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struct proc_dir_entry; struct net_device; struct sock; struct ctl_table_header; struct net_generic; struct uevent_sock; struct netns_ipvs; struct bpf_prog; #define NETDEV_HASHBITS 8 #define NETDEV_HASHENTRIES (1 << NETDEV_HASHBITS) struct net { /* First cache line can be often dirtied. * Do not place here read-mostly fields. */ refcount_t passive; /* To decide when the network * namespace should be freed. */ refcount_t count; /* To decided when the network * namespace should be shut down. */ spinlock_t rules_mod_lock; unsigned int dev_unreg_count; unsigned int dev_base_seq; /* protected by rtnl_mutex */ int ifindex; spinlock_t nsid_lock; atomic_t fnhe_genid; struct list_head list; /* list of network namespaces */ struct list_head exit_list; /* To linked to call pernet exit * methods on dead net ( * pernet_ops_rwsem read locked), * or to unregister pernet ops * (pernet_ops_rwsem write locked). */ struct llist_node cleanup_list; /* namespaces on death row */ #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS struct key_tag *key_domain; /* Key domain of operation tag */ #endif struct user_namespace *user_ns; /* Owning user namespace */ struct ucounts *ucounts; struct idr netns_ids; struct ns_common ns; struct list_head dev_base_head; struct proc_dir_entry *proc_net; struct proc_dir_entry *proc_net_stat; #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL struct ctl_table_set sysctls; #endif struct sock *rtnl; /* rtnetlink socket */ struct sock *genl_sock; struct uevent_sock *uevent_sock; /* uevent socket */ struct hlist_head *dev_name_head; struct hlist_head *dev_index_head; struct raw_notifier_head netdev_chain; /* Note that @hash_mix can be read millions times per second, * it is critical that it is on a read_mostly cache line. */ u32 hash_mix; struct net_device *loopback_dev; /* The loopback */ /* core fib_rules */ struct list_head rules_ops; struct netns_core core; struct netns_mib mib; struct netns_packet packet; struct netns_unix unx; struct netns_nexthop nexthop; struct netns_ipv4 ipv4; #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) struct netns_ipv6 ipv6; #endif #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IEEE802154_6LOWPAN) struct netns_ieee802154_lowpan ieee802154_lowpan; #endif #if defined(CONFIG_IP_SCTP) || defined(CONFIG_IP_SCTP_MODULE) struct netns_sctp sctp; #endif #if defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP) || defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP_MODULE) struct netns_dccp dccp; #endif #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER struct netns_nf nf; struct netns_xt xt; #if defined(CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK) || defined(CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_MODULE) struct netns_ct ct; #endif #if defined(CONFIG_NF_TABLES) || defined(CONFIG_NF_TABLES_MODULE) struct netns_nftables nft; #endif #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_DEFRAG_IPV6) struct netns_nf_frag nf_frag; struct ctl_table_header *nf_frag_frags_hdr; #endif struct sock *nfnl; struct sock *nfnl_stash; #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETFILTER_NETLINK_ACCT) struct list_head nfnl_acct_list; #endif #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_CT_NETLINK_TIMEOUT) struct list_head nfct_timeout_list; #endif #endif #ifdef CONFIG_WEXT_CORE struct sk_buff_head wext_nlevents; #endif struct net_generic __rcu *gen; /* Used to store attached BPF programs */ struct netns_bpf bpf; /* Note : following structs are cache line aligned */ #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM struct netns_xfrm xfrm; #endif atomic64_t net_cookie; /* written once */ #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_VS) struct netns_ipvs *ipvs; #endif #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MPLS) struct netns_mpls mpls; #endif #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CAN) struct netns_can can; #endif #ifdef CONFIG_XDP_SOCKETS struct netns_xdp xdp; #endif #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER) struct sock *crypto_nlsk; #endif struct sock *diag_nlsk; } __randomize_layout; #include <linux/seq_file_net.h> /* Init's network namespace */ extern struct net init_net; #ifdef CONFIG_NET_NS struct net *copy_net_ns(unsigned long flags, struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct net *old_net); void net_ns_get_ownership(const struct net *net, kuid_t *uid, kgid_t *gid); void net_ns_barrier(void); struct ns_common *get_net_ns(struct ns_common *ns); #else /* CONFIG_NET_NS */ #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/nsproxy.h> static inline struct net *copy_net_ns(unsigned long flags, struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct net *old_net) { if (flags & CLONE_NEWNET) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); return old_net; } static inline void net_ns_get_ownership(const struct net *net, kuid_t *uid, kgid_t *gid) { *uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID; *gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID; } static inline void net_ns_barrier(void) {} static inline struct ns_common *get_net_ns(struct ns_common *ns) { return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } #endif /* CONFIG_NET_NS */ extern struct list_head net_namespace_list; struct net *get_net_ns_by_pid(pid_t pid); struct net *get_net_ns_by_fd(int fd); u64 __net_gen_cookie(struct net *net); #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL void ipx_register_sysctl(void); void ipx_unregister_sysctl(void); #else #define ipx_register_sysctl() #define ipx_unregister_sysctl() #endif #ifdef CONFIG_NET_NS void __put_net(struct net *net); static inline struct net *get_net(struct net *net) { refcount_inc(&net->count); return net; } static inline struct net *maybe_get_net(struct net *net) { /* Used when we know struct net exists but we * aren't guaranteed a previous reference count * exists. If the reference count is zero this * function fails and returns NULL. */ if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&net->count)) net = NULL; return net; } static inline void put_net(struct net *net) { if (refcount_dec_and_test(&net->count)) __put_net(net); } static inline int net_eq(const struct net *net1, const struct net *net2) { return net1 == net2; } static inline int check_net(const struct net *net) { return refcount_read(&net->count) != 0; } void net_drop_ns(void *); #else static inline struct net *get_net(struct net *net) { return net; } static inline void put_net(struct net *net) { } static inline struct net *maybe_get_net(struct net *net) { return net; } static inline int net_eq(const struct net *net1, const struct net *net2) { return 1; } static inline int check_net(const struct net *net) { return 1; } #define net_drop_ns NULL #endif typedef struct { #ifdef CONFIG_NET_NS struct net *net; #endif } possible_net_t; static inline void write_pnet(possible_net_t *pnet, struct net *net) { #ifdef CONFIG_NET_NS pnet->net = net; #endif } static inline struct net *read_pnet(const possible_net_t *pnet) { #ifdef CONFIG_NET_NS return pnet->net; #else return &init_net; #endif } /* Protected by net_rwsem */ #define for_each_net(VAR) \ list_for_each_entry(VAR, &net_namespace_list, list) #define for_each_net_continue_reverse(VAR) \ list_for_each_entry_continue_reverse(VAR, &net_namespace_list, list) #define for_each_net_rcu(VAR) \ list_for_each_entry_rcu(VAR, &net_namespace_list, list) #ifdef CONFIG_NET_NS #define __net_init #define __net_exit #define __net_initdata #define __net_initconst #else #define __net_init __init #define __net_exit __ref #define __net_initdata __initdata #define __net_initconst __initconst #endif int peernet2id_alloc(struct net *net, struct net *peer, gfp_t gfp); int peernet2id(const struct net *net, struct net *peer); bool peernet_has_id(const struct net *net, struct net *peer); struct net *get_net_ns_by_id(const struct net *net, int id); struct pernet_operations { struct list_head list; /* * Below methods are called without any exclusive locks. * More than one net may be constructed and destructed * in parallel on several cpus. Every pernet_operations * have to keep in mind all other pernet_operations and * to introduce a locking, if they share common resources. * * The only time they are called with exclusive lock is * from register_pernet_subsys(), unregister_pernet_subsys() * register_pernet_device() and unregister_pernet_device(). * * Exit methods using blocking RCU primitives, such as * synchronize_rcu(), should be implemented via exit_batch. * Then, destruction of a group of net requires single * synchronize_rcu() related to these pernet_operations, * instead of separate synchronize_rcu() for every net. * Please, avoid synchronize_rcu() at all, where it's possible. * * Note that a combination of pre_exit() and exit() can * be used, since a synchronize_rcu() is guaranteed between * the calls. */ int (*init)(struct net *net); void (*pre_exit)(struct net *net); void (*exit)(struct net *net); void (*exit_batch)(struct list_head *net_exit_list); unsigned int *id; size_t size; }; /* * Use these carefully. If you implement a network device and it * needs per network namespace operations use device pernet operations, * otherwise use pernet subsys operations. * * Network interfaces need to be removed from a dying netns _before_ * subsys notifiers can be called, as most of the network code cleanup * (which is done from subsys notifiers) runs with the assumption that * dev_remove_pack has been called so no new packets will arrive during * and after the cleanup functions have been called. dev_remove_pack * is not per namespace so instead the guarantee of no more packets * arriving in a network namespace is provided by ensuring that all * network devices and all sockets have left the network namespace * before the cleanup methods are called. * * For the longest time the ipv4 icmp code was registered as a pernet * device which caused kernel oops, and panics during network * namespace cleanup. So please don't get this wrong. */ int register_pernet_subsys(struct pernet_operations *); void unregister_pernet_subsys(struct pernet_operations *); int register_pernet_device(struct pernet_operations *); void unregister_pernet_device(struct pernet_operations *); struct ctl_table; struct ctl_table_header; #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL int net_sysctl_init(void); struct ctl_table_header *register_net_sysctl(struct net *net, const char *path, struct ctl_table *table); void unregister_net_sysctl_table(struct ctl_table_header *header); #else static inline int net_sysctl_init(void) { return 0; } static inline struct ctl_table_header *register_net_sysctl(struct net *net, const char *path, struct ctl_table *table) { return NULL; } static inline void unregister_net_sysctl_table(struct ctl_table_header *header) { } #endif static inline int rt_genid_ipv4(const struct net *net) { return atomic_read(&net->ipv4.rt_genid); } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) static inline int rt_genid_ipv6(const struct net *net) { return atomic_read(&net->ipv6.fib6_sernum); } #endif static inline void rt_genid_bump_ipv4(struct net *net) { atomic_inc(&net->ipv4.rt_genid); } extern void (*__fib6_flush_trees)(struct net *net); static inline void rt_genid_bump_ipv6(struct net *net) { if (__fib6_flush_trees) __fib6_flush_trees(net); } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IEEE802154_6LOWPAN) static inline struct netns_ieee802154_lowpan * net_ieee802154_lowpan(struct net *net) { return &net->ieee802154_lowpan; } #endif /* For callers who don't really care about whether it's IPv4 or IPv6 */ static inline void rt_genid_bump_all(struct net *net) { rt_genid_bump_ipv4(net); rt_genid_bump_ipv6(net); } static inline int fnhe_genid(const struct net *net) { return atomic_read(&net->fnhe_genid); } static inline void fnhe_genid_bump(struct net *net) { atomic_inc(&net->fnhe_genid); } #endif /* __NET_NET_NAMESPACE_H */
