1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #undef TRACE_SYSTEM #define TRACE_SYSTEM tlb #if !defined(_TRACE_TLB_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ) #define _TRACE_TLB_H #include <linux/mm_types.h> #include <linux/tracepoint.h> #define TLB_FLUSH_REASON \ EM( TLB_FLUSH_ON_TASK_SWITCH, "flush on task switch" ) \ EM( TLB_REMOTE_SHOOTDOWN, "remote shootdown" ) \ EM( TLB_LOCAL_SHOOTDOWN, "local shootdown" ) \ EM( TLB_LOCAL_MM_SHOOTDOWN, "local mm shootdown" ) \ EMe( TLB_REMOTE_SEND_IPI, "remote ipi send" ) /* * First define the enums in TLB_FLUSH_REASON to be exported to userspace * via TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM(). */ #undef EM #undef EMe #define EM(a,b) TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM(a); #define EMe(a,b) TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM(a); TLB_FLUSH_REASON /* * Now redefine the EM() and EMe() macros to map the enums to the strings * that will be printed in the output. */ #undef EM #undef EMe #define EM(a,b) { a, b }, #define EMe(a,b) { a, b } TRACE_EVENT(tlb_flush, TP_PROTO(int reason, unsigned long pages), TP_ARGS(reason, pages), TP_STRUCT__entry( __field( int, reason) __field(unsigned long, pages) ), TP_fast_assign( __entry->reason = reason; __entry->pages = pages; ), TP_printk("pages:%ld reason:%s (%d)", __entry->pages, __print_symbolic(__entry->reason, TLB_FLUSH_REASON), __entry->reason) ); #endif /* _TRACE_TLB_H */ /* This part must be outside protection */ #include <trace/define_trace.h>
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #undef TRACE_SYSTEM #define TRACE_SYSTEM cgroup #if !defined(_TRACE_CGROUP_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ) #define _TRACE_CGROUP_H #include <linux/cgroup.h> #include <linux/tracepoint.h> DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(cgroup_root, TP_PROTO(struct cgroup_root *root), TP_ARGS(root), TP_STRUCT__entry( __field( int, root ) __field( u16, ss_mask ) __string( name, root->name ) ), TP_fast_assign( __entry->root = root->hierarchy_id; __entry->ss_mask = root->subsys_mask; __assign_str(name, root->name); ), TP_printk("root=%d ss_mask=%#x name=%s", __entry->root, __entry->ss_mask, __get_str(name)) ); DEFINE_EVENT(cgroup_root, cgroup_setup_root, TP_PROTO(struct cgroup_root *root), TP_ARGS(root) ); DEFINE_EVENT(cgroup_root, cgroup_destroy_root, TP_PROTO(struct cgroup_root *root), TP_ARGS(root) ); DEFINE_EVENT(cgroup_root, cgroup_remount, TP_PROTO(struct cgroup_root *root), TP_ARGS(root) ); DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(cgroup, TP_PROTO(struct cgroup *cgrp, const char *path), TP_ARGS(cgrp, path), TP_STRUCT__entry( __field( int, root ) __field( int, id ) __field( int, level ) __string( path, path ) ), TP_fast_assign( __entry->root = cgrp->root->hierarchy_id; __entry->id = cgroup_id(cgrp); __entry->level = cgrp->level; __assign_str(path, path); ), TP_printk("root=%d id=%d level=%d path=%s", __entry->root, __entry->id, __entry->level, __get_str(path)) ); DEFINE_EVENT(cgroup, cgroup_mkdir, TP_PROTO(struct cgroup *cgrp, const char *path), TP_ARGS(cgrp, path) ); DEFINE_EVENT(cgroup, cgroup_rmdir, TP_PROTO(struct cgroup *cgrp, const char *path), TP_ARGS(cgrp, path) ); DEFINE_EVENT(cgroup, cgroup_release, TP_PROTO(struct cgroup *cgrp, const char *path), TP_ARGS(cgrp, path) ); DEFINE_EVENT(cgroup, cgroup_rename, TP_PROTO(struct cgroup *cgrp, const char *path), TP_ARGS(cgrp, path) ); DEFINE_EVENT(cgroup, cgroup_freeze, TP_PROTO(struct cgroup *cgrp, const char *path), TP_ARGS(cgrp, path) ); DEFINE_EVENT(cgroup, cgroup_unfreeze, TP_PROTO(struct cgroup *cgrp, const char *path), TP_ARGS(cgrp, path) ); DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(cgroup_migrate, TP_PROTO(struct cgroup *dst_cgrp, const char *path, struct task_struct *task, bool threadgroup), TP_ARGS(dst_cgrp, path, task, threadgroup), TP_STRUCT__entry( __field( int, dst_root ) __field( int, dst_id ) __field( int, dst_level ) __field( int, pid ) __string( dst_path, path ) __string( comm, task->comm ) ), TP_fast_assign( __entry->dst_root = dst_cgrp->root->hierarchy_id; __entry->dst_id = cgroup_id(dst_cgrp); __entry->dst_level = dst_cgrp->level; __assign_str(dst_path, path); __entry->pid = task->pid; __assign_str(comm, task->comm); ), TP_printk("dst_root=%d dst_id=%d dst_level=%d dst_path=%s pid=%d comm=%s", __entry->dst_root, __entry->dst_id, __entry->dst_level, __get_str(dst_path), __entry->pid, __get_str(comm)) ); DEFINE_EVENT(cgroup_migrate, cgroup_attach_task, TP_PROTO(struct cgroup *dst_cgrp, const char *path, struct task_struct *task, bool threadgroup), TP_ARGS(dst_cgrp, path, task, threadgroup) ); DEFINE_EVENT(cgroup_migrate, cgroup_transfer_tasks, TP_PROTO(struct cgroup *dst_cgrp, const char *path, struct task_struct *task, bool threadgroup), TP_ARGS(dst_cgrp, path, task, threadgroup) ); DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(cgroup_event, TP_PROTO(struct cgroup *cgrp, const char *path, int val), TP_ARGS(cgrp, path, val), TP_STRUCT__entry( __field( int, root ) __field( int, id ) __field( int, level ) __string( path, path ) __field( int, val ) ), TP_fast_assign( __entry->root = cgrp->root->hierarchy_id; __entry->id = cgroup_id(cgrp); __entry->level = cgrp->level; __assign_str(path, path); __entry->val = val; ), TP_printk("root=%d id=%d level=%d path=%s val=%d", __entry->root, __entry->id, __entry->level, __get_str(path), __entry->val) ); DEFINE_EVENT(cgroup_event, cgroup_notify_populated, TP_PROTO(struct cgroup *cgrp, const char *path, int val), TP_ARGS(cgrp, path, val) ); DEFINE_EVENT(cgroup_event, cgroup_notify_frozen, TP_PROTO(struct cgroup *cgrp, const char *path, int val), TP_ARGS(cgrp, path, val) ); #endif /* _TRACE_CGROUP_H */ /* This part must be outside protection */ #include <trace/define_trace.h>
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef _LINUX_RCULIST_BL_H #define _LINUX_RCULIST_BL_H /* * RCU-protected bl list version. See include/linux/list_bl.h. */ #include <linux/list_bl.h> #include <linux/rcupdate.h> static inline void hlist_bl_set_first_rcu(struct hlist_bl_head *h, struct hlist_bl_node *n) { LIST_BL_BUG_ON((unsigned long)n & LIST_BL_LOCKMASK); LIST_BL_BUG_ON(((unsigned long)h->first & LIST_BL_LOCKMASK) != LIST_BL_LOCKMASK); rcu_assign_pointer(h->first, (struct hlist_bl_node *)((unsigned long)n | LIST_BL_LOCKMASK)); } static inline struct hlist_bl_node *hlist_bl_first_rcu(struct hlist_bl_head *h) { return (struct hlist_bl_node *) ((unsigned long)rcu_dereference_check(h->first, hlist_bl_is_locked(h)) & ~LIST_BL_LOCKMASK); } /** * hlist_bl_del_rcu - deletes entry from hash list without re-initialization * @n: the element to delete from the hash list. * * Note: hlist_bl_unhashed() on entry does not return true after this, * the entry is in an undefined state. It is useful for RCU based * lockfree traversal. * * In particular, it means that we can not poison the forward * pointers that may still be used for walking the hash list. * * The caller must take whatever precautions are necessary * (such as holding appropriate locks) to avoid racing * with another list-mutation primitive, such as hlist_bl_add_head_rcu() * or hlist_bl_del_rcu(), running on this same list. * However, it is perfectly legal to run concurrently with * the _rcu list-traversal primitives, such as * hlist_bl_for_each_entry(). */ static inline void hlist_bl_del_rcu(struct hlist_bl_node *n) { __hlist_bl_del(n); n->pprev = LIST_POISON2; } /** * hlist_bl_add_head_rcu * @n: the element to add to the hash list. * @h: the list to add to. * * Description: * Adds the specified element to the specified hlist_bl, * while permitting racing traversals. * * The caller must take whatever precautions are necessary * (such as holding appropriate locks) to avoid racing * with another list-mutation primitive, such as hlist_bl_add_head_rcu() * or hlist_bl_del_rcu(), running on this same list. * However, it is perfectly legal to run concurrently with * the _rcu list-traversal primitives, such as * hlist_bl_for_each_entry_rcu(), used to prevent memory-consistency * problems on Alpha CPUs. Regardless of the type of CPU, the * list-traversal primitive must be guarded by rcu_read_lock(). */ static inline void hlist_bl_add_head_rcu(struct hlist_bl_node *n, struct hlist_bl_head *h) { struct hlist_bl_node *first; /* don't need hlist_bl_first_rcu because we're under lock */ first = hlist_bl_first(h); n->next = first; if (first) first->pprev = &n->next; n->pprev = &h->first; /* need _rcu because we can have concurrent lock free readers */ hlist_bl_set_first_rcu(h, n); } /** * hlist_bl_for_each_entry_rcu - iterate over rcu list of given type * @tpos: the type * to use as a loop cursor. * @pos: the &struct hlist_bl_node to use as a loop cursor. * @head: the head for your list. * @member: the name of the hlist_bl_node within the struct. * */ #define hlist_bl_for_each_entry_rcu(tpos, pos, head, member) \ for (pos = hlist_bl_first_rcu(head); \ pos && \ ({ tpos = hlist_bl_entry(pos, typeof(*tpos), member); 1; }); \ pos = rcu_dereference_raw(pos->next)) #endif
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But we need to * get the type for the ~ right in round_down (it needs to be * as wide as the result!), and we want to evaluate the macro * arguments just once each. */ #define __round_mask(x, y) ((__typeof__(x))((y)-1)) /** * round_up - round up to next specified power of 2 * @x: the value to round * @y: multiple to round up to (must be a power of 2) * * Rounds @x up to next multiple of @y (which must be a power of 2). * To perform arbitrary rounding up, use roundup() below. */ #define round_up(x, y) ((((x)-1) | __round_mask(x, y))+1) /** * round_down - round down to next specified power of 2 * @x: the value to round * @y: multiple to round down to (must be a power of 2) * * Rounds @x down to next multiple of @y (which must be a power of 2). * To perform arbitrary rounding down, use rounddown() below. */ #define round_down(x, y) ((x) & ~__round_mask(x, y)) #define typeof_member(T, m) typeof(((T*)0)->m) #define DIV_ROUND_UP __KERNEL_DIV_ROUND_UP #define DIV_ROUND_DOWN_ULL(ll, d) \ ({ unsigned long long _tmp = (ll); do_div(_tmp, d); _tmp; }) #define DIV_ROUND_UP_ULL(ll, d) \ DIV_ROUND_DOWN_ULL((unsigned long long)(ll) + (d) - 1, (d)) #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32 # define DIV_ROUND_UP_SECTOR_T(ll,d) DIV_ROUND_UP_ULL(ll, d) #else # define DIV_ROUND_UP_SECTOR_T(ll,d) DIV_ROUND_UP(ll,d) #endif /** * roundup - round up to the next specified multiple * @x: the value to up * @y: multiple to round up to * * Rounds @x up to next multiple of @y. If @y will always be a power * of 2, consider using the faster round_up(). */ #define roundup(x, y) ( \ { \ typeof(y) __y = y; \ (((x) + (__y - 1)) / __y) * __y; \ } \ ) /** * rounddown - round down to next specified multiple * @x: the value to round * @y: multiple to round down to * * Rounds @x down to next multiple of @y. If @y will always be a power * of 2, consider using the faster round_down(). */ #define rounddown(x, y) ( \ { \ typeof(x) __x = (x); \ __x - (__x % (y)); \ } \ ) /* * Divide positive or negative dividend by positive or negative divisor * and round to closest integer. Result is undefined for negative * divisors if the dividend variable type is unsigned and for negative * dividends if the divisor variable type is unsigned. */ #define DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST(x, divisor)( \ { \ typeof(x) __x = x; \ typeof(divisor) __d = divisor; \ (((typeof(x))-1) > 0 || \ ((typeof(divisor))-1) > 0 || \ (((__x) > 0) == ((__d) > 0))) ? \ (((__x) + ((__d) / 2)) / (__d)) : \ (((__x) - ((__d) / 2)) / (__d)); \ } \ ) /* * Same as above but for u64 dividends. divisor must be a 32-bit * number. */ #define DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST_ULL(x, divisor)( \ { \ typeof(divisor) __d = divisor; \ unsigned long long _tmp = (x) + (__d) / 2; \ do_div(_tmp, __d); \ _tmp; \ } \ ) /* * Multiplies an integer by a fraction, while avoiding unnecessary * overflow or loss of precision. */ #define mult_frac(x, numer, denom)( \ { \ typeof(x) quot = (x) / (denom); \ typeof(x) rem = (x) % (denom); \ (quot * (numer)) + ((rem * (numer)) / (denom)); \ } \ ) #define _RET_IP_ (unsigned long)__builtin_return_address(0) #define _THIS_IP_ ({ __label__ __here; __here: (unsigned long)&&__here; }) #define sector_div(a, b) do_div(a, b) /** * upper_32_bits - return bits 32-63 of a number * @n: the number we're accessing * * A basic shift-right of a 64- or 32-bit quantity. Use this to suppress * the "right shift count >= width of type" warning when that quantity is * 32-bits. */ #define upper_32_bits(n) ((u32)(((n) >> 16) >> 16)) /** * lower_32_bits - return bits 0-31 of a number * @n: the number we're accessing */ #define lower_32_bits(n) ((u32)((n) & 0xffffffff)) struct completion; struct pt_regs; struct user; #ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_VOLUNTARY extern int _cond_resched(void); # define might_resched() _cond_resched() #else # define might_resched() do { } while (0) #endif #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP extern void ___might_sleep(const char *file, int line, int preempt_offset); extern void __might_sleep(const char *file, int line, int preempt_offset); extern void __cant_sleep(const char *file, int line, int preempt_offset); /** * might_sleep - annotation for functions that can sleep * * this macro will print a stack trace if it is executed in an atomic * context (spinlock, irq-handler, ...). Additional sections where blocking is * not allowed can be annotated with non_block_start() and non_block_end() * pairs. * * This is a useful debugging help to be able to catch problems early and not * be bitten later when the calling function happens to sleep when it is not * supposed to. */ # define might_sleep() \ do { __might_sleep(__FILE__, __LINE__, 0); might_resched(); } while (0) /** * cant_sleep - annotation for functions that cannot sleep * * this macro will print a stack trace if it is executed with preemption enabled */ # define cant_sleep() \ do { __cant_sleep(__FILE__, __LINE__, 0); } while (0) # define sched_annotate_sleep() (current->task_state_change = 0) /** * non_block_start - annotate the start of section where sleeping is prohibited * * This is on behalf of the oom reaper, specifically when it is calling the mmu * notifiers. The problem is that if the notifier were to block on, for example, * mutex_lock() and if the process which holds that mutex were to perform a * sleeping memory allocation, the oom reaper is now blocked on completion of * that memory allocation. Other blocking calls like wait_event() pose similar * issues. */ # define non_block_start() (current->non_block_count++) /** * non_block_end - annotate the end of section where sleeping is prohibited * * Closes a section opened by non_block_start(). */ # define non_block_end() WARN_ON(current->non_block_count-- == 0) #else static inline void ___might_sleep(const char *file, int line, int preempt_offset) { } static inline void __might_sleep(const char *file, int line, int preempt_offset) { } # define might_sleep() do { might_resched(); } while (0) # define cant_sleep() do { } while (0) # define sched_annotate_sleep() do { } while (0) # define non_block_start() do { } while (0) # define non_block_end() do { } while (0) #endif #define might_sleep_if(cond) do { if (cond) might_sleep(); } while (0) #ifndef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT # define cant_migrate() cant_sleep() #else /* Placeholder for now */ # define cant_migrate() do { } while (0) #endif /** * abs - return absolute value of an argument * @x: the value. If it is unsigned type, it is converted to signed type first. * char is treated as if it was signed (regardless of whether it really is) * but the macro's return type is preserved as char. * * Return: an absolute value of x. */ #define abs(x) __abs_choose_expr(x, long long, \ __abs_choose_expr(x, long, \ __abs_choose_expr(x, int, \ __abs_choose_expr(x, short, \ __abs_choose_expr(x, char, \ __builtin_choose_expr( \ __builtin_types_compatible_p(typeof(x), char), \ (char)({ signed char __x = (x); __x<0?-__x:__x; }), \ ((void)0))))))) #define __abs_choose_expr(x, type, other) __builtin_choose_expr( \ __builtin_types_compatible_p(typeof(x), signed type) || \ __builtin_types_compatible_p(typeof(x), unsigned type), \ ({ signed type __x = (x); __x < 0 ? -__x : __x; }), other) /** * reciprocal_scale - "scale" a value into range [0, ep_ro) * @val: value * @ep_ro: right open interval endpoint * * Perform a "reciprocal multiplication" in order to "scale" a value into * range [0, @ep_ro), where the upper interval endpoint is right-open. * This is useful, e.g. for accessing a index of an array containing * @ep_ro elements, for example. Think of it as sort of modulus, only that * the result isn't that of modulo. ;) Note that if initial input is a * small value, then result will return 0. * * Return: a result based on @val in interval [0, @ep_ro). */ static inline u32 reciprocal_scale(u32 val, u32 ep_ro) { return (u32)(((u64) val * ep_ro) >> 32); } #if defined(CONFIG_MMU) && \ (defined(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) || defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP)) #define might_fault() __might_fault(__FILE__, __LINE__) void __might_fault(const char *file, int line); #else static inline void might_fault(void) { } #endif extern struct atomic_notifier_head panic_notifier_list; extern long (*panic_blink)(int state); __printf(1, 2) void panic(const char *fmt, ...) __noreturn __cold; void nmi_panic(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *msg); extern void oops_enter(void); extern void oops_exit(void); extern bool oops_may_print(void); void do_exit(long error_code) __noreturn; void complete_and_exit(struct completion *, long) __noreturn; /* Internal, do not use. */ int __must_check _kstrtoul(const char *s, unsigned int base, unsigned long *res); int __must_check _kstrtol(const char *s, unsigned int base, long *res); int __must_check kstrtoull(const char *s, unsigned int base, unsigned long long *res); int __must_check kstrtoll(const char *s, unsigned int base, long long *res); /** * kstrtoul - convert a string to an unsigned long * @s: The start of the string. The string must be null-terminated, and may also * include a single newline before its terminating null. The first character * may also be a plus sign, but not a minus sign. * @base: The number base to use. The maximum supported base is 16. If base is * given as 0, then the base of the string is automatically detected with the * conventional semantics - If it begins with 0x the number will be parsed as a * hexadecimal (case insensitive), if it otherwise begins with 0, it will be * parsed as an octal number. Otherwise it will be parsed as a decimal. * @res: Where to write the result of the conversion on success. * * Returns 0 on success, -ERANGE on overflow and -EINVAL on parsing error. * Preferred over simple_strtoul(). Return code must be checked. */ static inline int __must_check kstrtoul(const char *s, unsigned int base, unsigned long *res) { /* * We want to shortcut function call, but * __builtin_types_compatible_p(unsigned long, unsigned long long) = 0. */ if (sizeof(unsigned long) == sizeof(unsigned long long) && __alignof__(unsigned long) == __alignof__(unsigned long long)) return kstrtoull(s, base, (unsigned long long *)res); else return _kstrtoul(s, base, res); } /** * kstrtol - convert a string to a long * @s: The start of the string. The string must be null-terminated, and may also * include a single newline before its terminating null. The first character * may also be a plus sign or a minus sign. * @base: The number base to use. The maximum supported base is 16. If base is * given as 0, then the base of the string is automatically detected with the * conventional semantics - If it begins with 0x the number will be parsed as a * hexadecimal (case insensitive), if it otherwise begins with 0, it will be * parsed as an octal number. Otherwise it will be parsed as a decimal. * @res: Where to write the result of the conversion on success. * * Returns 0 on success, -ERANGE on overflow and -EINVAL on parsing error. * Preferred over simple_strtol(). Return code must be checked. */ static inline int __must_check kstrtol(const char *s, unsigned int base, long *res) { /* * We want to shortcut function call, but * __builtin_types_compatible_p(long, long long) = 0. */ if (sizeof(long) == sizeof(long long) && __alignof__(long) == __alignof__(long long)) return kstrtoll(s, base, (long long *)res); else return _kstrtol(s, base, res); } int __must_check kstrtouint(const char *s, unsigned int base, unsigned int *res); int __must_check kstrtoint(const char *s, unsigned int base, int *res); static inline int __must_check kstrtou64(const char *s, unsigned int base, u64 *res) { return kstrtoull(s, base, res); } static inline int __must_check kstrtos64(const char *s, unsigned int base, s64 *res) { return kstrtoll(s, base, res); } static inline int __must_check kstrtou32(const char *s, unsigned int base, u32 *res) { return kstrtouint(s, base, res); } static inline int __must_check kstrtos32(const char *s, unsigned int base, s32 *res) { return kstrtoint(s, base, res); } int __must_check kstrtou16(const char *s, unsigned int base, u16 *res); int __must_check kstrtos16(const char *s, unsigned int base, s16 *res); int __must_check kstrtou8(const char *s, unsigned int base, u8 *res); int __must_check kstrtos8(const char *s, unsigned int base, s8 *res); int __must_check kstrtobool(const char *s, bool *res); int __must_check kstrtoull_from_user(const char __user *s, size_t count, unsigned int base, unsigned long long *res); int __must_check kstrtoll_from_user(const char __user *s, size_t count, unsigned int base, long long *res); int __must_check kstrtoul_from_user(const char __user *s, size_t count, unsigned int base, unsigned long *res); int __must_check kstrtol_from_user(const char __user *s, size_t count, unsigned int base, long *res); int __must_check kstrtouint_from_user(const char __user *s, size_t count, unsigned int base, unsigned int *res); int __must_check kstrtoint_from_user(const char __user *s, size_t count, unsigned int base, int *res); int __must_check kstrtou16_from_user(const char __user *s, size_t count, unsigned int base, u16 *res); int __must_check kstrtos16_from_user(const char __user *s, size_t count, unsigned int base, s16 *res); int __must_check kstrtou8_from_user(const char __user *s, size_t count, unsigned int base, u8 *res); int __must_check kstrtos8_from_user(const char __user *s, size_t count, unsigned int base, s8 *res); int __must_check kstrtobool_from_user(const char __user *s, size_t count, bool *res); static inline int __must_check kstrtou64_from_user(const char __user *s, size_t count, unsigned int base, u64 *res) { return kstrtoull_from_user(s, count, base, res); } static inline int __must_check kstrtos64_from_user(const char __user *s, size_t count, unsigned int base, s64 *res) { return kstrtoll_from_user(s, count, base, res); } static inline int __must_check kstrtou32_from_user(const char __user *s, size_t count, unsigned int base, u32 *res) { return kstrtouint_from_user(s, count, base, res); } static inline int __must_check kstrtos32_from_user(const char __user *s, size_t count, unsigned int base, s32 *res) { return kstrtoint_from_user(s, count, base, res); } /* * Use kstrto<foo> instead. * * NOTE: simple_strto<foo> does not check for the range overflow and, * depending on the input, may give interesting results. * * Use these functions if and only if you cannot use kstrto<foo>, because * the conversion ends on the first non-digit character, which may be far * beyond the supported range. It might be useful to parse the strings like * 10x50 or 12:21 without altering original string or temporary buffer in use. * Keep in mind above caveat. */ extern unsigned long simple_strtoul(const char *,char **,unsigned int); extern long simple_strtol(const char *,char **,unsigned int); extern unsigned long long simple_strtoull(const char *,char **,unsigned int); extern long long simple_strtoll(const char *,char **,unsigned int); extern int num_to_str(char *buf, int size, unsigned long long num, unsigned int width); /* lib/printf utilities */ extern __printf(2, 3) int sprintf(char *buf, const char * fmt, ...); extern __printf(2, 0) int vsprintf(char *buf, const char *, va_list); extern __printf(3, 4) int snprintf(char *buf, size_t size, const char *fmt, ...); extern __printf(3, 0) int vsnprintf(char *buf, size_t size, const char *fmt, va_list args); extern __printf(3, 4) int scnprintf(char *buf, size_t size, const char *fmt, ...); extern __printf(3, 0) int vscnprintf(char *buf, size_t size, const char *fmt, va_list args); extern __printf(2, 3) __malloc char *kasprintf(gfp_t gfp, const char *fmt, ...); extern __printf(2, 0) __malloc char *kvasprintf(gfp_t gfp, const char *fmt, va_list args); extern __printf(2, 0) const char *kvasprintf_const(gfp_t gfp, const char *fmt, va_list args); extern __scanf(2, 3) int sscanf(const char *, const char *, ...); extern __scanf(2, 0) int vsscanf(const char *, const char *, va_list); extern int get_option(char **str, int *pint); extern char *get_options(const char *str, int nints, int *ints); extern unsigned long long memparse(const char *ptr, char **retptr); extern bool parse_option_str(const char *str, const char *option); extern char *next_arg(char *args, char **param, char **val); extern int core_kernel_text(unsigned long addr); extern int init_kernel_text(unsigned long addr); extern int core_kernel_data(unsigned long addr); extern int __kernel_text_address(unsigned long addr); extern int kernel_text_address(unsigned long addr); extern int func_ptr_is_kernel_text(void *ptr); u64 int_pow(u64 base, unsigned int exp); unsigned long int_sqrt(unsigned long); #if BITS_PER_LONG < 64 u32 int_sqrt64(u64 x); #else static inline u32 int_sqrt64(u64 x) { return (u32)int_sqrt(x); } #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SMP extern unsigned int sysctl_oops_all_cpu_backtrace; #else #define sysctl_oops_all_cpu_backtrace 0 #endif /* CONFIG_SMP */ extern void bust_spinlocks(int yes); extern int panic_timeout; extern unsigned long panic_print; extern int panic_on_oops; extern int panic_on_unrecovered_nmi; extern int panic_on_io_nmi; extern int panic_on_warn; extern unsigned long panic_on_taint; extern bool panic_on_taint_nousertaint; extern int sysctl_panic_on_rcu_stall; extern int sysctl_panic_on_stackoverflow; extern bool crash_kexec_post_notifiers; /* * panic_cpu is used for synchronizing panic() and crash_kexec() execution. It * holds a CPU number which is executing panic() currently. A value of * PANIC_CPU_INVALID means no CPU has entered panic() or crash_kexec(). */ extern atomic_t panic_cpu; #define PANIC_CPU_INVALID -1 /* * Only to be used by arch init code. If the user over-wrote the default * CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT, honor it. */ static inline void set_arch_panic_timeout(int timeout, int arch_default_timeout) { if (panic_timeout == arch_default_timeout) panic_timeout = timeout; } extern const char *print_tainted(void); enum lockdep_ok { LOCKDEP_STILL_OK, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE }; extern void add_taint(unsigned flag, enum lockdep_ok); extern int test_taint(unsigned flag); extern unsigned long get_taint(void); extern int root_mountflags; extern bool early_boot_irqs_disabled; /* * Values used for system_state. Ordering of the states must not be changed * as code checks for <, <=, >, >= STATE. */ extern enum system_states { SYSTEM_BOOTING, SYSTEM_SCHEDULING, SYSTEM_RUNNING, SYSTEM_HALT, SYSTEM_POWER_OFF, SYSTEM_RESTART, SYSTEM_SUSPEND, } system_state; /* This cannot be an enum because some may be used in assembly source. */ #define TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE 0 #define TAINT_FORCED_MODULE 1 #define TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC 2 #define TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD 3 #define TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK 4 #define TAINT_BAD_PAGE 5 #define TAINT_USER 6 #define TAINT_DIE 7 #define TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE 8 #define TAINT_WARN 9 #define TAINT_CRAP 10 #define TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND 11 #define TAINT_OOT_MODULE 12 #define TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE 13 #define TAINT_SOFTLOCKUP 14 #define TAINT_LIVEPATCH 15 #define TAINT_AUX 16 #define TAINT_RANDSTRUCT 17 #define TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT 18 #define TAINT_FLAGS_MAX ((1UL << TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT) - 1) struct taint_flag { char c_true; /* character printed when tainted */ char c_false; /* character printed when not tainted */ bool module; /* also show as a per-module taint flag */ }; extern const struct taint_flag taint_flags[TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT]; extern const char hex_asc[]; #define hex_asc_lo(x) hex_asc[((x) & 0x0f)] #define hex_asc_hi(x) hex_asc[((x) & 0xf0) >> 4] static inline char *hex_byte_pack(char *buf, u8 byte) { *buf++ = hex_asc_hi(byte); *buf++ = hex_asc_lo(byte); return buf; } extern const char hex_asc_upper[]; #define hex_asc_upper_lo(x) hex_asc_upper[((x) & 0x0f)] #define hex_asc_upper_hi(x) hex_asc_upper[((x) & 0xf0) >> 4] static inline char *hex_byte_pack_upper(char *buf, u8 byte) { *buf++ = hex_asc_upper_hi(byte); *buf++ = hex_asc_upper_lo(byte); return buf; } extern int hex_to_bin(char ch); extern int __must_check hex2bin(u8 *dst, const char *src, size_t count); extern char *bin2hex(char *dst, const void *src, size_t count); bool mac_pton(const char *s, u8 *mac); /* * General tracing related utility functions - trace_printk(), * tracing_on/tracing_off and tracing_start()/tracing_stop * * Use tracing_on/tracing_off when you want to quickly turn on or off * tracing. It simply enables or disables the recording of the trace events. * This also corresponds to the user space /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/tracing_on * file, which gives a means for the kernel and userspace to interact. * Place a tracing_off() in the kernel where you want tracing to end. * From user space, examine the trace, and then echo 1 > tracing_on * to continue tracing. * * tracing_stop/tracing_start has slightly more overhead. It is used * by things like suspend to ram where disabling the recording of the * trace is not enough, but tracing must actually stop because things * like calling smp_processor_id() may crash the system. * * Most likely, you want to use tracing_on/tracing_off. */ enum ftrace_dump_mode { DUMP_NONE, DUMP_ALL, DUMP_ORIG, }; #ifdef CONFIG_TRACING void tracing_on(void); void tracing_off(void); int tracing_is_on(void); void tracing_snapshot(void); void tracing_snapshot_alloc(void); extern void tracing_start(void); extern void tracing_stop(void); static inline __printf(1, 2) void ____trace_printk_check_format(const char *fmt, ...) { } #define __trace_printk_check_format(fmt, args...) \ do { \ if (0) \ ____trace_printk_check_format(fmt, ##args); \ } while (0) /** * trace_printk - printf formatting in the ftrace buffer * @fmt: the printf format for printing * * Note: __trace_printk is an internal function for trace_printk() and * the @ip is passed in via the trace_printk() macro. * * This function allows a kernel developer to debug fast path sections * that printk is not appropriate for. By scattering in various * printk like tracing in the code, a developer can quickly see * where problems are occurring. * * This is intended as a debugging tool for the developer only. * Please refrain from leaving trace_printks scattered around in * your code. (Extra memory is used for special buffers that are * allocated when trace_printk() is used.) * * A little optimization trick is done here. If there's only one * argument, there's no need to scan the string for printf formats. * The trace_puts() will suffice. But how can we take advantage of * using trace_puts() when trace_printk() has only one argument? * By stringifying the args and checking the size we can tell * whether or not there are args. __stringify((__VA_ARGS__)) will * turn into "()\0" with a size of 3 when there are no args, anything * else will be bigger. All we need to do is define a string to this, * and then take its size and compare to 3. If it's bigger, use * do_trace_printk() otherwise, optimize it to trace_puts(). Then just * let gcc optimize the rest. */ #define trace_printk(fmt, ...) \ do { \ char _______STR[] = __stringify((__VA_ARGS__)); \ if (sizeof(_______STR) > 3) \ do_trace_printk(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__); \ else \ trace_puts(fmt); \ } while (0) #define do_trace_printk(fmt, args...) \ do { \ static const char *trace_printk_fmt __used \ __section("__trace_printk_fmt") = \ __builtin_constant_p(fmt) ? fmt : NULL; \ \ __trace_printk_check_format(fmt, ##args); \ \ if (__builtin_constant_p(fmt)) \ __trace_bprintk(_THIS_IP_, trace_printk_fmt, ##args); \ else \ __trace_printk(_THIS_IP_, fmt, ##args); \ } while (0) extern __printf(2, 3) int __trace_bprintk(unsigned long ip, const char *fmt, ...); extern __printf(2, 3) int __trace_printk(unsigned long ip, const char *fmt, ...); /** * trace_puts - write a string into the ftrace buffer * @str: the string to record * * Note: __trace_bputs is an internal function for trace_puts and * the @ip is passed in via the trace_puts macro. * * This is similar to trace_printk() but is made for those really fast * paths that a developer wants the least amount of "Heisenbug" effects, * where the processing of the print format is still too much. * * This function allows a kernel developer to debug fast path sections * that printk is not appropriate for. By scattering in various * printk like tracing in the code, a developer can quickly see * where problems are occurring. * * This is intended as a debugging tool for the developer only. * Please refrain from leaving trace_puts scattered around in * your code. (Extra memory is used for special buffers that are * allocated when trace_puts() is used.) * * Returns: 0 if nothing was written, positive # if string was. * (1 when __trace_bputs is used, strlen(str) when __trace_puts is used) */ #define trace_puts(str) ({ \ static const char *trace_printk_fmt __used \ __section("__trace_printk_fmt") = \ __builtin_constant_p(str) ? str : NULL; \ \ if (__builtin_constant_p(str)) \ __trace_bputs(_THIS_IP_, trace_printk_fmt); \ else \ __trace_puts(_THIS_IP_, str, strlen(str)); \ }) extern int __trace_bputs(unsigned long ip, const char *str); extern int __trace_puts(unsigned long ip, const char *str, int size); extern void trace_dump_stack(int skip); /* * The double __builtin_constant_p is because gcc will give us an error * if we try to allocate the static variable to fmt if it is not a * constant. Even with the outer if statement. */ #define ftrace_vprintk(fmt, vargs) \ do { \ if (__builtin_constant_p(fmt)) { \ static const char *trace_printk_fmt __used \ __section("__trace_printk_fmt") = \ __builtin_constant_p(fmt) ? fmt : NULL; \ \ __ftrace_vbprintk(_THIS_IP_, trace_printk_fmt, vargs); \ } else \ __ftrace_vprintk(_THIS_IP_, fmt, vargs); \ } while (0) extern __printf(2, 0) int __ftrace_vbprintk(unsigned long ip, const char *fmt, va_list ap); extern __printf(2, 0) int __ftrace_vprintk(unsigned long ip, const char *fmt, va_list ap); extern void ftrace_dump(enum ftrace_dump_mode oops_dump_mode); #else static inline void tracing_start(void) { } static inline void tracing_stop(void) { } static inline void trace_dump_stack(int skip) { } static inline void tracing_on(void) { } static inline void tracing_off(void) { } static inline int tracing_is_on(void) { return 0; } static inline void tracing_snapshot(void) { } static inline void tracing_snapshot_alloc(void) { } static inline __printf(1, 2) int trace_printk(const char *fmt, ...) { return 0; } static __printf(1, 0) inline int ftrace_vprintk(const char *fmt, va_list ap) { return 0; } static inline void ftrace_dump(enum ftrace_dump_mode oops_dump_mode) { } #endif /* CONFIG_TRACING */ /* This counts to 12. Any more, it will return 13th argument. */ #define __COUNT_ARGS(_0, _1, _2, _3, _4, _5, _6, _7, _8, _9, _10, _11, _12, _n, X...) _n #define COUNT_ARGS(X...) __COUNT_ARGS(, ##X, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0) #define __CONCAT(a, b) a ## b #define CONCATENATE(a, b) __CONCAT(a, b) /** * container_of - cast a member of a structure out to the containing structure * @ptr: the pointer to the member. * @type: the type of the container struct this is embedded in. * @member: the name of the member within the struct. * */ #define container_of(ptr, type, member) ({ \ void *__mptr = (void *)(ptr); \ BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(!__same_type(*(ptr), ((type *)0)->member) && \ !__same_type(*(ptr), void), \ "pointer type mismatch in container_of()"); \ ((type *)(__mptr - offsetof(type, member))); }) /** * container_of_safe - cast a member of a structure out to the containing structure * @ptr: the pointer to the member. * @type: the type of the container struct this is embedded in. * @member: the name of the member within the struct. * * If IS_ERR_OR_NULL(ptr), ptr is returned unchanged. */ #define container_of_safe(ptr, type, member) ({ \ void *__mptr = (void *)(ptr); \ BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(!__same_type(*(ptr), ((type *)0)->member) && \ !__same_type(*(ptr), void), \ "pointer type mismatch in container_of()"); \ IS_ERR_OR_NULL(__mptr) ? ERR_CAST(__mptr) : \ ((type *)(__mptr - offsetof(type, member))); }) /* Rebuild everything on CONFIG_FTRACE_MCOUNT_RECORD */ #ifdef CONFIG_FTRACE_MCOUNT_RECORD # define REBUILD_DUE_TO_FTRACE_MCOUNT_RECORD #endif /* Permissions on a sysfs file: you didn't miss the 0 prefix did you? */ #define VERIFY_OCTAL_PERMISSIONS(perms) \ (BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO((perms) < 0) + \ BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO((perms) > 0777) + \ /* USER_READABLE >= GROUP_READABLE >= OTHER_READABLE */ \ BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO((((perms) >> 6) & 4) < (((perms) >> 3) & 4)) + \ BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO((((perms) >> 3) & 4) < ((perms) & 4)) + \ /* USER_WRITABLE >= GROUP_WRITABLE */ \ BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO((((perms) >> 6) & 2) < (((perms) >> 3) & 2)) + \ /* OTHER_WRITABLE? Generally considered a bad idea. */ \ BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO((perms) & 2) + \ (perms)) #endif
