EFAULT; kfree(scontext); return err; } static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) { u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL; u16 family; struct inode_security_struct *isec; if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) family = PF_INET; else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) family = PF_INET6; else if (sock) family = sock->sk->sk_family; else goto out; if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) { isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock)); peer_secid = isec->sid; } else if (skb) selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid); out: *secid = peer_secid; if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL) return -EINVAL; return 0; } static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec; sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority); if (!sksec) return -ENOMEM; sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET; selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec); sk->sk_security = sksec; return 0; } static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; sk->sk_security = NULL; selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec); kfree(sksec); } static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; newsksec->sid = sksec->sid; newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid; newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass; selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec); } static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid) { if (!sk) *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET; else { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; *secid = sksec->sid; } } static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent)); struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 || sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) isec->sid = sksec->sid; sksec->sclass = isec->sclass; } /* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT chunk. This happens when an incoming * connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association * already present). */ static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; u8 peerlbl_active; u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; u32 conn_sid; int err = 0; if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass()) return 0; peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); if (peerlbl_active) { /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve(). */ err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, ep->base.sk->sk_family, &peer_sid); if (err) return err; if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; } if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) { sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET; /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks), * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary * peer SID for getpeercon(3). */ sksec->peer_sid = peer_sid; } else if (sksec->peer_sid != peer_sid) { /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce * consistency among the peer SIDs. */ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sk = ep->base.sk; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid, sksec->sclass, SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad); if (err) return err; } /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store * the information in ep. This will be used by SCTP TCP type * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then * plug this into the new socket. */ err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peer_sid, &conn_sid); if (err) return err; ep->secid = conn_sid; ep->peer_secid = peer_sid; /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */ return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(ep, skb); } /* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting * based on their @optname. */ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0; void *addr_buf; struct sockaddr *addr; struct socket *sock; if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass()) return 0; /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */ sock = sk->sk_socket; addr_buf = address; while (walk_size < addrlen) { if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrlen) return -EINVAL; addr = addr_buf; switch (addr->sa_family) { case AF_UNSPEC: case AF_INET: len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); break; case AF_INET6: len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); break; default: return -EINVAL; } if (walk_size + len > addrlen) return -EINVAL; err = -EINVAL; switch (optname) { /* Bind checks */ case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR: case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR: case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD: err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len); break; /* Connect checks */ case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX: case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY: case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP: case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT: err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len); if (err) return err; /* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked, * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked() * is called here. The situations handled are: * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2), * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new * primary address is selected. * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via * selinux_socket_connect(). */ err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr); break; } if (err) return err; addr_buf += len; walk_size += len; } return 0; } /* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call * the non-sctp clone version. */ if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass()) return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk); newsksec->sid = ep->secid; newsksec->peer_sid = ep->peer_secid; newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass; selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk); } static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; int err; u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family; u32 connsid; u32 peersid; err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid); if (err) return err; err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid); if (err) return err; req->secid = connsid; req->peer_secid = peersid; return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family); } static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, const struct request_sock *req) { struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; newsksec->sid = req->secid; newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid; /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet. So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which time it will have been created and available. */ /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only * thread with access to newsksec */ selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family); } static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { u16 family = sk->sk_family; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) family = PF_INET; selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid); } static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid) { const struct task_security_struct *__tsec; u32 tsid; __tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); tsid = __tsec->sid; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL); } static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void) { atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount); } static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void) { atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount); } static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl) { fl->flowi_secid = req->secid; } static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security) { struct tun_security_struct *tunsec; tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL); if (!tunsec) return -ENOMEM; tunsec->sid = current_sid(); *security = tunsec; return 0; } static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security) { kfree(security); } static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void) { u32 sid = current_sid(); /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense, * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE, NULL); } static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security) { struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL); } static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security) { struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling * protocols were being used */ sksec->sid = tunsec->sid; sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET; return 0; } static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security) { struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; u32 sid = current_sid(); int err; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL); if (err) return err; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL); if (err) return err; tunsec->sid = sid; return 0; } #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *indev, u16 family) { int err; char *addrp; u32 peer_sid; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; u8 secmark_active; u8 netlbl_active; u8 peerlbl_active; if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer()) return NF_ACCEPT; secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled(); peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) return NF_ACCEPT; if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0) return NF_DROP; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex; ad.u.net->family = family; if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0) return NF_DROP; if (peerlbl_active) { err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex, addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad); if (err) { selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1); return NF_DROP; } } if (secmark_active) if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, peer_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad)) return NF_DROP; if (netlbl_active) /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH * protection */ if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0) return NF_DROP; return NF_ACCEPT; } static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state) { return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET); } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state) { return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6); } #endif /* IPV6 */ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family) { struct sock *sk; u32 sid; if (!netlbl_enabled()) return NF_ACCEPT; /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */ sk = skb->sk; if (sk) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec; if (sk_listener(sk)) /* if the socket is the listening state then this * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent. * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is * as any IP option based labeling should be copied * from the initial connection request (in the IP * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a * security label in the packet itself this is the * best we can do. */ return NF_ACCEPT; /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */ sksec = sk->sk_security; sid = sksec->sid; } else sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0) return NF_DROP; return NF_ACCEPT; } static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state) { return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET); } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state) { return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET6); } #endif /* IPV6 */ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, u16 family) { struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb); struct sk_security_struct *sksec; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; char *addrp; u8 proto; if (sk == NULL) return NF_ACCEPT; sksec = sk->sk_security; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->netif = ifindex; ad.u.net->family = family; if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto)) return NF_DROP; if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad)) return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto)) return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); return NF_ACCEPT; } static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *outdev, u16 family) { u32 secmark_perm; u32 peer_sid; int ifindex = outdev->ifindex; struct sock *sk; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; char *addrp; u8 secmark_active; u8 peerlbl_active; /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function * as fast and as clean as possible. */ if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer()) return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family); secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) return NF_ACCEPT; sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb); #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks * when the packet is on it's final way out. * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do; * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per * connection. */ if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL && !(sk && sk_listener(sk))) return NF_ACCEPT; #endif if (sk == NULL) { /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */ if (skb->skb_iif) { secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT; if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid)) return NF_DROP; } else { secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; } } else if (sk_listener(sk)) { /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In * this particular case the correct security label is assigned * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output() * for similar problems. */ u32 skb_sid; struct sk_security_struct *sksec; sksec = sk->sk_security; if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid)) return NF_DROP; /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final" * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely * pass the packet. */ if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) { switch (family) { case PF_INET: if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED) return NF_ACCEPT; break; case PF_INET6: if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED) return NF_ACCEPT; break; default: return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); } } if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid)) return NF_DROP; secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; } else { /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the * associated socket. */ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; peer_sid = sksec->sid; secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; } ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->netif = ifindex; ad.u.net->family = family; if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL)) return NF_DROP; if (secmark_active) if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, peer_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad)) return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); if (peerlbl_active) { u32 if_sid; u32 