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1422 1423 1424 1425 1426 1427 1428 1429 1430 1431 1432 1433 1434 1435 1436 1437 1438 1439 1440 1441 1442 1443 1444 1445 1446 1447 1448 1449 1450 1451 1452 1453 1454 1455 1456 1457 1458 1459 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * Linux Socket Filter Data Structures */ #ifndef __LINUX_FILTER_H__ #define __LINUX_FILTER_H__ #include <stdarg.h> #include <linux/atomic.h> #include <linux/refcount.h> #include <linux/compat.h> #include <linux/skbuff.h> #include <linux/linkage.h> #include <linux/printk.h> #include <linux/workqueue.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/set_memory.h> #include <linux/kallsyms.h> #include <linux/if_vlan.h> #include <linux/vmalloc.h> #include <linux/sockptr.h> #include <crypto/sha.h> #include <net/sch_generic.h> #include <asm/byteorder.h> #include <uapi/linux/filter.h> #include <uapi/linux/bpf.h> struct sk_buff; struct sock; struct seccomp_data; struct bpf_prog_aux; struct xdp_rxq_info; struct xdp_buff; struct sock_reuseport; struct ctl_table; struct ctl_table_header; /* ArgX, context and stack frame pointer register positions. Note, * Arg1, Arg2, Arg3, etc are used as argument mappings of function * calls in BPF_CALL instruction. */ #define BPF_REG_ARG1 BPF_REG_1 #define BPF_REG_ARG2 BPF_REG_2 #define BPF_REG_ARG3 BPF_REG_3 #define BPF_REG_ARG4 BPF_REG_4 #define BPF_REG_ARG5 BPF_REG_5 #define BPF_REG_CTX BPF_REG_6 #define BPF_REG_FP BPF_REG_10 /* Additional register mappings for converted user programs. */ #define BPF_REG_A BPF_REG_0 #define BPF_REG_X BPF_REG_7 #define BPF_REG_TMP BPF_REG_2 /* scratch reg */ #define BPF_REG_D BPF_REG_8 /* data, callee-saved */ #define BPF_REG_H BPF_REG_9 /* hlen, callee-saved */ /* Kernel hidden auxiliary/helper register. */ #define BPF_REG_AX MAX_BPF_REG #define MAX_BPF_EXT_REG (MAX_BPF_REG + 1) #define MAX_BPF_JIT_REG MAX_BPF_EXT_REG /* unused opcode to mark special call to bpf_tail_call() helper */ #define BPF_TAIL_CALL 0xf0 /* unused opcode to mark special load instruction. Same as BPF_ABS */ #define BPF_PROBE_MEM 0x20 /* unused opcode to mark call to interpreter with arguments */ #define BPF_CALL_ARGS 0xe0 /* unused opcode to mark speculation barrier for mitigating * Speculative Store Bypass */ #define BPF_NOSPEC 0xc0 /* As per nm, we expose JITed images as text (code) section for * kallsyms. That way, tools like perf can find it to match * addresses. */ #define BPF_SYM_ELF_TYPE 't' /* BPF program can access up to 512 bytes of stack space. */ #define MAX_BPF_STACK 512 /* Helper macros for filter block array initializers. */ /* ALU ops on registers, bpf_add|sub|...: dst_reg += src_reg */ #define BPF_ALU64_REG(OP, DST, SRC) \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_OP(OP) | BPF_X, \ .dst_reg = DST, \ .src_reg = SRC, \ .off = 0, \ .imm = 0 }) #define BPF_ALU32_REG(OP, DST, SRC) \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = BPF_ALU | BPF_OP(OP) | BPF_X, \ .dst_reg = DST, \ .src_reg = SRC, \ .off = 0, \ .imm = 0 }) /* ALU ops on immediates, bpf_add|sub|...: dst_reg += imm32 */ #define BPF_ALU64_IMM(OP, DST, IMM) \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_OP(OP) | BPF_K, \ .dst_reg = DST, \ .src_reg = 0, \ .off = 0, \ .imm = IMM }) #define BPF_ALU32_IMM(OP, DST, IMM) \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = BPF_ALU | BPF_OP(OP) | BPF_K, \ .dst_reg = DST, \ .src_reg = 0, \ .off = 0, \ .imm = IMM }) /* Endianess conversion, cpu_to_{l,b}e(), {l,b}e_to_cpu() */ #define BPF_ENDIAN(TYPE, DST, LEN) \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = BPF_ALU | BPF_END | BPF_SRC(TYPE), \ .dst_reg = DST, \ .src_reg = 0, \ .off = 0, \ .imm = LEN }) /* Short form of mov, dst_reg = src_reg */ #define BPF_MOV64_REG(DST, SRC) \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOV | BPF_X, \ .dst_reg = DST, \ .src_reg = SRC, \ .off = 0, \ .imm = 0 }) #define BPF_MOV32_REG(DST, SRC) \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = BPF_ALU | BPF_MOV | BPF_X, \ .dst_reg = DST, \ .src_reg = SRC, \ .off = 0, \ .imm = 0 }) /* Short form of mov, dst_reg = imm32 */ #define BPF_MOV64_IMM(DST, IMM) \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOV | BPF_K, \ .dst_reg = DST, \ .src_reg = 0, \ .off = 0, \ .imm = IMM }) #define BPF_MOV32_IMM(DST, IMM) \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = BPF_ALU | BPF_MOV | BPF_K, \ .dst_reg = DST, \ .src_reg = 0, \ .off = 0, \ .imm = IMM }) /* Special form of mov32, used for doing explicit zero extension on dst. */ #define BPF_ZEXT_REG(DST) \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = BPF_ALU | BPF_MOV | BPF_X, \ .dst_reg = DST, \ .src_reg = DST, \ .off = 0, \ .imm = 1 }) static inline bool insn_is_zext(const struct bpf_insn *insn) { return insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOV | BPF_X) && insn->imm == 1; } /* BPF_LD_IMM64 macro encodes single 'load 64-bit immediate' insn */ #define BPF_LD_IMM64(DST, IMM) \ BPF_LD_IMM64_RAW(DST, 0, IMM) #define BPF_LD_IMM64_RAW(DST, SRC, IMM) \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = BPF_LD | BPF_DW | BPF_IMM, \ .dst_reg = DST, \ .src_reg = SRC, \ .off = 0, \ .imm = (__u32) (IMM) }), \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = 0, /* zero is reserved opcode */ \ .dst_reg = 0, \ .src_reg = 0, \ .off = 0, \ .imm = ((__u64) (IMM)) >> 32 }) /* pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn used to refer to process-local map_fd */ #define BPF_LD_MAP_FD(DST, MAP_FD) \ BPF_LD_IMM64_RAW(DST, BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD, MAP_FD) /* Short form of mov based on type, BPF_X: dst_reg = src_reg, BPF_K: dst_reg = imm32 */ #define BPF_MOV64_RAW(TYPE, DST, SRC, IMM) \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOV | BPF_SRC(TYPE), \ .dst_reg = DST, \ .src_reg = SRC, \ .off = 0, \ .imm = IMM }) #define BPF_MOV32_RAW(TYPE, DST, SRC, IMM) \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = BPF_ALU | BPF_MOV | BPF_SRC(TYPE), \ .dst_reg = DST, \ .src_reg = SRC, \ .off = 0, \ .imm = IMM }) /* Direct packet access, R0 = *(uint *) (skb->data + imm32) */ #define BPF_LD_ABS(SIZE, IMM) \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = BPF_LD | BPF_SIZE(SIZE) | BPF_ABS, \ .dst_reg = 0, \ .src_reg = 0, \ .off = 0, \ .imm = IMM }) /* Indirect packet access, R0 = *(uint *) (skb->data + src_reg + imm32) */ #define BPF_LD_IND(SIZE, SRC, IMM) \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = BPF_LD | BPF_SIZE(SIZE) | BPF_IND, \ .dst_reg = 0, \ .src_reg = SRC, \ .off = 0, \ .imm = IMM }) /* Memory load, dst_reg = *(uint *) (src_reg + off16) */ #define BPF_LDX_MEM(SIZE, DST, SRC, OFF) \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = BPF_LDX | BPF_SIZE(SIZE) | BPF_MEM, \ .dst_reg = DST, \ .src_reg = SRC, \ .off = OFF, \ .imm = 0 }) /* Memory store, *(uint *) (dst_reg + off16) = src_reg */ #define BPF_STX_MEM(SIZE, DST, SRC, OFF) \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = BPF_STX | BPF_SIZE(SIZE) | BPF_MEM, \ .dst_reg = DST, \ .src_reg = SRC, \ .off = OFF, \ .imm = 0 }) /* Atomic memory add, *(uint *)(dst_reg + off16) += src_reg */ #define BPF_STX_XADD(SIZE, DST, SRC, OFF) \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = BPF_STX | BPF_SIZE(SIZE) | BPF_XADD, \ .dst_reg = DST, \ .src_reg = SRC, \ .off = OFF, \ .imm = 0 }) /* Memory store, *(uint *) (dst_reg + off16) = imm32 */ #define BPF_ST_MEM(SIZE, DST, OFF, IMM) \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = BPF_ST | BPF_SIZE(SIZE) | BPF_MEM, \ .dst_reg = DST, \ .src_reg = 0, \ .off = OFF, \ .imm = IMM }) /* Conditional jumps against registers, if (dst_reg 'op' src_reg) goto pc + off16 */ #define BPF_JMP_REG(OP, DST, SRC, OFF) \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = BPF_JMP | BPF_OP(OP) | BPF_X, \ .dst_reg = DST, \ .src_reg = SRC, \ .off = OFF, \ .imm = 0 }) /* Conditional jumps against immediates, if (dst_reg 'op' imm32) goto pc + off16 */ #define BPF_JMP_IMM(OP, DST, IMM, OFF) \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = BPF_JMP | BPF_OP(OP) | BPF_K, \ .dst_reg = DST, \ .src_reg = 0, \ .off = OFF, \ .imm = IMM }) /* Like BPF_JMP_REG, but with 32-bit wide operands for comparison. */ #define BPF_JMP32_REG(OP, DST, SRC, OFF) \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = BPF_JMP32 | BPF_OP(OP) | BPF_X, \ .dst_reg = DST, \ .src_reg = SRC, \ .off = OFF, \ .imm = 0 }) /* Like BPF_JMP_IMM, but with 32-bit wide operands for comparison. */ #define BPF_JMP32_IMM(OP, DST, IMM, OFF) \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = BPF_JMP32 | BPF_OP(OP) | BPF_K, \ .dst_reg = DST, \ .src_reg = 0, \ .off = OFF, \ .imm = IMM }) /* Unconditional jumps, goto pc + off16 */ #define BPF_JMP_A(OFF) \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = BPF_JMP | BPF_JA, \ .dst_reg = 0, \ .src_reg = 0, \ .off = OFF, \ .imm = 0 }) /* Relative call */ #define BPF_CALL_REL(TGT) \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, \ .dst_reg = 0, \ .src_reg = BPF_PSEUDO_CALL, \ .off = 0, \ .imm = TGT }) /* Function call */ #define BPF_CAST_CALL(x) \ ((u64 (*)(u64, u64, u64, u64, u64))(x)) #define BPF_EMIT_CALL(FUNC) \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, \ .dst_reg = 0, \ .src_reg = 0, \ .off = 0, \ .imm = ((FUNC) - __bpf_call_base) }) /* Raw code statement block */ #define