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef _LINUX_SOCKET_H #define _LINUX_SOCKET_H #include <asm/socket.h> /* arch-dependent defines */ #include <linux/sockios.h> /* the SIOCxxx I/O controls */ #include <linux/uio.h> /* iovec support */ #include <linux/types.h> /* pid_t */ #include <linux/compiler.h> /* __user */ #include <uapi/linux/socket.h> struct file; struct pid; struct cred; struct socket; #define __sockaddr_check_size(size) \ BUILD_BUG_ON(((size) > sizeof(struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage))) #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS struct seq_file; extern void socket_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq); #endif typedef __kernel_sa_family_t sa_family_t; /* * 1003.1g requires sa_family_t and that sa_data is char. */ struct sockaddr { sa_family_t sa_family; /* address family, AF_xxx */ char sa_data[14]; /* 14 bytes of protocol address */ }; struct linger { int l_onoff; /* Linger active */ int l_linger; /* How long to linger for */ }; #define sockaddr_storage __kernel_sockaddr_storage /* * As we do 4.4BSD message passing we use a 4.4BSD message passing * system, not 4.3. Thus msg_accrights(len) are now missing. They * belong in an obscure libc emulation or the bin. */ struct msghdr { void *msg_name; /* ptr to socket address structure */ int msg_namelen; /* size of socket address structure */ struct iov_iter msg_iter; /* data */ /* * Ancillary data. msg_control_user is the user buffer used for the * recv* side when msg_control_is_user is set, msg_control is the kernel * buffer used for all other cases. */ union { void *msg_control; void __user *msg_control_user; }; bool msg_control_is_user : 1; __kernel_size_t msg_controllen; /* ancillary data buffer length */ unsigned int msg_flags; /* flags on received message */ struct kiocb *msg_iocb; /* ptr to iocb for async requests */ }; struct user_msghdr { void __user *msg_name; /* ptr to socket address structure */ int msg_namelen; /* size of socket address structure */ struct iovec __user *msg_iov; /* scatter/gather array */ __kernel_size_t msg_iovlen; /* # elements in msg_iov */ void __user *msg_control; /* ancillary data */ __kernel_size_t msg_controllen; /* ancillary data buffer length */ unsigned int msg_flags; /* flags on received message */ }; /* For recvmmsg/sendmmsg */ struct mmsghdr { struct user_msghdr msg_hdr; unsigned int msg_len; }; /* * POSIX 1003.1g - ancillary data object information * Ancillary data consits of a sequence of pairs of * (cmsghdr, cmsg_data[]) */ struct cmsghdr { __kernel_size_t cmsg_len; /* data byte count, including hdr */ int cmsg_level; /* originating protocol */ int cmsg_type; /* protocol-specific type */ }; /* * Ancillary data object information MACROS * Table 5-14 of POSIX 1003.1g */ #define __CMSG_NXTHDR(ctl, len, cmsg) __cmsg_nxthdr((ctl),(len),(cmsg)) #define CMSG_NXTHDR(mhdr, cmsg) cmsg_nxthdr((mhdr), (cmsg)) #define CMSG_ALIGN(len) ( ((len)+sizeof(long)-1) & ~(sizeof(long)-1) ) #define CMSG_DATA(cmsg) \ ((void *)(cmsg) + sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) #define CMSG_USER_DATA(cmsg) \ ((void __user *)(cmsg) + sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) #define CMSG_SPACE(len) (sizeof(struct cmsghdr) + CMSG_ALIGN(len)) #define CMSG_LEN(len) (sizeof(struct cmsghdr) + (len)) #define __CMSG_FIRSTHDR(ctl,len) ((len) >= sizeof(struct cmsghdr) ? \ (struct cmsghdr *)(ctl) : \ (struct cmsghdr *)NULL) #define CMSG_FIRSTHDR(msg) __CMSG_FIRSTHDR((msg)->msg_control, (msg)->msg_controllen) #define CMSG_OK(mhdr, cmsg) ((cmsg)->cmsg_len >= sizeof(struct cmsghdr) && \ (cmsg)->cmsg_len <= (unsigned long) \ ((mhdr)->msg_controllen - \ ((char *)(cmsg) - (char *)(mhdr)->msg_control))) #define for_each_cmsghdr(cmsg, msg) \ for (cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(msg); \ cmsg; \ cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(msg, cmsg)) /* * Get the next cmsg header * * PLEASE, do not touch this function. If you think, that it is * incorrect, grep kernel sources and think about consequences * before trying to improve it. * * Now it always returns valid, not truncated ancillary object * HEADER. But caller still MUST check, that cmsg->cmsg_len is * inside range, given by msg->msg_controllen before using * ancillary object DATA. --ANK (980731) */ static inline struct cmsghdr * __cmsg_nxthdr(void *__ctl, __kernel_size_t __size, struct cmsghdr *__cmsg) { struct cmsghdr * __ptr; __ptr = (struct cmsghdr*)(((unsigned char *) __cmsg) + CMSG_ALIGN(__cmsg->cmsg_len)); if ((unsigned long)((char*)(__ptr+1) - (char *) __ctl) > __size) return (struct cmsghdr *)0; return __ptr; } static inline struct cmsghdr * cmsg_nxthdr (struct msghdr *__msg, struct cmsghdr *__cmsg) { return __cmsg_nxthdr(__msg->msg_control, __msg->msg_controllen, __cmsg); } static inline size_t msg_data_left(struct msghdr *msg) { return iov_iter_count(&msg->msg_iter); } /* "Socket"-level control message types: */ #define SCM_RIGHTS 0x01 /* rw: access rights (array of int) */ #define SCM_CREDENTIALS 0x02 /* rw: struct ucred */ #define SCM_SECURITY 0x03 /* rw: security label */ struct ucred { __u32 pid; __u32 uid; __u32 gid; }; /* Supported address families. */ #define AF_UNSPEC 0 #define AF_UNIX 1 /* Unix domain sockets */ #define AF_LOCAL 1 /* POSIX name for AF_UNIX */ #define AF_INET 2 /* Internet IP Protocol */ #define AF_AX25 3 /* Amateur Radio AX.25 */ #define AF_IPX 4 /* Novell IPX */ #define AF_APPLETALK 5 /* AppleTalk DDP */ #define AF_NETROM 6 /* Amateur Radio NET/ROM */ #define AF_BRIDGE 7 /* Multiprotocol bridge */ #define AF_ATMPVC 8 /* ATM PVCs */ #define AF_X25 9 /* Reserved for X.25 project */ #define AF_INET6 10 /* IP version 6 */ #define AF_ROSE 11 /* Amateur Radio X.25 PLP */ #define AF_DECnet 12 /* Reserved for DECnet project */ #define AF_NETBEUI 13 /* Reserved for 802.2LLC project*/ #define AF_SECURITY 14 /* Security callback pseudo AF */ #define AF_KEY 15 /* PF_KEY key management API */ #define AF_NETLINK 16 #define AF_ROUTE AF_NETLINK /* Alias to emulate 4.4BSD */ #define AF_PACKET 17 /* Packet family */ #define AF_ASH 18 /* Ash */ #define AF_ECONET 19 /* Acorn Econet */ #define AF_ATMSVC 20 /* ATM SVCs */ #define AF_RDS 21 /* RDS sockets */ #define AF_SNA 22 /* Linux SNA Project (nutters!) */ #define AF_IRDA 23 /* IRDA sockets */ #define AF_PPPOX 24 /* PPPoX sockets */ #define AF_WANPIPE 25 /* Wanpipe API Sockets */ #define AF_LLC 26 /* Linux LLC */ #define AF_IB 27 /* Native InfiniBand address */ #define AF_MPLS 28 /* MPLS */ #define AF_CAN 29 /* Controller Area Network */ #define AF_TIPC 30 /* TIPC sockets */ #define AF_BLUETOOTH 31 /* Bluetooth sockets */ #define AF_IUCV 32 /* IUCV sockets */ #define AF_RXRPC 33 /* RxRPC sockets */ #define AF_ISDN 34 /* mISDN sockets */ #define AF_PHONET 35 /* Phonet sockets */ #define AF_IEEE802154 36 /* IEEE802154 sockets */ #define AF_CAIF 37 /* CAIF sockets */ #define AF_ALG 38 /* Algorithm sockets */ #define AF_NFC 39 /* NFC sockets */ #define AF_VSOCK 40 /* vSockets */ #define AF_KCM 41 /* Kernel Connection Multiplexor*/ #define AF_QIPCRTR 42 /* Qualcomm IPC Router */ #define AF_SMC 43 /* smc sockets: reserve number for * PF_SMC protocol family that * reuses AF_INET address family */ #define AF_XDP 44 /* XDP sockets */ #define AF_MAX 45 /* For now.. */ /* Protocol families, same as address families. */ #define PF_UNSPEC AF_UNSPEC #define PF_UNIX AF_UNIX #define PF_LOCAL AF_LOCAL #define PF_INET AF_INET #define PF_AX25 AF_AX25 #define PF_IPX AF_IPX #define PF_APPLETALK AF_APPLETALK #define PF_NETROM AF_NETROM #define PF_BRIDGE AF_BRIDGE #define PF_ATMPVC AF_ATMPVC #define PF_X25 AF_X25 #define PF_INET6 AF_INET6 #define PF_ROSE AF_ROSE #define PF_DECnet AF_DECnet #define PF_NETBEUI AF_NETBEUI #define PF_SECURITY AF_SECURITY #define PF_KEY AF_KEY #define PF_NETLINK AF_NETLINK #define PF_ROUTE AF_ROUTE #define PF_PACKET AF_PACKET #define PF_ASH AF_ASH #define PF_ECONET AF_ECONET #define PF_ATMSVC AF_ATMSVC #define PF_RDS AF_RDS #define PF_SNA AF_SNA #define PF_IRDA AF_IRDA #define PF_PPPOX AF_PPPOX #define PF_WANPIPE AF_WANPIPE #define PF_LLC AF_LLC #define PF_IB AF_IB #define PF_MPLS AF_MPLS #define PF_CAN AF_CAN #define PF_TIPC AF_TIPC #define PF_BLUETOOTH AF_BLUETOOTH #define PF_IUCV AF_IUCV #define PF_RXRPC AF_RXRPC #define PF_ISDN AF_ISDN #define PF_PHONET AF_PHONET #define PF_IEEE802154 AF_IEEE802154 #define PF_CAIF AF_CAIF #define PF_ALG AF_ALG #define PF_NFC AF_NFC #define PF_VSOCK AF_VSOCK #define PF_KCM AF_KCM #define PF_QIPCRTR AF_QIPCRTR #define PF_SMC AF_SMC #define PF_XDP AF_XDP #define PF_MAX AF_MAX /* Maximum queue length specifiable by listen. */ #define SOMAXCONN 4096 /* Flags we can use with send/ and recv. Added those for 1003.1g not all are supported yet */ #define MSG_OOB 1 #define MSG_PEEK 2 #define MSG_DONTROUTE 4 #define MSG_TRYHARD 4 /* Synonym for MSG_DONTROUTE for DECnet */ #define MSG_CTRUNC 8 #define MSG_PROBE 0x10 /* Do not send. Only probe path f.e. for MTU */ #define MSG_TRUNC 0x20 #define MSG_DONTWAIT 0x40 /* Nonblocking io */ #define MSG_EOR 0x80 /* End of record */ #define MSG_WAITALL 0x100 /* Wait for a full request */ #define MSG_FIN 0x200 #define MSG_SYN 0x400 #define MSG_CONFIRM 0x800 /* Confirm path validity */ #define MSG_RST 0x1000 #define MSG_ERRQUEUE 0x2000 /* Fetch message from error queue */ #define MSG_NOSIGNAL 0x4000 /* Do not generate SIGPIPE */ #define MSG_MORE 0x8000 /* Sender will send more */ #define MSG_WAITFORONE 0x10000 /* recvmmsg(): block until 1+ packets avail */ #define MSG_SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY 0x10000 /* sendpage() internal : do no apply policy */ #define MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST 0x20000 /* sendpage() internal : not the last page */ #define MSG_BATCH 0x40000 /* sendmmsg(): more messages coming */ #define MSG_EOF MSG_FIN #define MSG_NO_SHARED_FRAGS 0x80000 /* sendpage() internal : page frags are not shared */ #define MSG_SENDPAGE_DECRYPTED 0x100000 /* sendpage() internal : page may carry * plain text and require encryption */ #define MSG_ZEROCOPY 0x4000000 /* Use user data in kernel path */ #define MSG_FASTOPEN 0x20000000 /* Send data in TCP SYN */ #define MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC 0x40000000 /* Set close_on_exec for file descriptor received through SCM_RIGHTS */ #if defined(CONFIG_COMPAT) #define MSG_CMSG_COMPAT 0x80000000 /* This message needs 32 bit fixups */ #else #define MSG_CMSG_COMPAT 0 /* We never have 32 bit fixups */ #endif /* Setsockoptions(2) level. Thanks to BSD these must match IPPROTO_xxx */ #define SOL_IP 0 /* #define SOL_ICMP 1 No-no-no! Due to Linux :-) we cannot use SOL_ICMP=1 */ #define SOL_TCP 6 #define SOL_UDP 17 #define SOL_IPV6 41 #define SOL_ICMPV6 58 #define SOL_SCTP 132 #define SOL_UDPLITE 136 /* UDP-Lite (RFC 3828) */ #define SOL_RAW 255 #define SOL_IPX 256 #define SOL_AX25 257 #define SOL_ATALK 258 #define SOL_NETROM 259 #define SOL_ROSE 260 #define SOL_DECNET 261 #define SOL_X25 262 #define SOL_PACKET 263 #define SOL_ATM 264 /* ATM layer (cell level) */ #define SOL_AAL 265 /* ATM Adaption Layer (packet level) */ #define SOL_IRDA 266 #define SOL_NETBEUI 267 #define SOL_LLC 268 #define SOL_DCCP 269 #define SOL_NETLINK 270 #define SOL_TIPC 271 #define SOL_RXRPC 272 #define SOL_PPPOL2TP 273 #define SOL_BLUETOOTH 274 #define SOL_PNPIPE 275 #define SOL_RDS 276 #define SOL_IUCV 277 #define SOL_CAIF 278 #define SOL_ALG 279 #define SOL_NFC 280 #define SOL_KCM 281 #define SOL_TLS 282 #define SOL_XDP 283 /* IPX options */ #define IPX_TYPE 1 extern int move_addr_to_kernel(void __user *uaddr, int ulen, struct sockaddr_storage *kaddr); extern int put_cmsg(struct msghdr*, int level, int type, int len, void *data); struct timespec64; struct __kernel_timespec; struct old_timespec32; struct scm_timestamping_internal { struct timespec64 ts[3]; }; extern void put_cmsg_scm_timestamping64(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_timestamping_internal *tss); extern void put_cmsg_scm_timestamping(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_timestamping_internal *tss); /* The __sys_...msg variants allow MSG_CMSG_COMPAT iff * forbid_cmsg_compat==false */ extern long __sys_recvmsg(int fd, struct user_msghdr __user *msg, unsigned int flags, bool forbid_cmsg_compat); extern long __sys_sendmsg(int fd, struct user_msghdr __user *msg, unsigned int flags, bool forbid_cmsg_compat); extern int __sys_recvmmsg(int fd, struct mmsghdr __user *mmsg, unsigned int vlen, unsigned int flags, struct __kernel_timespec __user *timeout, struct old_timespec32 __user *timeout32); extern int __sys_sendmmsg(int fd, struct mmsghdr __user *mmsg, unsigned int vlen, unsigned int flags, bool forbid_cmsg_compat); extern long __sys_sendmsg_sock(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, unsigned int flags); extern long __sys_recvmsg_sock(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct user_msghdr __user *umsg, struct sockaddr __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags); extern int sendmsg_copy_msghdr(struct msghdr *msg, struct user_msghdr __user *umsg, unsigned flags, struct iovec **iov); extern int recvmsg_copy_msghdr(struct msghdr *msg, struct user_msghdr __user *umsg, unsigned flags, struct sockaddr __user **uaddr, struct iovec **iov); extern int __copy_msghdr_from_user(struct msghdr *kmsg, struct user_msghdr __user *umsg, struct sockaddr __user **save_addr, struct iovec __user **uiov, size_t *nsegs); /* helpers which do the actual work for syscalls */ extern int __sys_recvfrom(int fd, void __user *ubuf, size_t size, unsigned int flags, struct sockaddr __user *addr, int __user *addr_len); extern int __sys_sendto(int fd, void __user *buff, size_t len, unsigned int flags, struct sockaddr __user *addr, int addr_len); extern int __sys_accept4_file(struct file *file, unsigned file_flags, struct sockaddr __user *upeer_sockaddr, int __user *upeer_addrlen, int flags, unsigned long nofile); extern int __sys_accept4(int fd, struct sockaddr __user *upeer_sockaddr, int __user *upeer_addrlen, int flags); extern int __sys_socket(int family, int type, int protocol); extern int __sys_bind(int fd, struct sockaddr __user *umyaddr, int addrlen); extern int __sys_connect_file(struct file *file, struct sockaddr_storage *addr, int addrlen, int file_flags); extern int __sys_connect(int fd, struct sockaddr __user *uservaddr, int addrlen); extern int __sys_listen(int fd, int backlog); extern int __sys_getsockname(int fd, struct sockaddr __user *usockaddr, int __user *usockaddr_len); extern int __sys_getpeername(int fd, struct sockaddr __user *usockaddr, int __user *usockaddr_len); extern int __sys_socketpair(int family, int type, int protocol, int __user *usockvec); extern int __sys_shutdown(int fd, int how); #endif /* _LINUX_SOCKET_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef _LINUX_POLL_H #define _LINUX_POLL_H #include <linux/compiler.h> #include <linux/ktime.h> #include <linux/wait.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/sysctl.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <uapi/linux/poll.h> #include <uapi/linux/eventpoll.h> extern struct ctl_table epoll_table[]; /* for sysctl */ /* ~832 bytes of stack space used max in sys_select/sys_poll before allocating additional memory. */ #ifdef __clang__ #define MAX_STACK_ALLOC 768 #else #define MAX_STACK_ALLOC 832 #endif #define FRONTEND_STACK_ALLOC 256 #define SELECT_STACK_ALLOC FRONTEND_STACK_ALLOC #define POLL_STACK_ALLOC FRONTEND_STACK_ALLOC #define WQUEUES_STACK_ALLOC (MAX_STACK_ALLOC - FRONTEND_STACK_ALLOC) #define N_INLINE_POLL_ENTRIES (WQUEUES_STACK_ALLOC / sizeof(struct poll_table_entry)) #define DEFAULT_POLLMASK (EPOLLIN | EPOLLOUT | EPOLLRDNORM | EPOLLWRNORM) struct poll_table_struct; /* * structures and helpers for f_op->poll implementations */ typedef void (*poll_queue_proc)(struct file *, wait_queue_head_t *, struct poll_table_struct *); /* * Do not touch the structure directly, use the access functions * poll_does_not_wait() and poll_requested_events() instead. */ typedef struct poll_table_struct { poll_queue_proc _qproc; __poll_t _key; } poll_table; static inline void poll_wait(struct file * filp, wait_queue_head_t * wait_address, poll_table *p) { if (p && p->_qproc && wait_address) p->_qproc(filp, wait_address, p); } /* * Return true if it is guaranteed that poll will not wait. This is the case * if the poll() of another file descriptor in the set got an event, so there * is no need for waiting. */ static inline bool poll_does_not_wait(const poll_table *p) { return p == NULL || p->_qproc == NULL; } /* * Return the set of events that the application wants to poll for. * This is useful for drivers that need to know whether a DMA transfer has * to be started implicitly on poll(). You typically only want to do that * if the application is actually polling for POLLIN and/or POLLOUT. */ static inline __poll_t poll_requested_events(const poll_table *p) { return p ? p->_key : ~(__poll_t)0; } static inline void init_poll_funcptr(poll_table *pt, poll_queue_proc qproc) { pt->_qproc = qproc; pt->_key = ~(__poll_t)0; /* all events enabled */ } static inline bool file_can_poll(struct file *file) { return file->f_op->poll; } static inline __poll_t vfs_poll(struct file *file, struct poll_table_struct *pt) { if (unlikely(!file->f_op->poll)) return DEFAULT_POLLMASK; return file->f_op->poll(file, pt); } struct poll_table_entry { struct file *filp; __poll_t key; wait_queue_entry_t wait; wait_queue_head_t *wait_address; }; /* * Structures and helpers for select/poll syscall */ struct poll_wqueues { poll_table pt; struct poll_table_page *table; struct task_struct *polling_task; int triggered; int error; int inline_index; struct poll_table_entry inline_entries[N_INLINE_POLL_ENTRIES]; }; extern void poll_initwait(struct poll_wqueues *pwq); extern void poll_freewait(struct poll_wqueues *pwq); extern u64 select_estimate_accuracy(struct timespec64 *tv); #define MAX_INT64_SECONDS (((s64)(~((u64)0)>>1)/HZ)-1) extern int core_sys_select(int n, fd_set __user *inp, fd_set __user *outp, fd_set __user *exp, struct timespec64 *end_time); extern int poll_select_set_timeout(struct timespec64 *to, time64_t sec, long nsec); #define __MAP(v, from, to) \ (from < to ? (v & from) * (to/from) : (v & from) / (from/to)) static inline __u16 mangle_poll(__poll_t val) { __u16 v = (__force __u16)val; #define M(X) __MAP(v, (__force __u16)EPOLL##X, POLL##X) return M(IN) | M(OUT) | M(PRI) | M(ERR) | M(NVAL) | M(RDNORM) | M(RDBAND) | M(WRNORM) | M(WRBAND) | M(HUP) | M(RDHUP) | M(MSG); #undef M } static inline __poll_t demangle_poll(u16 val) { #define M(X) (__force __poll_t)__MAP(val, POLL##X, (__force __u16)EPOLL##X) return M(IN) | M(OUT) | M(PRI) | M(ERR) | M(NVAL) | M(RDNORM) | M(RDBAND) | M(WRNORM) | M(WRBAND) | M(HUP) | M(RDHUP) | M(MSG); #undef M } #undef __MAP #endif /* _LINUX_POLL_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* delayacct.h - per-task delay accounting * * Copyright (C) Shailabh Nagar, IBM Corp. 2006 */ #ifndef _LINUX_DELAYACCT_H #define _LINUX_DELAYACCT_H #include <uapi/linux/taskstats.h> /* * Per-task flags relevant to delay accounting * maintained privately to avoid exhausting similar flags in sched.h:PF_* * Used to set current->delays->flags */ #define DELAYACCT_PF_SWAPIN 0x00000001 /* I am doing a swapin */ #define DELAYACCT_PF_BLKIO 0x00000002 /* I am waiting on IO */ #ifdef CONFIG_TASK_DELAY_ACCT struct task_delay_info { raw_spinlock_t lock; unsigned int flags; /* Private per-task flags */ /* For each stat XXX, add following, aligned appropriately * * struct timespec XXX_start, XXX_end; * u64 XXX_delay; * u32 XXX_count; * * Atomicity of updates to XXX_delay, XXX_count protected by * single lock above (split into XXX_lock if contention is an issue). */ /* * XXX_count is incremented on every XXX operation, the delay * associated with the operation is added to XXX_delay. * XXX_delay contains the accumulated delay time in nanoseconds. */ u64 blkio_start; /* Shared by blkio, swapin */ u64 blkio_delay; /* wait for sync block io completion */ u64 swapin_delay; /* wait for swapin block io completion */ u32 blkio_count; /* total count of the number of sync block */ /* io operations performed */ u32 swapin_count; /* total count of the number of swapin block */ /* io operations performed */ u64 freepages_start; u64 freepages_delay; /* wait for memory reclaim */ u64 thrashing_start; u64 thrashing_delay; /* wait for thrashing page */ u32 freepages_count; /* total count of memory reclaim */ u32 thrashing_count; /* total count of thrash waits */ }; #endif #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #ifdef CONFIG_TASK_DELAY_ACCT extern int delayacct_on; /* Delay accounting turned on/off */ extern struct kmem_cache *delayacct_cache; extern void delayacct_init(void); extern void __delayacct_tsk_init(struct task_struct *); extern void __delayacct_tsk_exit(struct task_struct *); extern void __delayacct_blkio_start(void); extern void __delayacct_blkio_end(struct task_struct *); extern int __delayacct_add_tsk(struct taskstats *, struct task_struct *); extern __u64 __delayacct_blkio_ticks(struct task_struct *); extern void __delayacct_freepages_start(void); extern void __delayacct_freepages_end(void); extern void __delayacct_thrashing_start(void); extern void __delayacct_thrashing_end(void); static inline int delayacct_is_task_waiting_on_io(struct task_struct *p) { if (p->delays) return (p->delays->flags & DELAYACCT_PF_BLKIO); else return 0; } static inline void delayacct_set_flag(int flag) { if (current->delays) current->delays->flags |= flag; } static inline void delayacct_clear_flag(int flag) { if (current->delays) current->delays->flags &= ~flag; } static inline void delayacct_tsk_init(struct task_struct *tsk) { /* reinitialize in case parent's non-null pointer was dup'ed*/ tsk->delays = NULL; if (delayacct_on) __delayacct_tsk_init(tsk); } /* Free tsk->delays. Called from bad fork and __put_task_struct * where there's no risk of tsk->delays being accessed elsewhere */ static inline void delayacct_tsk_free(struct task_struct *tsk) { if (tsk->delays) kmem_cache_free(delayacct_cache, tsk->delays); tsk->delays = NULL; } static inline void delayacct_blkio_start(void) { delayacct_set_flag(DELAYACCT_PF_BLKIO); if (current->delays) __delayacct_blkio_start(); } static inline void delayacct_blkio_end(struct task_struct *p) { if (p->delays) __delayacct_blkio_end(p); delayacct_clear_flag(DELAYACCT_PF_BLKIO); } static inline int delayacct_add_tsk(struct taskstats *d, struct task_struct *tsk) { if (!delayacct_on || !tsk->delays) return 0; return __delayacct_add_tsk(d, tsk); } static inline __u64 delayacct_blkio_ticks(struct task_struct *tsk) { if (tsk->delays) return __delayacct_blkio_ticks(tsk); return 0; } static inline void delayacct_freepages_start(void) { if (current->delays) __delayacct_freepages_start(); } static inline void delayacct_freepages_end(void) { if (current->delays) __delayacct_freepages_end(); } static inline void delayacct_thrashing_start(void) { if (current->delays) __delayacct_thrashing_start(); } static inline void delayacct_thrashing_end(void) { if (current->delays) __delayacct_thrashing_end(); } #else static inline void delayacct_set_flag(int flag) {} static inline void delayacct_clear_flag(int flag) {} static inline void delayacct_init(void) {} static inline void delayacct_tsk_init(struct task_struct *tsk) {} static inline void delayacct_tsk_free(struct task_struct *tsk) {} static inline void delayacct_blkio_start(void) {} static inline void delayacct_blkio_end(struct task_struct *p) {} static inline int delayacct_add_tsk(struct taskstats *d, struct task_struct *tsk) { return 0; } static inline __u64 delayacct_blkio_ticks(struct task_struct *tsk) { return 0; } static inline int delayacct_is_task_waiting_on_io(struct task_struct *p) { return 0; } static inline void delayacct_freepages_start(void) {} static inline void delayacct_freepages_end(void) {} static inline void delayacct_thrashing_start(void) {} static inline void delayacct_thrashing_end(void) {} #endif /* CONFIG_TASK_DELAY_ACCT */ #endif
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef _LINUX_CLEANCACHE_H #define _LINUX_CLEANCACHE_H #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/exportfs.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #define CLEANCACHE_NO_POOL -1 #define CLEANCACHE_NO_BACKEND -2 #define CLEANCACHE_NO_BACKEND_SHARED -3 #define CLEANCACHE_KEY_MAX 6 /* * cleancache requires every file with a page in cleancache to have a * unique key unless/until the file is removed/truncated. For some * filesystems, the inode number is unique, but for "modern" filesystems * an exportable filehandle is required (see exportfs.h) */ struct cleancache_filekey { union { ino_t ino; __u32 fh[CLEANCACHE_KEY_MAX]; u32 key[CLEANCACHE_KEY_MAX]; } u; }; struct cleancache_ops { int (*init_fs)(size_t); int (*init_shared_fs)(uuid_t *uuid, size_t); int (*get_page)(int, struct cleancache_filekey, pgoff_t, struct page *); void (*put_page)(int, struct cleancache_filekey, pgoff_t, struct page *); void (*invalidate_page)(int, struct cleancache_filekey, pgoff_t); void (*invalidate_inode)(int, struct cleancache_filekey); void (*invalidate_fs)(int); }; extern int cleancache_register_ops(const struct cleancache_ops *ops); extern void __cleancache_init_fs(struct super_block *); extern void __cleancache_init_shared_fs(struct super_block *); extern int __cleancache_get_page(struct page *); extern void __cleancache_put_page(struct page *); extern void __cleancache_invalidate_page(struct address_space *, struct page *); extern void __cleancache_invalidate_inode(struct address_space *); extern void __cleancache_invalidate_fs(struct super_block *); #ifdef CONFIG_CLEANCACHE #define cleancache_enabled (1) static inline bool cleancache_fs_enabled_mapping(struct address_space *mapping) { return mapping->host->i_sb->cleancache_poolid >= 0; } static inline bool cleancache_fs_enabled(struct page *page) { return cleancache_fs_enabled_mapping(page->mapping); } #else #define cleancache_enabled (0) #define cleancache_fs_enabled(_page) (0) #define cleancache_fs_enabled_mapping(_page) (0) #endif /* * The shim layer provided by these inline functions allows the compiler * to reduce all cleancache hooks to nothingness if CONFIG_CLEANCACHE * is disabled, to a single global variable check if CONFIG_CLEANCACHE * is enabled but no cleancache "backend" has dynamically enabled it, * and, for the most frequent cleancache ops, to a single global variable * check plus a superblock element comparison if CONFIG_CLEANCACHE is enabled * and a cleancache backend has dynamically enabled cleancache, but the * filesystem referenced by that cleancache op has not enabled cleancache. * As a result, CONFIG_CLEANCACHE can be enabled by default with essentially * no measurable performance impact. */ static inline void cleancache_init_fs(struct super_block *sb) { if (cleancache_enabled) __cleancache_init_fs(sb); } static inline void cleancache_init_shared_fs(struct super_block *sb) { if (cleancache_enabled) __cleancache_init_shared_fs(sb); } static inline int cleancache_get_page(struct page *page) { if (cleancache_enabled && cleancache_fs_enabled(page)) return __cleancache_get_page(page); return -1; } static inline void cleancache_put_page(struct page *page) { if (cleancache_enabled && cleancache_fs_enabled(page)) __cleancache_put_page(page); } static inline void cleancache_invalidate_page(struct address_space *mapping, struct page *page) { /* careful... page->mapping is NULL sometimes when this is called */ if (cleancache_enabled && cleancache_fs_enabled_mapping(mapping)) __cleancache_invalidate_page(mapping, page); } static inline void cleancache_invalidate_inode(struct address_space *mapping) { if (cleancache_enabled && cleancache_fs_enabled_mapping(mapping)) __cleancache_invalidate_inode(mapping); } static inline void cleancache_invalidate_fs(struct super_block *sb) { if (cleancache_enabled) __cleancache_invalidate_fs(sb); } #endif /* _LINUX_CLEANCACHE_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * fs/ext4/extents_status.h * * Written by Yongqiang Yang <xiaoqiangnk@gmail.com> * Modified by * Allison Henderson <achender@linux.vnet.ibm.com> * Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com> * */ #ifndef _EXT4_EXTENTS_STATUS_H #define _EXT4_EXTENTS_STATUS_H /* * Turn on ES_DEBUG__ to get lots of info about extent status operations. */ #ifdef ES_DEBUG__ #define es_debug(fmt, ...) printk(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__) #else #define es_debug(fmt, ...) no_printk(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__) #endif /* * With ES_AGGRESSIVE_TEST defined, the result of es caching will be * checked with old map_block's result. */ #define ES_AGGRESSIVE_TEST__ /* * These flags live in the high bits of extent_status.es_pblk */ enum { ES_WRITTEN_B, ES_UNWRITTEN_B, ES_DELAYED_B, ES_HOLE_B, ES_REFERENCED_B, ES_FLAGS }; #define ES_SHIFT (sizeof(ext4_fsblk_t)*8 - ES_FLAGS) #define ES_MASK (~((ext4_fsblk_t)0) << ES_SHIFT) #define EXTENT_STATUS_WRITTEN (1 << ES_WRITTEN_B) #define EXTENT_STATUS_UNWRITTEN (1 << ES_UNWRITTEN_B) #define EXTENT_STATUS_DELAYED (1 << ES_DELAYED_B) #define EXTENT_STATUS_HOLE (1 << ES_HOLE_B) #define EXTENT_STATUS_REFERENCED (1 << ES_REFERENCED_B) #define ES_TYPE_MASK ((ext4_fsblk_t)(EXTENT_STATUS_WRITTEN | \ EXTENT_STATUS_UNWRITTEN | \ EXTENT_STATUS_DELAYED | \ EXTENT_STATUS_HOLE) << ES_SHIFT) struct ext4_sb_info; struct ext4_extent; struct extent_status { struct rb_node rb_node; ext4_lblk_t es_lblk; /* first logical block extent covers */ ext4_lblk_t es_len; /* length of extent in block */ ext4_fsblk_t es_pblk; /* first physical block */ }; struct ext4_es_tree { struct rb_root root; struct extent_status *cache_es; /* recently accessed extent */ }; struct ext4_es_stats { unsigned long es_stats_shrunk; struct percpu_counter es_stats_cache_hits; struct percpu_counter es_stats_cache_misses; u64 es_stats_scan_time; u64 es_stats_max_scan_time; struct percpu_counter es_stats_all_cnt; struct percpu_counter es_stats_shk_cnt; }; /* * Pending cluster reservations for bigalloc file systems * * A cluster with a pending reservation is a logical cluster shared by at * least one extent in the extents status tree with delayed and unwritten * status and at least one other written or unwritten extent. The * reservation is said to be pending because a cluster reservation would * have to be taken in the event all blocks in the cluster shared with * written or unwritten extents were deleted while the delayed and * unwritten blocks remained. * * The set of pending cluster reservations is an auxiliary data structure * used with the extents status tree to implement reserved cluster/block * accounting for bigalloc file systems. The set is kept in memory and * records all pending cluster reservations. * * Its primary function is to avoid the need to read extents from the * disk when invalidating pages as a result of a truncate, punch hole, or * collapse range operation. Page invalidation requires a decrease in the * reserved cluster count if it results in the removal of all delayed * and unwritten extents (blocks) from a cluster that is not shared with a * written or unwritten extent, and no decrease otherwise. Determining * whether the cluster is shared can be done by searching for a pending * reservation on it. * * Secondarily, it provides a potentially faster method for determining * whether the reserved cluster count should be increased when a physical * cluster is deallocated as a result of a truncate, punch hole, or * collapse range operation. The necessary information is also present * in the extents status tree, but might be more rapidly accessed in * the pending reservation set in many cases due to smaller size. * * The pending cluster reservation set is implemented as a red-black tree * with the goal of minimizing per page search time overhead. */ struct pending_reservation { struct rb_node rb_node; ext4_lblk_t lclu; }; struct ext4_pending_tree { struct rb_root root; }; extern int __init ext4_init_es(void); extern void ext4_exit_es(void); extern void ext4_es_init_tree(struct ext4_es_tree *tree); extern int ext4_es_insert_extent(struct inode *inode, ext4_lblk_t lblk, ext4_lblk_t len, ext4_fsblk_t pblk, unsigned int status); extern void ext4_es_cache_extent(struct inode *inode, ext4_lblk_t lblk, ext4_lblk_t len, ext4_fsblk_t pblk, unsigned int status); extern int ext4_es_remove_extent(struct inode *inode, ext4_lblk_t lblk, ext4_lblk_t len); extern void ext4_es_find_extent_range(struct inode *inode, int (*match_fn)(struct extent_status *es), ext4_lblk_t lblk, ext4_lblk_t end, struct extent_status *es); extern int ext4_es_lookup_extent(struct inode *inode, ext4_lblk_t lblk, ext4_lblk_t *next_lblk, struct extent_status *es); extern bool ext4_es_scan_range(struct inode *inode, int (*matching_fn)(struct extent_status *es), ext4_lblk_t lblk, ext4_lblk_t end); extern bool ext4_es_scan_clu(struct inode *inode, int (*matching_fn)(struct extent_status *es), ext4_lblk_t lblk); static inline unsigned int ext4_es_status(struct extent_status *es) { return es->es_pblk >> ES_SHIFT; } static inline unsigned int ext4_es_type(struct extent_status *es) { return (es->es_pblk & ES_TYPE_MASK) >> ES_SHIFT; } static inline int ext4_es_is_written(struct extent_status *es) { return (ext4_es_type(es) & EXTENT_STATUS_WRITTEN) != 0; } static inline int ext4_es_is_unwritten(struct extent_status *es) { return (ext4_es_type(es) & EXTENT_STATUS_UNWRITTEN) != 0; } static inline int ext4_es_is_delayed(struct extent_status *es) { return (ext4_es_type(es) & EXTENT_STATUS_DELAYED) != 0; } static inline int ext4_es_is_hole(struct extent_status *es) { return (ext4_es_type(es) & EXTENT_STATUS_HOLE) != 0; } static inline int ext4_es_is_mapped(struct extent_status *es) { return (ext4_es_is_written(es) || ext4_es_is_unwritten(es)); } static inline int ext4_es_is_delonly(struct extent_status *es) { return (ext4_es_is_delayed(es) && !ext4_es_is_unwritten(es)); } static inline void ext4_es_set_referenced(struct extent_status *es) { es->es_pblk |= ((ext4_fsblk_t)EXTENT_STATUS_REFERENCED) << ES_SHIFT; } static inline void ext4_es_clear_referenced(struct extent_status *es) { es->es_pblk &= ~(((ext4_fsblk_t)EXTENT_STATUS_REFERENCED) << ES_SHIFT); } static inline int ext4_es_is_referenced(struct extent_status *es) { return (ext4_es_status(es) & EXTENT_STATUS_REFERENCED) != 0; } static inline ext4_fsblk_t ext4_es_pblock(struct extent_status *es) { return es->es_pblk & ~ES_MASK; } static inline ext4_fsblk_t ext4_es_show_pblock(struct extent_status *es) { ext4_fsblk_t pblock = ext4_es_pblock(es); return pblock == ~ES_MASK ? 0 : pblock; } static inline void ext4_es_store_pblock(struct extent_status *es, ext4_fsblk_t pb) { ext4_fsblk_t block; block = (pb & ~ES_MASK) | (es->es_pblk & ES_MASK); es->es_pblk = block; } static inline void ext4_es_store_status(struct extent_status *es, unsigned int status) { es->es_pblk = (((ext4_fsblk_t)status << ES_SHIFT) & ES_MASK) | (es->es_pblk & ~ES_MASK); } static inline void ext4_es_store_pblock_status(struct extent_status *es, ext4_fsblk_t pb, unsigned int status) { es->es_pblk = (((ext4_fsblk_t)status << ES_SHIFT) & ES_MASK) | (pb & ~ES_MASK); } extern int ext4_es_register_shrinker(struct ext4_sb_info *sbi); extern void ext4_es_unregister_shrinker(struct ext4_sb_info *sbi); extern int ext4_seq_es_shrinker_info_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v); extern int __init ext4_init_pending(void); extern void ext4_exit_pending(void); extern void ext4_init_pending_tree(struct ext4_pending_tree *tree); extern void ext4_remove_pending(struct inode *inode, ext4_lblk_t lblk); extern bool ext4_is_pending(struct inode *inode, ext4_lblk_t lblk); extern int ext4_es_insert_delayed_block(struct inode *inode, ext4_lblk_t lblk, bool allocated); extern unsigned int ext4_es_delayed_clu(struct inode *inode, ext4_lblk_t lblk, ext4_lblk_t len); extern void ext4_clear_inode_es(struct inode *inode); #endif /* _EXT4_EXTENTS_STATUS_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * net/dst.h Protocol independent destination cache definitions. * * Authors: Alexey Kuznetsov, <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru> * */ #ifndef _NET_DST_H #define _NET_DST_H #include <net/dst_ops.h> #include <linux/netdevice.h> #include <linux/rtnetlink.h> #include <linux/rcupdate.h> #include <linux/bug.h> #include <linux/jiffies.h> #include <linux/refcount.h> #include <net/neighbour.h> #include <asm/processor.h> struct sk_buff; struct dst_entry { struct net_device *dev; struct dst_ops *ops; unsigned long _metrics; unsigned long expires; #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM struct xfrm_state *xfrm; #else void *__pad1; #endif int (*input)(struct sk_buff *); int (*output)(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); unsigned short flags; #define DST_NOXFRM 0x0002 #define DST_NOPOLICY 0x0004 #define DST_NOCOUNT 0x0008 #define DST_FAKE_RTABLE 0x0010 #define DST_XFRM_TUNNEL 0x0020 #define DST_XFRM_QUEUE 0x0040 #define DST_METADATA 0x0080 /* A non-zero value of dst->obsolete forces by-hand validation * of the route entry. Positive values are set by the generic * dst layer to indicate that the entry has been forcefully * destroyed. * * Negative values are used by the implementation layer code to * force invocation of the dst_ops->check() method. */ short obsolete; #define DST_OBSOLETE_NONE 0 #define DST_OBSOLETE_DEAD 2 #define DST_OBSOLETE_FORCE_CHK -1 #define DST_OBSOLETE_KILL -2 unsigned short header_len; /* more space at head required */ unsigned short trailer_len; /* space to reserve at tail */ /* * __refcnt wants to be on a different cache line from * input/output/ops or performance tanks badly */ #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT atomic_t __refcnt; /* 64-bit offset 64 */ #endif int __use; unsigned long lastuse; struct lwtunnel_state *lwtstate; struct rcu_head rcu_head; short error; short __pad; __u32 tclassid; #ifndef CONFIG_64BIT atomic_t __refcnt; /* 32-bit offset 64 */ #endif }; struct dst_metrics { u32 metrics[RTAX_MAX]; refcount_t refcnt; } __aligned(4); /* Low pointer bits contain DST_METRICS_FLAGS */ extern const struct dst_metrics dst_default_metrics; u32 *dst_cow_metrics_generic(struct dst_entry *dst, unsigned long old); #define DST_METRICS_READ_ONLY 0x1UL #define DST_METRICS_REFCOUNTED 0x2UL #define DST_METRICS_FLAGS 0x3UL #define __DST_METRICS_PTR(Y) \ ((u32 *)((Y) & ~DST_METRICS_FLAGS)) #define DST_METRICS_PTR(X) __DST_METRICS_PTR((X)->_metrics) static inline bool dst_metrics_read_only(const struct dst_entry *dst) { return dst->_metrics & DST_METRICS_READ_ONLY; } void __dst_destroy_metrics_generic(struct dst_entry *dst, unsigned long old); static inline void dst_destroy_metrics_generic(struct dst_entry *dst) { unsigned long val = dst->_metrics; if (!(val & DST_METRICS_READ_ONLY)) __dst_destroy_metrics_generic(dst, val); } static inline u32 *dst_metrics_write_ptr(struct dst_entry *dst) { unsigned long p = dst->_metrics; BUG_ON(!p); if (p & DST_METRICS_READ_ONLY) return dst->ops->cow_metrics(dst, p); return __DST_METRICS_PTR(p); } /* This may only be invoked before the entry has reached global * visibility. */ static inline void dst_init_metrics(struct dst_entry *dst, const u32 *src_metrics, bool read_only) { dst->_metrics = ((unsigned long) src_metrics) | (read_only ? DST_METRICS_READ_ONLY : 0); } static inline void dst_copy_metrics(struct dst_entry *dest, const struct dst_entry *src) { u32 *dst_metrics = dst_metrics_write_ptr(dest); if (dst_metrics) { u32 *src_metrics = DST_METRICS_PTR(src); memcpy(dst_metrics, src_metrics, RTAX_MAX * sizeof(u32)); } } static inline u32 *dst_metrics_ptr(struct dst_entry *dst) { return DST_METRICS_PTR(dst); } static inline u32 dst_metric_raw(const struct dst_entry *dst, const int metric) { u32 *p = DST_METRICS_PTR(dst); return p[metric-1]; } static inline u32 dst_metric(const struct dst_entry *dst, const int metric) { WARN_ON_ONCE(metric == RTAX_HOPLIMIT || metric == RTAX_ADVMSS || metric == RTAX_MTU); return dst_metric_raw(dst, metric); } static inline u32 dst_metric_advmss(const struct dst_entry *dst) { u32 advmss = dst_metric_raw(dst, RTAX_ADVMSS); if (!advmss) advmss = dst->ops->default_advmss(dst); return advmss; } static inline void dst_metric_set(struct dst_entry *dst, int metric, u32 val) { u32 *p = dst_metrics_write_ptr(dst); if (p) p[metric-1] = val; } /* Kernel-internal feature bits that are unallocated in user space. */ #define DST_FEATURE_ECN_CA (1U << 31) #define DST_FEATURE_MASK (DST_FEATURE_ECN_CA) #define DST_FEATURE_ECN_MASK (DST_FEATURE_ECN_CA | RTAX_FEATURE_ECN) static inline u32 dst_feature(const struct dst_entry *dst, u32 feature) { return dst_metric(dst, RTAX_FEATURES) & feature; } static inline u32 dst_mtu(const struct dst_entry *dst) { return dst->ops->mtu(dst); } /* RTT metrics are stored in milliseconds for user ABI, but used as jiffies */ static inline unsigned long dst_metric_rtt(const struct dst_entry *dst, int metric) { return msecs_to_jiffies(dst_metric(dst, metric)); } static inline u32 dst_allfrag(const struct dst_entry *dst) { int ret = dst_feature(dst, RTAX_FEATURE_ALLFRAG); return ret; } static inline int dst_metric_locked(const struct dst_entry *dst, int metric) { return dst_metric(dst, RTAX_LOCK) & (1 << metric); } static inline void dst_hold(struct dst_entry *dst) { /* * If your kernel compilation stops here, please check * the placement of __refcnt in struct dst_entry */ BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct dst_entry, __refcnt) & 63); WARN_ON(atomic_inc_not_zero(&dst->__refcnt) == 0); } static inline void dst_use_noref(struct dst_entry *dst, unsigned long time) { if (unlikely(time != dst->lastuse)) { dst->__use++; dst->lastuse = time; } } static inline void dst_hold_and_use(struct dst_entry *dst, unsigned long time) { dst_hold(dst); dst_use_noref(dst, time); } static inline struct dst_entry *dst_clone(struct dst_entry *dst) { if (dst) dst_hold(dst); return dst; } void dst_release(struct dst_entry *dst); void dst_release_immediate(struct dst_entry *dst); static inline void refdst_drop(unsigned long refdst) { if (!(refdst & SKB_DST_NOREF)) dst_release((struct dst_entry *)(refdst & SKB_DST_PTRMASK)); } /** * skb_dst_drop - drops skb dst * @skb: buffer * * Drops dst reference count if a reference was taken. */ static inline void skb_dst_drop(struct sk_buff *skb) { if (skb->_skb_refdst) { refdst_drop(skb->_skb_refdst); skb->_skb_refdst = 0UL; } } static inline void __skb_dst_copy(struct sk_buff *nskb, unsigned long refdst) { nskb->_skb_refdst = refdst; if (!