node_sid; if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid)) return NF_DROP; if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, peer_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad)) return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid)) return NF_DROP; if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, peer_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad)) return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); } return NF_ACCEPT; } static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state) { return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET); } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state) { return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6); } #endif /* IPV6 */ #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { int rc = 0; unsigned int msg_len; unsigned int data_len = skb->len; unsigned char *data = skb->data; struct nlmsghdr *nlh; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; u16 sclass = sksec->sclass; u32 perm; while (data_len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) { nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)data; /* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink * users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus * length fields; our solution is to follow what * netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at * messages with length fields that are clearly junk */ if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || nlh->nlmsg_len > data_len) return 0; rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm); if (rc == 0) { rc = sock_has_perm(sk, perm); if (rc) return rc; } else if (rc == -EINVAL) { /* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */ pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink" " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s" " pid=%d comm=%s\n", sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, secclass_map[sclass - 1].name, task_pid_nr(current), current->comm); if (enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) && !security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state)) return rc; rc = 0; } else if (rc == -ENOENT) { /* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */ rc = 0; } else { return rc; } /* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */ msg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len); if (msg_len >= data_len) return 0; data_len -= msg_len; data += msg_len; } return rc; } static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass) { isec->sclass = sclass; isec->sid = current_sid(); } static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms, u32 perms) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); isec = selinux_ipc(ipc_perms); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad); } static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg) { struct msg_security_struct *msec; msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg); msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; return 0; } /* message queue security operations */ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; isec = selinux_ipc(msq); ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_MSGQ); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__CREATE, &ad); return rc; } static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); isec = selinux_ipc(msq); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad); } static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd) { int err; int perms; switch (cmd) { case IPC_INFO: case MSG_INFO: /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL); case IPC_STAT: case MSG_STAT: case MSG_STAT_ANY: perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE; break; case IPC_SET: perms = MSGQ__SETATTR; break; case IPC_RMID: perms = MSGQ__DESTROY; break; default: return 0; } err = ipc_has_perm(msq, perms); return err; } static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct msg_security_struct *msec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; isec = selinux_ipc(msq); msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg); /* * First time through, need to assign label to the message */ if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) { /* * Compute new sid based on current process and * message queue this message will be stored in */ rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid); if (rc) return rc; } ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key; /* Can this process write to the queue? */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__WRITE, &ad); if (!rc) /* Can this process send the message */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad); if (!rc) /* Can the message be put in the queue? */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad); return rc; } static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct msg_security_struct *msec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = task_sid(target); int rc; isec = selinux_ipc(msq); msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad); if (!rc) rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad); return rc; } /* Shared Memory security operations */ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; isec = selinux_ipc(shp); ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SHM); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, SHM__CREATE, &ad); return rc; } static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); isec = selinux_ipc(shp); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); } /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */ static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd) { int perms; int err; switch (cmd) { case IPC_INFO: case SHM_INFO: /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL); case IPC_STAT: case SHM_STAT: case SHM_STAT_ANY: perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE; break; case IPC_SET: perms = SHM__SETATTR; break; case SHM_LOCK: case SHM_UNLOCK: perms = SHM__LOCK; break; case IPC_RMID: perms = SHM__DESTROY; break; default: return 0; } err = ipc_has_perm(shp, perms); return err; } static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg) { u32 perms; if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY) perms = SHM__READ; else perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE; return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms); } /* Semaphore security operations */ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; isec = selinux_ipc(sma); ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SEM); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, SEM__CREATE, &ad); return rc; } static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); isec = selinux_ipc(sma); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); } /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */ static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd) { int err; u32 perms; switch (cmd) { case IPC_INFO: case SEM_INFO: /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL); case GETPID: case GETNCNT: case GETZCNT: perms = SEM__GETATTR; break; case GETVAL: case GETALL: perms = SEM__READ; break; case SETVAL: case SETALL: perms = SEM__WRITE; break; case IPC_RMID: perms = SEM__DESTROY; break; case IPC_SET: perms = SEM__SETATTR; break; case IPC_STAT: case SEM_STAT: case SEM_STAT_ANY: perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE; break; default: return 0; } err = ipc_has_perm(sma, perms); return err; } static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter) { u32 perms; if (alter) perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE; else perms = SEM__READ; return ipc_has_perm(sma, perms); } static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) { u32 av = 0; av = 0; if (flag & S_IRUGO) av |= IPC__UNIX_READ; if (flag & S_IWUGO) av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE; if (av == 0) return 0; return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av); } static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp); *secid = isec->sid; } static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) { if (inode) inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry); } static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) { const struct task_security_struct *__tsec; u32 sid; int error; unsigned len; rcu_read_lock(); __tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p)); if (current != p) { error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), __tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL); if (error) goto bad; } if (!strcmp(name, "current")) sid = __tsec->sid; else if (!strcmp(name, "prev")) sid = __tsec->osid; else if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) sid = __tsec->exec_sid; else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) sid = __tsec->create_sid; else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid; else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid; else { error = -EINVAL; goto bad; } rcu_read_unlock(); if (!sid) return 0; error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, value, &len); if (error) return error; return len; bad: rcu_read_unlock(); return error; } static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) { struct task_security_struct *tsec; struct cred *new; u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid; int error; char *str = value; /* * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all. */ if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL); else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL); else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL); else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL); else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL); else error = -EINVAL; if (error) return error; /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */ if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') { if (str[size-1] == '\n') { str[size-1] = 0; size--; } error = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) { if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) { struct audit_buffer *ab; size_t audit_size; /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the * context contains a nul and we should audit that */ if (str[size - 1] == '\0') audit_size = size - 1; else audit_size = size; ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR); audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context="); audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size); audit_log_end(ab); return error; } error = security_context_to_sid_force( &selinux_state, value, size, &sid); } if (error) return error; } new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) return -ENOMEM; /* Permission checking based on the specified context is performed during the actual operation (execve, open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the operation. See selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec for the execve checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */ tsec = selinux_cred(new); if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) { tsec->exec_sid = sid; } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) { tsec->create_sid = sid; } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) { if (sid) { error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL); if (error) goto abort_change; } tsec->keycreate_sid = sid; } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) { tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid; } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) { error = -EINVAL; if (sid == 0) goto abort_change; /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */ error = -EPERM; if (!current_is_single_threaded()) { error = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, sid); if (error) goto abort_change; } /* Check permissions for the transition. */ error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL); if (error) goto abort_change; /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok. Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */ ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid(); if (ptsid != 0) { error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); if (error) goto abort_change; } tsec->sid = sid; } else { error = -EINVAL; goto abort_change; } commit_creds(new); return size; abort_change: abort_creds(new); return error; } static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name) { return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0); } static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) { return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid, secdata, seclen); } static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) { return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL); } static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) { kfree(secdata); } static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); spin_lock(&isec->lock); isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID; spin_unlock(&isec->lock); } /* * called with inode->i_mutex locked */ static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) { int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0); /* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */ return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc; } /* * called with inode->i_mutex locked */ static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) { return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0); } static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) { int len = 0; len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, true); if (len < 0) return len; *ctxlen = len; return 0; } #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec; struct key_security_struct *ksec; ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); if (!ksec) return -ENOMEM; tsec = selinux_cred(cred); if (tsec->keycreate_sid) ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid; else ksec->sid = tsec->sid; k->security = ksec; return 0; } static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k) { struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security; k->security = NULL; kfree(ksec); } static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, enum key_need_perm need_perm) { struct key *key; struct key_security_struct *ksec; u32 perm, sid; switch (need_perm) { case KEY_NEED_VIEW: perm = KEY__VIEW; break; case KEY_NEED_READ: perm = KEY__READ; break; case KEY_NEED_WRITE: perm = KEY__WRITE; break; case KEY_NEED_SEARCH: perm = KEY__SEARCH; break; case KEY_NEED_LINK: perm = KEY__LINK; break; case KEY_NEED_SETATTR: perm = KEY__SETATTR; break; case KEY_NEED_UNLINK: case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE: case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE: case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK: return 0; default: WARN_ON(1); return -EPERM; } sid = cred_sid(cred); key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); ksec = key->security; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL); } static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) { struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security; char *context = NULL; unsigned len; int rc; rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ksec->sid, &context, &len); if (!rc) rc = len; *_buffer = context; return rc; } #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS static int selinux_watch_key(struct key *key) { struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security; u32 sid = current_sid(); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, NULL); } #endif #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val) { struct common_audit_data ad; int err; u32 sid = 0; struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec; struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey; err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid); if (err) return err; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY; ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix; ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val; ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY, INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad); } static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name, u8 port_num) { struct common_audit_data ad; int err; u32 sid = 0; struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec; struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport; err = security_ib_endport_sid(&selinux_state, dev_name, port_num, &sid); if (err) return err; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT; strncpy(ibendport.dev_name, dev_name, sizeof(ibendport.dev_name)); ibendport.port = port_num; ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT, INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad); } static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec) { struct ib_security_struct *sec; sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL); if (!sec) return -ENOMEM; sec->sid = current_sid(); *ib_sec = sec; return 0; } static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec) { kfree(ib_sec); } #endif #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size) { u32 sid = current_sid(); int ret; switch (cmd) { case BPF_MAP_CREATE: ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE, NULL); break; case BPF_PROG_LOAD: ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD, NULL); break; default: ret = 0; break; } return ret; } static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode) { u32 av = 0; if (fmode & FMODE_READ) av |= BPF__MAP_READ; if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE) av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE; return av; } /* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see * if it is a bpf related object. And apply correspinding checks on the bpf * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode. * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files. */ static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid) { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; struct bpf_prog *prog; struct bpf_map *map; int ret; if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) { map = file->private_data; bpfsec = map->security; ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL); if (ret) return ret; } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) { prog = file->private_data; bpfsec = prog->aux->security; ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL); if (ret) return ret; } return 0; } static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode) { u32 sid = current_sid(); struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; bpfsec = map->security; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL); } static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) { u32 sid = current_sid(); struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; bpfsec = prog->aux->security; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL); } static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map) { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL); if (!bpfsec) return -ENOMEM; bpfsec->sid = current_sid(); map->security = bpfsec; return 0; } static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security; map->security = NULL; kfree(bpfsec); } static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL); if (!bpfsec) return -ENOMEM; bpfsec->sid = current_sid(); aux->security = bpfsec; return 0; } static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security; aux->security = NULL; kfree(bpfsec); } #endif static int selinux_lockdown(enum lockdown_reason what) { struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); int invalid_reason = (what <= LOCKDOWN_NONE) || (what == LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX) || (what >= LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX); if (WARN(invalid_reason, "Invalid lockdown reason")) { audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR, "lockdown_reason=invalid"); return -EINVAL; } ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_LOCKDOWN; ad.u.reason = what; if (what <= LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX) return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_LOCKDOWN, LOCKDOWN__INTEGRITY, &ad); else return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_LOCKDOWN, LOCKDOWN__CONFIDENTIALITY, &ad); } struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct), .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct), .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), }; #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type) { u32 requested, sid = current_sid(); if (type == PERF_SECURITY_OPEN) requested = PERF_EVENT__OPEN; else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_CPU) requested = PERF_EVENT__CPU; else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL) requested = PERF_EVENT__KERNEL; else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT) requested = PERF_EVENT__TRACEPOINT; else return -EINVAL; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, requested, NULL); } static int selinux_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event) { struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec; perfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*perfsec), GFP_KERNEL); if (!perfsec) return -ENOMEM; perfsec->sid = current_sid(); event->security = perfsec; return 0; } static void selinux_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event) { struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security; event->security = NULL; kfree(perfsec); } static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event) { struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security; u32 sid = current_sid(); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__READ, NULL); } static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event) { struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security; u32 sid = current_sid(); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__WRITE, NULL); } #endif /* * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order: * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below, * 2. hooks that both access structures allocated by other hooks, and allocate * structures that can be later accessed by other hooks (mostly "cloning" * hooks), * 3. hooks that only allocate structures that can be later accessed by other * hooks ("allocating" hooks). * * Please follow block comment delimiters in the list to keep this order. * * This ordering is needed for SELinux runtime disable to work at least somewhat * safely. Breaking the ordering rules above might lead to NULL pointer derefs * when disabling SELinux at