BPF_RAW_INSN(CODE, DST, SRC, OFF, IMM) \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = CODE, \ .dst_reg = DST, \ .src_reg = SRC, \ .off = OFF, \ .imm = IMM }) /* Program exit */ #define BPF_EXIT_INSN() \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT, \ .dst_reg = 0, \ .src_reg = 0, \ .off = 0, \ .imm = 0 }) /* Speculation barrier */ #define BPF_ST_NOSPEC() \ ((struct bpf_insn) { \ .code = BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC, \ .dst_reg = 0, \ .src_reg = 0, \ .off = 0, \ .imm = 0 }) /* Internal classic blocks for direct assignment */ #define __BPF_STMT(CODE, K) \ ((struct sock_filter) BPF_STMT(CODE, K)) #define __BPF_JUMP(CODE, K, JT, JF) \ ((struct sock_filter) BPF_JUMP(CODE, K, JT, JF)) #define bytes_to_bpf_size(bytes) \ ({ \ int bpf_size = -EINVAL; \ \ if (bytes == sizeof(u8)) \ bpf_size = BPF_B; \ else if (bytes == sizeof(u16)) \ bpf_size = BPF_H; \ else if (bytes == sizeof(u32)) \ bpf_size = BPF_W; \ else if (bytes == sizeof(u64)) \ bpf_size = BPF_DW; \ \ bpf_size; \ }) #define bpf_size_to_bytes(bpf_size) \ ({ \ int bytes = -EINVAL; \ \ if (bpf_size == BPF_B) \ bytes = sizeof(u8); \ else if (bpf_size == BPF_H) \ bytes = sizeof(u16); \ else if (bpf_size == BPF_W) \ bytes = sizeof(u32); \ else if (bpf_size == BPF_DW) \ bytes = sizeof(u64); \ \ bytes; \ }) #define BPF_SIZEOF(type) \ ({ \ const int __size = bytes_to_bpf_size(sizeof(type)); \ BUILD_BUG_ON(__size < 0); \ __size; \ }) #define BPF_FIELD_SIZEOF(type, field) \ ({ \ const int __size = bytes_to_bpf_size(sizeof_field(type, field)); \ BUILD_BUG_ON(__size < 0); \ __size; \ }) #define BPF_LDST_BYTES(insn) \ ({ \ const int __size = bpf_size_to_bytes(BPF_SIZE((insn)->code)); \ WARN_ON(__size < 0); \ __size; \ }) #define __BPF_MAP_0(m, v, ...) v #define __BPF_MAP_1(m, v, t, a, ...) m(t, a) #define __BPF_MAP_2(m, v, t, a, ...) m(t, a), __BPF_MAP_1(m, v, __VA_ARGS__) #define __BPF_MAP_3(m, v, t, a, ...) m(t, a), __BPF_MAP_2(m, v, __VA_ARGS__) #define __BPF_MAP_4(m, v, t, a, ...) m(t, a), __BPF_MAP_3(m, v, __VA_ARGS__) #define __BPF_MAP_5(m, v, t, a, ...) m(t, a), __BPF_MAP_4(m, v, __VA_ARGS__) #define __BPF_REG_0(...) __BPF_PAD(5) #define __BPF_REG_1(...) __BPF_MAP(1, __VA_ARGS__), __BPF_PAD(4) #define __BPF_REG_2(...) __BPF_MAP(2, __VA_ARGS__), __BPF_PAD(3) #define __BPF_REG_3(...) __BPF_MAP(3, __VA_ARGS__), __BPF_PAD(2) #define __BPF_REG_4(...) __BPF_MAP(4, __VA_ARGS__), __BPF_PAD(1) #define __BPF_REG_5(...) __BPF_MAP(5, __VA_ARGS__) #define __BPF_MAP(n, ...) __BPF_MAP_##n(__VA_ARGS__) #define __BPF_REG(n, ...) __BPF_REG_##n(__VA_ARGS__) #define __BPF_CAST(t, a) \ (__force t) \ (__force \ typeof(__builtin_choose_expr(sizeof(t) == sizeof(unsigned long), \ (unsigned long)0, (t)0))) a #define __BPF_V void #define __BPF_N #define __BPF_DECL_ARGS(t, a) t a #define __BPF_DECL_REGS(t, a) u64 a #define __BPF_PAD(n) \ __BPF_MAP(n, __BPF_DECL_ARGS, __BPF_N, u64, __ur_1, u64, __ur_2, \ u64, __ur_3, u64, __ur_4, u64, __ur_5) #define BPF_CALL_x(x, name, ...) \ static __always_inline \ u64 ____##name(__BPF_MAP(x, __BPF_DECL_ARGS, __BPF_V, __VA_ARGS__)); \ typedef u64 (*btf_##name)(__BPF_MAP(x, __BPF_DECL_ARGS, __BPF_V, __VA_ARGS__)); \ u64 name(__BPF_REG(x, __BPF_DECL_REGS, __BPF_N, __VA_ARGS__)); \ u64 name(__BPF_REG(x, __BPF_DECL_REGS, __BPF_N, __VA_ARGS__)) \ { \ return ((btf_##name)____##name)(__BPF_MAP(x,__BPF_CAST,__BPF_N,__VA_ARGS__));\ } \ static __always_inline \ u64 ____##name(__BPF_MAP(x, __BPF_DECL_ARGS, __BPF_V, __VA_ARGS__)) #define BPF_CALL_0(name, ...) BPF_CALL_x(0, name, __VA_ARGS__) #define BPF_CALL_1(name, ...) BPF_CALL_x(1, name, __VA_ARGS__) #define BPF_CALL_2(name, ...) BPF_CALL_x(2, name, __VA_ARGS__) #define BPF_CALL_3(name, ...) BPF_CALL_x(3, name, __VA_ARGS__) #define BPF_CALL_4(name, ...) BPF_CALL_x(4, name, __VA_ARGS__) #define BPF_CALL_5(name, ...) BPF_CALL_x(5, name, __VA_ARGS__) #define bpf_ctx_range(TYPE, MEMBER) \ offsetof(TYPE, MEMBER) ... offsetofend(TYPE, MEMBER) - 1 #define bpf_ctx_range_till(TYPE, MEMBER1, MEMBER2) \ offsetof(TYPE, MEMBER1) ... offsetofend(TYPE, MEMBER2) - 1 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 64 # define bpf_ctx_range_ptr(TYPE, MEMBER) \ offsetof(TYPE, MEMBER) ... offsetofend(TYPE, MEMBER) - 1 #else # define bpf_ctx_range_ptr(TYPE, MEMBER) \ offsetof(TYPE, MEMBER) ... offsetof(TYPE, MEMBER) + 8 - 1 #endif /* BITS_PER_LONG == 64 */ #define bpf_target_off(TYPE, MEMBER, SIZE, PTR_SIZE) \ ({ \ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof_field(TYPE, MEMBER) != (SIZE)); \ *(PTR_SIZE) = (SIZE); \ offsetof(TYPE, MEMBER); \ }) /* A struct sock_filter is architecture independent. */ struct compat_sock_fprog { u16 len; compat_uptr_t filter; /* struct sock_filter * */ }; struct sock_fprog_kern { u16 len; struct sock_filter *filter; }; /* Some arches need doubleword alignment for their instructions and/or data */ #define BPF_IMAGE_ALIGNMENT 8 struct bpf_binary_header { u32 pages; u8 image[] __aligned(BPF_IMAGE_ALIGNMENT); }; struct bpf_prog { u16 pages; /* Number of allocated pages */ u16 jited:1, /* Is our filter JIT'ed? */ jit_requested:1,/* archs need to JIT the prog */ gpl_compatible:1, /* Is filter GPL compatible? */ cb_access:1, /* Is control block accessed? */ dst_needed:1, /* Do we need dst entry? */ blinded:1, /* Was blinded */ is_func:1, /* program is a bpf function */ kprobe_override:1, /* Do we override a kprobe? */ has_callchain_buf:1, /* callchain buffer allocated? */ enforce_expected_attach_type:1, /* Enforce expected_attach_type checking at attach time */ call_get_stack:1; /* Do we call bpf_get_stack() or bpf_get_stackid() */ enum bpf_prog_type type; /* Type of BPF program */ enum bpf_attach_type expected_attach_type; /* For some prog types */ u32 len; /* Number of filter blocks */ u32 jited_len; /* Size of jited insns in bytes */ u8 tag[BPF_TAG_SIZE]; struct bpf_prog_aux *aux; /* Auxiliary fields */ struct sock_fprog_kern *orig_prog; /* Original BPF program */ unsigned int (*bpf_func)(const void *ctx, const struct bpf_insn *insn); /* Instructions for interpreter */ struct sock_filter insns[0]; struct bpf_insn insnsi[]; }; struct sk_filter { refcount_t refcnt; struct rcu_head rcu; struct bpf_prog *prog; }; DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(bpf_stats_enabled_key); #define __BPF_PROG_RUN(prog, ctx, dfunc) ({ \ u32 __ret; \ cant_migrate(); \ if (static_branch_unlikely(&bpf_stats_enabled_key)) { \ struct bpf_prog_stats *__stats; \ u64 __start = sched_clock(); \ __ret = dfunc(ctx, (prog)->insnsi, (prog)->bpf_func); \ __stats = this_cpu_ptr(prog->aux->stats); \ u64_stats_update_begin(&__stats->syncp); \ __stats->cnt++; \ __stats->nsecs += sched_clock() - __start; \ u64_stats_update_end(&__stats->syncp); \ } else { \ __ret = dfunc(ctx, (prog)->insnsi, (prog)->bpf_func); \ } \ __ret; }) #define BPF_PROG_RUN(prog, ctx) \ __BPF_PROG_RUN(prog, ctx, bpf_dispatcher_nop_func) /* * Use in preemptible and therefore migratable context to make sure that * the execution of the BPF program runs on one CPU. * * This uses migrate_disable/enable() explicitly to document that the * invocation of a BPF program does not require reentrancy protection * against a BPF program which is invoked from a preempting task. * * For non RT enabled kernels migrate_disable/enable() maps to * preempt_disable/enable(), i.e. it disables also preemption. */ static inline u32 bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu(const struct bpf_prog *prog, const void *ctx) { u32 ret; migrate_disable(); ret = __BPF_PROG_RUN(prog, ctx, bpf_dispatcher_nop_func); migrate_enable(); return ret; } #define BPF_SKB_CB_LEN QDISC_CB_PRIV_LEN struct bpf_skb_data_end { struct qdisc_skb_cb qdisc_cb; void *data_meta; void *data_end; }; struct bpf_nh_params { u32 nh_family; union { u32 ipv4_nh; struct in6_addr ipv6_nh; }; }; struct bpf_redirect_info { u32 flags; u32 tgt_index; void *tgt_value; struct bpf_map *map; u32 kern_flags; struct bpf_nh_params nh; }; DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct bpf_redirect_info, bpf_redirect_info); /* flags for bpf_redirect_info kern_flags */ #define BPF_RI_F_RF_NO_DIRECT BIT(0) /* no napi_direct on return_frame */ /* Compute the linear packet data range [data, data_end) which * will be accessed by various program types (cls_bpf, act_bpf, * lwt, ...). Subsystems allowing direct data access must (!) * ensure that cb[] area can be written to when BPF program is * invoked (otherwise cb[] save/restore is necessary). */ static inline void bpf_compute_data_pointers(struct sk_buff *skb) { struct bpf_skb_data_end *cb = (struct bpf_skb_data_end *)skb->cb; BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*cb) > sizeof_field(struct sk_buff, cb)); cb->data_meta = skb->data - skb_metadata_len(skb); cb->data_end = skb->data + skb_headlen(skb); } /* Similar to bpf_compute_data_pointers(), except that save orginal * data in cb->data and cb->meta_data for restore. */ static inline void bpf_compute_and_save_data_end( struct sk_buff *skb, void **saved_data_end) { struct bpf_skb_data_end *cb = (struct bpf_skb_data_end *)skb->cb; *saved_data_end = cb->data_end; cb->data_end = skb->data + skb_headlen(skb); } /* Restore data saved by bpf_compute_data_pointers(). */ static inline void bpf_restore_data_end( struct sk_buff *skb, void *saved_data_end) { struct bpf_skb_data_end *cb = (struct bpf_skb_data_end *)skb->cb; cb->data_end = saved_data_end; } static inline u8 *bpf_skb_cb(struct sk_buff *skb) { /* eBPF programs may read/write skb->cb[] area to transfer meta * data between tail calls. Since this also needs to work with * tc, that scratch memory is mapped to qdisc_skb_cb's data area. * * In some socket filter cases, the cb unfortunately needs to be * saved/restored so that protocol specific skb->cb[] data won't * be lost. In any case, due to unpriviledged eBPF programs * attached to sockets, we need to clear the bpf_skb_cb() area * to not leak previous contents to user space. */ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof_field(struct __sk_buff, cb) != BPF_SKB_CB_LEN); BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof_field(struct __sk_buff, cb) != sizeof_field(struct qdisc_skb_cb, data)); return qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->data; } /* Must be invoked with migration disabled */ static inline u32 __bpf_prog_run_save_cb(const struct bpf_prog *prog, struct sk_buff *skb) { u8 *cb_data = bpf_skb_cb(skb); u8 cb_saved[BPF_SKB_CB_LEN]; u32 res; if (unlikely(prog->cb_access)) { memcpy(cb_saved, cb_data, sizeof(cb_saved)); memset(cb_data, 0, sizeof(cb_saved)); } res = BPF_PROG_RUN(prog, skb); if (unlikely(prog->cb_access)) memcpy(cb_data, cb_saved, sizeof(cb_saved)); return