(nskb->_skb_refdst & SKB_DST_NOREF)) dst_clone(skb_dst(nskb)); } static inline void skb_dst_copy(struct sk_buff *nskb, const struct sk_buff *oskb) { __skb_dst_copy(nskb, oskb->_skb_refdst); } /** * dst_hold_safe - Take a reference on a dst if possible * @dst: pointer to dst entry * * This helper returns false if it could not safely * take a reference on a dst. */ static inline bool dst_hold_safe(struct dst_entry *dst) { return atomic_inc_not_zero(&dst->__refcnt); } /** * skb_dst_force - makes sure skb dst is refcounted * @skb: buffer * * If dst is not yet refcounted and not destroyed, grab a ref on it. * Returns true if dst is refcounted. */ static inline bool skb_dst_force(struct sk_buff *skb) { if (skb_dst_is_noref(skb)) { struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb); WARN_ON(!rcu_read_lock_held()); if (!dst_hold_safe(dst)) dst = NULL; skb->_skb_refdst = (unsigned long)dst; } return skb->_skb_refdst != 0UL; } /** * __skb_tunnel_rx - prepare skb for rx reinsert * @skb: buffer * @dev: tunnel device * @net: netns for packet i/o * * After decapsulation, packet is going to re-enter (netif_rx()) our stack, * so make some cleanups. (no accounting done) */ static inline void __skb_tunnel_rx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, struct net *net) { skb->dev = dev; /* * Clear hash so that we can recalulate the hash for the * encapsulated packet, unless we have already determine the hash * over the L4 4-tuple. */ skb_clear_hash_if_not_l4(skb); skb_set_queue_mapping(skb, 0); skb_scrub_packet(skb, !net_eq(net, dev_net(dev))); } /** * skb_tunnel_rx - prepare skb for rx reinsert * @skb: buffer * @dev: tunnel device * @net: netns for packet i/o * * After decapsulation, packet is going to re-enter (netif_rx()) our stack, * so make some cleanups, and perform accounting. * Note: this accounting is not SMP safe. */ static inline void skb_tunnel_rx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, struct net *net) { /* TODO : stats should be SMP safe */ dev->stats.rx_packets++; dev->stats.rx_bytes += skb->len; __skb_tunnel_rx(skb, dev, net); } static inline u32 dst_tclassid(const struct sk_buff *skb) { #ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID const struct dst_entry *dst; dst = skb_dst(skb); if (dst) return dst->tclassid; #endif return 0; } int dst_discard_out(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); static inline int dst_discard(struct sk_buff *skb) { return dst_discard_out(&init_net, skb->sk, skb); } void *dst_alloc(struct dst_ops *ops, struct net_device *dev, int initial_ref, int initial_obsolete, unsigned short flags); void dst_init(struct dst_entry *dst, struct dst_ops *ops, struct net_device *dev, int initial_ref, int initial_obsolete, unsigned short flags); struct dst_entry *dst_destroy(struct dst_entry *dst); void dst_dev_put(struct dst_entry *dst); static inline void dst_confirm(struct dst_entry *dst) { } static inline struct neighbour *dst_neigh_lookup(const struct dst_entry *dst, const void *daddr) { struct neighbour *n = dst->ops->neigh_lookup(dst, NULL, daddr); return IS_ERR(n) ? NULL : n; } static inline struct neighbour *dst_neigh_lookup_skb(const struct dst_entry *dst, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct neighbour *n = NULL; /* The packets from tunnel devices (eg bareudp) may have only * metadata in the dst pointer of skb. Hence a pointer check of * neigh_lookup is needed. */ if (dst->ops->neigh_lookup) n = dst->ops->neigh_lookup(dst, skb, NULL); return IS_ERR(n) ? NULL : n; } static inline void dst_confirm_neigh(const struct dst_entry *dst, const void *daddr) { if (dst->ops->confirm_neigh) dst->ops->confirm_neigh(dst, daddr); } static inline void dst_link_failure(struct sk_buff *skb) { struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb); if (dst && dst->ops && dst->ops->link_failure) dst->ops->link_failure(skb); } static inline void dst_set_expires(struct dst_entry *dst, int timeout) { unsigned long expires = jiffies + timeout; if (expires == 0) expires = 1; if (dst->expires == 0 || time_before(expires, dst->expires)) dst->expires = expires; } /* Output packet to network from transport. */ static inline int dst_output(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { return skb_dst(skb)->output(net, sk, skb); } /* Input packet from network to transport. */ static inline int dst_input(struct sk_buff *skb) { return skb_dst(skb)->input(skb); } static inline struct dst_entry *dst_check(struct dst_entry *dst, u32 cookie) { if (dst->obsolete) dst = dst->ops->check(dst, cookie); return dst; } /* Flags for xfrm_lookup flags argument. */ enum { XFRM_LOOKUP_ICMP = 1 << 0, XFRM_LOOKUP_QUEUE = 1 << 1, XFRM_LOOKUP_KEEP_DST_REF = 1 << 2, }; struct flowi; #ifndef CONFIG_XFRM static inline struct dst_entry *xfrm_lookup(struct net *net, struct dst_entry *dst_orig, const struct flowi *fl, const struct sock *sk, int flags) { return dst_orig; } static inline struct dst_entry * xfrm_lookup_with_ifid(struct net *net, struct dst_entry *dst_orig, const struct flowi *fl, const struct sock *sk, int flags, u32 if_id) { return dst_orig; } static inline struct dst_entry *xfrm_lookup_route(struct net *net, struct dst_entry *dst_orig, const struct flowi *fl, const struct sock *sk, int flags) { return dst_orig; } static inline struct xfrm_state *dst_xfrm(const struct dst_entry *dst) { return NULL; } #else struct dst_entry *xfrm_lookup(struct net *net, struct dst_entry *dst_orig, const struct flowi *fl, const struct sock *sk, int flags); struct dst_entry *xfrm_lookup_with_ifid(struct net *net, struct dst_entry *dst_orig, const struct flowi *fl, const struct sock *sk, int flags, u32 if_id); struct dst_entry *xfrm_lookup_route(struct net *net, struct dst_entry *dst_orig, const struct flowi *fl, const struct sock *sk, int flags); /* skb attached with this dst needs transformation if dst->xfrm is valid */ static inline struct xfrm_state *dst_xfrm(const struct dst_entry *dst) { return dst->xfrm; } #endif static inline void skb_dst_update_pmtu(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 mtu) { struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb); if (dst && dst->ops->update_pmtu) dst->ops->update_pmtu(dst, NULL, skb, mtu, true); } /* update dst pmtu but not do neighbor confirm */ static inline void skb_dst_update_pmtu_no_confirm(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 mtu) { struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb); if (dst && dst->ops->update_pmtu) dst->ops->update_pmtu(dst, NULL, skb, mtu, false); } struct dst_entry *dst_blackhole_check(struct dst_entry *dst, u32 cookie); void dst_blackhole_update_pmtu(struct dst_entry *dst, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 mtu, bool confirm_neigh); void dst_blackhole_redirect(struct dst_entry *dst, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); u32 *dst_blackhole_cow_metrics(struct dst_entry *dst, unsigned long old); struct neighbour *dst_blackhole_neigh_lookup(const struct dst_entry *dst, struct sk_buff *skb, const void *daddr); unsigned int dst_blackhole_mtu(const struct dst_entry *dst); #endif /* _NET_DST_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef __LINUX_BIT_SPINLOCK_H #define __LINUX_BIT_SPINLOCK_H #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/preempt.h> #include <linux/atomic.h> #include <linux/bug.h> /* * bit-based spin_lock() * * Don't use this unless you really need to: spin_lock() and spin_unlock() * are significantly faster. */ static inline void bit_spin_lock(int bitnum, unsigned long *addr) { /* * Assuming the lock is uncontended, this never enters * the body of the outer loop. If it is contended, then * within the inner loop a non-atomic test is used to * busywait with less bus contention for a good time to * attempt to acquire the lock bit. */ preempt_disable(); #if defined(CONFIG_SMP) || defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK) while (unlikely(test_and_set_bit_lock(bitnum, addr))) { preempt_enable(); do { cpu_relax(); } while (test_bit(bitnum, addr)); preempt_disable(); } #endif __acquire(bitlock); } /* * Return true if it was acquired */ static inline int bit_spin_trylock(int bitnum, unsigned long *addr) { preempt_disable(); #if defined(CONFIG_SMP) || defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK) if (unlikely(test_and_set_bit_lock(bitnum, addr))) { preempt_enable(); return 0; } #endif __acquire(bitlock); return 1; } /* * bit-based spin_unlock() */ static inline void bit_spin_unlock(int bitnum, unsigned long *addr) { #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK BUG_ON(!test_bit(bitnum, addr)); #endif #if defined(CONFIG_SMP) || defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK) clear_bit_unlock(bitnum, addr); #endif preempt_enable(); __release(bitlock); } /* * bit-based spin_unlock() * non-atomic version, which can be used eg. if the bit lock itself is * protecting the rest of the flags in the word. */ static inline void __bit_spin_unlock(int bitnum, unsigned long *addr) { #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK BUG_ON(!test_bit(bitnum, addr)); #endif #if defined(CONFIG_SMP) || defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK) __clear_bit_unlock(bitnum, addr); #endif preempt_enable(); __release(bitlock); } /* * Return true if the lock is held. */ static inline int bit_spin_is_locked(int bitnum, unsigned long *addr) { #if defined(CONFIG_SMP) || defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK) return test_bit(bitnum, addr); #elif defined CONFIG_PREEMPT_COUNT return preempt_count(); #else return 1; #endif } #endif /* __LINUX_BIT_SPINLOCK_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef _LINUX_COMPACTION_H #define _LINUX_COMPACTION_H /* * Determines how hard direct compaction should try to succeed. * Lower value means higher priority, analogically to reclaim priority. */ enum compact_priority { COMPACT_PRIO_SYNC_FULL, MIN_COMPACT_PRIORITY = COMPACT_PRIO_SYNC_FULL, COMPACT_PRIO_SYNC_LIGHT, MIN_COMPACT_COSTLY_PRIORITY = COMPACT_PRIO_SYNC_LIGHT, DEF_COMPACT_PRIORITY = COMPACT_PRIO_SYNC_LIGHT, COMPACT_PRIO_ASYNC, INIT_COMPACT_PRIORITY = COMPACT_PRIO_ASYNC }; /* Return values for compact_zone() and try_to_compact_pages() */ /* When adding new states, please adjust include/trace/events/compaction.h */ enum compact_result { /* For more detailed tracepoint output - internal to compaction */ COMPACT_NOT_SUITABLE_ZONE, /* * compaction didn't start as it was not possible or direct reclaim * was more suitable */ COMPACT_SKIPPED, /* compaction didn't start as it was deferred due to past failures */ COMPACT_DEFERRED, /* For more detailed tracepoint output - internal to compaction */ COMPACT_NO_SUITABLE_PAGE, /* compaction should continue to another pageblock */ COMPACT_CONTINUE, /* * The full zone was compacted scanned but wasn't successfull to compact * suitable pages. */ COMPACT_COMPLETE, /* * direct compaction has scanned part of the zone but wasn't successfull * to compact suitable pages. */ COMPACT_PARTIAL_SKIPPED, /* compaction terminated prematurely due to lock contentions */ COMPACT_CONTENDED, /* * direct compaction terminated after concluding that the allocation * should now succeed */ COMPACT_SUCCESS, }; struct alloc_context; /* in mm/internal.h */ /* * Number of free order-0 pages that should be available above given watermark * to make sure compaction has reasonable chance of not running out of free * pages that it needs to isolate as migration target during its work. */ static inline unsigned long compact_gap(unsigned int order) { /* * Although all the isolations for migration are temporary, compaction * free scanner may have up to 1 << order pages on its list and then * try to split an (order - 1) free page. At that point, a gap of * 1 << order might not be enough, so it's safer to require twice that * amount. Note that the number of pages on the list is also * effectively limited by COMPACT_CLUSTER_MAX, as that's the maximum * that the migrate scanner can have isolated on migrate list, and free * scanner is only invoked when the number of isolated free pages is * lower than that. But it's not worth to complicate the formula here * as a bigger gap for higher orders than strictly necessary can also * improve chances of compaction success. */ return 2UL << order; } #ifdef CONFIG_COMPACTION extern int sysctl_compact_memory; extern unsigned int sysctl_compaction_proactiveness; extern int sysctl_compaction_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer, size_t *length, loff_t *ppos); extern int sysctl_extfrag_threshold; extern int sysctl_compact_unevictable_allowed; extern unsigned int extfrag_for_order(struct zone *zone, unsigned int order); extern int fragmentation_index(struct zone *zone, unsigned int order); extern enum compact_result try_to_compact_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order, unsigned int alloc_flags, const struct alloc_context *ac, enum compact_priority prio, struct page **page); extern void reset_isolation_suitable(pg_data_t *pgdat); extern enum compact_result compaction_suitable(struct zone *zone, int order, unsigned int alloc_flags, int highest_zoneidx); extern void defer_compaction(struct zone *zone, int order); extern bool compaction_deferred(struct zone *zone, int order); extern void compaction_defer_reset(struct zone *zone, int order, bool alloc_success); extern bool compaction_restarting(struct zone *zone, int order); /* Compaction has made some progress and retrying makes sense */ static inline bool compaction_made_progress(enum compact_result result) { /* * Even though this might sound confusing this in fact tells us * that the compaction successfully isolated and migrated some * pageblocks. */ if (result == COMPACT_SUCCESS) return true; return false; } /* Compaction has failed and it doesn't make much sense to keep retrying. */ static inline bool compaction_failed(enum compact_result result) { /* All zones were scanned completely and still not result. */ if (result == COMPACT_COMPLETE) return true; return false; } /* Compaction needs reclaim to be performed first, so it can continue. */ static inline bool compaction_needs_reclaim(enum compact_result result) { /* * Compaction backed off due to watermark checks for order-0 * so the regular reclaim has to try harder and reclaim something. */ if (result == COMPACT_SKIPPED) return true; return false; } /* * Compaction has backed off for some reason after doing some work or none * at all. It might be throttling or lock contention. Retrying might be still * worthwhile, but with a higher priority if allowed. */ static inline bool compaction_withdrawn(enum compact_result result) { /* * If compaction is deferred for high-order allocations, it is * because sync compaction recently failed. If this is the case * and the caller requested a THP allocation, we do not want * to heavily disrupt the system, so we fail the allocation * instead of entering direct reclaim. */ if (result == COMPACT_DEFERRED) return true; /* * If compaction in async mode encounters contention or blocks higher * priority task we back off early rather than cause stalls. */ if (result == COMPACT_CONTENDED) return true; /* * Page scanners have met but we haven't scanned full zones so this * is a back off in fact. */ if (result == COMPACT_PARTIAL_SKIPPED) return true; return false; } bool compaction_zonelist_suitable(struct alloc_context *ac, int order, int alloc_flags); extern int kcompactd_run(int nid); extern void kcompactd_stop(int nid); extern void wakeup_kcompactd(pg_data_t *pgdat, int order, int highest_zoneidx); #else static inline void reset_isolation_suitable(pg_data_t *pgdat) { } static inline enum compact_result compaction_suitable(struct zone *zone, int order, int alloc_flags, int highest_zoneidx) { return COMPACT_SKIPPED; } static inline void defer_compaction(struct zone *zone, int order) { } static inline bool compaction_deferred(struct zone *zone, int order) { return true; } static inline bool compaction_made_progress(enum compact_result result) { return false; } static inline bool compaction_failed(enum compact_result result) { return false; } static inline bool compaction_needs_reclaim(enum compact_result result) { return false; } static inline bool compaction_withdrawn(enum compact_result result) { return true; } static inline int kcompactd_run(int nid) { return 0; } static inline void kcompactd_stop(int nid) { } static inline void wakeup_kcompactd(pg_data_t *pgdat, int order, int highest_zoneidx) { } #endif /* CONFIG_COMPACTION */ struct node; #if defined(CONFIG_COMPACTION) && defined(CONFIG_SYSFS) && defined(CONFIG_NUMA) extern int compaction_register_node(struct node *node); extern void compaction_unregister_node(struct node *node); #else static inline int compaction_register_node(struct node *node) { return 0; } static inline void compaction_unregister_node(struct node *node) { } #endif /* CONFIG_COMPACTION && CONFIG_SYSFS && CONFIG_NUMA */ #endif /* _LINUX_COMPACTION_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef _MM_PERCPU_INTERNAL_H #define _MM_PERCPU_INTERNAL_H #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/percpu.h> /* * There are two chunk types: root and memcg-aware. * Chunks of each type have separate slots list. * * Memcg-aware chunks have an attached vector of obj_cgroup pointers, which is * used to store memcg membership data of a percpu object. Obj_cgroups are * ref-counted pointers to a memory cgroup with an ability to switch dynamically * to the parent memory cgroup. This allows to reclaim a deleted memory cgroup * without reclaiming of all outstanding objects, which hold a reference at it. */ enum pcpu_chunk_type { PCPU_CHUNK_ROOT, #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM PCPU_CHUNK_MEMCG, #endif PCPU_NR_CHUNK_TYPES, PCPU_FAIL_ALLOC = PCPU_NR_CHUNK_TYPES }; /* * pcpu_block_md is the metadata block struct. * Each chunk's bitmap is split into a number of full blocks. * All units are in terms of bits. * * The scan hint is the largest known contiguous area before the contig hint. * It is not necessarily the actual largest contig hint though. There is an * invariant that the scan_hint_start > contig_hint_start iff * scan_hint == contig_hint. This is necessary because when scanning forward, * we don't know if a new contig hint would be better than the current one. */ struct pcpu_block_md { int scan_hint; /* scan hint for block */ int scan_hint_start; /* block relative starting position of the scan hint */ int contig_hint; /* contig hint for block */ int contig_hint_start; /* block relative starting position of the contig hint */ int left_free; /* size of free space along the left side of the block */ int right_free; /* size of free space along the right side of the block */ int first_free; /* block position of first free */ int nr_bits; /* total bits responsible for */ }; struct pcpu_chunk { #ifdef CONFIG_PERCPU_STATS int nr_alloc; /* # of allocations */ size_t max_alloc_size; /* largest allocation size */ #endif struct list_head list; /* linked to pcpu_slot lists */ int free_bytes; /* free bytes in the chunk */ struct pcpu_block_md chunk_md; void *base_addr; /* base address of this chunk */ unsigned long *alloc_map; /* allocation map */ unsigned long *bound_map; /* boundary map */ struct pcpu_block_md *md_blocks; /* metadata blocks */ void *data; /* chunk data */ bool immutable; /* no [de]population allowed */ int start_offset; /* the overlap with the previous region to have a page aligned base_addr */ int end_offset; /* additional area required to have the region end page aligned */ #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM struct obj_cgroup **obj_cgroups; /* vector of object cgroups */ #endif int nr_pages; /* # of pages served by this chunk */ int nr_populated; /* # of populated pages */ int nr_empty_pop_pages; /* # of empty populated pages */ unsigned long populated[]; /* populated bitmap */ }; extern spinlock_t pcpu_lock; extern struct list_head *pcpu_chunk_lists; extern int pcpu_nr_slots; extern int pcpu_nr_empty_pop_pages[]; extern struct pcpu_chunk *pcpu_first_chunk; extern struct pcpu_chunk *pcpu_reserved_chunk; /** * pcpu_chunk_nr_blocks - converts nr_pages to # of md_blocks * @chunk: chunk of interest * * This conversion is from the number of physical pages that the chunk * serves to the number of bitmap blocks used. */ static inline int pcpu_chunk_nr_blocks(struct pcpu_chunk *chunk) { return chunk->nr_pages * PAGE_SIZE / PCPU_BITMAP_BLOCK_SIZE; } /** * pcpu_nr_pages_to_map_bits - converts the pages to size of bitmap * @pages: number of physical pages * * This conversion is from physical pages to the number of bits * required in the bitmap. */ static inline int pcpu_nr_pages_to_map_bits(int pages) { return pages * PAGE_SIZE / PCPU_MIN_ALLOC_SIZE; } /** * pcpu_chunk_map_bits - helper to convert nr_pages to size of bitmap * @chunk: chunk of interest * * This conversion is from the number of physical pages that the chunk * serves to the number of bits in the bitmap. */ static inline int pcpu_chunk_map_bits(struct pcpu_chunk *chunk) { return pcpu_nr_pages_to_map_bits(chunk->nr_pages); } #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM static inline enum pcpu_chunk_type pcpu_chunk_type(struct pcpu_chunk *chunk) { if (chunk->obj_cgroups) return PCPU_CHUNK_MEMCG; return PCPU_CHUNK_ROOT; } static inline bool pcpu_is_memcg_chunk(enum pcpu_chunk_type chunk_type) { return chunk_type == PCPU_CHUNK_MEMCG; } #else static inline enum pcpu_chunk_type pcpu_chunk_type(struct pcpu_chunk *chunk) { return PCPU_CHUNK_ROOT; } static inline bool pcpu_is_memcg_chunk(enum pcpu_chunk_type chunk_type) { return false; } #endif static inline struct list_head *pcpu_chunk_list(enum pcpu_chunk_type chunk_type) { return &pcpu_chunk_lists[pcpu_nr_slots * pcpu_is_memcg_chunk(chunk_type)]; } #ifdef CONFIG_PERCPU_STATS #include <linux/spinlock.h> struct percpu_stats { u64 nr_alloc; /* lifetime # of allocations */ u64 nr_dealloc; /* lifetime # of deallocations */ u64 nr_cur_alloc; /* current # of allocations */ u64 nr_max_alloc; /* max # of live allocations */ u32 nr_chunks; /* current # of live chunks */ u32 nr_max_chunks; /* max # of live chunks */ size_t min_alloc_size; /* min allocaiton size */ size_t max_alloc_size; /* max allocation size */ }; extern struct percpu_stats pcpu_stats; extern struct pcpu_alloc_info pcpu_stats_ai; /* * For debug purposes. We don't care about the flexible array. */ static inline void pcpu_stats_save_ai(const struct pcpu_alloc_info *ai) { memcpy(&pcpu_stats_ai, ai, sizeof(struct pcpu_alloc_info)); /* initialize min_alloc_size to unit_size */ pcpu_stats.min_alloc_size = pcpu_stats_ai.unit_size; } /* * pcpu_stats_area_alloc - increment area allocation stats * @chunk: the location of the area being allocated * @size: size of area to allocate in bytes * * CONTEXT: * pcpu_lock. */ static inline void pcpu_stats_area_alloc(struct pcpu_chunk *chunk, size_t size) { lockdep_assert_held(&pcpu_lock); pcpu_stats.nr_alloc++; pcpu_stats.nr_cur_alloc++; pcpu_stats.nr_max_alloc = max(pcpu_stats.nr_max_alloc, pcpu_stats.nr_cur_alloc); pcpu_stats.min_alloc_size = min(pcpu_stats.min_alloc_size, size); pcpu_stats.max_alloc_size = max(pcpu_stats.max_alloc_size, size); chunk->nr_alloc++; chunk->max_alloc_size = max(chunk->max_alloc_size, size); } /* * pcpu_stats_area_dealloc - decrement allocation stats * @chunk: the location of the area being deallocated * * CONTEXT: * pcpu_lock. */ static inline void pcpu_stats_area_dealloc(struct pcpu_chunk *chunk) { lockdep_assert_held(&pcpu_lock); pcpu_stats.nr_dealloc++; pcpu_stats.nr_cur_alloc--; chunk->nr_alloc--; } /* * pcpu_stats_chunk_alloc - increment chunk stats */ static inline void pcpu_stats_chunk_alloc(void) { unsigned long flags; spin_lock_irqsave(&pcpu_lock, flags); pcpu_stats.nr_chunks++; pcpu_stats.nr_max_chunks = max(pcpu_stats.nr_max_chunks, pcpu_stats.nr_chunks); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pcpu_lock, flags); } /* * pcpu_stats_chunk_dealloc - decrement chunk stats */ static inline void pcpu_stats_chunk_dealloc(void) { unsigned long flags; spin_lock_irqsave(&pcpu_lock, flags); pcpu_stats.nr_chunks--; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pcpu_lock, flags); } #else static inline void pcpu_stats_save_ai(const struct pcpu_alloc_info *ai) { } static inline void pcpu_stats_area_alloc(struct pcpu_chunk *chunk, size_t size) { } static inline void pcpu_stats_area_dealloc(struct pcpu_chunk *chunk) { } static inline void pcpu_stats_chunk_alloc(void) { } static inline void pcpu_stats_chunk_dealloc(void) { } #endif /* !CONFIG_PERCPU_STATS */ #endif
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #undef TRACE_SYSTEM #define TRACE_SYSTEM alarmtimer #if !defined(_TRACE_ALARMTIMER_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ) #define _TRACE_ALARMTIMER_H #include <linux/alarmtimer.h> #include <linux/rtc.h> #include <linux/tracepoint.h> TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM(ALARM_REALTIME); TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM(ALARM_BOOTTIME); TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM(ALARM_REALTIME_FREEZER); TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM(ALARM_BOOTTIME_FREEZER); #define show_alarm_type(type) __print_flags(type, " | ", \ { 1 << ALARM_REALTIME, "REALTIME" }, \ { 1 << ALARM_BOOTTIME, "BOOTTIME" }, \ { 1 << ALARM_REALTIME_FREEZER, "REALTIME Freezer" }, \ { 1 << ALARM_BOOTTIME_FREEZER, "BOOTTIME Freezer" }) TRACE_EVENT(alarmtimer_suspend, TP_PROTO(ktime_t expires, int flag), TP_ARGS(expires, flag), TP_STRUCT__entry( __field(s64, expires) __field(unsigned char, alarm_type) ), TP_fast_assign( __entry->expires = expires; __entry->alarm_type = flag; ), TP_printk("alarmtimer type:%s expires:%llu", show_alarm_type((1 << __entry->alarm_type)), __entry->expires ) ); DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(alarm_class, TP_PROTO(struct alarm *alarm, ktime_t now), TP_ARGS(alarm, now), TP_STRUCT__entry( __field(void *, alarm) __field(unsigned char, alarm_type) __field(s64, expires) __field(s64, now) ), TP_fast_assign( __entry->alarm = alarm; __entry->alarm_type = alarm->type; __entry->expires = alarm->node.expires; __entry->now = now; ), TP_printk("alarmtimer:%p type:%s expires:%llu now:%llu", __entry->alarm, show_alarm_type((1 << __entry->alarm_type)), __entry->expires, __entry->now ) ); DEFINE_EVENT(alarm_class, alarmtimer_fired, TP_PROTO(struct alarm *alarm, ktime_t now), TP_ARGS(alarm, now) ); DEFINE_EVENT(alarm_class, alarmtimer_start, TP_PROTO(struct alarm *alarm, ktime_t now), TP_ARGS(alarm, now) ); DEFINE_EVENT(alarm_class, alarmtimer_cancel, TP_PROTO(struct alarm *alarm, ktime_t now), TP_ARGS(alarm, now) ); #endif /* _TRACE_ALARMTIMER_H */ /* This part must be outside protection */ #include <trace/define_trace.h>
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7419 7420 7421 7422 7423 7424 7425 7426 7427 7428 7429 7430 7431 7432 7433 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only /* * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module * * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations. * * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com> * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com> * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> * * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd. * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp> * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies */ #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/kd.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h> #include <linux/tracehook.h> #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/sched/signal.h> #include <linux/sched/task.h> #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <linux/xattr.h> #include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/unistd.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/mman.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/pagemap.h> #include <linux/proc_fs.h> #include <linux/swap.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/dcache.h> #include <linux/file.h> #include <linux/fdtable.h> #include <linux/namei.h> #include <linux/mount.h> #include <linux/fs_context.h> #include <linux/fs_parser.h> #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h> #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h> #include <linux/tty.h> #include <net/icmp.h> #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */ #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */ #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h> #include <net/net_namespace.h> #include <net/netlabel.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <asm/ioctls.h> #include <linux/atomic.h> #include <linux/bitops.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */ #include <net/netlink.h> #include <linux/tcp.h> #include <linux/udp.h> #include <linux/dccp.h> #include <linux/sctp.h> #include <net/sctp/structs.h> #include <linux/quota.h> #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */ #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */ #include <linux/parser.h> #include <linux/nfs_mount.h> #include <net/ipv6.h> #include <linux/hugetlb.h> #include <linux/personality.h> #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/posix-timers.h> #include <linux/syslog.h> #include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/msg.h> #include <linux/shm.h> #include <linux/bpf.h> #include <linux/kernfs.h> #include <linux/stringhash.h> /* for hashlen_string() */ #include <uapi/linux/mount.h> #include <linux/fsnotify.h> #include <linux/fanotify.h> #include "avc.h" #include "objsec.h" #include "netif.h" #include "netnode.h" #include "netport.h" #include "ibpkey.h" #include "xfrm.h" #include "netlabel.h" #include "audit.h" #include "avc_ss.h" struct selinux_state selinux_state; /* SECMARK reference count */ static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP static int selinux_enforcing_boot __initdata; static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str) { unsigned long enforcing; if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing)) selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0; return 1; } __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup); #else #define selinux_enforcing_boot 1 #endif int selinux_enabled_boot __initdata = 1; #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str) { unsigned long enabled; if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled)) selinux_enabled_boot = enabled ? 1 : 0; return 1; } __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup); #endif static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE; static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str) { unsigned long checkreqprot; if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) { selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0; if (checkreqprot) pr_warn("SELinux: checkreqprot set to 1 via kernel parameter. This is deprecated and will be rejected in a future kernel release.\n"); } return 1; } __setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup); /** * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled * * Description: * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled. * */ static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void) { return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount)); } /** * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled * * Description: * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling * is always considered enabled. * */ static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void) { return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()); } static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event) { if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) { sel_netif_flush(); sel_netnode_flush(); sel_netport_flush(); synchronize_net(); } return 0; } static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event) { if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) { sel_ib_pkey_flush(); call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL); } return 0; } /* * initialise the security for the init task */ static void cred_init_security(void) { struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred; struct task_security_struct *tsec; tsec = selinux_cred(cred); tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; } /* * get the security ID of a set of credentials */ static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec; tsec = selinux_cred(cred); return tsec->sid; } /* * get the objective security ID of a task */ static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task) { u32 sid; rcu_read_lock(); sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task)); rcu_read_unlock(); return sid; } static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry); /* * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is * invalid. The @dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode. */ static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry, bool may_sleep) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); might_sleep_if(may_sleep); if (selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) && isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) { if (!may_sleep) return -ECHILD; /* * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be * found; in that case, continue using the old label. */ inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry); } return 0; } static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode) { return selinux_inode(inode); } static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu) { int error; error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu); if (error) return ERR_PTR(error); return selinux_inode(inode); } /* * Get the security label of an inode. */ static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode) { __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true); return selinux_inode(inode); } static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); return selinux_inode(inode); } /* * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode. */ static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true); return selinux_inode(inode); } static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; if (!isec) return; sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; /* * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste * time taking a lock doing nothing. * * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once. * It should not be possible for this function to be called with * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here. */ if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) { spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); list_del_init(&isec->list); spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); } } static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; sb->s_security = NULL; kfree(sbsec); } struct selinux_mnt_opts { const char *fscontext, *context, *rootcontext, *defcontext; }; static void selinux_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts) { struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts; kfree(opts->fscontext); kfree(opts->context); kfree(opts->rootcontext); kfree(opts->defcontext); kfree(opts); } enum { Opt_error = -1, Opt_context = 0, Opt_defcontext = 1, Opt_fscontext = 2, Opt_rootcontext = 3, Opt_seclabel = 4, }; #define A(s, has_arg) {#s, sizeof(#s) - 1, Opt_##s, has_arg} static struct { const char *name; int len; int opt; bool has_arg; } tokens[] = { A(context, true), A(fscontext, true), A(defcontext, true), A(rootcontext, true), A(seclabel, false), }; #undef A static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg) { int i; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) { size_t len = tokens[i].len; if (len > l || memcmp(s, tokens[i].name, len)) continue; if (tokens[i].has_arg) { if (len == l || s[len] != '=') continue; *arg = s + len + 1; } else if (len != l) continue; return tokens[i].opt; } return Opt_error; } #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n" static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid, struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, const struct cred *cred) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred); int rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); if (rc) return rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL); return rc; } static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid, struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, const struct cred *cred) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred); int rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); if (rc) return rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL); return rc; } static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb) { /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */ return !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") || (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() && (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))); } static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; /* * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new * SECURITY_FS_USE_* definition! */ BUILD_BUG_ON(SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX != 7); switch (sbsec->behavior) { case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR: case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS: case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK: case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE: return 1; case SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS: return selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(sb); /* Never allow relabeling on context mounts */ case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT: case SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE: default: return 0; } } static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; struct dentry *root = sb->s_root; struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root); int rc = 0; if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */ if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) { pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no " "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; goto out; } rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) { if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type " "%s) has no security xattr handler\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); else pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type " "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, -rc); goto out; } } sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED; /* * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared. */ if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb)) sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT; else sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT; /* Initialize the root inode. */ rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root); /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g. inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly populates itself. */ spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); while (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = list_first_entry(&sbsec->isec_head, struct inode_security_struct, list); struct inode *inode = isec->inode; list_del_init(&isec->list); spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); inode = igrab(inode); if (inode) { if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode)) inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL); iput(inode); } spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); } spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); out: return rc; } static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag, u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid) { char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK; /* check if the old mount command had the same options */ if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) || (old_sid != new_sid)) return 1; /* check if we were passed the same options twice, * aka someone passed context=a,context=b */ if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) if (mnt_flags & flag) return 1; return 0; } static int parse_sid(struct super_block *sb, const char *s, u32 *sid) { int rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, s, sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid" "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", s, sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc); return rc; } /* * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point * labeling information. */ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts, unsigned long kern_flags, unsigned long *set_kern_flags) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root; struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts; struct inode_security_struct *root_isec; u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0; u32 defcontext_sid = 0; int rc = 0; mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock); if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) { if (!opts) { /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, after the initial policy is loaded and the security server is ready to handle calls. */ goto out; } rc = -EINVAL; pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options " "before the security server is initialized\n"); goto out; } if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) { /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to * place the results is not allowed */ rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } /* * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs. * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data * we need to skip the double mount verification. * * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options * will be used for both mounts) */ if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) && !opts) goto out; root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root); /* * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids. * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more * than once with different security options. */ if (opts) { if (opts->fscontext) { rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &fscontext_sid); if (rc) goto out; if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, fscontext_sid)) goto out_double_mount; sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT; } if (opts->context) { rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &context_sid); if (rc) goto out; if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, context_sid)) goto out_double_mount; sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT; } if (opts->rootcontext) { rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &rootcontext_sid); if (rc) goto out; if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, rootcontext_sid)) goto out_double_mount; sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT; } if (opts->defcontext) { rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &defcontext_sid); if (rc) goto out; if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, defcontext_sid)) goto out_double_mount; sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT; } } if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) { /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */ if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !opts) goto out_double_mount; rc = 0; goto out; } if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0) sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS; if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore")) sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS; if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")) sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR; if (!sbsec->behavior) { /* * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this * filesystem type. */ rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, sb); if (rc) { pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n", __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc); goto out; } } /* * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command * line and security labels must be ignored. */ if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns && strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") && strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") && strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts")) { if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid || defcontext_sid) { rc = -EACCES; goto out; } if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT; rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, current_sid(), current_sid(), SECCLASS_FILE, NULL, &sbsec->mntpoint_sid); if (rc) goto out; } goto out_set_opts; } /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */ if (fscontext_sid) { rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred); if (rc) goto out; sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid; } /* * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior. * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set * the superblock context if not already set. */ if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) { sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE; *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS; } if (context_sid) { if (!fscontext_sid) { rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, cred); if (rc) goto out; sbsec->sid = context_sid; } else { rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, cred); if (rc) goto out; } if (!rootcontext_sid) rootcontext_sid = context_sid; sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid; sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT; } if (rootcontext_sid) { rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, cred); if (rc) goto out; root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid; root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; } if (defcontext_sid) { if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) { rc = -EINVAL; pr_warn("SELinux: defcontext option is " "invalid for this filesystem type\n"); goto out; } if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) { rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid, sbsec, cred); if (rc) goto out; } sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid; } out_set_opts: rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb); out: mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock); return rc; out_double_mount: rc = -EINVAL; pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different " "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); goto out; } static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb, const struct super_block *newsb) { struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security; struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security; char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK; char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK; if (oldflags != newflags) goto mismatch; if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid) goto mismatch; if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid) goto mismatch; if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid) goto mismatch; if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) { struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root); struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root); if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid) goto mismatch; } return 0; mismatch: pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, " "different security settings for (dev %s, " "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name); return -EBUSY; } static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, struct super_block *newsb, unsigned long kern_flags, unsigned long *set_kern_flags) { int rc = 0; const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security; struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security; int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT); int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT); int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT); /* * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later */ if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) return 0; /* * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to * place the results is not allowed. */ if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) return -EINVAL; /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */ BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)); /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */ if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) { if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS; return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb); } mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock); newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags; newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid; newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid; newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior; if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE && !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) { rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, newsb); if (rc) goto out; } if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) { newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE; *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS; } if (set_context) { u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid; if (!set_fscontext) newsbsec->sid = sid; if (!set_rootcontext) { struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root); newisec->sid = sid; } newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid; } if (set_rootcontext) { const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root); struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root); newisec->sid = oldisec->sid; } sb_finish_set_opts(newsb); out: mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock); return rc; } static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts) { struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts; if (token == Opt_seclabel) /* eaten and completely ignored */ return 0; if (!opts) { opts = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL); if (!opts) return -ENOMEM; *mnt_opts = opts; } if (!s) return -ENOMEM; switch (token) { case Opt_context: if (opts->context || opts->defcontext) goto Einval; opts->context = s; break; case Opt_fscontext: if (opts->fscontext) goto Einval; opts->fscontext = s; break; case Opt_rootcontext: if (opts->rootcontext) goto Einval; opts->rootcontext = s; break; case Opt_defcontext: if (opts->context || opts->defcontext) goto Einval; opts->defcontext = s; break; } return 0; Einval: pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); return -EINVAL; } static int selinux_add_mnt_opt(const char *option, const char *val, int len, void **mnt_opts) { int token = Opt_error; int rc, i; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) { if (strcmp(option, tokens[i].name) == 0) { token = tokens[i].opt; break; } } if (token == Opt_error) return -EINVAL; if (token != Opt_seclabel) { val = kmemdup_nul(val, len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!val) { rc = -ENOMEM; goto free_opt; } } rc = selinux_add_opt(token, val, mnt_opts); if (unlikely(rc)) { kfree(val); goto free_opt; } return rc; free_opt: if (*mnt_opts) { selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts); *mnt_opts = NULL; } return rc; } static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid) { char *context = NULL; u32 len; int rc; rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, &context, &len); if (!rc) { bool has_comma = context && strchr(context, ','); seq_putc(m, '='); if (has_comma) seq_putc(m, '\"'); seq_escape(m, context, "\"\n\\"); if (has_comma) seq_putc(m, '\"'); } kfree(context); return rc; } static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; int rc; if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) return 0; if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) return 0; if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) { seq_putc(m, ','); seq_puts(m, FSCONTEXT_STR); rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->sid); if (rc) return rc; } if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) { seq_putc(m, ','); seq_puts(m, CONTEXT_STR); rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->mntpoint_sid); if (rc) return rc; } if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) { seq_putc(m, ','); seq_puts(m, DEFCONTEXT_STR); rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->def_sid); if (rc) return rc; } if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) { struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root; struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root); seq_putc(m, ','); seq_puts(m, ROOTCONTEXT_STR); rc = show_sid(m, isec->sid); if (rc) return rc; } if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) { seq_putc(m, ','); seq_puts(m, SECLABEL_STR); } return 0; } static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode) { switch (mode & S_IFMT) { case S_IFSOCK: return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE; case S_IFLNK: return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE; case S_IFREG: return SECCLASS_FILE; case S_IFBLK: return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE; case S_IFDIR: return SECCLASS_DIR; case S_IFCHR: return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE; case S_IFIFO: return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE; } return SECCLASS_FILE; } static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol) { return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP); } static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol) { return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP); } static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol) { int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass(); switch (family) { case PF_UNIX: switch (type) { case SOCK_STREAM: case SOCK_SEQPACKET: return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET; case SOCK_DGRAM: case SOCK_RAW: return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET; } break; case PF_INET: case PF_INET6: switch (type) { case SOCK_STREAM: case SOCK_SEQPACKET: if (default_protocol_stream(protocol)) return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET; else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP) return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET; else return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; case SOCK_DGRAM: if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol)) return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET; else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP || protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6)) return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET; else return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; case SOCK_DCCP: return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET; default: return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; } break; case PF_NETLINK: switch (protocol) { case NETLINK_ROUTE: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET; case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET; case NETLINK_NFLOG: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET; case NETLINK_XFRM: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET; case NETLINK_SELINUX: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET; case NETLINK_ISCSI: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET; case NETLINK_AUDIT: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET; case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET; case NETLINK_CONNECTOR: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET; case NETLINK_NETFILTER: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET; case NETLINK_DNRTMSG: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET; case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET; case NETLINK_GENERIC: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET; case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET; case NETLINK_RDMA: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET; case NETLINK_CRYPTO: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET; default: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET; } case PF_PACKET: return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET; case PF_KEY: return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET; case PF_APPLETALK: return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET; } if (extsockclass) { switch (family) { case PF_AX25: return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET; case PF_IPX: return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET; case PF_NETROM: return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET; case PF_ATMPVC: return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET; case PF_X25: return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET; case PF_ROSE: return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET; case PF_DECnet: return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET; case PF_ATMSVC: return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET; case PF_RDS: return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET; case PF_IRDA: return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET; case PF_PPPOX: return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET; case PF_LLC: return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET; case PF_CAN: return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET; case PF_TIPC: return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET; case PF_BLUETOOTH: return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET; case PF_IUCV: return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET; case PF_RXRPC: return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET; case PF_ISDN: return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET; case PF_PHONET: return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET; case PF_IEEE802154: return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET; case PF_CAIF: return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET; case PF_ALG: return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET; case PF_NFC: return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET; case PF_VSOCK: return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET; case PF_KCM: return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET; case PF_QIPCRTR: return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET; case PF_SMC: return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET; case PF_XDP: return SECCLASS_XDP_SOCKET; #if PF_MAX > 45 #error New address family defined, please update this function. #endif } } return SECCLASS_SOCKET; } static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry, u16 tclass, u16 flags, u32 *sid) { int rc; struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb; char *buffer, *path; buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); if (!buffer) return -ENOMEM; path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE); if (IS_ERR(path)) rc = PTR_ERR(path); else { if (flags & SE_SBPROC) { /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling. * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */ while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') { path[1] = '/'; path++; } } rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name, path, tclass, sid); if (rc == -ENOENT) { /* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */ *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; rc = 0; } } free_page((unsigned long)buffer); return rc; } static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry, u32 def_sid, u32 *sid) { #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255 char *context; unsigned int len; int rc; len = INITCONTEXTLEN; context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS); if (!context) return -ENOMEM; context[len] = '\0'; rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len); if (rc == -ERANGE) { kfree(context); /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */ rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); if (rc < 0) return rc; len = rc; context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS); if (!context) return -ENOMEM; context[len] = '\0'; rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len); } if (rc < 0) { kfree(context); if (rc != -ENODATA) { pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); return rc; } *sid = def_sid; return 0; } rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state, context, rc, sid, def_sid, GFP_NOFS); if (rc) { char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id; unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino; if (rc == -EINVAL) { pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context); } else { pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino); } } kfree(context); return 0; } /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL; struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); u32 task_sid, sid = 0; u16 sclass; struct dentry *dentry; int rc = 0; if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED) return 0; spin_lock(&isec->lock); if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED) goto out_unlock; if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE) isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) { /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, after the initial policy is loaded and the security server is ready to handle calls. */ spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); if (list_empty(&isec->list)) list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head); spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); goto out_unlock; } sclass = isec->sclass; task_sid = isec->task_sid; sid = isec->sid; isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING; spin_unlock(&isec->lock); switch (sbsec->behavior) { case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE: break; case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR: if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) { sid = sbsec->def_sid; break; } /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one. Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */ if (opt_dentry) { /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */ dentry = dget(opt_dentry); } else { /* * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try * that first. We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in * two, depending upon that... */ dentry = d_find_alias(inode); if (!dentry) dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode); } if (!dentry) { /* * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we * may find inodes that have no dentry on the * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these * will get fixed up the next time we go through * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could * be used again by userspace. */ goto out_invalid; } rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid, &sid); dput(dentry); if (rc) goto out; break; case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK: sid = task_sid; break; case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS: /* Default to the fs SID. */ sid = sbsec->sid; /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */ rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, task_sid, sid, sclass, NULL, &sid); if (rc) goto out; break; case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT: sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid; break; default: /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */ sid = sbsec->sid; if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) && (!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) || selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks())) { /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on * procfs inodes */ if (opt_dentry) { /* Called from d_instantiate or * d_splice_alias. */ dentry = dget(opt_dentry); } else { /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to * find a dentry. Some filesystems really want * a connected one, so try that first. */ dentry = d_find_alias(inode); if (!dentry) dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode); } /* * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we * may find inodes that have no dentry on the * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as * these will get fixed up the next time we go through * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes * could be used again by userspace. */ if (!dentry) goto out_invalid; rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass, sbsec->flags, &sid); if (rc) { dput(dentry); goto out; } if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) && (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) { rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sid, &sid); if (rc) { dput(dentry); goto out; } } dput(dentry); } break; } out: spin_lock(&isec->lock); if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) { if (rc) { isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID; goto out_unlock; } isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; isec->sid = sid; } out_unlock: spin_unlock(&isec->lock); return rc; out_invalid: spin_lock(&isec->lock); if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) { isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID; isec->sid = sid; } spin_unlock(&isec->lock); return 0; } /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */ static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig) { u32 perm = 0; switch (sig) { case SIGCHLD: /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */ perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD; break; case SIGKILL: /* Cannot be caught or ignored */ perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL; break; case SIGSTOP: /* Cannot be caught or ignored */ perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP; break; default: /* All other signals. */ perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL; break; } return perm; } #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63. #endif /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred, int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns) { struct common_audit_data ad; struct av_decision avd; u16 sclass; u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap); int rc; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP; ad.u.cap = cap; switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) { case 0: sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS; break; case 1: sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS; break; default: pr_err("SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap); BUG(); return -EINVAL; } rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state, sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd); if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) { int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state, sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0); if (rc2) return rc2; } return rc; } /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode. The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct inode *inode, u32 perms, struct common_audit_data *adp) { struct inode_security_struct *isec; u32 sid; validate_creds(cred); if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return 0; sid = cred_sid(cred); isec = selinux_inode(inode); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp); } /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the pathname if needed. */ static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct dentry *dentry, u32 av) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct common_audit_data ad; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true); return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); } /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the pathname if needed. */ static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, const struct path *path, u32 av) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry); struct common_audit_data ad; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; ad.u.path = *path; __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true); return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); } /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */ static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, u32 av) { struct common_audit_data ad; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; ad.u.file = file; return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad); } #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid); #endif /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to access an inode in a given way. Check access to the descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to check a particular permission to the file. Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, u32 av) { struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file); struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); int rc; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; ad.u.file = file; if (sid != fsec->sid) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad); if (rc) goto out; } #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred)); if (rc) return rc; #endif /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */ rc = 0; if (av) rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); out: return rc; } /* * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned. */ static int selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass, u32 *_new_isid) { const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) { *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid; } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) && tsec->create_sid) { *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid; } else { const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir); return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass, name, _new_isid); } return 0; } /* Check whether a task can create a file. */ static int may_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, u16 tclass) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); struct inode_security_struct *dsec; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; u32 sid, newsid; struct common_audit_data ad; int rc; dsec = inode_security(dir); sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; sid = tsec->sid; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad); if (rc) return rc; rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass, &newsid); if (rc) return rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad); if (rc) return rc; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, newsid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); } #define MAY_LINK 0 #define MAY_UNLINK 1 #define MAY_RMDIR 2 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */ static int may_link(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int kind) { struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); u32 av; int rc; dsec = inode_security(dir); isec = backing_inode_security(dentry); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; av = DIR__SEARCH; av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME); rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad); if (rc) return rc; switch (kind) { case MAY_LINK: av = FILE__LINK; break; case MAY_UNLINK: av = FILE__UNLINK; break; case MAY_RMDIR: av = DIR__RMDIR; break; default: pr_warn("SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n", __func__, kind); return 0; } rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad); return rc; } static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) { struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); u32 av; int old_is_dir, new_is_dir; int rc; old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir); old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry); old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry); new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = old_dentry; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad); if (rc) return rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, old_isec->sid, old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad); if (rc) return rc; if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, old_isec->sid, old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad); if (rc) return rc; } ad.u.dentry = new_dentry; av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH; if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad); if (rc) return rc; if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) { new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry); new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry); rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, new_isec->sid, new_isec->sclass, (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad); if (rc) return rc; } return 0; } /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */ static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct super_block *sb, u32 perms, struct common_audit_data *ad) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); sbsec = sb->s_security; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad); } /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */ static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask) { u32 av = 0; if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) { if (mask & MAY_EXEC) av |= FILE__EXECUTE; if (mask & MAY_READ) av |= FILE__READ; if (mask & MAY_APPEND) av |= FILE__APPEND; else if (mask & MAY_WRITE) av |= FILE__WRITE; } else { if (mask & MAY_EXEC) av |= DIR__SEARCH; if (mask & MAY_WRITE) av |= DIR__WRITE; if (mask & MAY_READ) av |= DIR__READ; } return av; } /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */ static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file) { u32 av = 0; if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) av |= FILE__READ; if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) { if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND) av |= FILE__APPEND; else av |= FILE__WRITE; } if (!av) { /* * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use. */ av = FILE__IOCTL; } return av; } /* * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct * open permission. */ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file) { u32 av = file_to_av(file); struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); if (selinux_policycap_openperm() && inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC) av |= FILE__OPEN; return av; } /* Hook functions begin here. */ static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr) { u32 mysid = current_sid(); u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL); } static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from, struct task_struct *to) { u32 mysid = current_sid(); u32 fromsid = task_sid(from); u32 tosid = task_sid(to); int rc; if (mysid != fromsid) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL); if (rc) return rc; } return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL, NULL); } static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from, struct task_struct *to) { u32 fromsid = task_sid(from); u32 tosid = task_sid(to); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER, NULL); } static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from, struct task_struct *to, struct file *file) { u32 sid = task_sid(to); struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file); struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry; struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; int rc; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; ad.u.path = file->f_path; if (sid != fsec->sid) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad); if (rc) return rc; } #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid); if (rc) return rc; #endif if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; isec = backing_inode_security(dentry); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file), &ad); } static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) { u32 sid = current_sid(); u32 csid = task_sid(child); if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); } static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, task_sid(parent), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); } static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL); } static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, const kernel_cap_t *effective, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *permitted) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL); } /* * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook, * which was removed). * * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook. */ static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, unsigned int opts) { return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns); } static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); int rc = 0; if (!sb) return 0; switch (cmds) { case Q_SYNC: case Q_QUOTAON: case Q_QUOTAOFF: case Q_SETINFO: case Q_SETQUOTA: case Q_XQUOTAOFF: case Q_XQUOTAON: case Q_XSETQLIM: rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL); break; case Q_GETFMT: case Q_GETINFO: case Q_GETQUOTA: case Q_XGETQUOTA: case Q_XGETQSTAT: case Q_XGETQSTATV: case Q_XGETNEXTQUOTA: rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL); break; default: rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */ break; } return rc; } static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON); } static int selinux_syslog(int type) { switch (type) { case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */ case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL); case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */ case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */ /* Set level of messages printed to console */ case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL: return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE, NULL); } /* All other syslog types */ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL); } /* * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not. * * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all * processes that allocate mappings. */ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) { int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0; rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true); if (rc == 0) cap_sys_admin = 1; return cap_sys_admin; } /* binprm security operations */ static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void) { u32 sid = 0; struct task_struct *tracer; rcu_read_lock(); tracer = ptrace_parent(current); if (tracer) sid = task_sid(tracer); rcu_read_unlock(); return sid; } static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec, const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec) { int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS); int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt); int rc; u32 av; if (!nnp && !nosuid) return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */ if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) return 0; /* No change in credentials */ /* * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability, * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the * policy allows the corresponding permission between * the old and new contexts. */ if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) { av = 0; if (nnp) av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION; if (nosuid) av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL); if (!rc) return 0; } /* * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs, * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset * of the permissions of the current SID. */ rc = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid); if (!rc) return 0; /* * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid. * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller. * nosuid: Permission denied to file. */ if (nnp) return -EPERM; return -EACCES; } static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec; struct task_security_struct *new_tsec; struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file); int rc; /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not * the script interpreter */ old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred); isec = inode_security(inode); /* Default to the current task SID. */ new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid; new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid; /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */ new_tsec->create_sid = 0; new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0; new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0; if (old_tsec->exec_sid) { new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid; /* Reset exec SID on execve. */ new_tsec->exec_sid = 0; /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */ rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec); if (rc) return rc; } else { /* Check for a default transition on this program. */ rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL, &new_tsec->sid); if (rc) return rc; /* * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed * transition. */ rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec); if (rc) new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid; } ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; ad.u.file = bprm->file; if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad); if (rc) return rc; } else { /* Check permissions for the transition. */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad); if (rc) return rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, new_tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad); if (rc) return rc; /* Check for shared state */ if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE, NULL); if (rc) return -EPERM; } /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */ if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) { u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid(); if (ptsid != 0) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, ptsid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); if (rc) return -EPERM; } } /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */ bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless the noatsecure permission is granted between the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL); bprm->secureexec |= !!rc; } return 0; } static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd) { return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0; } /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, struct files_struct *files) { struct file *file, *devnull = NULL; struct tty_struct *tty; int drop_tty = 0; unsigned n; tty = get_current_tty(); if (tty) { spin_lock(&tty->files_lock); if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) { struct tty_file_private *file_priv; /* Revalidate access to controlling tty. Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular open file may belong to another process and we are only interested in the inode-based check here. */ file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct tty_file_private, list); file = file_priv->file; if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE)) drop_tty = 1; } spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock); tty_kref_put(tty); } /* Reset controlling tty. */ if (drop_tty) no_tty(); /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */ n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred); if (!n) /* none found? */ return; devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred); if (IS_ERR(devnull)) devnull = NULL; /* replace all the matching ones with this */ do { replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0); } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0); if (devnull) fput(devnull); } /* * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec */ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { struct task_security_struct *new_tsec; struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim; int rc, i; new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred); if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid) return; /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */ flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files); /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */ current->pdeath_signal = 0; /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit. * * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK. */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL); if (rc) { /* protect against do_prlimit() */ task_lock(current); for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) { rlim = current->signal->rlim + i; initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i; rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur); } task_unlock(current); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS)) update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU)); } } /* * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials * due to exec */ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); u32 osid, sid; int rc; osid = tsec->osid; sid = tsec->sid; if (sid == osid) return; /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID. * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and * flush and unblock signals. * * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID. */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL); if (rc) { clear_itimer(); spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock); if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) { flush_sigqueue(&current->pending); flush_sigqueue(&current->signal->shared_pending); flush_signal_handlers(current, 1); sigemptyset(&current->blocked); recalc_sigpending(); } spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock); } /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck * wait permission to the new task SID. */ read_lock(&tasklist_lock); __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent); read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); } /* superblock security operations */ static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); if (!sbsec) return -ENOMEM; mutex_init(&sbsec->lock); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head); spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock); sbsec->sb = sb; sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE; sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; sb->s_security = sbsec; return 0; } static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb) { superblock_free_security(sb); } static inline int opt_len(const char *s) { bool open_quote = false; int len; char c; for (len = 0; (c = s[len]) != '\0'; len++) { if (c == '"') open_quote = !open_quote; if (c == ',' && !open_quote) break; } return len; } static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts) { char *from = options; char *to = options; bool first = true; int rc; while (1) { int len = opt_len(from); int token; char *arg = NULL; token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg); if (token != Opt_error) { char *p, *q; /* strip quotes */ if (arg) { for (p = q = arg; p < from + len; p++) { char c = *p; if (c != '"') *q++ = c; } arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, q - arg, GFP_KERNEL); if (!arg) { rc = -ENOMEM; goto free_opt; } } rc = selinux_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts); if (unlikely(rc)) { kfree(arg); goto free_opt; } } else { if (!first) { // copy with preceding comma from--; len++; } if (to != from) memmove(to, from, len); to += len; first = false; } if (!from[len]) break; from += len + 1; } *to = '\0'; return 0; free_opt: if (*mnt_opts) { selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts); *mnt_opts = NULL; } return rc; } static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts) { struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; u32 sid; int rc; if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) return 0; if (!opts) return 0; if (opts->fscontext) { rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &sid); if (rc) return rc; if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid)) goto out_bad_option; } if (opts->context) { rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &sid); if (rc) return rc; if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid)) goto out_bad_option; } if (opts->rootcontext) { struct inode_security_struct *root_isec; root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root); rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &sid); if (rc) return rc; if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid)) goto out_bad_option; } if (opts->defcontext) { rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &sid); if (rc) return rc; if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid)) goto out_bad_option; } return 0; out_bad_option: pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options " "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); return -EINVAL; } static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct common_audit_data ad; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root; return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad); } static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct common_audit_data ad; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root; return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad); } static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL); else return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON); } static int selinux_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, const struct path *to_path) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return path_has_perm(cred, to_path, FILE__MOUNTON); } static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb, FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL); } static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc) { const struct selinux_mnt_opts *src = src_fc->security; struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts; if (!src) return 0; fc->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL); if (!fc->security) return -ENOMEM; opts = fc->security; if (src->fscontext) { opts->fscontext = kstrdup(src->fscontext, GFP_KERNEL); if (!opts->fscontext) return -ENOMEM; } if (src->context) { opts->context = kstrdup(src->context, GFP_KERNEL); if (!opts->context) return -ENOMEM; } if (src->rootcontext) { opts->rootcontext = kstrdup(src->rootcontext, GFP_KERNEL); if (!opts->rootcontext) return -ENOMEM; } if (src->defcontext) { opts->defcontext = kstrdup(src->defcontext, GFP_KERNEL); if (!opts->defcontext) return -ENOMEM; } return 0; } static const struct fs_parameter_spec selinux_fs_parameters[] = { fsparam_string(CONTEXT_STR, Opt_context), fsparam_string(DEFCONTEXT_STR, Opt_defcontext), fsparam_string(FSCONTEXT_STR, Opt_fscontext), fsparam_string(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, Opt_rootcontext), fsparam_flag (SECLABEL_STR, Opt_seclabel), {} }; static int selinux_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param) { struct fs_parse_result result; int opt, rc; opt = fs_parse(fc, selinux_fs_parameters, param, &result); if (opt < 0) return opt; rc = selinux_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security); if (!rc) { param->string = NULL; rc = 1; } return rc; } /* inode security operations */ static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); u32 sid = current_sid(); spin_lock_init(&isec->lock); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list); isec->inode = inode; isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE; isec->task_sid = sid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID; return 0; } static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) { inode_free_security(inode); } static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, const struct qstr *name, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) { u32 newsid; int rc; rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()), d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode), &newsid); if (rc) return rc; return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen); } static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, struct qstr *name, const struct cred *old, struct cred *new) { u32 newsid; int rc; struct task_security_struct *tsec; rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old), d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode), &newsid); if (rc) return rc; tsec = selinux_cred(new); tsec->create_sid = newsid; return 0; } static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name, void **value, size_t *len) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; u32 newsid, clen; int rc; char *context; sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; newsid = tsec->create_sid; rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, qstr, inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode), &newsid); if (rc) return rc; /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */ if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); isec->sid = newsid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; } if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (name) *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX; if (value && len) { rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid, &context, &clen); if (rc) return rc; *value = context; *len = clen; } return 0; } static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) { return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE); } static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) { return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK); } static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) { return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK); } static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) { return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE); } static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask) { return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR); } static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) { return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR); } static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev) { return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode)); } static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry) { return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry); } static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ); } static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, bool rcu) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct common_audit_data ad; struct inode_security_struct *isec; u32 sid; validate_creds(cred); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; sid = cred_sid(cred); isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu); if (IS_ERR(isec)) return PTR_ERR(isec); return avc_has_perm_flags(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad, rcu ? MAY_NOT_BLOCK : 0); } static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result) { struct common_audit_data ad; struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); int rc; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE; ad.u.inode = inode; rc = slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state, current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, audited, denied, result, &ad); if (rc) return rc; return 0; } static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); u32 perms; bool from_access; bool no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK; struct inode_security_struct *isec; u32 sid; struct av_decision avd; int rc, rc2; u32 audited, denied; from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS; mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND); /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ if (!mask) return 0; validate_creds(cred); if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return 0; perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask); sid = cred_sid(cred); isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, no_block); if (IS_ERR(isec)) return PTR_ERR(isec); rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, no_block ? AVC_NONBLOCKING : 0, &avd); audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc, from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0, &denied); if (likely(!audited)) return rc; /* fall back to ref-walk if we have to generate audit */ if (no_block) return -ECHILD; rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc); if (rc2) return rc2; return rc; } static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid; __u32 av = FILE__WRITE; /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */ if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) { ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE | ATTR_FORCE); if (!ia_valid) return 0; } if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID | ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET)) return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); if (selinux_policycap_openperm() && inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) && !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE)) av |= FILE__OPEN; return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av); } static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) { return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR); } static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); unsigned int opts = audit ? CAP_OPT_NONE : CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT; if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts)) return false; if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true)) return false; return true; } static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 newsid, sid = current_sid(); int rc = 0; if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); if (rc) return rc; /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the ordinary setattr permission. */ return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR); } if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) return (inode_owner_or_capable(inode) ? 0 : -EPERM); sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode)) return -EPERM; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; isec = backing_inode_security(dentry); rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad); if (rc) return rc; rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc == -EINVAL) { if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) { struct audit_buffer *ab; size_t audit_size; /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the * context contains a nul and we should audit that */ if (value) { const char *str = value; if (str[size - 1] == '\0') audit_size = size - 1; else audit_size = size; } else { audit_size = 0; } ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR); audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context="); audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size); audit_log_end(ab); return rc; } rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid); } if (rc) return rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, newsid, isec->sclass, FILE__RELABELTO, &ad); if (rc) return rc; rc = security_validate_transition(&selinux_state, isec->sid, newsid, sid, isec->sclass); if (rc) return rc; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, newsid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); } static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct inode_security_struct *isec; u32 newsid; int rc; if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */ return; } if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) { /* If we haven't even been initialized, then we can't validate * against a policy, so leave the label as invalid. It may * resolve to a valid label on the next revalidation try if * we've since initialized. */ return; } rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid); if (rc) { pr_err("SELinux: unable to map context to SID" "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n", inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc); return; } isec = backing_inode_security(dentry); spin_lock(&isec->lock); isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); isec->sid = newsid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; spin_unlock(&isec->lock); return; } static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); } static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); } static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) { if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); if (rc) return rc; /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the ordinary setattr permission. */ return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR); } if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) return 0; /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label. You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */ return -EACCES; } static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask, unsigned int obj_type) { int ret; u32 perm; struct common_audit_data ad; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; ad.u.path = *path; /* * Set permission needed based on the type of mark being set. * Performs an additional check for sb watches. */ switch (obj_type) { case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT: perm = FILE__WATCH_MOUNT; break; case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB: perm = FILE__WATCH_SB; ret = superblock_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__WATCH, &ad); if (ret) return ret; break; case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE: perm = FILE__WATCH; break; default: return -EINVAL; } /* blocking watches require the file:watch_with_perm permission */ if (mask & (ALL_FSNOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS)) perm |= FILE__WATCH_WITH_PERM; /* watches on read-like events need the file:watch_reads permission */ if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_ACCESS_PERM | FS_CLOSE_NOWRITE)) perm |= FILE__WATCH_READS; return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, perm); } /* * Copy the inode security context value to the user. * * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook. */ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) { u32 size; int error; char *context = NULL; struct inode_security_struct *isec; /* * If we're not initialized yet, then we can't validate contexts, so * just let vfs_getxattr fall back to using the on-disk xattr. */ if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) || strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; /* * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise, * use the in-core value under current policy. * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the * in-core context value, not a denial. */ isec = inode_security(inode); if (has_cap_mac_admin(false)) error = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, isec->sid, &context, &size); else error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid, &context, &size); if (error) return error; error = size; if (alloc) { *buffer = context; goto out_nofree; } kfree(context); out_nofree: return error; } static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode); struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; u32 newsid; int rc; if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (!value || !size) return -EACCES; rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) return rc; spin_lock(&isec->lock); isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); isec->sid = newsid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; spin_unlock(&isec->lock); return 0; } static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) { const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX); if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) return 0; if (buffer && len <= buffer_size) memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len); return len; } static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode); *secid = isec->sid; } static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) { u32 sid; struct task_security_struct *tsec; struct cred *new_creds = *new; if (new_creds == NULL) { new_creds = prepare_creds(); if (!new_creds) return -ENOMEM; } tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds); /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */ selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid); tsec->create_sid = sid; *new = new_creds; return 0; } static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) { /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower * xattrs up. Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs. */ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0) return 1; /* Discard */ /* * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported * by selinux. */ return -EOPNOTSUPP; } /* kernfs node operations */ static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, struct kernfs_node *kn) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen; int rc; char *context; rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); if (rc == -ENODATA) return 0; else if (rc < 0) return rc; clen = (u32)rc; context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL); if (!context) return -ENOMEM; rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen); if (rc < 0) { kfree(context); return rc; } rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, context, clen, &parent_sid, GFP_KERNEL); kfree(context); if (rc) return rc; if (tsec->create_sid) { newsid = tsec->create_sid; } else { u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode); struct qstr q; q.name = kn->name; q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name); rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, parent_sid, secclass, &q, &newsid); if (rc) return rc; } rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid, &context, &clen); if (rc) return rc; rc = kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen, XATTR_CREATE); kfree(context); return rc; } /* file security operations */ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */ if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE)) mask |= MAY_APPEND; return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask)); } static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file); struct inode_security_struct *isec; u32 sid = current_sid(); if (!mask) /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ return 0; isec = inode_security(inode); if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state)) /* No change since file_open check. */ return 0; return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask); } static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) { struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file); u32 sid = current_sid(); fsec->sid = sid; fsec->fown_sid = sid; return 0; } /* * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd * operation to an inode. */ static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, u32 requested, u16 cmd) { struct common_audit_data ad; struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file); struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl; u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred); int rc; u8 driver = cmd >> 8; u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP; ad.u.op = &ioctl; ad.u.op->cmd = cmd; ad.u.op->path = file->f_path; if (ssid != fsec->sid) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, ssid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad); if (rc) goto out; } if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return 0; isec = inode_security(inode); rc = avc_has_extended_perms(&selinux_state, ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, requested, driver, xperm, &ad); out: return rc; } static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); int error = 0; switch (cmd) { case FIONREAD: case FIBMAP: case FIGETBSZ: case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS: case FS_IOC_GETVERSION: error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR); break; case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS: case FS_IOC_SETVERSION: error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR); break; /* sys_ioctl() checks */ case FIONBIO: case FIOASYNC: error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0); break; case KDSKBENT: case KDSKBSENT: error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG, CAP_OPT_NONE, true); break; /* default case assumes that the command will go * to the file's ioctl() function. */ default: error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd); } return error; } static int default_noexec __ro_after_init; static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); int rc = 0; if (default_noexec && (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) { /* * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a * private file mapping that will also be writable. * This has an additional check. */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL); if (rc) goto error; } if (file) { /* read access is always possible with a mapping */ u32 av = FILE__READ; /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */ if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)) av |= FILE__WRITE; if (prot & PROT_EXEC) av |= FILE__EXECUTE; return file_has_perm(cred, file, av); } error: return rc; } static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) { int rc = 0; if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) { u32 sid = current_sid(); rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT, MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL); } return rc; } static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) { struct common_audit_data ad; int rc; if (file) { ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; ad.u.file = file; rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file), FILE__MAP, &ad); if (rc) return rc; } if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state)) prot = reqprot; return file_map_prot_check(file, prot, (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED); } static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state)) prot = reqprot; if (default_noexec && (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) { int rc = 0; if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk && vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL); } else if (!vma->vm_file && ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack && vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) || vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL); } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) { /* * We are making executable a file mapping that has * had some COW done. Since pages might have been * written, check ability to execute the possibly * modified content. This typically should only * occur for text relocations. */ rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD); } if (rc) return rc; } return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED); } static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK); } static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); int err = 0; switch (cmd) { case F_SETFL: if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) { err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE); break; } fallthrough; case F_SETOWN: case F_SETSIG: case F_GETFL: case F_GETOWN: case F_GETSIG: case F_GETOWNER_UIDS: /* Just check FD__USE permission */ err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0); break; case F_GETLK: case F_SETLK: case F_SETLKW: case F_OFD_GETLK: case F_OFD_SETLK: case F_OFD_SETLKW: #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32 case F_GETLK64: case F_SETLK64: case F_SETLKW64: #endif err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK); break; } return err; } static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) { struct file_security_struct *fsec; fsec = selinux_file(file); fsec->fown_sid = current_sid(); } static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, struct fown_struct *fown, int signum) { struct file *file; u32 sid = task_sid(tsk); u32 perm; struct file_security_struct *fsec; /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */ file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner); fsec = selinux_file(file); if (!signum) perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */ else perm = signal_to_av(signum); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, fsec->fown_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); } static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file)); } static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file) { struct file_security_struct *fsec; struct inode_security_struct *isec; fsec = selinux_file(file); isec = inode_security(file_inode(file)); /* * Save inode label and policy sequence number * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission * can determine whether revalidation is necessary. * Task label is already saved in the file security * struct as its SID. */ fsec->isid = isec->sid; fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state); /* * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted. * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the * new inode label or new policy. * This check is not redundant - do not remove. */ return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file)); } /* task security operations */ static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags) { u32 sid = current_sid(); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL); } /* * prepare a new set of credentials for modification */ static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) { const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old); struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); *tsec = *old_tsec; return 0; } /* * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds */ static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) { const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old); struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); *tsec = *old_tsec; } static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) { *secid = cred_sid(c); } /* * set the security data for a kernel service * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled */ static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) { struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); u32 sid = current_sid(); int ret; ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, secid, SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE, KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE, NULL); if (ret == 0) { tsec->sid = secid; tsec->create_sid = 0; tsec->keycreate_sid = 0; tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0; } return ret; } /* * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the * objective context of the specified inode */ static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode); struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); u32 sid = current_sid(); int ret; ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE, KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS, NULL); if (ret == 0) tsec->create_sid = isec->sid; return ret; } static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) { struct common_audit_data ad; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD; ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad); } static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file) { struct common_audit_data ad; struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct file_security_struct *fsec; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; /* init_module */ if (file == NULL) return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL); /* finit_module */ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; ad.u.file = file; fsec = selinux_file(file); if (sid != fsec->sid) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad); if (rc) return rc; } isec = inode_security(file_inode(file)); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad); } static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, bool contents) { int rc = 0; switch (id) { case READING_MODULE: rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(contents ? file : NULL); break; default: break; } return rc; } static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) { int rc = 0; switch (id) { case LOADING_MODULE: rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL); default: break; } return rc; } static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL); } static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL); } static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL); } static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) { *secid = task_sid(p); } static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL); } static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL); } static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL); } static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred, unsigned int flags) { u32 av = 0; if (!flags) return 0; if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE) av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT; if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ) av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred), SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL); } static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) { struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource; /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */ if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max) return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL); return 0; } static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL); } static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL); } static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL); } static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info, int sig, const struct cred *cred) { u32 secid; u32 perm; if (!sig) perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */ else perm = signal_to_av(sig); if (!cred) secid = current_sid(); else secid = cred_sid(cred); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); } static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); u32 sid = task_sid(p); spin_lock(&isec->lock); isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); isec->sid = sid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; spin_unlock(&isec->lock); } /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto) { int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL; struct iphdr _iph, *ih; offset = skb_network_offset(skb); ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph); if (ih == NULL) goto out; ihlen = ih->ihl * 4; if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph)) goto out; ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr; ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr; ret = 0; if (proto) *proto = ih->protocol; switch (ih->protocol) { case IPPROTO_TCP: { struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) break; offset += ihlen; th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph); if (th == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = th->source; ad->u.net->dport = th->dest; break; } case IPPROTO_UDP: { struct udphdr _udph, *uh; if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) break; offset += ihlen; uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph); if (uh == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = uh->source; ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest; break; } case IPPROTO_DCCP: { struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh; if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) break; offset += ihlen; dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph); if (dh == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport; ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport; break; } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP) case IPPROTO_SCTP: { struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh; if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) break; offset += ihlen; sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph); if (sh == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = sh->source; ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest; break; } #endif default: break; } out: return ret; } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto) { u8 nexthdr; int ret = -EINVAL, offset; struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6; __be16 frag_off; offset = skb_network_offset(skb); ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h); if (ip6 == NULL) goto out; ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr; ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr; ret = 0; nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr; offset += sizeof(_ipv6h); offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off); if (offset < 0) goto out; if (proto) *proto = nexthdr; switch (nexthdr) { case IPPROTO_TCP: { struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph); if (th == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = th->source; ad->u.net->dport = th->dest; break; } case IPPROTO_UDP: { struct udphdr _udph, *uh; uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph); if (uh == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = uh->source; ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest; break; } case IPPROTO_DCCP: { struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh; dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph); if (dh == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport; ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport; break; } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP) case IPPROTO_SCTP: { struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh; sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph); if (sh == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = sh->source; ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest; break; } #endif /* includes fragments */ default: break; } out: return ret; } #endif /* IPV6 */ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad, char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto) { char *addrp; int ret; switch (ad->u.net->family) { case PF_INET: ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto); if (ret) goto parse_error; addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr : &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr); goto okay; #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) case PF_INET6: ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto); if (ret) goto parse_error; addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr : &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr); goto okay; #endif /* IPV6 */ default: addrp = NULL; goto okay; } parse_error: pr_warn( "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb()," " unable to parse packet\n"); return ret; okay: if (_addrp) *_addrp = addrp; return 0; } /** * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet * @skb: the packet * @family: protocol family * @sid: the packet's peer label SID * * Description: * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL) * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different * peer labels. * */ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid) { int err; u32 xfrm_sid; u32 nlbl_sid; u32 nlbl_type; err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid); if (unlikely(err)) return -EACCES; err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid); if (unlikely(err)) return -EACCES; err = security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state, nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid); if (unlikely(err)) { pr_warn( "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid()," " unable to determine packet's peer label\n"); return -EACCES; } return 0; } /** * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID * @skb_sid: the packet's SID * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID * * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then @conn_sid is simply a copy * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure. * */ static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid) { int err = 0; if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL) err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid); else *conn_sid = sk_sid; return err; } /* socket security operations */ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec, u16 secclass, u32 *socksid) { if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) { *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid; return 0; } return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL, socksid); } static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL) return 0; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sk = sk; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad); } static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); u32 newsid; u16 secclass; int rc; if (kern) return 0; secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid); if (rc) return rc; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL); } static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock)); struct sk_security_struct *sksec; u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; int err = 0; if (!kern) { err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid); if (err) return err; } isec->sclass = sclass; isec->sid = sid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; if (sock->sk) { sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; sksec->sclass = sclass; sksec->sid = sid; /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */ if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET; err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family); } return err; } static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security; sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid; sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid; return 0; } /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind. Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind permission check between the socket and the port number. */ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; u16 family; int err; err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND); if (err) goto out; /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */ family = sk->sk_family; if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) { char *addrp; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; u16 family_sa; unsigned short snum; u32 sid, node_perm; /* * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect() * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET. */ if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family)) return -EINVAL; family_sa = address->sa_family; switch (family_sa) { case AF_UNSPEC: case AF_INET: if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) return -EINVAL; addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address; if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) { /* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY */ if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY)) goto err_af; family_sa = AF_INET; } snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port); addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr; break; case AF_INET6: if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) return -EINVAL; addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port); addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr; break; default: goto err_af; } ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum); ad.u.net->family = family_sa; if (snum) { int low, high; inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high); if (inet_port_requires_bind_service(sock_net(sk), snum) || snum < low || snum > high) { err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid); if (err) goto out; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad); if (err) goto out; } } switch (sksec->sclass) { case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET: node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; break; case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET: node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; break; case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET: node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; break; case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET: node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; break; default: node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; break; } err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid); if (err) goto out; if (family_sa == AF_INET) ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr; else ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad); if (err) goto out; } out: return err; err_af: /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */ if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) return -EINVAL; return -EAFNOSUPPORT; } /* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3) * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/SCTP.rst */ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; int err; err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT); if (err) return err; if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family)) return -EINVAL; /* connect(AF_UNSPEC) has special handling, as it is a documented * way to disconnect the socket */ if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) return 0; /* * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission * for the port. */ if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET || sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET || sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) { struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; unsigned short snum; u32 sid, perm; /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect() * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET. */ switch (address->sa_family) { case AF_INET: addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address; if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) return -EINVAL; snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port); break; case AF_INET6: addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) return -EINVAL; snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port); break; default: /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT. */ if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) return -EINVAL; else return -EAFNOSUPPORT; } err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid); if (err) return err; switch (sksec->sclass) { case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET: perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT; break; case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET: perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT; break; case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET: perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT; break; } ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum); ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad); if (err) return err; } return 0; } /* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { int err; struct sock *sk = sock->sk; err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen); if (err) return err; return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address); } static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) { return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN); } static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) { int err; struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct inode_security_struct *newisec; u16 sclass; u32 sid; err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT); if (err) return err; isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock)); spin_lock(&isec->lock); sclass = isec->sclass; sid = isec->sid; spin_unlock(&isec->lock); newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock)); newisec->sclass = sclass; newisec->sid = sid; newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; return 0; } static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size) { return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE); } static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags) { return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ); } static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) { return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR); } static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) { return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR); } static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) { int err; err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT); if (err) return err; return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname); } static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) { return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT); } static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) { return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN); } static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; int err; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sk = other; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid, sksec_other->sclass, UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad); if (err) return err; /* server child socket */ sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid; err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid); if (err) return err; /* connecting socket */ sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid; return 0; } static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) { struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sk = other->sk; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad); } static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid, struct common_audit_data *ad) { int err; u32 if_sid; u32 node_sid; err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid); if (err) return err; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, peer_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad); if (err) return err; err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid); if (err) return err; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, peer_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad); } static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family) { int err = 0; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; char *addrp; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; ad.u.net->family = family; err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL); if (err) return err; if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) { err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RECV, &ad); if (err) return err; } err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad); if (err) return err; err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad); return err; } static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { int err; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; u16 family = sk->sk_family; u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; char *addrp; u8 secmark_active; u8 peerlbl_active; if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6) return 0; /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) family = PF_INET; /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function * as fast and as clean as possible. */ if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer()) return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family); secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) return 0; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; ad.u.net->family = family; err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL); if (err) return err; if (peerlbl_active) { u32 peer_sid; err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid); if (err) return err; err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif, addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad); if (err) { selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0); return err; } err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad); if (err) { selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0); return err; } } if (secmark_active) { err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RECV, &ad); if (err) return err; } return err; } static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen, unsigned len) { int err = 0; char *scontext; u32 scontext_len; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL; if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET || sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET || sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid; if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) return -ENOPROTOOPT; err = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len); if (err) return err; if (scontext_len > len) { err = -ERANGE; goto out_len; } if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len)) err = -EFAULT; out_len: if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen)) err = -EFAULT; kfree(scontext); return err; } static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) { u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL; u16 family; struct inode_security_struct *isec; if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) family = PF_INET; else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) family = PF_INET6; else if (sock) family = sock->sk->sk_family; else goto out; if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) { isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock)); peer_secid = isec->sid; } else if (skb) selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid); out: *secid = peer_secid; if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL) return -EINVAL; return 0; } static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec; sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority); if (!sksec) return -ENOMEM; sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET; selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec); sk->sk_security = sksec; return 0; } static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; sk->sk_security = NULL; selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec); kfree(sksec); } static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; newsksec->sid = sksec->sid; newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid; newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass; selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec); } static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid) { if (!sk) *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET; else { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; *secid = sksec->sid; } } static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent)); struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 || sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) isec->sid = sksec->sid; sksec->sclass = isec->sclass; } /* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT chunk. This happens when an incoming * connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association * already present). */ static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; u8 peerlbl_active; u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; u32 conn_sid; int err = 0; if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass()) return 0; peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); if (peerlbl_active) { /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve(). */ err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, ep->base.sk->sk_family, &peer_sid); if (err) return err; if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; } if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) { sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET; /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks), * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary * peer SID for getpeercon(3). */ sksec->peer_sid = peer_sid; } else if (sksec->peer_sid != peer_sid) { /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce * consistency among the peer SIDs. */ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sk = ep->base.sk; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid, sksec->sclass, SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad); if (err) return err; } /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store * the information in ep. This will be used by SCTP TCP type * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then * plug this into the new socket. */ err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peer_sid, &conn_sid); if (err) return err; ep->secid = conn_sid; ep->peer_secid = peer_sid; /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */ return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(ep, skb); } /* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting * based on their @optname. */ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0; void *addr_buf; struct sockaddr *addr; struct socket *sock; if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass()) return 0; /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */ sock = sk->sk_socket; addr_buf = address; while (walk_size < addrlen) { if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrlen) return -EINVAL; addr = addr_buf; switch (addr->sa_family) { case AF_UNSPEC: case AF_INET: len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); break; case AF_INET6: len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); break; default: return -EINVAL; } if (walk_size + len > addrlen) return -EINVAL; err = -EINVAL; switch (optname) { /* Bind checks */ case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR: case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR: case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD: err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len); break; /* Connect checks */ case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX: case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY: case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP: case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT: err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len); if (err) return err; /* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked, * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked() * is called here. The situations handled are: * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2), * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new * primary address is selected. * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via * selinux_socket_connect(). */ err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr); break; } if (err) return err; addr_buf += len; walk_size += len; } return 0; } /* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call * the non-sctp clone version. */ if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass()) return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk); newsksec->sid = ep->secid; newsksec->peer_sid = ep->peer_secid; newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass; selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk); } static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; int err; u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family; u32 connsid; u32 peersid; err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid); if (err) return err; err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid); if (err) return err; req->secid = connsid; req->peer_secid = peersid; return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family); } static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, const struct request_sock *req) { struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; newsksec->sid = req->secid; newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid; /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet. So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which time it will have been created and available. */ /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only * thread with access to newsksec */ selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family); } static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { u16 family = sk->sk_family; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) family = PF_INET; selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid); } static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid) { const struct task_security_struct *__tsec; u32 tsid; __tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); tsid = __tsec->sid; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL); } static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void) { atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount); } static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void) { atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount); } static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl) { fl->flowi_secid = req->secid; } static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security) { struct tun_security_struct *tunsec; tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL); if (!tunsec) return -ENOMEM; tunsec->sid = current_sid(); *security = tunsec; return 0; } static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security) { kfree(security); } static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void) { u32 sid = current_sid(); /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense, * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE, NULL); } static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security) { struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL); } static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security) { struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling * protocols were being used */ sksec->sid = tunsec->sid; sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET; return 0; } static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security) { struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; u32 sid = current_sid(); int err; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL); if (err) return err; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL); if (err) return err; tunsec->sid = sid; return 0; } #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *indev, u16 family) { int err; char *addrp; u32 peer_sid; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; u8 secmark_active; u8 netlbl_active; u8 peerlbl_active; if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer()) return NF_ACCEPT; secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled(); peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) return NF_ACCEPT; if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0) return NF_DROP; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex; ad.u.net->family = family; if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0) return NF_DROP; if (peerlbl_active) { err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex, addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad); if (err) { selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1); return NF_DROP; } } if (secmark_active) if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, peer_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad)) return NF_DROP; if (netlbl_active) /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH * protection */ if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0) return NF_DROP; return NF_ACCEPT; } static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state) { return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET); } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state) { return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6); } #endif /* IPV6 */ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family) { struct sock *sk; u32 sid; if (!netlbl_enabled()) return NF_ACCEPT; /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */ sk = skb->sk; if (sk) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec; if (sk_listener(sk)) /* if the socket is the listening state then this * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent. * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is * as any IP option based labeling should be copied * from the initial connection request (in the IP * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a * security label in the packet itself this is the * best we can do. */ return NF_ACCEPT; /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */ sksec = sk->sk_security; sid = sksec->sid; } else sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0) return NF_DROP; return NF_ACCEPT; } static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state) { return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET); } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state) { return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET6); } #endif /* IPV6 */ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, u16 family) { struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb); struct sk_security_struct *sksec; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; char *addrp; u8 proto; if (sk == NULL) return NF_ACCEPT; sksec = sk->sk_security; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->netif = ifindex; ad.u.net->family = family; if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto)) return NF_DROP; if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad)) return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto)) return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); return NF_ACCEPT; } static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *outdev, u16 family) { u32 secmark_perm; u32 peer_sid; int ifindex = outdev->ifindex; struct sock *sk; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; char *addrp; u8 secmark_active; u8 peerlbl_active; /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function * as fast and as clean as possible. */ if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer()) return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family); secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) return NF_ACCEPT; sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb); #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks * when the packet is on it's final way out. * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do; * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per * connection. */ if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL && !(sk && sk_listener(sk))) return NF_ACCEPT; #endif if (sk == NULL) { /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */ if (skb->skb_iif) { secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT; if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid)) return NF_DROP; } else { secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; } } else if (sk_listener(sk)) { /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In * this particular case the correct security label is assigned * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output() * for similar problems. */ u32 skb_sid; struct sk_security_struct *sksec; sksec = sk->sk_security; if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid)) return NF_DROP; /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final" * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely * pass the packet. */ if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) { switch (family) { case PF_INET: if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED) return NF_ACCEPT; break; case PF_INET6: if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED) return NF_ACCEPT; break; default: return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); } } if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid)) return NF_DROP; secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; } else { /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the * associated socket. */ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; peer_sid = sksec->sid; secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; } ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->netif = ifindex; ad.u.net->family = family; if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL)) return NF_DROP; if (secmark_active) if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, peer_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad)) return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); if (peerlbl_active) { u32 if_sid; u32 node_sid; if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid)) return NF_DROP; if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, peer_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad)) return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid)) return NF_DROP; if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, peer_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad)) return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); } return NF_ACCEPT; } static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state) { return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET); } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state) { return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6); } #endif /* IPV6 */ #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { int rc = 0; unsigned int msg_len; unsigned int data_len = skb->len; unsigned char *data = skb->data; struct nlmsghdr *nlh; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; u16 sclass = sksec->sclass; u32 perm; while (data_len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) { nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)data; /* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink * users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus * length fields; our solution is to follow what * netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at * messages with length fields that are clearly junk */ if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || nlh->nlmsg_len > data_len) return 0; rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm); if (rc == 0) { rc = sock_has_perm(sk, perm); if (rc) return rc; } else if (rc == -EINVAL) { /* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */ pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink" " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s" " pid=%d comm=%s\n", sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, secclass_map[sclass - 1].name, task_pid_nr(current), current->comm); if (enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) && !security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state)) return rc; rc = 0; } else if (rc == -ENOENT) { /* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */ rc = 0; } else { return rc; } /* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */ msg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len); if (msg_len >= data_len) return 0; data_len -= msg_len; data += msg_len; } return rc; } static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass) { isec->sclass = sclass; isec->sid = current_sid(); } static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms, u32 perms) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); isec = selinux_ipc(ipc_perms); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad); } static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg) { struct msg_security_struct *msec; msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg); msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; return 0; } /* message queue security operations */ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; isec = selinux_ipc(msq); ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_MSGQ); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__CREATE, &ad); return rc; } static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); isec = selinux_ipc(msq); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad); } static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd) { int err; int perms; switch (cmd) { case IPC_INFO: case MSG_INFO: /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL); case IPC_STAT: case MSG_STAT: case MSG_STAT_ANY: perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE; break; case IPC_SET: perms = MSGQ__SETATTR; break; case IPC_RMID: perms = MSGQ__DESTROY; break; default: return 0; } err = ipc_has_perm(msq, perms); return err; } static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct msg_security_struct *msec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; isec = selinux_ipc(msq); msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg); /* * First time through, need to assign label to the message */ if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) { /* * Compute new sid based on current process and * message queue this message will be stored in */ rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid); if (rc) return rc; } ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key; /* Can this process write to the queue? */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__WRITE, &ad); if (!rc) /* Can this process send the message */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad); if (!rc) /* Can the message be put in the queue? */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad); return rc; } static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct msg_security_struct *msec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = task_sid(target); int rc; isec = selinux_ipc(msq); msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad); if (!rc) rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad); return rc; } /* Shared Memory security operations */ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; isec = selinux_ipc(shp); ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SHM); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, SHM__CREATE, &ad); return rc; } static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); isec = selinux_ipc(shp); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); } /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */ static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd) { int perms; int err; switch (cmd) { case IPC_INFO: case SHM_INFO: /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL); case IPC_STAT: case SHM_STAT: case SHM_STAT_ANY: perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE; break; case IPC_SET: perms = SHM__SETATTR; break; case SHM_LOCK: case SHM_UNLOCK: perms = SHM__LOCK; break; case IPC_RMID: perms = SHM__DESTROY; break; default: return 0; } err = ipc_has_perm(shp, perms); return err; } static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg) { u32 perms; if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY) perms = SHM__READ; else perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE; return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms); } /* Semaphore security operations */ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; isec = selinux_ipc(sma); ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SEM); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, SEM__CREATE, &ad); return rc; } static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); isec = selinux_ipc(sma); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); } /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */ static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd) { int err; u32 perms; switch (cmd) { case IPC_INFO: case SEM_INFO: /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL); case GETPID: case GETNCNT: case GETZCNT: perms = SEM__GETATTR; break; case GETVAL: case GETALL: perms = SEM__READ; break; case SETVAL: case SETALL: perms = SEM__WRITE; break; case IPC_RMID: perms = SEM__DESTROY; break; case IPC_SET: perms = SEM__SETATTR; break; case IPC_STAT: case SEM_STAT: case SEM_STAT_ANY: perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE; break; default: return 0; } err = ipc_has_perm(sma, perms); return err; } static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter) { u32 perms; if (alter) perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE; else perms = SEM__READ; return ipc_has_perm(sma, perms); } static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) { u32 av = 0; av = 0; if (flag & S_IRUGO) av |= IPC__UNIX_READ; if (flag & S_IWUGO) av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE; if (av == 0) return 0; return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av); } static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp); *secid = isec->sid; } static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) { if (inode) inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry); } static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) { const struct task_security_struct *__tsec; u32 sid; int error; unsigned len; rcu_read_lock(); __tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p)); if (current != p) { error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), __tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL); if (error) goto bad; } if (!strcmp(name, "current")) sid = __tsec->sid; else if (!strcmp(name, "prev")) sid = __tsec->osid; else if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) sid = __tsec->exec_sid; else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) sid = __tsec->create_sid; else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid; else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid; else { error = -EINVAL; goto bad; } rcu_read_unlock(); if (!sid) return 0; error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, value, &len); if (error) return error; return len; bad: rcu_read_unlock(); return error; } static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) { struct task_security_struct *tsec; struct cred *new; u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid; int error; char *str = value; /* * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all. */ if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL); else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL); else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL); else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL); else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL); else error = -EINVAL; if (error) return error; /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */ if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') { if (str[size-1] == '\n') { str[size-1] = 0; size--; } error = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) { if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) { struct audit_buffer *ab; size_t audit_size; /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the * context contains a nul and we should audit that */ if (str[size - 1] == '\0') audit_size = size - 1; else audit_size = size; ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR); audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context="); audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size); audit_log_end(ab); return error; } error = security_context_to_sid_force( &selinux_state, value, size, &sid); } if (error) return error; } new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) return -ENOMEM; /* Permission checking based on the specified context is performed during the actual operation (execve, open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the operation. See selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec for the execve checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */ tsec = selinux_cred(new); if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) { tsec->exec_sid = sid; } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) { tsec->create_sid = sid; } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) { if (sid) { error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL); if (error) goto abort_change; } tsec->keycreate_sid = sid; } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) { tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid; } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) { error = -EINVAL; if (sid == 0) goto abort_change; /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */ error = -EPERM; if (!current_is_single_threaded()) { error = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, sid); if (error) goto abort_change; } /* Check permissions for the transition. */ error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL); if (error) goto abort_change; /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok. Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */ ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid(); if (ptsid != 0) { error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); if (error) goto abort_change; } tsec->sid = sid; } else { error = -EINVAL; goto abort_change; } commit_creds(new); return size; abort_change: abort_creds(new); return error; } static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name) { return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0); } static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) { return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid, secdata, seclen); } static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) { return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL); } static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) { kfree(secdata); } static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); spin_lock(&isec->lock); isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID; spin_unlock(&isec->lock); } /* * called with inode->i_mutex locked */ static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) { int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0); /* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */ return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc; } /* * called with inode->i_mutex locked */ static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) { return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0); } static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) { int len = 0; len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, true); if (len < 0) return len; *ctxlen = len; return 0; } #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec; struct key_security_struct *ksec; ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); if (!ksec) return -ENOMEM; tsec = selinux_cred(cred); if (tsec->keycreate_sid) ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid; else ksec->sid = tsec->sid; k->security = ksec; return 0; } static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k) { struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security; k->security = NULL; kfree(ksec); } static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, enum key_need_perm need_perm) { struct key *key; struct key_security_struct *ksec; u32 perm, sid; switch (need_perm) { case KEY_NEED_VIEW: perm = KEY__VIEW; break; case KEY_NEED_READ: perm = KEY__READ; break; case KEY_NEED_WRITE: perm = KEY__WRITE; break; case KEY_NEED_SEARCH: perm = KEY__SEARCH; break; case KEY_NEED_LINK: perm = KEY__LINK; break; case KEY_NEED_SETATTR: perm = KEY__SETATTR; break; case KEY_NEED_UNLINK: case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE: case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE: case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK: return 0; default: WARN_ON(1); return -EPERM; } sid = cred_sid(cred); key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); ksec = key->security; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL); } static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) { struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security; char *context = NULL; unsigned len; int rc; rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ksec->sid, &context, &len); if (!rc) rc = len; *_buffer = context; return rc; } #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS static int selinux_watch_key(struct key *key) { struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security; u32 sid = current_sid(); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, NULL); } #endif #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val) { struct common_audit_data ad; int err; u32 sid = 0; struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec; struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey; err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid); if (err) return err; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY; ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix; ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val; ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY, INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad); } static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name, u8 port_num) { struct common_audit_data ad; int err; u32 sid = 0; struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec; struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport; err = security_ib_endport_sid(&selinux_state, dev_name, port_num, &sid); if (err) return err; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT; strncpy(ibendport.dev_name, dev_name, sizeof(ibendport.dev_name)); ibendport.port = port_num; ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT, INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad); } static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec) { struct ib_security_struct *sec; sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL); if (!sec) return -ENOMEM; sec->sid = current_sid(); *ib_sec = sec; return 0; } static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec) { kfree(ib_sec); } #endif #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size) { u32 sid = current_sid(); int ret; switch (cmd) { case BPF_MAP_CREATE: ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE, NULL); break; case BPF_PROG_LOAD: ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD, NULL); break; default: ret = 0; break; } return ret; } static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode) { u32 av = 0; if (fmode & FMODE_READ) av |= BPF__MAP_READ; if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE) av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE; return av; } /* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see * if it is a bpf related object. And apply correspinding checks on the bpf * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode. * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files. */ static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid) { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; struct bpf_prog *prog; struct bpf_map *map; int ret; if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) { map = file->private_data; bpfsec = map->security; ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL); if (ret) return ret; } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) { prog = file->private_data; bpfsec = prog->aux->security; ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL); if (ret) return ret; } return 0; } static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode) { u32 sid = current_sid(); struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; bpfsec = map->security; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL); } static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) { u32 sid = current_sid(); struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; bpfsec = prog->aux->security; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL); } static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map) { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL); if (!bpfsec) return -ENOMEM; bpfsec->sid = current_sid(); map->security = bpfsec; return 0; } static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security; map->security = NULL; kfree(bpfsec); } static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL); if (!bpfsec) return -ENOMEM; bpfsec->sid = current_sid(); aux->security = bpfsec; return 0; } static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security; aux->security = NULL; kfree(bpfsec); } #endif static int selinux_lockdown(enum lockdown_reason what) { struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); int invalid_reason = (what <= LOCKDOWN_NONE) || (what == LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX) || (what >= LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX); if (WARN(invalid_reason, "Invalid lockdown reason")) { audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR, "lockdown_reason=invalid"); return -EINVAL; } ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_LOCKDOWN; ad.u.reason = what; if (what <= LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX) return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_LOCKDOWN, LOCKDOWN__INTEGRITY, &ad); else return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_LOCKDOWN, LOCKDOWN__CONFIDENTIALITY, &ad); } struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct), .