runtime. */ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction), LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder), LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable), LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on), LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog), LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory), LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts), LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, selinux_move_mount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify, selinux_path_notify), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file), LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate), LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd), LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv), LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate), LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop), LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate), LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel), LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect), LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, selinux_socket_socketpair), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established), LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet), LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc), LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec), LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open), #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet, selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity), #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key, selinux_watch_key), #endif #endif #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known), LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match), LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_open, selinux_perf_event_open), LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_free, selinux_perf_event_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_read, selinux_perf_event_read), LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write), #endif LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, selinux_lockdown), /* * PUT "CLONING" (ACCESSING + ALLOCATING) HOOKS HERE */ LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, selinux_fs_context_dup), LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_add_mnt_opt, selinux_add_mnt_opt), #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone), #endif /* * PUT "ALLOCATING" HOOKS HERE */ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security, selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security), #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc, selinux_perf_event_alloc), #endif }; static __init int selinux_init(void) { pr_info("SELinux: Initializing.\n"); memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state)); enforcing_set(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot); checkreqprot_set(&selinux_state, selinux_checkreqprot_boot); selinux_avc_init(&selinux_state.avc); mutex_init(&selinux_state.status_lock); mutex_init(&selinux_state.policy_mutex); /* Set the security state for the initial task. */ cred_init_security(); default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC); avc_init(); avtab_cache_init(); ebitmap_cache_init(); hashtab_cache_init(); security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux"); if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET)) panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n"); if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET)) panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n"); if (selinux_enforcing_boot) pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n"); else pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n"); fs_validate_description("selinux", selinux_fs_parameters); return 0; } static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused) { selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, NULL, 0, NULL); } void selinux_complete_init(void) { pr_debug("SELinux: Completing initialization.\n"); /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */ pr_debug("SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n"); iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL); } /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label all processes and objects when they are created. */ DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = { .name = "selinux", .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE, .enabled = &selinux_enabled_boot, .blobs = &selinux_blob_sizes, .init = selinux_init, }; #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = { { .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute, .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4, .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST, }, { .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward, .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4, .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD, .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, }, { .hook = selinux_ipv4_output, .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4, .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT, .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, }, #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) { .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute, .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6, .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST, }, { .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward, .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6, .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD, .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, }, { .hook = selinux_ipv6_output, .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6, .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT, .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, }, #endif /* IPV6 */ }; static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net) { return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops)); } static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net) { nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops)); } static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = { .init = selinux_nf_register, .exit = selinux_nf_unregister, }; static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void) { int err; if (!selinux_enabled_boot) return 0; pr_debug("SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n"); err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops); if (err) panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err); return 0; } __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void) { pr_debug("SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n"); unregister_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops); } #endif #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE #define selinux_nf_ip_exit() #endif #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state) { if (selinux_initialized(state)) { /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */ return -EINVAL; } if (selinux_disabled(state)) { /* Only do this once. */ return -EINVAL; } selinux_mark_disabled(state); pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n"); /* * Unregister netfilter hooks. * Must be done before security_delete_hooks() to avoid breaking * runtime disable. */ selinux_nf_ip_exit(); security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks)); /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */ avc_disable(); /* Unregister selinuxfs. */ exit_sel_fs(); return 0; } #endif
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef _LINUX_JUMP_LABEL_H #define _LINUX_JUMP_LABEL_H /* * Jump label support * * Copyright (C) 2009-2012 Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com> * Copyright (C) 2011-2012 Red Hat, Inc., Peter Zijlstra * * DEPRECATED API: * * The use of 'struct static_key' directly, is now DEPRECATED. In addition * static_key_{true,false}() is also DEPRECATED. IE DO NOT use the following: * * struct static_key false = STATIC_KEY_INIT_FALSE; * struct static_key true = STATIC_KEY_INIT_TRUE; * static_key_true() * static_key_false() * * The updated API replacements are: * * DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(key); * DEFINE_STATIC