res; } static inline u32 bpf_prog_run_save_cb(const struct bpf_prog *prog, struct sk_buff *skb) { u32 res; migrate_disable(); res = __bpf_prog_run_save_cb(prog, skb); migrate_enable(); return res; } static inline u32 bpf_prog_run_clear_cb(const struct bpf_prog *prog, struct sk_buff *skb) { u8 *cb_data = bpf_skb_cb(skb); u32 res; if (unlikely(prog->cb_access)) memset(cb_data, 0, BPF_SKB_CB_LEN); res = bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu(prog, skb); return res; } DECLARE_BPF_DISPATCHER(xdp) static __always_inline u32 bpf_prog_run_xdp(const struct bpf_prog *prog, struct xdp_buff *xdp) { /* Caller needs to hold rcu_read_lock() (!), otherwise program * can be released while still running, or map elements could be * freed early while still having concurrent users. XDP fastpath * already takes rcu_read_lock() when fetching the program, so * it's not necessary here anymore. */ return __BPF_PROG_RUN(prog, xdp, BPF_DISPATCHER_FUNC(xdp)); } void bpf_prog_change_xdp(struct bpf_prog *prev_prog, struct bpf_prog *prog); static inline u32 bpf_prog_insn_size(const struct bpf_prog *prog) { return prog->len * sizeof(struct bpf_insn); } static inline u32 bpf_prog_tag_scratch_size(const struct bpf_prog *prog) { return round_up(bpf_prog_insn_size(prog) + sizeof(__be64) + 1, SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE); } static inline unsigned int bpf_prog_size(unsigned int proglen) { return max(sizeof(struct bpf_prog), offsetof(struct bpf_prog, insns[proglen])); } static inline bool bpf_prog_was_classic(const struct bpf_prog *prog) { /* When classic BPF programs have been loaded and the arch * does not have a classic BPF JIT (anymore), they have been * converted via bpf_migrate_filter() to eBPF and thus always * have an unspec program type. */ return prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_UNSPEC; } static inline u32 bpf_ctx_off_adjust_machine(u32 size) { const u32 size_machine = sizeof(unsigned long); if (size > size_machine && size % size_machine == 0) size = size_machine; return size; } static inline bool bpf_ctx_narrow_access_ok(u32 off, u32 size, u32 size_default) { return size <= size_default && (size & (size - 1)) == 0; } static inline u8 bpf_ctx_narrow_access_offset(u32 off, u32 size, u32 size_default) { u8 access_off = off & (size_default - 1); #ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN return access_off; #else return size_default - (access_off + size); #endif } #define bpf_ctx_wide_access_ok(off, size, type, field) \ (size == sizeof(__u64) && \ off >= offsetof(type, field) && \ off + sizeof(__u64) <= offsetofend(type, field) && \ off % sizeof(__u64) == 0) #define bpf_classic_proglen(fprog) (fprog->len * sizeof(fprog->filter[0])) static inline void bpf_prog_lock_ro(struct bpf_prog *fp) { #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON if (!fp->jited) { set_vm_flush_reset_perms(fp); set_memory_ro((unsigned long)fp, fp->pages); } #endif } static inline void bpf_jit_binary_lock_ro(struct bpf_binary_header *hdr) { set_vm_flush_reset_perms(hdr); set_memory_ro((unsigned long)hdr, hdr->pages); set_memory_x((unsigned long)hdr, hdr->pages); } static inline struct bpf_binary_header * bpf_jit_binary_hdr(const struct bpf_prog *fp) { unsigned long real_start = (unsigned long)fp->bpf_func; unsigned long addr = real_start & PAGE_MASK; return (void *)addr; } int sk_filter_trim_cap(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int cap); static inline int sk_filter(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { return sk_filter_trim_cap(sk, skb, 1); } struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_select_runtime(struct bpf_prog *fp, int *err); void bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *fp); bool bpf_opcode_in_insntable(u8 code); void bpf_prog_free_linfo(struct bpf_prog *prog); void bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo(struct bpf_prog *prog, const u32 *insn_to_jit_off); int bpf_prog_alloc_jited_linfo(struct bpf_prog *prog); void bpf_prog_free_jited_linfo(struct bpf_prog *prog); void bpf_prog_free_unused_jited_linfo(struct bpf_prog *prog); struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_alloc(unsigned int size, gfp_t gfp_extra_flags); struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats(unsigned int size, gfp_t gfp_extra_flags); struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_realloc(struct bpf_prog *fp_old, unsigned int size, gfp_t gfp_extra_flags); void __bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *fp); static inline void bpf_prog_unlock_free(struct bpf_prog *fp) { __bpf_prog_free(fp); } typedef int (*bpf_aux_classic_check_t)(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen); int bpf_prog_create(struct bpf_prog **pfp, struct sock_fprog_kern *fprog); int bpf_prog_create_from_user(struct bpf_prog **pfp, struct sock_fprog *fprog, bpf_aux_classic_check_t trans, bool save_orig); void bpf_prog_destroy(struct bpf_prog *fp); int sk_attach_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog, struct sock *sk); int sk_attach_bpf(u32 ufd, struct sock *sk); int sk_reuseport_attach_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog, struct sock *sk); int sk_reuseport_attach_bpf(u32 ufd, struct sock *sk); void sk_reuseport_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *prog); int sk_detach_filter(struct sock *sk); int sk_get_filter(struct sock *sk, struct sock_filter __user *filter, unsigned int len); bool sk_filter_charge(struct sock *sk, struct sk_filter *fp); void sk_filter_uncharge(struct sock *sk, struct sk_filter *fp); u64 __bpf_call_base(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5); #define __bpf_call_base_args \ ((u64 (*)(u64, u64, u64, u64, u64, const struct bpf_insn *)) \ (void *)__bpf_call_base) struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog); void bpf_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog); bool bpf_jit_needs_zext(void); bool bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(void *func); static inline bool bpf_dump_raw_ok(const struct cred *cred) { /* Reconstruction of call-sites is dependent on kallsyms, * thus make dump the same restriction. */ return kallsyms_show_value(cred); } struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_single(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off, const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len); int bpf_remove_insns(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off, u32 cnt); void bpf_clear_redirect_map(struct bpf_map *map); static inline bool xdp_return_frame_no_direct(void) { struct bpf_redirect_info *ri = this_cpu_ptr(&bpf_redirect_info); return ri->kern_flags & BPF_RI_F_RF_NO_DIRECT; } static inline void xdp_set_return_frame_no_direct(void) { struct bpf_redirect_info *ri = this_cpu_ptr(&bpf_redirect_info); ri->kern_flags |= BPF_RI_F_RF_NO_DIRECT; } static inline void xdp_clear_return_frame_no_direct(void) { struct bpf_redirect_info *ri = this_cpu_ptr(&bpf_redirect_info); ri->kern_flags &= ~BPF_RI_F_RF_NO_DIRECT; } static inline int xdp_ok_fwd_dev(const struct net_device *fwd, unsigned int pktlen) { unsigned int len; if (unlikely(!(fwd->flags & IFF_UP))) return -ENETDOWN; len = fwd->mtu + fwd->hard_header_len + VLAN_HLEN; if (pktlen > len) return -EMSGSIZE; return 0; } /* The pair of xdp_do_redirect and xdp_do_flush MUST be called in the * same cpu context. Further for best results no more than a single map * for the do_redirect/do_flush pair should be used. This limitation is * because we only track one map and force a flush when the map changes. * This does not appear to be a real limitation for existing software. */ int xdp_do_generic_redirect(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb, struct xdp_buff *xdp, struct bpf_prog *prog); int xdp_do_redirect(struct net_device *dev, struct xdp_buff *xdp, struct bpf_prog *prog); void xdp_do_flush(void); /* The xdp_do_flush_map() helper has been renamed to drop the _map suffix, as * it is no longer only flushing maps. Keep this define for compatibility * until all drivers are updated - do not use xdp_do_flush_map() in new code! */ #define xdp_do_flush_map xdp_do_flush void bpf_warn_invalid_xdp_action(u32 act); #ifdef CONFIG_INET struct sock *bpf_run_sk_reuseport(struct sock_reuseport *reuse, struct sock *sk, struct bpf_prog *prog, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 hash); #else static inline struct sock * bpf_run_sk_reuseport(struct sock_reuseport *reuse, struct sock *sk, struct bpf_prog *prog, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 hash) { return NULL; } #endif #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT extern int bpf_jit_enable; extern int bpf_jit_harden; extern int bpf_jit_kallsyms; extern long bpf_jit_limit; extern long bpf_jit_limit_max; typedef void (*bpf_jit_fill_hole_t)(void *area, unsigned int size); struct bpf_binary_header * bpf_jit_binary_alloc(unsigned int proglen, u8 **image_ptr, unsigned int alignment, bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns); void bpf_jit_binary_free(struct bpf_binary_header *hdr); u64 bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit(void); void *bpf_jit_alloc_exec(unsigned long size); void bpf_jit_free_exec(void *addr); void bpf_jit_free(struct bpf_prog *fp); int bpf_jit_add_poke_descriptor(struct bpf_prog *prog, struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *poke); int bpf_jit_get_func_addr(const struct bpf_prog *prog, const struct bpf_insn *insn, bool extra_pass, u64 *func_addr, bool *func_addr_fixed); struct bpf_prog *bpf_jit_blind_constants(struct bpf_prog *fp); void bpf_jit_prog_release_other(struct bpf_prog *fp, struct bpf_prog *fp_other); static inline void bpf_jit_dump(unsigned int flen, unsigned int proglen, u32 pass, void *image) { pr_err("flen=%u proglen=%u pass=%u image=%pK from=%s pid=%d\n", flen, proglen, pass, image, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current)); if (image) print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "JIT code: ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 1, image, proglen, false); } static inline bool bpf_jit_is_ebpf(void) { # ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_EBPF_JIT return true; # else return false; # endif } static inline bool ebpf_jit_enabled(void) { return bpf_jit_enable && bpf_jit_is_ebpf(); } static inline bool bpf_prog_ebpf_jited(const struct bpf_prog *fp) { return fp->jited && bpf_jit_is_ebpf(); } static inline bool bpf_jit_blinding_enabled(struct bpf_prog *prog) { /* These are the prerequisites, should someone ever have the * idea to call blinding outside of them, we make sure to * bail out. */ if (!bpf_jit_is_ebpf()) return false; if (!prog->jit_requested) return false; if (!bpf_jit_harden) return false; if (bpf_jit_harden == 1 && capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return false; return true; } static inline bool bpf_jit_kallsyms_enabled(void) { /* There are a couple of corner cases where kallsyms should * not be enabled f.e. on hardening. */ if (bpf_jit_harden) return false; if (!bpf_jit_kallsyms) return false; if (bpf_jit_kallsyms == 1) return true; return false; } const char *__bpf_address_lookup(unsigned long addr, unsigned long *size, unsigned long *off, char *sym); bool is_bpf_text_address(unsigned long addr); int bpf_get_kallsym(unsigned int symnum, unsigned long *value, char *type, char *sym); static inline const char * bpf_address_lookup(unsigned long addr, unsigned long *size, unsigned long *off, char **modname, char *sym) { const char *ret = __bpf_address_lookup(addr, size, off, sym); if (ret && modname) *modname = NULL; return ret; } void bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(struct bpf_prog *fp); void bpf_prog_kallsyms_del(struct bpf_prog *fp); #else /* CONFIG_BPF_JIT */ static inline bool ebpf_jit_enabled(void) { return false; } static inline bool bpf_jit_blinding_enabled(struct bpf_prog *prog) { return false; } static inline bool bpf_prog_ebpf_jited(const struct bpf_prog *fp) { return false; } static inline int bpf_jit_add_poke_descriptor(struct bpf_prog *prog, struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *poke) { return -ENOTSUPP; } static inline void bpf_jit_free(struct bpf_prog *fp) { bpf_prog_unlock_free(fp); } static inline bool bpf_jit_kallsyms_enabled(void) { return false; } static inline const char * __bpf_address_lookup(unsigned long addr, unsigned long *size, unsigned long *off, char *sym) { return NULL; } static inline bool is_bpf_text_address(unsigned long addr) { return false; } static inline int bpf_get_kallsym(unsigned int symnum, unsigned long *value, char *type, char *sym) { return -ERANGE; } static inline const char * bpf_address_lookup(unsigned long addr, unsigned long *size, unsigned long *off, char **modname, char *sym) { return NULL; } static inline void bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(struct bpf_prog *fp) { } static inline void bpf_prog_kallsyms_del(struct bpf_prog *fp) { } #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_JIT */ void bpf_prog_kallsyms_del_all(struct bpf_prog *fp); #define BPF_ANC BIT(15) static inline bool bpf_needs_clear_a(const struct sock_filter *first) { switch (first->code) { case BPF_RET | BPF_K: case BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_LEN: return false; case BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS: case BPF_LD | BPF_H | BPF_ABS: case BPF_LD | BPF_B | BPF_ABS: if (first->k == SKF_AD_OFF + SKF_AD_ALU_XOR_X) return true; return false; default: return true; } } static inline u16 bpf_anc_helper(const struct sock_filter *ftest) { BUG_ON(ftest->code & BPF_ANC); switch (ftest->code) { case BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS: case BPF_LD | BPF_H | BPF_ABS: case BPF_LD | BPF_B | BPF_ABS: #define BPF_ANCILLARY(CODE) case SKF_AD_OFF + SKF_AD_##CODE: \ return BPF_ANC | SKF_AD_##CODE switch (ftest->k) { BPF_ANCILLARY(PROTOCOL); BPF_ANCILLARY(PKTTYPE); BPF_ANCILLARY(IFINDEX); BPF_ANCILLARY(NLATTR); BPF_ANCILLARY(NLATTR_NEST); BPF_ANCILLARY(MARK); BPF_ANCILLARY(QUEUE); BPF_ANCILLARY(HATYPE); BPF_ANCILLARY(RXHASH); BPF_ANCILLARY(CPU); BPF_ANCILLARY(ALU_XOR_X); BPF_ANCILLARY(VLAN_TAG); BPF_ANCILLARY(VLAN_TAG_PRESENT); BPF_ANCILLARY(PAY_OFFSET); BPF_ANCILLARY(RANDOM); BPF_ANCILLARY(VLAN_TPID); } fallthrough; default: return ftest->code; } } void *bpf_internal_load_pointer_neg_helper(const struct sk_buff *skb, int k, unsigned int size); static inline void *bpf_load_pointer(const struct sk_buff *skb, int k, unsigned int size, void *buffer) { if (k >= 0) return skb_header_pointer(skb, k, size, buffer); return bpf_internal_load_pointer_neg_helper(skb, k, size); } static inline int bpf_tell_extensions(void) { return SKF_AD_MAX; } struct bpf_sock_addr_kern { struct sock *sk; struct sockaddr *uaddr; /* Temporary "register" to make indirect stores to nested structures * defined above. We need three registers to make such a store, but * only two (src and dst) are available at convert_ctx_access time */ u64 tmp_reg; void *t_ctx; /* Attach type specific context. */ }; struct bpf_sock_ops_kern { struct sock *sk; union { u32 args[4]; u32 reply; u32 replylong[4]; }; struct sk_buff *syn_skb; struct sk_buff *skb; void *skb_data_end; u8 op; u8 is_fullsock; u8 remaining_opt_len; u64 temp; /* temp and everything after is not * initialized to 0 before calling * the BPF program. New fields that * should be initialized to 0 should * be inserted before temp. * temp is scratch storage used by * sock_ops_convert_ctx_access * as temporary storage of a register. */ }; struct bpf_sysctl_kern { struct ctl_table_header *head; struct ctl_table *table; void *cur_val; size_t cur_len; void *new_val; size_t new_len; int new_updated; int write; loff_t *ppos; /* Temporary "register" for indirect stores to ppos. */ u64 tmp_reg; }; struct bpf_sockopt_kern { struct sock *sk; u8 *optval; u8 *optval_end; s32 level; s32 optname; s32 optlen; s32 retval; }; int copy_bpf_fprog_from_user(struct sock_fprog *dst, sockptr_t src, int len); struct bpf_sk_lookup_kern { u16 family; u16 protocol; __be16 sport; u16 dport; struct { __be32 saddr; __be32 daddr; } v4; struct { const struct in6_addr *saddr; const struct in6_addr *daddr; } v6; struct sock *selected_sk; bool no_reuseport; }; extern struct static_key_false bpf_sk_lookup_enabled; /* Runners for BPF_SK_LOOKUP programs to invoke on socket lookup. * * Allowed return values for a BPF SK_LOOKUP program are SK_PASS and * SK_DROP. Their meaning is as follows: * * SK_PASS && ctx.selected_sk != NULL: use selected_sk as lookup result * SK_PASS && ctx.selected_sk == NULL: continue to htable-based socket lookup * SK_DROP : terminate lookup with -ECONNREFUSED * * This macro aggregates return values and selected sockets from * multiple BPF programs according to following rules in order: * * 1. If any program returned SK_PASS and a non-NULL ctx.selected_sk, * macro result is SK_PASS and last ctx.selected_sk is used. * 2. If any program returned SK_DROP return value, * macro result is SK_DROP. * 3. Otherwise result is SK_PASS and ctx.selected_sk is NULL. * * Caller must ensure that the prog array is non-NULL, and that the * array as well as the programs it contains remain valid. */ #define BPF_PROG_SK_LOOKUP_RUN_ARRAY(array, ctx, func) \ ({ \ struct bpf_sk_lookup_kern *_ctx = &(ctx); \ struct bpf_prog_array_item *_item; \ struct sock *_selected_sk = NULL; \ bool _no_reuseport = false; \ struct bpf_prog *_prog; \ bool _all_pass = true; \ u32 _ret; \ \ migrate_disable(); \ _item = &(array)->items[0]; \ while ((_prog = READ_ONCE(_item->prog))) { \ /* restore most recent selection */ \ _ctx->selected_sk = _selected_sk; \ _ctx->no_reuseport = _no_reuseport; \ \ _ret = func(_prog, _ctx); \ if (_ret == SK_PASS && _ctx->selected_sk) { \ /* remember last non-NULL socket */ \ _selected_sk = _ctx->selected_sk; \ _no_reuseport = _ctx->no_reuseport; \ } else if (_ret == SK_DROP && _all_pass) { \ _all_pass = false; \ } \ _item++; \ } \ _ctx->selected_sk = _selected_sk; \ _ctx->no_reuseport = _no_reuseport; \ migrate_enable(); \ _all_pass || _selected_sk ? SK_PASS : SK_DROP; \ }) static inline bool bpf_sk_lookup_run_v4(struct net *net, int protocol, const __be32 saddr, const __be16 sport, const __be32 daddr, const u16 dport, struct sock **psk) { struct bpf_prog_array *run_array; struct sock *selected_sk = NULL; bool no_reuseport = false; rcu_read_lock(); run_array = rcu_dereference(net->bpf.run_array[NETNS_BPF_SK_LOOKUP]); if (run_array) { struct bpf_sk_lookup_kern ctx = { .family = AF_INET, .protocol = protocol, .v4.saddr = saddr, .v4.daddr = daddr, .sport = sport, .dport = dport, }; u32 act; act = BPF_PROG_SK_LOOKUP_RUN_ARRAY(run_array, ctx, BPF_PROG_RUN); if (act == SK_PASS) { selected_sk = ctx.selected_sk; no_reuseport = ctx.no_reuseport; } else { selected_sk = ERR_PTR(-ECONNREFUSED); } } rcu_read_unlock(); *psk = selected_sk; return no_reuseport; } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) static inline bool bpf_sk_lookup_run_v6(struct net *net, int protocol, const struct in6_addr *saddr, const __be16 sport, const struct in6_addr *daddr, const u16 dport, struct sock **psk) { struct bpf_prog_array *run_array; struct sock *selected_sk = NULL; bool no_reuseport = false; rcu_read_lock(); run_array = rcu_dereference(net->bpf.run_array[NETNS_BPF_SK_LOOKUP]); if (run_array) { struct bpf_sk_lookup_kern ctx = { .family = AF_INET6, .protocol = protocol, .v6.saddr = saddr, .v6.daddr = daddr, .sport = sport, .dport = dport, }; u32 act; act = BPF_PROG_SK_LOOKUP_RUN_ARRAY(run_array, ctx, BPF_PROG_RUN); if (act == SK_PASS) { selected_sk = ctx.selected_sk; no_reuseport = ctx.no_reuseport; } else { selected_sk = ERR_PTR(-ECONNREFUSED); } } rcu_read_unlock(); *psk = selected_sk; return no_reuseport; } #endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) */ #endif /* __LINUX_FILTER_H__ */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef _ASM_X86_TLB_H #define _ASM_X86_TLB_H #define tlb_start_vma(tlb, vma) do { } while (0) #define tlb_end_vma(tlb, vma) do { } while (0) #define __tlb_remove_tlb_entry(tlb, ptep, address) do { } while (0) #define tlb_flush tlb_flush static inline void tlb_flush(struct mmu_gather *tlb); #include <asm-generic/tlb.h> static inline void tlb_flush(struct mmu_gather *tlb) { unsigned long start = 0UL, end = TLB_FLUSH_ALL; unsigned int stride_shift = tlb_get_unmap_shift(tlb); if (!tlb->fullmm && !tlb->need_flush_all) { start = tlb->start; end = tlb->end; } flush_tlb_mm_range(tlb->mm, start, end, stride_shift, tlb->freed_tables); } /* * While x86 architecture in general requires an IPI to perform TLB * shootdown, enablement code for several hypervisors overrides * .flush_tlb_others hook in pv_mmu_ops and implements it by issuing * a hypercall. To keep software pagetable walkers safe in this case we * switch to RCU based table free (MMU_GATHER_RCU_TABLE_FREE). See the comment * below 'ifdef CONFIG_MMU_GATHER_RCU_TABLE_FREE' in include/asm-generic/tlb.h * for more details. */ static inline void __tlb_remove_table(void *table) { free_page_and_swap_cache(table); } #endif /* _ASM_X86_TLB_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef __SOUND_CORE_H #define __SOUND_CORE_H /* * Main header file for the ALSA driver * Copyright (c) 1994-2001 by Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz> */ #include <linux/device.h> #include <linux/sched.h> /* wake_up() */ #include <linux/mutex.h> /* struct mutex */ #include <linux/rwsem.h> /* struct rw_semaphore */ #include <linux/pm.h> /* pm_message_t */ #include <linux/stringify.h> #include <linux/printk.h> /* number of supported soundcards */ #ifdef CONFIG_SND_DYNAMIC_MINORS #define SNDRV_CARDS CONFIG_SND_MAX_CARDS #else #define SNDRV_CARDS 8 /* don't change - minor numbers */ #endif #define CONFIG_SND_MAJOR 116 /* standard configuration */ /* forward declarations */ struct pci_dev; struct module; struct completion; /* device allocation stuff */ /* type of the object used in snd_device_*() * this also defines the calling order */ enum snd_device_type { SNDRV_DEV_LOWLEVEL, SNDRV_DEV_INFO, SNDRV_DEV_BUS, SNDRV_DEV_CODEC, SNDRV_DEV_PCM, SNDRV_DEV_COMPRESS, SNDRV_DEV_RAWMIDI, SNDRV_DEV_TIMER, SNDRV_DEV_SEQUENCER, SNDRV_DEV_HWDEP, SNDRV_DEV_JACK, SNDRV_DEV_CONTROL, /* NOTE: this must be the last one */ }; enum snd_device_state { SNDRV_DEV_BUILD, SNDRV_DEV_REGISTERED, SNDRV_DEV_DISCONNECTED, }; struct snd_device; struct snd_device_ops { int (*dev_free)(struct snd_device *dev); int (*dev_register)(struct snd_device *dev); int (*dev_disconnect)(struct snd_device *dev); }; struct snd_device { struct list_head list; /* list of registered devices */ struct snd_card *card; /* card which holds this device */ enum snd_device_state state; /* state of the device */ enum snd_device_type type; /* device type */ void *device_data; /* device structure */ const struct snd_device_ops *ops; /* operations */ }; #define snd_device(n) list_entry(n, struct snd_device, list) /* main structure for soundcard */ struct snd_card { int number; /* number of soundcard (index to snd_cards) */ char id[16]; /* id string of this card */ char driver[16]; /* driver name */ char shortname[32]; /* short name of this soundcard */ char longname[80]; /* name of this soundcard */ char irq_descr[32]; /* Interrupt description */ char mixername[80]; /* mixer name */ char components[128]; /* card components delimited with space */ struct module *module; /* top-level module */ void *private_data; /* private data for soundcard */ void (*private_free) (struct snd_card *card); /* callback for freeing of private data */ struct list_head devices; /* devices */ struct device ctl_dev; /* control device */ unsigned int last_numid; /* last used numeric ID */ struct rw_semaphore controls_rwsem; /* controls list lock */ rwlock_t ctl_files_rwlock; /* ctl_files list lock */ int controls_count; /* count of all controls */ int user_ctl_count; /* count of all user controls */ struct list_head controls; /* all controls for this card */ struct list_head ctl_files; /* active control files */ struct snd_info_entry *proc_root; /* root for soundcard specific files */ struct proc_dir_entry *proc_root_link; /* number link to real id */ struct list_head files_list; /* all files associated to this card */ struct snd_shutdown_f_ops *s_f_ops; /* file operations in the shutdown state */ spinlock_t files_lock; /* lock the files for this card */ int shutdown; /* this card is going down */ struct completion *release_completion; struct device *dev; /* device assigned to this card */ struct device card_dev; /* cardX object for sysfs */ const struct attribute_group *dev_groups[4]; /* assigned sysfs attr */ bool registered; /* card_dev is registered? */ int sync_irq; /* assigned irq, used for PCM sync */ wait_queue_head_t remove_sleep; size_t total_pcm_alloc_bytes; /* total amount of allocated buffers */ struct mutex memory_mutex; /* protection for the above */ #ifdef CONFIG_PM unsigned int power_state; /* power state */ wait_queue_head_t power_sleep; #endif #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SND_MIXER_OSS) struct snd_mixer_oss *mixer_oss; int mixer_oss_change_count; #endif }; #define dev_to_snd_card(p) container_of(p, struct snd_card, card_dev) #ifdef CONFIG_PM static inline unsigned int snd_power_get_state(struct snd_card *card) { return card->power_state; } static inline void snd_power_change_state(struct snd_card *card, unsigned int state) { card->power_state = state; wake_up(&card->power_sleep); } /* init.c */ int snd_power_wait(struct snd_card *card, unsigned int power_state); #else /* ! CONFIG_PM */ static inline int snd_power_wait(struct snd_card *card, unsigned int state) { return 0; } #define snd_power_get_state(card) ({ (void)(card); SNDRV_CTL_POWER_D0; }) #define snd_power_change_state(card, state) do { (void)(card); } while (0) #endif /* CONFIG_PM */ struct snd_minor { int type; /* SNDRV_DEVICE_TYPE_XXX */ int card; /* card number */ int device; /* device number */ const struct file_operations *f_ops; /* file operations */ void *private_data; /* private data for f_ops->open */ struct device *dev; /* device for sysfs */ struct snd_card *card_ptr; /* assigned card instance */ }; /* return a device pointer linked to each sound device as a parent */ static inline struct device *snd_card_get_device_link(struct snd_card *card) { return card ? &card->card_dev : NULL; } /* sound.c */ extern int snd_major; extern int snd_ecards_limit; extern struct class *sound_class; void snd_request_card(int card); void snd_device_initialize(struct device *dev, struct snd_card *card); int snd_register_device(int type, struct snd_card *card, int dev, const struct file_operations *f_ops, void *private_data, struct device *device); int snd_unregister_device(struct device *dev); void *snd_lookup_minor_data(unsigned int minor, int type); #ifdef CONFIG_SND_OSSEMUL int snd_register_oss_device(int type, struct snd_card *card, int dev, const struct file_operations *f_ops, void *private_data); int snd_unregister_oss_device(int type, struct snd_card *card, int dev); void *snd_lookup_oss_minor_data(unsigned int minor, int type); #endif int snd_minor_info_init(void); /* sound_oss.c */ #ifdef CONFIG_SND_OSSEMUL int snd_minor_info_oss_init(void); #else static inline int snd_minor_info_oss_init(void) { return 0; } #endif /* memory.c */ int copy_to_user_fromio(void __user *dst, const volatile void __iomem *src, size_t count); int copy_from_user_toio(volatile void __iomem *dst, const void __user *src, size_t count); /* init.c */ int snd_card_locked(int card); #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SND_MIXER_OSS) #define SND_MIXER_OSS_NOTIFY_REGISTER 0 #define SND_MIXER_OSS_NOTIFY_DISCONNECT 1 #define SND_MIXER_OSS_NOTIFY_FREE 2 extern int (*snd_mixer_oss_notify_callback)(struct snd_card *card, int cmd); #endif int snd_card_new(struct device *parent, int idx, const char *xid, struct module *module, int extra_size, struct snd_card **card_ret); int snd_card_disconnect(struct snd_card *card); void snd_card_disconnect_sync(struct snd_card *card); int snd_card_free(struct snd_card *card); int snd_card_free_when_closed(struct snd_card *card); void snd_card_set_id(struct snd_card *card, const char *id); int snd_card_register(struct snd_card *card); int snd_card_info_init(void); int snd_card_add_dev_attr(struct snd_card *card, const struct attribute_group *group); int snd_component_add(struct snd_card *card, const char *component); int snd_card_file_add(struct snd_card *card, struct file *file); int snd_card_file_remove(struct snd_card *card, struct file *file); struct snd_card *snd_card_ref(int card); /** * snd_card_unref - Unreference the card object * @card: the card object to unreference * * Call this function for the card object that was obtained via snd_card_ref() * or snd_lookup_minor_data(). */ static inline void snd_card_unref(struct snd_card *card) { put_device(&card->card_dev); } #define snd_card_set_dev(card, devptr) ((card)->dev = (devptr)) /* device.c */ int snd_device_new(struct snd_card *card, enum snd_device_type type, void *device_data, const struct snd_device_ops *ops); int snd_device_register(struct snd_card *card, void *device_data); int snd_device_register_all(struct snd_card *card); void snd_device_disconnect(struct snd_card *card, void *device_data); void snd_device_disconnect_all(struct snd_card *card); void snd_device_free(struct snd_card *card, void *device_data); void snd_device_free_all(struct snd_card *card); int snd_device_get_state(struct snd_card *card, void *device_data); /* isadma.c */ #ifdef CONFIG_ISA_DMA_API #define DMA_MODE_NO_ENABLE 0x0100 void snd_dma_program(unsigned long dma, unsigned long addr, unsigned int size, unsigned short mode); void snd_dma_disable(unsigned long dma); unsigned int snd_dma_pointer(unsigned long dma, unsigned int size); #endif /* misc.c */ struct resource; void release_and_free_resource(struct resource *res); /* --- */ /* sound printk debug levels */ enum { SND_PR_ALWAYS, SND_PR_DEBUG, SND_PR_VERBOSE, }; #if defined(CONFIG_SND_DEBUG) || defined(CONFIG_SND_VERBOSE_PRINTK) __printf(4, 5) void __snd_printk(unsigned int level, const char *file, int line, const char *format, ...); #else #define __snd_printk(level, file, line, format, ...) \ printk(format, ##__VA_ARGS__) #endif /** * snd_printk - printk wrapper * @fmt: format string * * Works like printk() but prints the file and the line of the caller * when configured with CONFIG_SND_VERBOSE_PRINTK. */ #define snd_printk(fmt, ...) \ __snd_printk(0, __FILE__, __LINE__, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__) #ifdef CONFIG_SND_DEBUG /** * snd_printd - debug printk * @fmt: format string * * Works like snd_printk() for debugging purposes. * Ignored when CONFIG_SND_DEBUG is not set. */ #define snd_printd(fmt, ...) \ __snd_printk(1, __FILE__, __LINE__, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__) #define _snd_printd(level, fmt, ...) \ __snd_printk(level, __FILE__, __LINE__, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__) /** * snd_BUG - give a BUG warning message and stack trace * * Calls WARN() if CONFIG_SND_DEBUG is set. * Ignored when CONFIG_SND_DEBUG is not set. */ #define snd_BUG() WARN(1, "BUG?\n") /** * snd_printd_ratelimit - Suppress high rates of output when * CONFIG_SND_DEBUG is enabled. */ #define snd_printd_ratelimit() printk_ratelimit() /** * snd_BUG_ON - debugging check macro * @cond: condition to evaluate * * Has the same behavior as WARN_ON when CONFIG_SND_DEBUG is set, * otherwise just evaluates the conditional and returns the value. */ #define snd_BUG_ON(cond) WARN_ON((cond)) #else /* !CONFIG_SND_DEBUG */ __printf(1, 2) static inline void snd_printd(const char *format, ...) {} __printf(2, 3) static inline void _snd_printd(int level, const char *format, ...) {} #define snd_BUG() do { } while (0) #define snd_BUG_ON(condition) ({ \ int __ret_warn_on = !!