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct), .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), }; #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type) { u32 requested, sid = current_sid(); if (type == PERF_SECURITY_OPEN) requested = PERF_EVENT__OPEN; else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_CPU) requested = PERF_EVENT__CPU; else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL) requested = PERF_EVENT__KERNEL; else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT) requested = PERF_EVENT__TRACEPOINT; else return -EINVAL; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, requested, NULL); } static int selinux_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event) { struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec; perfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*perfsec), GFP_KERNEL); if (!perfsec) return -ENOMEM; perfsec->sid = current_sid(); event->security = perfsec; return 0; } static void selinux_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event) { struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security; event->security = NULL; kfree(perfsec); } static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event) { struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security; u32 sid = current_sid(); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__READ, NULL); } static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event) { struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security; u32 sid = current_sid(); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__WRITE, NULL); } #endif /* * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order: * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below, * 2. hooks that both access structures allocated by other hooks, and allocate * structures that can be later accessed by other hooks (mostly "cloning" * hooks), * 3. hooks that only allocate structures that can be later accessed by other * hooks ("allocating" hooks). * * Please follow block comment delimiters in the list to keep this order. * * This ordering is needed for SELinux runtime disable to work at least somewhat * safely. Breaking the ordering rules above might lead to NULL pointer derefs * when disabling SELinux at runtime. */ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction), LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder), LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable), LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on), LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog), LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory), LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts), LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, selinux_move_mount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify, selinux_path_notify), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file), LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate), LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd), LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv), LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate), LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop), LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate), LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel), LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect), LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, selinux_socket_socketpair), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established), LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet), LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc), LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec), LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open), #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet, selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity), #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key, selinux_watch_key), #endif #endif #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known), LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match), LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_open, selinux_perf_event_open), LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_free, selinux_perf_event_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_read, selinux_perf_event_read), LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write), #endif LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, selinux_lockdown), /* * PUT "CLONING" (ACCESSING + ALLOCATING) HOOKS HERE */ LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, selinux_fs_context_dup), LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_add_mnt_opt, selinux_add_mnt_opt), #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone), #endif /* * PUT "ALLOCATING" HOOKS HERE */ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security, selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security), #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc, selinux_perf_event_alloc), #endif }; static __init int selinux_init(void) { pr_info("SELinux: Initializing.\n"); memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state)); enforcing_set(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot); checkreqprot_set(&selinux_state, selinux_checkreqprot_boot); selinux_avc_init(&selinux_state.avc); mutex_init(&selinux_state.status_lock); mutex_init(&selinux_state.policy_mutex); /* Set the security state for the initial task. */ cred_init_security(); default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC); avc_init(); avtab_cache_init(); ebitmap_cache_init(); hashtab_cache_init(); security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux"); if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET)) panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n"); if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET)) panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n"); if (selinux_enforcing_boot) pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n"); else pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n"); fs_validate_description("selinux", selinux_fs_parameters); return 0; } static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused) { selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, NULL, 0, NULL); } void selinux_complete_init(void) { pr_debug("SELinux: Completing initialization.\n"); /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */ pr_debug("SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n"); iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL); } /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label all processes and objects when they are created. */ DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = { .name = "selinux", .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE, .enabled = &selinux_enabled_boot, .blobs = &selinux_blob_sizes, .init = selinux_init, }; #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = { { .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute, .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4, .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST, }, { .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward, .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4, .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD, .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, }, { .hook = selinux_ipv4_output, .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4, .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT, .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, }, #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) { .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute, .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6, .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST, }, { .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward, .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6, .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD, .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, }, { .hook = selinux_ipv6_output, .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6, .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT, .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, }, #endif /* IPV6 */ }; static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net) { return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops)); } static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net) { nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops)); } static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = { .init = selinux_nf_register, .exit = selinux_nf_unregister, }; static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void) { int err; if (!selinux_enabled_boot) return 0; pr_debug("SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n"); err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops); if (err) panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err); return 0; } __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void) { pr_debug("SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n"); unregister_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops); } #endif #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE #define selinux_nf_ip_exit() #endif #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state) { if (selinux_initialized(state)) { /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */ return -EINVAL; } if (selinux_disabled(state)) { /* Only do this once. */ return -EINVAL; } selinux_mark_disabled(state); pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n"); /* * Unregister netfilter hooks. * Must be done before security_delete_hooks() to avoid breaking * runtime disable. */ selinux_nf_ip_exit(); security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks)); /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */ avc_disable(); /* Unregister selinuxfs. */ exit_sel_fs(); return 0; } #endif
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef BLK_MQ_SCHED_H #define BLK_MQ_SCHED_H #include "blk-mq.h" #include "blk-mq-tag.h" void blk_mq_sched_assign_ioc(struct request *rq); void blk_mq_sched_request_inserted(struct request *rq); bool blk_mq_sched_try_merge(struct request_queue *q, struct bio *bio, unsigned int nr_segs, struct request **merged_request); bool __blk_mq_sched_bio_merge(struct request_queue *q, struct bio *bio, unsigned int nr_segs); bool blk_mq_sched_try_insert_merge(struct request_queue *q, struct request *rq); void blk_mq_sched_mark_restart_hctx(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx); void blk_mq_sched_restart(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx); void blk_mq_sched_insert_request(struct request *rq, bool at_head, bool run_queue, bool async); void blk_mq_sched_insert_requests(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx, struct blk_mq_ctx *ctx, struct list_head *list, bool run_queue_async); void blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx); int blk_mq_init_sched(struct request_queue *q, struct elevator_type *e); void blk_mq_exit_sched(struct request_queue *q, struct elevator_queue *e); void blk_mq_sched_free_requests(struct request_queue *q); static inline bool blk_mq_sched_bio_merge(struct request_queue *q, struct bio *bio, unsigned int nr_segs) { if (blk_queue_nomerges(q) || !bio_mergeable(bio)) return false; return __blk_mq_sched_bio_merge(q, bio, nr_segs); } static inline bool blk_mq_sched_allow_merge(struct request_queue *q, struct request *rq, struct bio *bio) { struct elevator_queue *e = q->elevator; if (e && e->type->ops.allow_merge) return e->type->ops.allow_merge(q, rq, bio); return true; } static inline void blk_mq_sched_completed_request(struct request *rq, u64 now) { struct elevator_queue *e = rq->q->elevator; if (e && e->type->ops.completed_request) e->type->ops.completed_request(rq, now); } static inline void blk_mq_sched_requeue_request(struct request *rq) { struct request_queue *q = rq->q; struct elevator_queue *e = q->elevator; if ((rq->rq_flags & RQF_ELVPRIV) && e && e->type->ops.requeue_request) e->type->ops.requeue_request(rq); } static inline bool blk_mq_sched_has_work(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx) { struct elevator_queue *e = hctx->queue->elevator; if (e && e->type->ops.has_work) return e->type->ops.has_work(hctx); return false; } static inline bool blk_mq_sched_needs_restart(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx) { return test_bit(BLK_MQ_S_SCHED_RESTART, &hctx->state); } #endif
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* request_key authorisation token key type * * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) */ #ifndef _KEYS_REQUEST_KEY_AUTH_TYPE_H #define _KEYS_REQUEST_KEY_AUTH_TYPE_H #include <linux/key.h> /* * Authorisation record for request_key(). */ struct request_key_auth { struct rcu_head rcu; struct key *target_key; struct key *dest_keyring; const struct cred *cred; void *callout_info; size_t callout_len; pid_t pid; char op[8]; } __randomize_layout; static inline struct request_key_auth *get_request_key_auth(const struct key *key) { return key->payload.data[0]; } #endif /* _KEYS_REQUEST_KEY_AUTH_TYPE_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef _ASM_X86_PTRACE_H #define _ASM_X86_PTRACE_H #include <asm/segment.h> #include <asm/page_types.h> #include <uapi/asm/ptrace.h> #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ #ifdef __i386__ struct pt_regs { /* * NB: 32-bit x86 CPUs are inconsistent as what happens in the * following cases (where %seg represents a segment register): * * - pushl %seg: some do a 16-bit write and leave the high * bits alone * - movl %seg, [mem]: some do a 16-bit write despite the movl * - IDT entry: some (e.g. 486) will leave the high bits of CS * and (if applicable) SS undefined. * * Fortunately, x86-32 doesn't read the high bits on POP or IRET, * so we can just treat all of the segment registers as 16-bit * values. */ unsigned long bx; unsigned long cx; unsigned long dx; unsigned long si; unsigned long di; unsigned long bp; unsigned long ax; unsigned short ds; unsigned short __dsh; unsigned short es; unsigned short __esh; unsigned short fs; unsigned short __fsh; /* On interrupt, gs and __gsh store the vector number. */ unsigned short gs; unsigned short __gsh; /* On interrupt, this is the error code. */ unsigned long orig_ax; unsigned long ip; unsigned short cs; unsigned short __csh; unsigned long flags; unsigned long sp; unsigned short ss; unsigned short __ssh; }; #else /* __i386__ */ struct pt_regs { /* * C ABI says these regs are callee-preserved. They aren't saved on kernel entry * unless syscall needs a complete, fully filled "struct pt_regs". */ unsigned long r15; unsigned long r14; unsigned long r13; unsigned long r12; unsigned long bp; unsigned long bx; /* These regs are callee-clobbered. Always saved on kernel entry. */ unsigned long r11; unsigned long r10; unsigned long r9; unsigned long r8; unsigned long ax; unsigned long cx; unsigned long dx; unsigned long si; unsigned long di; /* * On syscall entry, this is syscall#. On CPU exception, this is error code. * On hw interrupt, it's IRQ number: */ unsigned long orig_ax; /* Return frame for iretq */ unsigned long ip; unsigned long cs; unsigned long flags; unsigned long sp; unsigned long ss; /* top of stack page */ }; #endif /* !__i386__ */ #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT #include <asm/paravirt_types.h> #endif #include <asm/proto.h> struct cpuinfo_x86; struct task_struct; extern unsigned long profile_pc(struct pt_regs *regs); extern unsigned long convert_ip_to_linear(struct task_struct *child, struct pt_regs *regs); extern void send_sigtrap(struct pt_regs *regs, int error_code, int si_code); static inline unsigned long regs_return_value(struct pt_regs *regs) { return regs->ax; } static inline void regs_set_return_value(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long rc) { regs->ax = rc; } /* * user_mode(regs) determines whether a register set came from user * mode. On x86_32, this is true if V8086 mode was enabled OR if the * register set was from protected mode with RPL-3 CS value. This * tricky test checks that with one comparison. * * On x86_64, vm86 mode is mercifully nonexistent, and we don't need * the extra check. */ static __always_inline int user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs) { #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 return ((regs->cs & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK) | (regs->flags & X86_VM_MASK)) >= USER_RPL; #else return !!(regs->cs & 3); #endif } static inline int v8086_mode(struct pt_regs *regs) { #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 return (regs->flags & X86_VM_MASK); #else return 0; /* No V86 mode support in long mode */ #endif } static inline bool user_64bit_mode(struct pt_regs *regs) { #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 #ifndef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL /* * On non-paravirt systems, this is the only long mode CPL 3 * selector. We do not allow long mode selectors in the LDT. */ return regs->cs == __USER_CS; #else /* Headers are too twisted for this to go in paravirt.h. */ return regs->cs == __USER_CS || regs->cs == pv_info.extra_user_64bit_cs; #endif #else /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */ return false; #endif } /* * Determine whether the register set came from any context that is running in * 64-bit mode. */ static inline bool any_64bit_mode(struct pt_regs *regs) { #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 return !user_mode(regs) || user_64bit_mode(regs); #else return false; #endif } #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 #define current_user_stack_pointer() current_pt_regs()->sp #define compat_user_stack_pointer() current_pt_regs()->sp static inline bool ip_within_syscall_gap(struct pt_regs *regs) { bool ret = (regs->ip >= (unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_64 && regs->ip < (unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_64_safe_stack); #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION ret = ret || (regs->ip >= (unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_compat && regs->ip < (unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_compat_safe_stack); #endif return ret; } #endif static inline unsigned long kernel_stack_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs) { return regs->sp; } static inline unsigned long instruction_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs) { return regs->ip; } static inline void instruction_pointer_set(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long val) { regs->ip = val; } static inline unsigned long frame_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs) { return regs->bp; } static inline unsigned long user_stack_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs) { return regs->sp; } static inline void user_stack_pointer_set(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long val) { regs->sp = val; } static __always_inline bool regs_irqs_disabled(struct pt_regs *regs) { return !(regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_IF); } /* Query offset/name of register from its name/offset */ extern int regs_query_register_offset(const char *name); extern const char *regs_query_register_name(unsigned int offset); #define MAX_REG_OFFSET (offsetof(struct pt_regs, ss)) /** * regs_get_register() - get register value from its offset * @regs: pt_regs from which register value is gotten. * @offset: offset number of the register. * * regs_get_register returns the value of a register. The @offset is the * offset of the register in struct pt_regs address which specified by @regs. * If @offset is bigger than MAX_REG_OFFSET, this returns 0. */ static inline unsigned long regs_get_register(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int offset) { if (unlikely(offset > MAX_REG_OFFSET)) return 0; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 /* The selector fields are 16-bit. */ if (offset == offsetof(struct pt_regs, cs) || offset == offsetof(struct pt_regs, ss) || offset == offsetof(struct pt_regs, ds) || offset == offsetof(struct pt_regs, es) || offset == offsetof(struct pt_regs, fs) || offset == offsetof(struct pt_regs, gs)) { return *(u16 *)((unsigned long)regs + offset); } #endif return *(unsigned long *)((unsigned long)regs + offset); } /** * regs_within_kernel_stack() - check the address in the stack * @regs: pt_regs which contains kernel stack pointer. * @addr: address which is checked. * * regs_within_kernel_stack() checks @addr is within the kernel stack page(s). * If @addr is within the kernel stack, it returns true. If not, returns false. */ static inline int regs_within_kernel_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long addr) { return ((addr & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1)) == (regs->sp & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1))); } /** * regs_get_kernel_stack_nth_addr() - get the address of the Nth entry on stack * @regs: pt_regs which contains kernel stack pointer. * @n: stack entry number. * * regs_get_kernel_stack_nth() returns the address of the @n th entry of the * kernel stack which is specified by @regs. If the @n th entry is NOT in * the kernel stack, this returns NULL. */ static inline unsigned long *regs_get_kernel_stack_nth_addr(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int n) { unsigned long *addr = (unsigned long *)regs->sp; addr += n; if (regs_within_kernel_stack(regs, (unsigned long)addr)) return addr; else return NULL; } /* To avoid include hell, we can't include uaccess.h */ extern long copy_from_kernel_nofault(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size); /** * regs_get_kernel_stack_nth() - get Nth entry of the stack * @regs: pt_regs which contains kernel stack pointer. * @n: stack entry number. * * regs_get_kernel_stack_nth() returns @n th entry of the kernel stack which * is specified by @regs. If the @n th entry is NOT in the kernel stack * this returns 0. */ static inline unsigned long regs_get_kernel_stack_nth(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int n) { unsigned long *addr; unsigned long val; long ret; addr = regs_get_kernel_stack_nth_addr(regs, n); if (addr) { ret = copy_from_kernel_nofault(&val, addr, sizeof(val)); if (!ret) return val; } return 0; } /** * regs_get_kernel_argument() - get Nth function argument in kernel * @regs: pt_regs of that context * @n: function argument number (start from 0) * * regs_get_argument() returns @n th argument of the function call. * Note that this chooses most probably assignment, in some case * it can be incorrect. * This is expected to be called from kprobes or ftrace with regs * where the top of stack is the return address. */ static inline unsigned long regs_get_kernel_argument(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int n) { static const unsigned int argument_offs[] = { #ifdef __i386__ offsetof(struct pt_regs, ax), offsetof(struct pt_regs, dx), offsetof(struct pt_regs, cx), #define NR_REG_ARGUMENTS 3 #else offsetof(struct pt_regs, di), offsetof(struct pt_regs, si), offsetof(struct pt_regs, dx), offsetof(struct pt_regs, cx), offsetof(struct pt_regs, r8), offsetof(struct pt_regs, r9), #define NR_REG_ARGUMENTS 6 #endif }; if (n >= NR_REG_ARGUMENTS) { n -= NR_REG_ARGUMENTS - 1; return regs_get_kernel_stack_nth(regs, n); } else return regs_get_register(regs, argument_offs[n]); } #define arch_has_single_step() (1) #ifdef CONFIG_X86_DEBUGCTLMSR #define arch_has_block_step() (1) #else #define arch_has_block_step() (boot_cpu_data.x86 >= 6) #endif #define ARCH_HAS_USER_SINGLE_STEP_REPORT struct user_desc; extern int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx, struct user_desc __user *info); extern int do_set_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx, struct user_desc __user *info, int can_allocate); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 # define do_set_thread_area_64(p, s, t) do_arch_prctl_64(p, s, t) #else # define do_set_thread_area_64(p, s, t) (0) #endif #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_PTRACE_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * include/linux/cpu.h - generic cpu definition * * This is mainly for topological representation. We define the * basic 'struct cpu' here, which can be embedded in per-arch * definitions of processors. * * Basic handling of the devices is done in drivers/base/cpu.c * * CPUs are exported via sysfs in the devices/system/cpu * directory. */ #ifndef _LINUX_CPU_H_ #define _LINUX_CPU_H_ #include <linux/node.h> #include <linux/compiler.h> #include <linux/cpumask.h> #include <linux/cpuhotplug.h> struct device; struct device_node; struct attribute_group; struct cpu { int node_id; /* The node which contains the CPU */ int hotpluggable; /* creates sysfs control file if hotpluggable */ struct device dev; }; extern void boot_cpu_init(void); extern void boot_cpu_hotplug_init(void); extern void cpu_init(void); extern void trap_init(void); extern int register_cpu(struct cpu *cpu, int num); extern struct device *get_cpu_device(unsigned cpu); extern bool cpu_is_hotpluggable(unsigned cpu); extern bool arch_match_cpu_phys_id(int cpu, u64 phys_id); extern bool arch_find_n_match_cpu_physical_id(struct device_node *cpun, int cpu, unsigned int *thread); extern int cpu_add_dev_attr(struct device_attribute *attr); extern void cpu_remove_dev_attr(struct device_attribute *attr); extern int cpu_add_dev_attr_group(struct attribute_group *attrs); extern void cpu_remove_dev_attr_group(struct attribute_group *attrs); extern ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); extern ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); extern ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); extern ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); extern ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); extern ssize_t cpu_show_mds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); extern ssize_t cpu_show_tsx_async_abort(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); extern ssize_t cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); extern ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); extern __printf(4, 5) struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata, const struct attribute_group **groups, const char *fmt, ...); #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU extern void unregister_cpu(struct cpu *cpu); extern ssize_t arch_cpu_probe(const char *, size_t); extern ssize_t arch_cpu_release(const char *, size_t); #endif /* * These states are not related to the core CPU hotplug mechanism. They are * used by various (sub)architectures to track internal state */ #define CPU_ONLINE 0x0002 /* CPU is up */ #define CPU_UP_PREPARE 0x0003 /* CPU coming up */ #define CPU_DEAD 0x0007 /* CPU dead */ #define CPU_DEAD_FROZEN 0x0008 /* CPU timed out on unplug */ #define CPU_POST_DEAD 0x0009 /* CPU successfully unplugged */ #define CPU_BROKEN 0x000B /* CPU did not die properly */ #ifdef CONFIG_SMP extern bool cpuhp_tasks_frozen; int add_cpu(unsigned int cpu); int cpu_device_up(struct device *dev); void notify_cpu_starting(unsigned int cpu); extern void cpu_maps_update_begin(void); extern void cpu_maps_update_done(void); int bringup_hibernate_cpu(unsigned int sleep_cpu); void bringup_nonboot_cpus(unsigned int setup_max_cpus); #else /* CONFIG_SMP */ #define cpuhp_tasks_frozen 0 static inline void cpu_maps_update_begin(void) { } static inline void cpu_maps_update_done(void) { } #endif /* CONFIG_SMP */ extern struct bus_type cpu_subsys; #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU extern void cpus_write_lock(void); extern void cpus_write_unlock(void); extern void cpus_read_lock(void); extern void cpus_read_unlock(void); extern int cpus_read_trylock(void); extern void lockdep_assert_cpus_held(void); extern void cpu_hotplug_disable(void); extern void cpu_hotplug_enable(void); void clear_tasks_mm_cpumask(int cpu); int remove_cpu(unsigned int cpu); int cpu_device_down(struct device *dev); extern void smp_shutdown_nonboot_cpus(unsigned int primary_cpu); #else /* CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU */ static inline void cpus_write_lock(void) { } static inline void cpus_write_unlock(void) { } static inline void cpus_read_lock(void) { } static inline void cpus_read_unlock(void) { } static inline int cpus_read_trylock(void) { return true; } static inline void lockdep_assert_cpus_held(void) { } static inline void cpu_hotplug_disable(void) { } static inline void cpu_hotplug_enable(void) { } static inline void smp_shutdown_nonboot_cpus(unsigned int primary_cpu) { } #endif /* !CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU */ /* Wrappers which go away once all code is converted */ static inline void cpu_hotplug_begin(void) { cpus_write_lock(); } static inline void cpu_hotplug_done(void) { cpus_write_unlock(); } static inline void get_online_cpus(void) { cpus_read_lock(); } static inline void put_online_cpus(void) { cpus_read_unlock(); } #ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP_SMP extern int freeze_secondary_cpus(int primary); extern void thaw_secondary_cpus(void); static inline int suspend_disable_secondary_cpus(void) { int cpu = 0; if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PM_SLEEP_SMP_NONZERO_CPU)) cpu = -1; return freeze_secondary_cpus(cpu); } static inline void suspend_enable_secondary_cpus(void) { return thaw_secondary_cpus(); } #else /* !CONFIG_PM_SLEEP_SMP */ static inline void thaw_secondary_cpus(void) {} static inline int suspend_disable_secondary_cpus(void) { return 0; } static inline void suspend_enable_secondary_cpus(void) { } #endif /* !CONFIG_PM_SLEEP_SMP */ void cpu_startup_entry(enum cpuhp_state state); void cpu_idle_poll_ctrl(bool enable); /* Attach to any functions which should be considered cpuidle. */ #define __cpuidle __section(".cpuidle.text") bool cpu_in_idle(unsigned long pc); void arch_cpu_idle(void); void arch_cpu_idle_prepare(void); void arch_cpu_idle_enter(void); void arch_cpu_idle_exit(void); void arch_cpu_idle_dead(void); int cpu_report_state(int cpu); int cpu_check_up_prepare(int cpu); void cpu_set_state_online(int cpu); void play_idle_precise(u64 duration_ns, u64 latency_ns); static inline void play_idle(unsigned long duration_us) { play_idle_precise(duration_us * NSEC_PER_USEC, U64_MAX); } #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU bool cpu_wait_death(unsigned int cpu, int seconds); bool cpu_report_death(void); void cpuhp_report_idle_dead(void); #else static inline void cpuhp_report_idle_dead(void) { } #endif /* #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU */ enum cpuhp_smt_control { CPU_SMT_ENABLED, CPU_SMT_DISABLED, CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED, CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED, CPU_SMT_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, }; #if defined(CONFIG_SMP) && defined(CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT) extern enum cpuhp_smt_control cpu_smt_control; extern void cpu_smt_disable(bool force); extern void cpu_smt_check_topology(void); extern bool cpu_smt_possible(void); extern int cpuhp_smt_enable(void); extern int cpuhp_smt_disable(enum cpuhp_smt_control ctrlval); #else # define cpu_smt_control (CPU_SMT_NOT_IMPLEMENTED) static inline void cpu_smt_disable(bool force) { } static inline void cpu_smt_check_topology(void) { } static inline bool cpu_smt_possible(void) { return false; } static inline int cpuhp_smt_enable(void) { return 0; } static inline int cpuhp_smt_disable(enum cpuhp_smt_control ctrlval) { return 0; } #endif extern bool cpu_mitigations_off(void); extern bool cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt(void); #endif /* _LINUX_CPU_H_ */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* include/net/dsfield.h - Manipulation of the Differentiated Services field */ /* Written 1998-2000 by Werner Almesberger, EPFL ICA */ #ifndef __NET_DSFIELD_H #define __NET_DSFIELD_H #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/ip.h> #include <linux/ipv6.h> #include <asm/byteorder.h> static inline __u8 ipv4_get_dsfield(const struct iphdr *iph) { return iph->tos; } static inline __u8 ipv6_get_dsfield(const struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h) { return ntohs(*(__force const __be16 *)ipv6h) >> 4; } static inline void ipv4_change_dsfield(struct iphdr *iph,__u8 mask, __u8 value) { __u32 check = ntohs((__force __be16)iph->check); __u8 dsfield; dsfield = (iph->tos & mask) | value; check += iph->tos; if ((check+1) >> 16) check = (check+1) & 0xffff; check -= dsfield; check += check >> 16; /* adjust carry */ iph->check = (__force __sum16)htons(check); iph->tos = dsfield; } static inline void ipv6_change_dsfield(struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h,__u8 mask, __u8 value) { __be16 *p = (__force __be16 *)ipv6h; *p = (*p & htons((((u16)mask << 4) | 0xf00f))) | htons((u16)value << 4); } #endif
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* File: fs/ext4/xattr.h On-disk format of extended attributes for the ext4 filesystem. (C) 2001 Andreas Gruenbacher, <a.gruenbacher@computer.org> */ #include <linux/xattr.h> /* Magic value in attribute blocks */ #define EXT4_XATTR_MAGIC 0xEA020000 /* Maximum number of references to one attribute block */ #define EXT4_XATTR_REFCOUNT_MAX 1024 /* Name indexes */ #define EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_USER 1 #define EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS 2 #define EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT 3 #define EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_TRUSTED 4 #define EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_LUSTRE 5 #define EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY 6 #define EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_SYSTEM 7 #define EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_RICHACL 8 #define EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_ENCRYPTION 9 #define EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_HURD 10 /* Reserved for Hurd */ struct ext4_xattr_header { __le32 h_magic; /* magic number for identification */ __le32 h_refcount; /* reference count */ __le32 h_blocks; /* number of disk blocks used */ __le32 h_hash; /* hash value of all attributes */ __le32 h_checksum; /* crc32c(uuid+id+xattrblock) */ /* id = inum if refcount=1, blknum otherwise */ __u32 h_reserved[3]; /* zero right now */ }; struct ext4_xattr_ibody_header { __le32 h_magic; /* magic number for identification */ }; struct ext4_xattr_entry { __u8 e_name_len; /* length of name */ __u8 e_name_index; /* attribute name index */ __le16 e_value_offs; /* offset in disk block of value */ __le32 e_value_inum; /* inode in which the value is stored */ __le32 e_value_size; /* size of attribute value */ __le32 e_hash; /* hash value of name and value */ char e_name[]; /* attribute name */ }; #define EXT4_XATTR_PAD_BITS 2 #define EXT4_XATTR_PAD (1<<EXT4_XATTR_PAD_BITS) #define EXT4_XATTR_ROUND (EXT4_XATTR_PAD-1) #define EXT4_XATTR_LEN(name_len) \ (((name_len) + EXT4_XATTR_ROUND + \ sizeof(struct ext4_xattr_entry)) & ~EXT4_XATTR_ROUND) #define EXT4_XATTR_NEXT(entry) \ ((struct ext4_xattr_entry *)( \ (char *)(entry) + EXT4_XATTR_LEN((entry)->e_name_len))) #define EXT4_XATTR_SIZE(size) \ (((size) + EXT4_XATTR_ROUND) & ~EXT4_XATTR_ROUND) #define IHDR(inode, raw_inode) \ ((struct ext4_xattr_ibody_header *) \ ((void *)raw_inode + \ EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + \ EXT4_I(inode)->i_extra_isize)) #define IFIRST(hdr) ((struct ext4_xattr_entry *)((hdr)+1)) /* * XATTR_SIZE_MAX is currently 64k, but for the purposes of checking * for file system consistency errors, we use a somewhat bigger value. * This allows XATTR_SIZE_MAX to grow in the future, but by using this * instead of INT_MAX for certain consistency checks, we don't need to * worry about arithmetic overflows. (Actually XATTR_SIZE_MAX is * defined in include/uapi/linux/limits.h, so changing it is going * not going to be trivial....) */ #define EXT4_XATTR_SIZE_MAX (1 << 24) /* * The minimum size of EA value when you start storing it in an external inode * size of block - size of header - size of 1 entry - 4 null bytes */ #define EXT4_XATTR_MIN_LARGE_EA_SIZE(b) \ ((b) - EXT4_XATTR_LEN(3) - sizeof(struct ext4_xattr_header) - 4) #define BHDR(bh) ((struct ext4_xattr_header *)((bh)->b_data)) #define ENTRY(ptr) ((struct ext4_xattr_entry *)(ptr)) #define BFIRST(bh) ENTRY(BHDR(bh)+1) #define IS_LAST_ENTRY(entry) (*(__u32 *)(entry) == 0) #define EXT4_ZERO_XATTR_VALUE ((void *)-1) struct ext4_xattr_info { const char *name; const void *value; size_t value_len; int name_index; int in_inode; }; struct ext4_xattr_search { struct ext4_xattr_entry *first; void *base; void *end; struct ext4_xattr_entry *here; int not_found; }; struct ext4_xattr_ibody_find { struct ext4_xattr_search s; struct ext4_iloc iloc; }; struct ext4_xattr_inode_array { unsigned int count; /* # of used items in the array */ struct inode *inodes[]; }; extern const struct xattr_handler ext4_xattr_user_handler; extern const struct xattr_handler ext4_xattr_trusted_handler; extern const struct xattr_handler ext4_xattr_security_handler; extern const struct xattr_handler ext4_xattr_hurd_handler; #define EXT4_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT "c" /* * The EXT4_STATE_NO_EXPAND is overloaded and used for two purposes. * The first is to signal that there the inline xattrs and data are * taking up so much space that we might as well not keep trying to * expand it. The second is that xattr_sem is taken for writing, so * we shouldn't try to recurse into the inode expansion. For this * second case, we need to make sure that we take save and restore the * NO_EXPAND state flag appropriately. */ static inline void ext4_write_lock_xattr(struct inode *inode, int *save) { down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem); *save = ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_NO_EXPAND); ext4_set_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_NO_EXPAND); } static inline int ext4_write_trylock_xattr(struct inode *inode, int *save) { if (down_write_trylock(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem) == 0) return 0; *save = ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_NO_EXPAND); ext4_set_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_NO_EXPAND); return 1; } static inline void ext4_write_unlock_xattr(struct inode *inode, int *save) { if (*save == 0) ext4_clear_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_NO_EXPAND); up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem); } extern ssize_t ext4_listxattr(struct dentry *, char *, size_t); extern int ext4_xattr_get(struct inode *, int, const char *, void *, size_t); extern int ext4_xattr_set(struct inode *, int, const char *, const void *, size_t, int); extern int ext4_xattr_set_handle(handle_t *, struct inode *, int, const char *, const void *, size_t, int); extern int ext4_xattr_set_credits(struct inode *inode, size_t value_len, bool is_create, int *credits); extern int __ext4_xattr_set_credits(struct super_block *sb, struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head *block_bh, size_t value_len, bool is_create); extern int ext4_xattr_delete_inode(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, struct ext4_xattr_inode_array **array, int extra_credits); extern void ext4_xattr_inode_array_free(struct ext4_xattr_inode_array *array); extern int ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea(struct inode *inode, int new_extra_isize, struct ext4_inode *raw_inode, handle_t *handle); extern const struct xattr_handler *ext4_xattr_handlers[]; extern int ext4_xattr_ibody_find(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_xattr_info *i, struct ext4_xattr_ibody_find *is); extern int ext4_xattr_ibody_get(struct inode *inode, int name_index, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t buffer_size); extern int ext4_xattr_ibody_inline_set(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, struct ext4_xattr_info *i, struct ext4_xattr_ibody_find *is); extern struct mb_cache *ext4_xattr_create_cache(void); extern void ext4_xattr_destroy_cache(struct mb_cache *); #ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_SECURITY extern int ext4_init_security(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr); #else static inline int ext4_init_security(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr) { return 0; } #endif #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP extern void ext4_xattr_inode_set_class(struct inode *ea_inode); #else static inline void ext4_xattr_inode_set_class(struct inode *ea_inode) { } #endif extern int ext4_get_inode_usage(struct inode *inode, qsize_t *usage);