(condition); \ unlikely(__ret_warn_on); \ }) static inline bool snd_printd_ratelimit(void) { return false; } #endif /* CONFIG_SND_DEBUG */ #ifdef CONFIG_SND_DEBUG_VERBOSE /** * snd_printdd - debug printk * @format: format string * * Works like snd_printk() for debugging purposes. * Ignored when CONFIG_SND_DEBUG_VERBOSE is not set. */ #define snd_printdd(format, ...) \ __snd_printk(2, __FILE__, __LINE__, format, ##__VA_ARGS__) #else __printf(1, 2) static inline void snd_printdd(const char *format, ...) {} #endif #define SNDRV_OSS_VERSION ((3<<16)|(8<<8)|(1<<4)|(0)) /* 3.8.1a */ /* for easier backward-porting */ #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_GAMEPORT) #define gameport_set_dev_parent(gp,xdev) ((gp)->dev.parent = (xdev)) #define gameport_set_port_data(gp,r) ((gp)->port_data = (r)) #define gameport_get_port_data(gp) (gp)->port_data #endif /* PCI quirk list helper */ struct snd_pci_quirk { unsigned short subvendor; /* PCI subvendor ID */ unsigned short subdevice; /* PCI subdevice ID */ unsigned short subdevice_mask; /* bitmask to match */ int value; /* value */ #ifdef CONFIG_SND_DEBUG_VERBOSE const char *name; /* name of the device (optional) */ #endif }; #define _SND_PCI_QUIRK_ID_MASK(vend, mask, dev) \ .subvendor = (vend), .subdevice = (dev), .subdevice_mask = (mask) #define _SND_PCI_QUIRK_ID(vend, dev) \ _SND_PCI_QUIRK_ID_MASK(vend, 0xffff, dev) #define SND_PCI_QUIRK_ID(vend,dev) {_SND_PCI_QUIRK_ID(vend, dev)} #ifdef CONFIG_SND_DEBUG_VERBOSE #define SND_PCI_QUIRK(vend,dev,xname,val) \ {_SND_PCI_QUIRK_ID(vend, dev), .value = (val), .name = (xname)} #define SND_PCI_QUIRK_VENDOR(vend, xname, val) \ {_SND_PCI_QUIRK_ID_MASK(vend, 0, 0), .value = (val), .name = (xname)} #define SND_PCI_QUIRK_MASK(vend, mask, dev, xname, val) \ {_SND_PCI_QUIRK_ID_MASK(vend, mask, dev), \ .value = (val), .name = (xname)} #define snd_pci_quirk_name(q) ((q)->name) #else #define SND_PCI_QUIRK(vend,dev,xname,val) \ {_SND_PCI_QUIRK_ID(vend, dev), .value = (val)} #define SND_PCI_QUIRK_MASK(vend, mask, dev, xname, val) \ {_SND_PCI_QUIRK_ID_MASK(vend, mask, dev), .value = (val)} #define SND_PCI_QUIRK_VENDOR(vend, xname, val) \ {_SND_PCI_QUIRK_ID_MASK(vend, 0, 0), .value = (val)} #define snd_pci_quirk_name(q) "" #endif #ifdef CONFIG_PCI const struct snd_pci_quirk * snd_pci_quirk_lookup(struct pci_dev *pci, const struct snd_pci_quirk *list); const struct snd_pci_quirk * snd_pci_quirk_lookup_id(u16 vendor, u16 device, const struct snd_pci_quirk *list); #else static inline const struct snd_pci_quirk * snd_pci_quirk_lookup(struct pci_dev *pci, const struct snd_pci_quirk *list) { return NULL; } static inline const struct snd_pci_quirk * snd_pci_quirk_lookup_id(u16 vendor, u16 device, const struct snd_pci_quirk *list) { return NULL; } #endif #endif /* __SOUND_CORE_H */
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1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef __NET_NETLINK_H #define __NET_NETLINK_H #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/netlink.h> #include <linux/jiffies.h> #include <linux/in6.h> /* ======================================================================== * Netlink Messages and Attributes Interface (As Seen On TV) * ------------------------------------------------------------------------ * Messages Interface * ------------------------------------------------------------------------ * * Message Format: * <--- nlmsg_total_size(payload) ---> * <-- nlmsg_msg_size(payload) -> * +----------+- - -+-------------+- - -+-------- - - * | nlmsghdr | Pad | Payload | Pad | nlmsghdr * +----------+- - -+-------------+- - -+-------- - - * nlmsg_data(nlh)---^ ^ * nlmsg_next(nlh)-----------------------+ * * Payload Format: * <---------------------- nlmsg_len(nlh) ---------------------> * <------ hdrlen ------> <- nlmsg_attrlen(nlh, hdrlen) -> * +----------------------+- - -+--------------------------------+ * | Family Header | Pad | Attributes | * +----------------------+- - -+--------------------------------+ * nlmsg_attrdata(nlh, hdrlen)---^ * * Data Structures: * struct nlmsghdr netlink message header * * Message Construction: * nlmsg_new() create a new netlink message * nlmsg_put() add a netlink message to an skb * nlmsg_put_answer() callback based nlmsg_put() * nlmsg_end() finalize netlink message * nlmsg_get_pos() return current position in message * nlmsg_trim() trim part of message * nlmsg_cancel() cancel message construction * nlmsg_free() free a netlink message * * Message Sending: * nlmsg_multicast() multicast message to several groups * nlmsg_unicast() unicast a message to a single socket * nlmsg_notify() send notification message * * Message Length Calculations: * nlmsg_msg_size(payload) length of message w/o padding * nlmsg_total_size(payload) length of message w/ padding * nlmsg_padlen(payload) length of padding at tail * * Message Payload Access: * nlmsg_data(nlh) head of message payload * nlmsg_len(nlh) length of message payload * nlmsg_attrdata(nlh, hdrlen) head of attributes data * nlmsg_attrlen(nlh, hdrlen) length of attributes data * * Message Parsing: * nlmsg_ok(nlh, remaining) does nlh fit into remaining bytes? * nlmsg_next(nlh, remaining) get next netlink message * nlmsg_parse() parse attributes of a message * nlmsg_find_attr() find an attribute in a message * nlmsg_for_each_msg() loop over all messages * nlmsg_validate() validate netlink message incl. attrs * nlmsg_for_each_attr() loop over all attributes * * Misc: * nlmsg_report() report back to application? * * ------------------------------------------------------------------------ * Attributes Interface * ------------------------------------------------------------------------ * * Attribute Format: * <------- nla_total_size(payload) -------> * <---- nla_attr_size(payload) -----> * +----------+- - -+- - - - - - - - - +- - -+-------- - - * | Header | Pad | Payload | Pad | Header * +----------+- - -+- - - - - - - - - +- - -+-------- - - * <- nla_len(nla) -> ^ * nla_data(nla)----^ | * nla_next(nla)-----------------------------' * * Data Structures: * struct nlattr netlink attribute header * * Attribute Construction: * nla_reserve(skb, type, len) reserve room for an attribute * nla_reserve_nohdr(skb, len) reserve room for an attribute w/o hdr * nla_put(skb, type, len, data) add attribute to skb * nla_put_nohdr(skb, len, data) add attribute w/o hdr * nla_append(skb, len, data) append data to skb * * Attribute Construction for Basic Types: * nla_put_u8(skb, type, value) add u8 attribute to skb * nla_put_u16(skb, type, value) add u16 attribute to skb * nla_put_u32(skb, type, value) add u32 attribute to skb * nla_put_u64_64bit(skb, type, * value, padattr) add u64 attribute to skb * nla_put_s8(skb, type, value) add s8 attribute to skb * nla_put_s16(skb, type, value) add s16 attribute to skb * nla_put_s32(skb, type, value) add s32 attribute to skb * nla_put_s64(skb, type, value, * padattr) add s64 attribute to skb * nla_put_string(skb, type, str) add string attribute to skb * nla_put_flag(skb, type) add flag attribute to skb * nla_put_msecs(skb, type, jiffies, * padattr) add msecs attribute to skb * nla_put_in_addr(skb, type, addr) add IPv4 address attribute to skb * nla_put_in6_addr(skb, type, addr) add IPv6 address attribute to skb * * Nested Attributes Construction: * nla_nest_start(skb, type) start a nested attribute * nla_nest_end(skb, nla) finalize a nested attribute * nla_nest_cancel(skb, nla) cancel nested attribute construction * * Attribute Length Calculations: * nla_attr_size(payload) length of attribute w/o padding * nla_total_size(payload) length of attribute w/ padding * nla_padlen(payload) length of padding * * Attribute Payload Access: * nla_data(nla) head of attribute payload * nla_len(nla) length of attribute payload * * Attribute Payload Access for Basic Types: * nla_get_u8(nla) get payload for a u8 attribute * nla_get_u16(nla) get payload for a u16 attribute * nla_get_u32(nla) get payload for a u32 attribute * nla_get_u64(nla) get payload for a u64 attribute * nla_get_s8(nla) get payload for a s8 attribute * nla_get_s16(nla) get payload for a s16 attribute * nla_get_s32(nla) get payload for a s32 attribute * nla_get_s64(nla) get payload for a s64 attribute * nla_get_flag(nla) return 1 if flag is true * nla_get_msecs(nla) get payload for a msecs attribute * * Attribute Misc: * nla_memcpy(dest, nla, count) copy attribute into memory * nla_memcmp(nla, data, size) compare attribute with memory area * nla_strlcpy(dst, nla, size) copy attribute to a sized string * nla_strcmp(nla, str) compare attribute with string * * Attribute Parsing: * nla_ok(nla, remaining) does nla fit into remaining bytes? * nla_next(nla, remaining) get next netlink attribute * nla_validate() validate a stream of attributes * nla_validate_nested() validate a stream of nested attributes * nla_find() find attribute in stream of attributes * nla_find_nested() find attribute in nested attributes * nla_parse() parse and validate stream of attrs * nla_parse_nested() parse nested attributes * nla_for_each_attr() loop over all attributes * nla_for_each_nested() loop over the nested attributes *========================================================================= */ /** * Standard attribute types to specify validation policy */ enum { NLA_UNSPEC, NLA_U8, NLA_U16, NLA_U32, NLA_U64, NLA_STRING, NLA_FLAG, NLA_MSECS, NLA_NESTED, NLA_NESTED_ARRAY, NLA_NUL_STRING, NLA_BINARY, NLA_S8, NLA_S16, NLA_S32, NLA_S64, NLA_BITFIELD32, NLA_REJECT, __NLA_TYPE_MAX, }; #define NLA_TYPE_MAX (__NLA_TYPE_MAX - 1) struct netlink_range_validation { u64 min, max; }; struct netlink_range_validation_signed { s64 min, max; }; enum nla_policy_validation { NLA_VALIDATE_NONE, NLA_VALIDATE_RANGE, NLA_VALIDATE_RANGE_WARN_TOO_LONG, NLA_VALIDATE_MIN, NLA_VALIDATE_MAX, NLA_VALIDATE_MASK, NLA_VALIDATE_RANGE_PTR, NLA_VALIDATE_FUNCTION, }; /** * struct nla_policy - attribute validation policy * @type: Type of attribute or NLA_UNSPEC * @validation_type: type of attribute validation done in addition to * type-specific validation (e.g. range, function call), see * &enum nla_policy_validation * @len: Type specific length of payload * * Policies are defined as arrays of this struct, the array must be * accessible by attribute type up to the highest identifier to be expected. * * Meaning of `len' field: * NLA_STRING Maximum length of string * NLA_NUL_STRING Maximum length of string (excluding NUL) * NLA_FLAG Unused * NLA_BINARY Maximum length of attribute payload * (but see also below with the validation type) * NLA_NESTED, * NLA_NESTED_ARRAY Length verification is done by checking len of * nested header (or empty); len field is used if * nested_policy is also used, for the max attr * number in the nested