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT */ #ifndef __LINUX_OVERFLOW_H #define __LINUX_OVERFLOW_H #include <linux/compiler.h> #include <linux/limits.h> /* * In the fallback code below, we need to compute the minimum and * maximum values representable in a given type. These macros may also * be useful elsewhere, so we provide them outside the * COMPILER_HAS_GENERIC_BUILTIN_OVERFLOW block. * * It would seem more obvious to do something like * * #define type_min(T) (T)(is_signed_type(T) ? (T)1 << (8*sizeof(T)-1) : 0) * #define type_max(T) (T)(is_signed_type(T) ? ((T)1 << (8*sizeof(T)-1)) - 1 : ~(T)0) * * Unfortunately, the middle expressions, strictly speaking, have * undefined behaviour, and at least some versions of gcc warn about * the type_max expression (but not if -fsanitize=undefined is in * effect; in that case, the warning is deferred to runtime...). * * The slightly excessive casting in type_min is to make sure the * macros also produce sensible values for the exotic type _Bool. [The * overflow checkers only almost work for _Bool, but that's * a-feature-not-a-bug, since people shouldn't be doing arithmetic on * _Bools. Besides, the gcc builtins don't allow _Bool* as third * argument.] * * Idea stolen from * https://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-misc/2007/02/05/0000.html - * credit to Christian Biere. */ #define is_signed_type(type) (((type)(-1)) < (type)1) #define __type_half_max(type) ((type)1 << (8*sizeof(type) - 1 - is_signed_type(type))) #define type_max(T) ((T)((__type_half_max(T) - 1) + __type_half_max(T))) #define type_min(T) ((T)((T)-type_max(T)-(T)1)) /* * Avoids triggering -Wtype-limits compilation warning, * while using unsigned data types to check a < 0. */ #define is_non_negative(a) ((a) > 0 || (a) == 0) #define is_negative(a) (!(is_non_negative(a))) /* * Allows for effectively applying __must_check to a macro so we can have * both the type-agnostic benefits of the macros while also being able to * enforce that the return value is, in fact, checked. */ static inline bool __must_check __must_check_overflow(bool overflow) { return unlikely(overflow); } #ifdef COMPILER_HAS_GENERIC_BUILTIN_OVERFLOW /* * For simplicity and code hygiene, the fallback code below insists on * a, b and *d having the same type (similar to the min() and max() * macros), whereas gcc's type-generic overflow checkers accept * different types. Hence we don't just make check_add_overflow an * alias for __builtin_add_overflow, but add type checks similar to * below. */ #define check_add_overflow(a, b, d) __must_check_overflow(({ \ typeof(a) __a = (a); \ typeof(b) __b = (b); \ typeof(d) __d = (d); \ (void) (&__a == &__b); \ (void) (&__a == __d); \ __builtin_add_overflow(__a, __b, __d); \ })) #define check_sub_overflow(a, b, d) __must_check_overflow(({ \ typeof(a) __a = (a); \ typeof(b) __b = (b); \ typeof(d) __d = (d); \ (void) (&__a == &__b); \ (void) (&__a == __d); \ __builtin_sub_overflow(__a, __b, __d); \ })) #define check_mul_overflow(a, b, d) __must_check_overflow(({ \ typeof(a) __a = (a); \ typeof(b) __b = (b); \ typeof(d) __d = (d); \ (void) (&__a == &__b); \ (void) (&__a == __d); \ __builtin_mul_overflow(__a, __b, __d); \ })) #else /* Checking for unsigned overflow is relatively easy without causing UB. */ #define __unsigned_add_overflow(a, b, d) ({ \ typeof(a) __a = (a); \ typeof(b) __b = (b); \ typeof(d) __d = (d); \ (void) (&__a == &__b); \ (void) (&__a == __d); \ *__d = __a + __b; \ *__d < __a; \ }) #define __unsigned_sub_overflow(a, b, d) ({ \ typeof(a) __a = (a); \ typeof(b) __b = (b); \ typeof(d) __d = (d); \ (void) (&__a == &__b); \ (void) (&__a == __d); \ *__d = __a - __b; \ __a < __b; \ }) /* * If one of a or b is a compile-time constant, this avoids a division. */ #define __unsigned_mul_overflow(a, b, d) ({ \ typeof(a) __a = (a); \ typeof(b) __b = (b); \ typeof(d) __d = (d); \ (void) (&__a == &__b); \ (void) (&__a == __d); \ *__d = __a * __b; \ __builtin_constant_p(__b) ? \ __b > 0 && __a > type_max(typeof(__a)) / __b : \ __a > 0 && __b > type_max(typeof(__b)) / __a; \ }) /* * For signed types, detecting overflow is much harder, especially if * we want to avoid UB. But the interface of these macros is such that * we must provide a result in *d, and in fact we must produce the * result promised by gcc's builtins, which is simply the possibly * wrapped-around value. Fortunately, we can just formally do the * operations in the widest relevant unsigned type (u64) and then * truncate the result - gcc is smart enough to generate the same code * with and without the (u64) casts. */ /* * Adding two signed integers can overflow only if they have the same * sign, and overflow has happened iff the result has the opposite * sign. */ #define __signed_add_overflow(a, b, d) ({ \ typeof(a) __a = (a); \ typeof(b) __b = (b); \ typeof(d) __d = (d); \ (void) (&__a == &__b); \ (void) (&__a == __d); \ *__d = (u64)__a + (u64)__b; \ (((~(__a ^ __b)) & (*__d ^ __a)) \ & type_min(typeof(__a))) != 0; \ }) /* * Subtraction is similar, except that overflow can now happen only * when the signs are opposite. In this case, overflow has happened if * the result has the opposite sign of a. */ #define __signed_sub_overflow(a, b, d) ({ \ typeof(a) __a = (a); \ typeof(b) __b = (b); \ typeof(d) __d = (d); \ (void) (&__a == &__b); \ (void) (&__a == __d); \ *__d = (u64)__a - (u64)__b; \ ((((__a ^ __b)) & (*__d ^ __a)) \ & type_min(typeof(__a))) != 0; \ }) /* * Signed multiplication is rather hard. gcc always follows C99, so * division is truncated towards 0. This means that we can write the * overflow check like this: * * (a > 0 && (b > MAX/a || b < MIN/a)) || * (a < -1 && (b > MIN/a || b < MAX/a) || * (a == -1 && b == MIN) * * The redundant casts of -1 are to silence an annoying -Wtype-limits * (included in -Wextra) warning: When the type is u8 or u16, the * __b_c_e in check_mul_overflow obviously selects * __unsigned_mul_overflow, but unfortunately gcc still parses this * code and warns about the limited range of __b. */ #define __signed_mul_overflow(a, b, d) ({ \ typeof(a) __a = (a); \ typeof(b) __b = (b); \ typeof(d) __d = (d); \ typeof(a) __tmax = type_max(typeof(a)); \ typeof(a) __tmin = type_min(typeof(a)); \ (void) (&__a == &__b); \ (void) (&__a == __d); \ *__d = (u64)__a * (u64)__b; \ (__b > 0 && (__a > __tmax/__b || __a < __tmin/__b)) || \ (__b < (typeof(__b))-1 && (__a > __tmin/__b || __a < __tmax/__b)) || \ (__b == (typeof(__b))-1 && __a == __tmin); \ }) #define check_add_overflow(a, b, d) __must_check_overflow( \ __builtin_choose_expr(is_signed_type(typeof(a)), \ __signed_add_overflow(a, b, d), \ __unsigned_add_overflow(a, b, d))) #define check_sub_overflow(a, b, d) __must_check_overflow( \ __builtin_choose_expr(is_signed_type(typeof(a)), \ __signed_sub_overflow(a, b, d), \ __unsigned_sub_overflow(a, b, d))) #define check_mul_overflow(a, b, d) __must_check_overflow( \ __builtin_choose_expr(is_signed_type(typeof(a)), \ __signed_mul_overflow(a, b, d), \ __unsigned_mul_overflow(a, b, d))) #endif /* COMPILER_HAS_GENERIC_BUILTIN_OVERFLOW */ /** check_shl_overflow() - Calculate a left-shifted value and check overflow * * @a: Value to be shifted * @s: How many bits left to shift * @d: Pointer to where to store the result * * Computes *@d = (@a << @s) * * Returns true if '*d' cannot hold the result or when 'a << s' doesn't * make sense. Example conditions: * - 'a << s' causes bits to be lost when stored in *d. * - 's' is garbage (e.g. negative) or so large that the result of * 'a << s' is guaranteed to be 0. * - 'a' is negative. * - 'a << s' sets the sign bit, if any, in '*d'. * * '*d' will hold the results of the attempted shift, but is not * considered "safe for use" if false is returned. */ #define check_shl_overflow(a, s, d) __must_check_overflow(({ \ typeof(a) _a = a; \ typeof(s) _s = s; \ typeof(d) _d = d; \ u64 _a_full = _a; \ unsigned int _to_shift = \ is_non_negative(_s) && _s < 8 * sizeof(*d) ? _s : 0; \ *_d = (_a_full << _to_shift); \ (_to_shift != _s || is_negative(*_d) || is_negative(_a) || \ (*_d >> _to_shift) != _a); \ })) /** * array_size() - Calculate size of 2-dimensional array. * * @a: dimension one * @b: dimension two * * Calculates size of 2-dimensional array: @a * @b. * * Returns: number of bytes needed to represent the array or SIZE_MAX on * overflow. */ static inline __must_check size_t array_size(size_t a, size_t b) { size_t bytes; if (check_mul_overflow(a, b, &bytes)) return SIZE_MAX; return bytes; } /** * array3_size() - Calculate size of 3-dimensional array. * * @a: dimension one * @b: dimension two * @c: dimension three * * Calculates size of 3-dimensional array: @a * @b * @c. * * Returns: number of bytes needed to represent the array or SIZE_MAX on * overflow. */ static inline __must_check size_t array3_size(size_t a, size_t b, size_t c) { size_t bytes; if (check_mul_overflow(a, b, &bytes)) return SIZE_MAX; if (check_mul_overflow(bytes, c, &bytes)) return SIZE_MAX; return bytes; } /* * Compute a*b+c, returning SIZE_MAX on overflow. Internal helper for * struct_size() below. */ static inline __must_check size_t __ab_c_size(size_t a, size_t b, size_t c) { size_t bytes; if (check_mul_overflow(a, b, &bytes)) return SIZE_MAX; if (check_add_overflow(bytes, c, &bytes)) return SIZE_MAX; return bytes; } /** * struct_size() - Calculate size of structure with trailing array. * @p: Pointer to the structure. * @member: Name of the array member. * @count: Number of elements in the array. * * Calculates size of memory needed for structure @p followed by an * array of @count number of @member elements. * * Return: number of bytes needed or SIZE_MAX on overflow. */ #define struct_size(p, member, count) \ __ab_c_size(count, \ sizeof(*(p)->member) + __must_be_array((p)->member),\ sizeof(*(p))) /** * flex_array_size() - Calculate size of a flexible array member * within an enclosing structure. * * @p: Pointer to the structure. * @member: Name of the flexible array member. * @count: Number of elements in the array. * * Calculates size of a flexible array of @count number of @member * elements, at the end of structure @p. * * Return: number of bytes needed or SIZE_MAX on overflow. */ #define flex_array_size(p, member, count) \ array_size(count, \ sizeof(*(p)->member) + __must_be_array((p)->member)) #endif /* __LINUX_OVERFLOW_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #undef TRACE_SYSTEM #define TRACE_SYSTEM printk #if !defined(_TRACE_PRINTK_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ) #define _TRACE_PRINTK_H #include <linux/tracepoint.h> TRACE_EVENT(console, TP_PROTO(const char *text, size_t len), TP_ARGS(text, len), TP_STRUCT__entry( __dynamic_array(char, msg, len + 1) ), TP_fast_assign( /* * Each trace entry is printed in a new line. * If the msg finishes with '\n', cut it off * to avoid blank lines in the trace. */ if ((len > 0) && (text[len-1] == '\n')) len -= 1; memcpy(__get_str(msg), text, len); __get_str(msg)[len] = 0; ), TP_printk("%s", __get_str(msg)) ); #endif /* _TRACE_PRINTK_H */ /* This part must be outside protection */ #include <trace/define_trace.h>
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ /* * net busy poll support * Copyright(c) 2013 Intel Corporation. * * Author: Eliezer Tamir * * Contact Information: * e1000-devel Mailing List <e1000-devel@lists.sourceforge.net> */ #ifndef _LINUX_NET_BUSY_POLL_H #define _LINUX_NET_BUSY_POLL_H #include <linux/netdevice.h> #include <linux/sched/clock.h> #include <linux/sched/signal.h> #include <net/ip.h> /* 0 - Reserved to indicate value not set * 1..NR_CPUS - Reserved for sender_cpu * NR_CPUS+1..~0 - Region available for NAPI IDs */ #define MIN_NAPI_ID ((unsigned int)(NR_CPUS + 1)) #ifdef CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL struct napi_struct; extern unsigned int sysctl_net_busy_read __read_mostly; extern unsigned int sysctl_net_busy_poll __read_mostly; static inline bool net_busy_loop_on(void) { return sysctl_net_busy_poll; } static inline bool sk_can_busy_loop(const struct sock *sk) { return READ_ONCE(sk->sk_ll_usec) && !signal_pending(current); } bool sk_busy_loop_end(void *p, unsigned long start_time); void napi_busy_loop(unsigned int napi_id, bool (*loop_end)(void *, unsigned long), void *loop_end_arg); #else /* CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL */ static inline unsigned long net_busy_loop_on(void) { return 0; } static inline bool sk_can_busy_loop(struct sock *sk) { return false; } #endif /* CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL */ static inline unsigned long busy_loop_current_time(void) { #ifdef CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL return (unsigned long)(local_clock() >> 10); #else return 0; #endif } /* in poll/select we use the global sysctl_net_ll_poll value */ static inline bool busy_loop_timeout(unsigned long start_time) { #ifdef CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL unsigned long bp_usec = READ_ONCE(sysctl_net_busy_poll); if (bp_usec) { unsigned long end_time = start_time + bp_usec; unsigned long now = busy_loop_current_time(); return time_after(now, end_time); } #endif return true; } static inline bool sk_busy_loop_timeout(struct sock *sk, unsigned long start_time) { #ifdef CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL unsigned long bp_usec = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_ll_usec); if (bp_usec) { unsigned long end_time = start_time + bp_usec; unsigned long now = busy_loop_current_time(); return time_after(now, end_time); } #endif return true; } static inline void sk_busy_loop(struct sock *sk, int nonblock) { #ifdef CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL unsigned int napi_id = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_napi_id); if (napi_id >= MIN_NAPI_ID) napi_busy_loop(napi_id, nonblock ? NULL : sk_busy_loop_end, sk); #endif } /* used in the NIC receive handler to mark the skb */ static inline void skb_mark_napi_id(struct sk_buff *skb, struct napi_struct *napi) { #ifdef CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL /* If the skb was already marked with a valid NAPI ID, avoid overwriting * it. */ if (skb->napi_id < MIN_NAPI_ID) skb->napi_id = napi->napi_id; #endif } /* used in the protocol hanlder to propagate the napi_id to the socket */ static inline void sk_mark_napi_id(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb) { #ifdef CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_napi_id, skb->napi_id); #endif sk_rx_queue_set(sk, skb); } /* variant used for unconnected sockets */ static inline void sk_mark_napi_id_once(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb) { #ifdef CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL if (!READ_ONCE(sk->sk_napi_id)) WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_napi_id, skb->napi_id); #endif } #endif /* _LINUX_NET_BUSY_POLL_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * Generic nexthop implementation * * Copyright (c) 2017-19 Cumulus Networks * Copyright (c) 2017-19 David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com> */ #ifndef __LINUX_NEXTHOP_H #define __LINUX_NEXTHOP_H #include <linux/netdevice.h> #include <linux/notifier.h> #include <linux/route.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <net/ip_fib.h> #include <net/ip6_fib.h> #include <net/netlink.h> #define NEXTHOP_VALID_USER_FLAGS RTNH_F_ONLINK struct nexthop; struct nh_config { u32 nh_id; u8 nh_family; u8 nh_protocol; u8 nh_blackhole; u8 nh_fdb; u32 nh_flags; int nh_ifindex; struct net_device *dev; union { __be32 ipv4; struct in6_addr ipv6; } gw; struct nlattr *nh_grp; u16 nh_grp_type; struct nlattr *nh_encap; u16 nh_encap_type; u32 nlflags; struct nl_info nlinfo; }; struct nh_info { struct hlist_node dev_hash; /* entry on netns devhash */ struct nexthop *nh_parent; u8 family; bool reject_nh; bool fdb_nh; union { struct fib_nh_common fib_nhc; struct fib_nh fib_nh; struct fib6_nh fib6_nh; }; }; struct nh_grp_entry { struct nexthop *nh; u8 weight; atomic_t upper_bound; struct list_head nh_list; struct nexthop *nh_parent; /* nexthop of group with this entry */ }; struct nh_group { struct nh_group *spare; /* spare group for removals */ u16 num_nh; bool mpath; bool fdb_nh; bool has_v4; struct nh_grp_entry nh_entries[]; }; struct nexthop { struct rb_node rb_node; /* entry on netns rbtree */ struct list_head fi_list; /* v4 entries using nh */ struct list_head f6i_list; /* v6 entries using nh */ struct list_head fdb_list; /* fdb entries using this nh */ struct list_head grp_list; /* nh group entries using this nh */ struct net *net; u32 id; u8 protocol; /* app managing this nh */ u8 nh_flags; bool is_group; refcount_t refcnt; struct rcu_head rcu; union { struct nh_info __rcu *nh_info; struct nh_group __rcu *nh_grp; }; }; enum nexthop_event_type { NEXTHOP_EVENT_DEL }; int register_nexthop_notifier(struct net *net, struct notifier_block *nb); int unregister_nexthop_notifier(struct net *net, struct notifier_block *nb); /* caller is holding rcu or rtnl; no reference taken to nexthop */ struct nexthop *nexthop_find_by_id(struct net *net, u32 id); void nexthop_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head); static inline bool nexthop_get(struct nexthop *nh) { return refcount_inc_not_zero(&nh->refcnt); } static inline void nexthop_put(struct nexthop *nh) { if (refcount_dec_and_test(&nh->refcnt)) call_rcu(&nh->rcu, nexthop_free_rcu); } static inline bool nexthop_cmp(const struct nexthop *nh1, const struct nexthop *nh2) { return nh1 == nh2; } static inline bool nexthop_is_fdb(const struct nexthop *nh) { if (nh->is_group) { const struct nh_group *nh_grp; nh_grp = rcu_dereference_rtnl(nh->nh_grp); return nh_grp->fdb_nh; } else { const struct nh_info *nhi; nhi = rcu_dereference_rtnl(nh->nh_info); return nhi->fdb_nh; } } static inline bool nexthop_has_v4(const struct nexthop *nh) { if (nh->is_group) { struct nh_group *nh_grp; nh_grp = rcu_dereference_rtnl(nh->nh_grp); return nh_grp->has_v4; } return false; } static inline bool nexthop_is_multipath(const struct nexthop *nh) { if (nh->is_group) { struct nh_group *nh_grp; nh_grp = rcu_dereference_rtnl(nh->nh_grp); return nh_grp->mpath; } return false; } struct nexthop *nexthop_select_path(struct nexthop *nh, int hash); static inline unsigned int nexthop_num_path(const struct nexthop *nh) { unsigned int rc = 1; if (nh->is_group) { struct nh_group *nh_grp; nh_grp = rcu_dereference_rtnl(nh->nh_grp); if (nh_grp->mpath) rc = nh_grp->num_nh; } return rc; } static inline struct nexthop *nexthop_mpath_select(const struct nh_group *nhg, int nhsel) { /* for_nexthops macros in fib_semantics.c grabs a pointer to * the nexthop before checking nhsel */ if (nhsel >= nhg->num_nh) return NULL; return nhg->nh_entries[nhsel].nh; } static inline int nexthop_mpath_fill_node(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nexthop *nh, u8 rt_family) { struct nh_group *nhg = rtnl_dereference(nh->nh_grp); int i; for (i = 0; i < nhg->num_nh; i++) { struct nexthop *nhe = nhg->nh_entries[i].nh; struct nh_info *nhi = rcu_dereference_rtnl(nhe->nh_info); struct fib_nh_common *nhc = &nhi->fib_nhc; int weight = nhg->nh_entries[i].weight; if (fib_add_nexthop(skb, nhc, weight, rt_family, 0) < 0) return -EMSGSIZE; } return 0; } /* called with rcu lock */ static inline bool nexthop_is_blackhole(const struct nexthop *nh) { const struct nh_info *nhi; if (nh->is_group) { struct nh_group *nh_grp; nh_grp = rcu_dereference_rtnl(nh->nh_grp); if (nh_grp->num_nh > 1) return false; nh = nh_grp->nh_entries[0].nh; } nhi = rcu_dereference_rtnl(nh->nh_info); return nhi->reject_nh; } static inline void nexthop_path_fib_result(struct fib_result *res, int hash) { struct nh_info *nhi; struct nexthop *nh; nh = nexthop_select_path(res->fi->nh, hash); nhi = rcu_dereference(nh->nh_info); res->nhc = &nhi->fib_nhc; } /* called with rcu read lock or rtnl held */ static inline struct fib_nh_common *nexthop_fib_nhc(struct nexthop *nh, int nhsel) { struct nh_info *nhi; BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct fib_nh, nh_common) != 0); BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct fib6_nh, nh_common) != 0); if (nh->is_group) { struct nh_group *nh_grp; nh_grp = rcu_dereference_rtnl(nh->nh_grp); if (nh_grp->mpath) { nh = nexthop_mpath_select(nh_grp, nhsel); if (!nh) return NULL; } } nhi = rcu_dereference_rtnl(nh->nh_info); return &nhi->fib_nhc; } /* called from fib_table_lookup with rcu_lock */ static inline struct fib_nh_common *nexthop_get_nhc_lookup(const struct nexthop *nh, int fib_flags, const struct flowi4 *flp, int *nhsel) { struct nh_info *nhi; if (nh->is_group) { struct nh_group *nhg = rcu_dereference(nh->nh_grp); int i; for (i = 0; i < nhg->num_nh; i++) { struct nexthop *nhe = nhg->nh_entries[i].nh; nhi = rcu_dereference(nhe->nh_info); if (fib_lookup_good_nhc(&nhi->fib_nhc, fib_flags, flp)) { *nhsel = i; return &nhi->fib_nhc; } } } else { nhi = rcu_dereference(nh->nh_info); if (fib_lookup_good_nhc(&nhi->fib_nhc, fib_flags, flp)) { *nhsel = 0; return &nhi->fib_nhc; } } return NULL; } static inline bool nexthop_uses_dev(const struct nexthop *nh, const struct net_device *dev) { struct nh_info *nhi; if (nh->is_group) { struct nh_group *nhg = rcu_dereference(nh->nh_grp); int i; for (i = 0; i < nhg->num_nh; i++) { struct nexthop *nhe = nhg->nh_entries[i].nh; nhi = rcu_dereference(nhe->nh_info); if (nhc_l3mdev_matches_dev(&nhi->fib_nhc, dev)) return true; } } else { nhi = rcu_dereference(nh->nh_info); if (nhc_l3mdev_matches_dev(&nhi->fib_nhc, dev)) return true; } return false; } static inline unsigned int fib_info_num_path(const struct fib_info *fi) { if (unlikely(fi->nh)) return nexthop_num_path(fi->nh); return fi->fib_nhs; } int fib_check_nexthop(struct nexthop *nh, u8 scope, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack); static inline struct fib_nh_common *fib_info_nhc(struct fib_info *fi, int nhsel) { if (unlikely(fi->nh)) return nexthop_fib_nhc(fi->nh, nhsel); return &fi->fib_nh[nhsel].nh_common; } /* only used when fib_nh is built into fib_info */ static inline struct fib_nh *fib_info_nh(struct fib_info *fi, int nhsel) { WARN_ON(fi->nh); return &fi->fib_nh[nhsel]; } /* * IPv6 variants */ int fib6_check_nexthop(struct nexthop *nh, struct fib6_config *cfg, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack); /* Caller should either hold rcu_read_lock(), or RTNL. */ static inline struct fib6_nh *nexthop_fib6_nh(struct nexthop *nh) { struct nh_info *nhi; if (nh->is_group) { struct nh_group *nh_grp; nh_grp = rcu_dereference_rtnl(nh->nh_grp); nh = nexthop_mpath_select(nh_grp, 0); if (!nh) return NULL; } nhi = rcu_dereference_rtnl(nh->nh_info); if (nhi->family == AF_INET6) return &nhi->fib6_nh; return NULL; } /* Variant of nexthop_fib6_nh(). * Caller should either hold rcu_read_lock_bh(), or RTNL. */ static inline struct fib6_nh *nexthop_fib6_nh_bh(struct nexthop *nh) { struct nh_info *nhi; if (nh->is_group) { struct nh_group *nh_grp; nh_grp = rcu_dereference_bh_rtnl(nh->nh_grp); nh = nexthop_mpath_select(nh_grp, 0); if (!nh) return NULL; } nhi = rcu_dereference_bh_rtnl(nh->nh_info); if (nhi->family == AF_INET6) return &nhi->fib6_nh; return NULL; } static inline struct net_device *fib6_info_nh_dev(struct fib6_info *f6i) { struct fib6_nh *fib6_nh; fib6_nh = f6i->nh ? nexthop_fib6_nh(f6i->nh) : f6i->fib6_nh; return fib6_nh->fib_nh_dev; } static inline void nexthop_path_fib6_result(struct fib6_result *res, int hash) { struct nexthop *nh = res->f6i->nh; struct nh_info *nhi; nh = nexthop_select_path(nh, hash); nhi = rcu_dereference_rtnl(nh->nh_info); if (nhi->reject_nh) { res->fib6_type = RTN_BLACKHOLE; res->fib6_flags |= RTF_REJECT; res->nh = nexthop_fib6_nh(nh); } else { res->nh = &nhi->fib6_nh; } } int nexthop_for_each_fib6_nh(struct nexthop *nh, int (*cb)(struct fib6_nh *nh, void *arg), void *arg); static inline int nexthop_get_family(struct nexthop *nh) { struct nh_info *nhi = rcu_dereference_rtnl(nh->nh_info); return nhi->family; } static inline struct fib_nh_common *nexthop_fdb_nhc(struct nexthop *nh) { struct nh_info *nhi = rcu_dereference_rtnl(nh->nh_info); return &nhi->fib_nhc; } static inline struct fib_nh_common *nexthop_path_fdb_result(struct nexthop *nh, int hash) { struct nh_info *nhi; struct nexthop *nhp; nhp = nexthop_select_path(nh, hash); if (unlikely(!nhp)) return NULL; nhi = rcu_dereference(nhp->nh_info); return &nhi->fib_nhc; } #endif
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * Definitions for the 'struct ptr_ring' datastructure. * * Author: * Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> * * Copyright (C) 2016 Red Hat, Inc. * * This is a limited-size FIFO maintaining pointers in FIFO order, with * one CPU producing entries and another consuming entries from a FIFO. * * This implementation tries to minimize cache-contention when there is a * single producer and a single consumer CPU. */ #ifndef _LINUX_PTR_RING_H #define _LINUX_PTR_RING_H 1 #ifdef __KERNEL__ #include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/cache.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/compiler.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <asm/errno.h> #endif struct ptr_ring { int producer ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp; spinlock_t producer_lock; int consumer_head ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp; /* next valid entry */ int consumer_tail; /* next entry to invalidate */ spinlock_t consumer_lock; /* Shared consumer/producer data */ /* Read-only by both the producer and the consumer */ int size ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp; /* max entries in queue */ int batch; /* number of entries to consume in a batch */ void **queue; }; /* Note: callers invoking this in a loop must use a compiler barrier, * for example cpu_relax(). * * NB: this is unlike __ptr_ring_empty in that callers must hold producer_lock: * see e.g. ptr_ring_full. */ static inline bool __ptr_ring_full(struct ptr_ring *r) { return r->queue[r->producer]; } static inline bool ptr_ring_full(struct ptr_ring *r) { bool ret; spin_lock(&r->producer_lock); ret = __ptr_ring_full(r); spin_unlock(&r->producer_lock); return ret; } static inline bool ptr_ring_full_irq(struct ptr_ring *r) { bool ret; spin_lock_irq(&r->producer_lock); ret = __ptr_ring_full(r); spin_unlock_irq(&r->producer_lock); return ret; } static inline bool ptr_ring_full_any(struct ptr_ring *r) { unsigned long flags; bool ret; spin_lock_irqsave(&r->producer_lock, flags); ret = __ptr_ring_full(r); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->producer_lock, flags); return ret; } static inline bool ptr_ring_full_bh(struct ptr_ring *r) { bool ret; spin_lock_bh(&r->producer_lock); ret = __ptr_ring_full(r); spin_unlock_bh(&r->producer_lock); return ret; } /* Note: callers invoking this in a loop must use a compiler barrier, * for example cpu_relax(). Callers must hold producer_lock. * Callers are responsible for making sure pointer that is being queued * points to a valid data. */ static inline int __ptr_ring_produce(struct ptr_ring *r, void *ptr) { if (unlikely(!r->size) || r->queue[r->producer]) return -ENOSPC; /* Make sure the pointer we are storing points to a valid data. */ /* Pairs with the dependency ordering in __ptr_ring_consume. */ smp_wmb(); WRITE_ONCE(r->queue[r->producer++], ptr); if (unlikely(r->producer >= r->size)) r->producer = 0; return 0; } /* * Note: resize (below) nests producer lock within consumer lock, so if you * consume in interrupt or BH context, you must disable interrupts/BH when * calling this. */ static inline int ptr_ring_produce(struct ptr_ring *r, void *ptr) { int ret; spin_lock(&r->producer_lock); ret = __ptr_ring_produce(r, ptr); spin_unlock(&r->producer_lock); return ret; } static inline int ptr_ring_produce_irq(struct ptr_ring *r, void *ptr) { int ret; spin_lock_irq(&r->producer_lock); ret = __ptr_ring_produce(r, ptr); spin_unlock_irq(&r->producer_lock); return ret; } static inline int ptr_ring_produce_any(struct ptr_ring *r, void *ptr) { unsigned long flags; int ret; spin_lock_irqsave(&r->producer_lock, flags); ret = __ptr_ring_produce(r, ptr); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->producer_lock, flags); return ret; } static inline int ptr_ring_produce_bh(struct ptr_ring *r, void *ptr) { int ret; spin_lock_bh(&r->producer_lock); ret = __ptr_ring_produce(r, ptr); spin_unlock_bh(&r->producer_lock); return ret; } static inline void *__ptr_ring_peek(struct ptr_ring *r) { if (likely(r->size)) return READ_ONCE(r->queue[r->consumer_head]); return NULL; } /* * Test ring empty status without taking any locks. * * NB: This is only safe to call if ring is never resized. * * However, if some other CPU consumes ring entries at the same time, the value * returned is not guaranteed to be correct. * * In this case - to avoid incorrectly detecting the ring * as empty - the CPU consuming the ring entries is responsible * for either consuming all ring entries until the ring is empty, * or synchronizing with some other CPU and causing it to * re-test __ptr_ring_empty and/or consume the ring enteries * after the synchronization point. * * Note: callers invoking this in a loop must use a compiler barrier, * for example cpu_relax(). */ static inline bool __ptr_ring_empty(struct ptr_ring *r) { if (likely(r->size)) return !r->queue[READ_ONCE(r->consumer_head)]; return true; } static inline bool ptr_ring_empty(struct ptr_ring *r) { bool ret; spin_lock(&r->consumer_lock); ret = __ptr_ring_empty(r); spin_unlock(&r->consumer_lock); return ret; } static inline bool ptr_ring_empty_irq(struct ptr_ring *r) { bool ret; spin_lock_irq(&r->consumer_lock); ret = __ptr_ring_empty(r); spin_unlock_irq(&r->consumer_lock); return ret; } static inline bool ptr_ring_empty_any(struct ptr_ring *r) { unsigned long flags; bool ret; spin_lock_irqsave(&r->consumer_lock, flags); ret = __ptr_ring_empty(r); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->consumer_lock, flags); return ret; } static inline bool ptr_ring_empty_bh(struct ptr_ring *r) { bool ret; spin_lock_bh(&r->consumer_lock); ret = __ptr_ring_empty(r); spin_unlock_bh(&r->consumer_lock); return ret; } /* Must only be called after __ptr_ring_peek returned !NULL */ static inline void __ptr_ring_discard_one(struct ptr_ring *r) { /* Fundamentally, what we want to do is update consumer * index and zero out the entry so producer can reuse it. * Doing it naively at each consume would be as simple as: * consumer = r->consumer; * r->queue[consumer++] = NULL; * if (unlikely(consumer >= r->size)) * consumer = 0; * r->consumer = consumer; * but that is suboptimal when the ring is full as producer is writing * out new entries in the same cache line. Defer these updates until a * batch of entries has been consumed. */ /* Note: we must keep consumer_head valid at all times for __ptr_ring_empty * to work correctly. */ int consumer_head = r->consumer_head; int head = consumer_head++; /* Once we have processed enough entries invalidate them in * the ring all at once so producer can reuse their space in the ring. * We also do this when we reach end of the ring - not mandatory * but helps keep the implementation simple. */ if (unlikely(consumer_head - r->consumer_tail >= r->batch || consumer_head >= r->size)) { /* Zero out entries in the reverse order: this way we touch the * cache line that producer might currently be reading the last; * producer won't make progress and touch other cache lines * besides the first one until we write out all entries. */ while (likely(head >= r->consumer_tail)) r->queue[head--] = NULL; r->consumer_tail = consumer_head; } if (unlikely(consumer_head >= r->size)) { consumer_head = 0; r->consumer_tail = 0; } /* matching READ_ONCE in __ptr_ring_empty for lockless tests */ WRITE_ONCE(r->consumer_head, consumer_head); } static inline void *__ptr_ring_consume(struct ptr_ring *r) { void *ptr; /* The READ_ONCE in __ptr_ring_peek guarantees that anyone * accessing data through the pointer is up to date. Pairs * with smp_wmb in __ptr_ring_produce. */ ptr = __ptr_ring_peek(r); if (ptr) __ptr_ring_discard_one(r); return ptr; } static inline int __ptr_ring_consume_batched(struct ptr_ring *r, void **array, int n) { void *ptr; int i; for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { ptr = __ptr_ring_consume(r); if (!ptr) break; array[i] = ptr; } return i; } /* * Note: resize (below) nests producer lock within consumer lock, so if you * call this in interrupt or BH context, you must disable interrupts/BH when * producing. */ static inline void *ptr_ring_consume(struct ptr_ring *r) { void *ptr; spin_lock(&r->consumer_lock); ptr = __ptr_ring_consume(r); spin_unlock(&r->consumer_lock); return ptr; } static inline void *ptr_ring_consume_irq(struct ptr_ring *r) { void *ptr; spin_lock_irq(&r->consumer_lock); ptr = __ptr_ring_consume(r); spin_unlock_irq(&r->consumer_lock); return ptr; } static inline void *ptr_ring_consume_any(struct ptr_ring *r) { unsigned long flags; void *ptr; spin_lock_irqsave(&r->consumer_lock, flags); ptr = __ptr_ring_consume(r); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->consumer_lock, flags); return ptr; } static inline void *ptr_ring_consume_bh(struct ptr_ring *r) { void *ptr; spin_lock_bh(&r->consumer_lock); ptr = __ptr_ring_consume(r); spin_unlock_bh(&r->consumer_lock); return ptr; } static inline int ptr_ring_consume_batched(struct ptr_ring *r, void **array, int n) { int ret; spin_lock(&r->consumer_lock); ret = __ptr_ring_consume_batched(r, array, n); spin_unlock(&r->consumer_lock); return ret; } static inline int ptr_ring_consume_batched_irq(struct ptr_ring *r, void **array, int n) { int ret; spin_lock_irq(&r->consumer_lock); ret = __ptr_ring_consume_batched(r, array, n); spin_unlock_irq(&r->consumer_lock); return ret; } static inline int ptr_ring_consume_batched_any(struct ptr_ring *r, void **array, int n) { unsigned long flags; int ret; spin_lock_irqsave(&r->consumer_lock, flags); ret = __ptr_ring_consume_batched(r, array, n); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->consumer_lock, flags); return ret; } static inline int ptr_ring_consume_batched_bh(struct ptr_ring *r, void **array, int n) { int ret; spin_lock_bh(&r->consumer_lock); ret = __ptr_ring_consume_batched(r, array, n); spin_unlock_bh(&r->consumer_lock); return ret; } /* Cast to structure type and call a function without discarding from FIFO. * Function must return a value. * Callers must take consumer_lock. */ #define __PTR_RING_PEEK_CALL(r, f) ((f)(__ptr_ring_peek(r))) #define PTR_RING_PEEK_CALL(r, f) ({ \ typeof((f)(NULL)) __PTR_RING_PEEK_CALL_v; \ \ spin_lock(&(r)->consumer_lock); \ __PTR_RING_PEEK_CALL_v = __PTR_RING_PEEK_CALL(r, f); \ spin_unlock(&(r)->consumer_lock); \ __PTR_RING_PEEK_CALL_v; \ }) #define PTR_RING_PEEK_CALL_IRQ(r, f) ({ \ typeof((f)(NULL)) __PTR_RING_PEEK_CALL_v; \ \ spin_lock_irq(&(r)->consumer_lock); \ __PTR_RING_PEEK_CALL_v = __PTR_RING_PEEK_CALL(r, f); \ spin_unlock_irq(&(r)->consumer_lock); \ __PTR_RING_PEEK_CALL_v; \ }) #define PTR_RING_PEEK_CALL_BH(r, f) ({ \ typeof((f)(NULL)) __PTR_RING_PEEK_CALL_v; \ \ spin_lock_bh(&(r)->consumer_lock); \ __PTR_RING_PEEK_CALL_v = __PTR_RING_PEEK_CALL(r, f); \ spin_unlock_bh(&(r)->consumer_lock); \ __PTR_RING_PEEK_CALL_v; \ }) #define PTR_RING_PEEK_CALL_ANY(r, f) ({ \ typeof((f)(NULL)) __PTR_RING_PEEK_CALL_v; \ unsigned long __PTR_RING_PEEK_CALL_f;\ \ spin_lock_irqsave(&(r)->consumer_lock, __PTR_RING_PEEK_CALL_f); \ __PTR_RING_PEEK_CALL_v = __PTR_RING_PEEK_CALL(r, f); \ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&(r)->consumer_lock, __PTR_RING_PEEK_CALL_f); \ __PTR_RING_PEEK_CALL_v; \ }) /* Not all gfp_t flags (besides GFP_KERNEL) are allowed. See * documentation for vmalloc for which of them are legal. */ static inline void **__ptr_ring_init_queue_alloc(unsigned int size, gfp_t gfp) { if (size > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE / sizeof(void *)) return NULL; return kvmalloc_array(size, sizeof(void *), gfp | __GFP_ZERO); } static inline void __ptr_ring_set_size(struct ptr_ring *r, int size) { r->size = size; r->batch = SMP_CACHE_BYTES * 2 / sizeof(*(r->queue)); /* We need to set batch at least to 1 to make logic * in __ptr_ring_discard_one work correctly. * Batching too much (because ring is small) would cause a lot of * burstiness. Needs tuning, for now disable batching. */ if (r->batch > r->size / 2 || !r->batch) r->batch = 1; } static inline int ptr_ring_init(struct ptr_ring *r, int size, gfp_t gfp) { r->queue = __ptr_ring_init_queue_alloc(size, gfp); if (!r->queue) return -ENOMEM; __ptr_ring_set_size(r, size); r->producer = r->consumer_head = r->consumer_tail = 0; spin_lock_init(&r->producer_lock); spin_lock_init(&r->consumer_lock); return 0; } /* * Return entries into ring. Destroy entries that don't fit. * * Note: this is expected to be a rare slow path operation. * * Note: producer lock is nested within consumer lock, so if you * resize you must make sure all uses nest correctly. * In particular if you consume ring in interrupt or BH context, you must * disable interrupts/BH when doing so. */ static inline void ptr_ring_unconsume(struct ptr_ring *r, void **batch, int n, void (*destroy)(void *)) { unsigned long flags; int head; spin_lock_irqsave(&r->consumer_lock, flags); spin_lock(&r->producer_lock); if (!r->size) goto done; /* * Clean out buffered entries (for simplicity). This way following code * can test entries for NULL and if not assume they are valid. */ head = r->consumer_head - 1; while (likely(head >= r->consumer_tail)) r->queue[head--] = NULL; r->consumer_tail = r->consumer_head; /* * Go over entries in batch, start moving head back and copy entries. * Stop when we run into previously unconsumed entries. */ while (n) { head = r->consumer_head - 1; if (head < 0) head = r->size - 1; if (r->queue[head]) { /* This batch entry will have to be destroyed. */ goto done; } r->queue[head] = batch[--n]; r->consumer_tail = head; /* matching READ_ONCE in __ptr_ring_empty for lockless tests */ WRITE_ONCE(r->consumer_head, head); } done: /* Destroy all entries left in the batch. */ while (n) destroy(batch[--n]); spin_unlock(&r->producer_lock); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->consumer_lock, flags); } static inline void **__ptr_ring_swap_queue(struct ptr_ring *r, void **queue, int size, gfp_t gfp, void (*destroy)(void *)) { int producer = 0; void **old; void *ptr; while ((ptr = __ptr_ring_consume(r))) if (producer < size) queue[producer++] = ptr; else if (destroy) destroy(ptr); if (producer >= size) producer = 0; __ptr_ring_set_size(r, size); r->producer = producer; r->consumer_head = 0; r->consumer_tail = 0; old = r->queue; r->queue = queue; return old; } /* * Note: producer lock is nested within consumer lock, so if you * resize you must make sure all uses nest correctly. * In particular if you consume ring in interrupt or BH context, you must * disable interrupts/BH when doing so. */ static inline int ptr_ring_resize(struct ptr_ring *r, int size, gfp_t gfp, void (*destroy)(void *)) { unsigned long flags; void **queue = __ptr_ring_init_queue_alloc(size, gfp); void **old; if (!queue) return -ENOMEM; spin_lock_irqsave(&(r)->consumer_lock, flags); spin_lock(&(r)->producer_lock); old = __ptr_ring_swap_queue(r, queue, size, gfp, destr