policy. * NLA_U8, NLA_U16, * NLA_U32, NLA_U64, * NLA_S8, NLA_S16, * NLA_S32, NLA_S64, * NLA_MSECS Leaving the length field zero will verify the * given type fits, using it verifies minimum length * just like "All other" * NLA_BITFIELD32 Unused * NLA_REJECT Unused * All other Minimum length of attribute payload * * Meaning of validation union: * NLA_BITFIELD32 This is a 32-bit bitmap/bitselector attribute and * `bitfield32_valid' is the u32 value of valid flags * NLA_REJECT This attribute is always rejected and `reject_message' * may point to a string to report as the error instead * of the generic one in extended ACK. * NLA_NESTED `nested_policy' to a nested policy to validate, must * also set `len' to the max attribute number. Use the * provided NLA_POLICY_NESTED() macro. * Note that nla_parse() will validate, but of course not * parse, the nested sub-policies. * NLA_NESTED_ARRAY `nested_policy' points to a nested policy to validate, * must also set `len' to the max attribute number. Use * the provided NLA_POLICY_NESTED_ARRAY() macro. * The difference to NLA_NESTED is the structure: * NLA_NESTED has the nested attributes directly inside * while an array has the nested attributes at another * level down and the attribute types directly in the * nesting don't matter. * NLA_U8, * NLA_U16, * NLA_U32, * NLA_U64, * NLA_S8, * NLA_S16, * NLA_S32, * NLA_S64 The `min' and `max' fields are used depending on the * validation_type field, if that is min/max/range then * the min, max or both are used (respectively) to check * the value of the integer attribute. * Note that in the interest of code simplicity and * struct size both limits are s16, so you cannot * enforce a range that doesn't fall within the range * of s16 - do that as usual in the code instead. * Use the NLA_POLICY_MIN(), NLA_POLICY_MAX() and * NLA_POLICY_RANGE() macros. * NLA_U8, * NLA_U16, * NLA_U32, * NLA_U64 If the validation_type field instead is set to * NLA_VALIDATE_RANGE_PTR, `range' must be a pointer * to a struct netlink_range_validation that indicates * the min/max values. * Use NLA_POLICY_FULL_RANGE(). * NLA_S8, * NLA_S16, * NLA_S32, * NLA_S64 If the validation_type field instead is set to * NLA_VALIDATE_RANGE_PTR, `range_signed' must be a * pointer to a struct netlink_range_validation_signed * that indicates the min/max values. * Use NLA_POLICY_FULL_RANGE_SIGNED(). * * NLA_BINARY If the validation type is like the ones for integers * above, then the min/max length (not value like for * integers) of the attribute is enforced. * * All other Unused - but note that it's a union * * Meaning of `validate' field, use via NLA_POLICY_VALIDATE_FN: * NLA_BINARY Validation function called for the attribute. * All other Unused - but note that it's a union * * Example: * * static const u32 myvalidflags = 0xff231023; * * static const struct nla_policy my_policy[ATTR_MAX+1] = { * [ATTR_FOO] = { .type = NLA_U16 }, * [ATTR_BAR] = { .type = NLA_STRING, .len = BARSIZ }, * [ATTR_BAZ] = NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN(sizeof(struct mystruct)), * [ATTR_GOO] = NLA_POLICY_BITFIELD32(myvalidflags), * }; */ struct nla_policy { u8 type; u8 validation_type; u16 len; union { const u32 bitfield32_valid; const u32 mask; const char *reject_message; const struct nla_policy *nested_policy; struct netlink_range_validation *range; struct netlink_range_validation_signed *range_signed; struct { s16 min, max; }; int (*validate)(const struct nlattr *attr, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack); /* This entry is special, and used for the attribute at index 0 * only, and specifies special data about the policy, namely it * specifies the "boundary type" where strict length validation * starts for any attribute types >= this value, also, strict * nesting validation starts here. * * Additionally, it means that NLA_UNSPEC is actually NLA_REJECT * for any types >= this, so need to use NLA_POLICY_MIN_LEN() to * get the previous pure { .len = xyz } behaviour. The advantage * of this is that types not specified in the policy will be * rejected. * * For completely new families it should be set to 1 so that the * validation is enforced for all attributes. For existing ones * it should be set at least when new attributes are added to * the enum used by the policy, and be set to the new value that * was added to enforce strict validation from thereon. */ u16 strict_start_type; }; }; #define NLA_POLICY_ETH_ADDR NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN(ETH_ALEN) #define NLA_POLICY_ETH_ADDR_COMPAT NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN_WARN(ETH_ALEN) #define _NLA_POLICY_NESTED(maxattr, policy) \ { .type = NLA_NESTED, .nested_policy = policy, .len = maxattr } #define _NLA_POLICY_NESTED_ARRAY(maxattr, policy) \ { .type = NLA_NESTED_ARRAY, .nested_policy = policy, .len = maxattr } #define NLA_POLICY_NESTED(policy) \ _NLA_POLICY_NESTED(ARRAY_SIZE(policy) - 1, policy) #define NLA_POLICY_NESTED_ARRAY(policy) \ _NLA_POLICY_NESTED_ARRAY(ARRAY_SIZE(policy) - 1, policy) #define NLA_POLICY_BITFIELD32(valid) \ { .type = NLA_BITFIELD32, .bitfield32_valid = valid } #define __NLA_IS_UINT_TYPE(tp) \ (tp == NLA_U8 || tp == NLA_U16 || tp == NLA_U32 || tp == NLA_U64) #define __NLA_IS_SINT_TYPE(tp) \ (tp == NLA_S8 || tp == NLA_S16 || tp == NLA_S32 || tp == NLA_S64) #define __NLA_ENSURE(condition) BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(!(condition)) #define NLA_ENSURE_UINT_TYPE(tp) \ (__NLA_ENSURE(__NLA_IS_UINT_TYPE(tp)) + tp) #define NLA_ENSURE_UINT_OR_BINARY_TYPE(tp) \ (__NLA_ENSURE(__NLA_IS_UINT_TYPE(tp) || \ tp == NLA_MSECS || \ tp == NLA_BINARY) + tp) #define NLA_ENSURE_SINT_TYPE(tp) \ (__NLA_ENSURE(__NLA_IS_SINT_TYPE(tp)) + tp) #define NLA_ENSURE_INT_OR_BINARY_TYPE(tp) \ (__NLA_ENSURE(__NLA_IS_UINT_TYPE(tp) || \ __NLA_IS_SINT_TYPE(tp) || \ tp == NLA_MSECS || \ tp == NLA_BINARY) + tp) #define NLA_ENSURE_NO_VALIDATION_PTR(tp) \ (__NLA_ENSURE(tp != NLA_BITFIELD32 && \ tp != NLA_REJECT && \ tp != NLA_NESTED && \ tp != NLA_NESTED_ARRAY) + tp) #define NLA_POLICY_RANGE(tp, _min, _max) { \ .type = NLA_ENSURE_INT_OR_BINARY_TYPE(tp), \ .validation_type = NLA_VALIDATE_RANGE, \ .min = _min, \ .max = _max \ } #define NLA_POLICY_FULL_RANGE(tp, _range) { \ .type = NLA_ENSURE_UINT_OR_BINARY_TYPE(tp), \ .validation_type = NLA_VALIDATE_RANGE_PTR, \ .range = _range, \ } #define NLA_POLICY_FULL_RANGE_SIGNED(tp, _range) { \ .type = NLA_ENSURE_SINT_TYPE(tp), \ .validation_type = NLA_VALIDATE_RANGE_PTR, \ .range_signed = _range, \ } #define NLA_POLICY_MIN(tp, _min) { \ .type = NLA_ENSURE_INT_OR_BINARY_TYPE(tp), \ .validation_type = NLA_VALIDATE_MIN, \ .min = _min, \ } #define NLA_POLICY_MAX(tp, _max) { \ .type = NLA_ENSURE_INT_OR_BINARY_TYPE(tp), \ .validation_type = NLA_VALIDATE_MAX, \ .max = _max, \ } #define NLA_POLICY_MASK(tp, _mask) { \ .type = NLA_ENSURE_UINT_TYPE(tp), \ .validation_type = NLA_VALIDATE_MASK, \ .mask = _mask, \ } #define NLA_POLICY_VALIDATE_FN(tp, fn, ...) { \ .type = NLA_ENSURE_NO_VALIDATION_PTR(tp), \ .validation_type = NLA_VALIDATE_FUNCTION, \ .validate = fn, \ .len = __VA_ARGS__ + 0, \ } #define NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN(_len) NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_BINARY, _len, _len) #define NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN_WARN(_len) { \ .type = NLA_BINARY, \ .validation_type = NLA_VALIDATE_RANGE_WARN_TOO_LONG, \ .min = _len, \ .max = _len \ } #define NLA_POLICY_MIN_LEN(_len) NLA_POLICY_MIN(NLA_BINARY, _len) /** * struct nl_info - netlink source information * @nlh: Netlink message header of original request * @nl_net: Network namespace * @portid: Netlink PORTID of requesting application * @skip_notify: Skip netlink notifications to user space * @skip_notify_kernel: Skip selected in-kernel notifications */ struct nl_info { struct nlmsghdr *nlh; struct net *nl_net; u32 portid; u8 skip_notify:1, skip_notify_kernel:1; }; /** * enum netlink_validation - netlink message/attribute validation levels * @NL_VALIDATE_LIBERAL: Old-style "be liberal" validation, not caring about * extra data at the end of the message, attributes being longer than * they should be, or unknown attributes being present. * @NL_VALIDATE_TRAILING: Reject junk data encountered after attribute parsing. * @NL_VALIDATE_MAXTYPE: Reject attributes > max type; Together with _TRAILING * this is equivalent to the old nla_parse_strict()/nlmsg_parse_strict(). * @NL_VALIDATE_UNSPEC: Reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC in the policy. * This can safely be set by the kernel when the given policy has no * NLA_UNSPEC anymore, and can thus be used to ensure policy entries * are enforced going forward. * @NL_VALIDATE_STRICT_ATTRS: strict attribute policy parsing (e.g. * U8, U16, U32 must have exact size, etc.) * @NL_VALIDATE_NESTED: Check that NLA_F_NESTED is set for NLA_NESTED(_ARRAY) * and unset for other policies. */ enum netlink_validation { NL_VALIDATE_LIBERAL = 0, NL_VALIDATE_TRAILING = BIT(0), NL_VALIDATE_MAXTYPE = BIT(1), NL_VALIDATE_UNSPEC = BIT(2), NL_VALIDATE_STRICT_ATTRS = BIT(3), NL_VALIDATE_NESTED = BIT(4), }; #define NL_VALIDATE_DEPRECATED_STRICT (NL_VALIDATE_TRAILING |\ NL_VALIDATE_MAXTYPE) #define NL_VALIDATE_STRICT (NL_VALIDATE_TRAILING |\ NL_VALIDATE_MAXTYPE |\ NL_VALIDATE_UNSPEC |\ NL_VALIDATE_STRICT_ATTRS |\ NL_VALIDATE_NESTED) int netlink_rcv_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, int (*cb)(struct sk_buff *, struct nlmsghdr *, struct netlink_ext_ack *)); int nlmsg_notify(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 portid, unsigned int group, int report, gfp_t flags); int __nla_validate(const struct nlattr *head, int len, int maxtype, const struct nla_policy *policy, unsigned int validate, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack); int __nla_parse(struct nlattr **tb, int maxtype, const struct nlattr *head, int len, const struct nla_policy *policy, unsigned int validate, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack); int nla_policy_len(const struct nla_policy *, int); struct nlattr *nla_find(const struct nlattr *head, int len, int attrtype); size_t nla_strlcpy(char *dst, const struct nlattr *nla, size_t dstsize); char *nla_strdup(const struct nlattr *nla, gfp_t flags); int nla_memcpy(void *dest, const struct nlattr *src, int count); int nla_memcmp(const struct nlattr *nla, const void *data, size_t size); int nla_strcmp(const struct nlattr *nla, const char *str); struct nlattr *__nla_reserve(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, int attrlen); struct nlattr *__nla_reserve_64bit(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, int attrlen, int padattr); void *__nla_reserve_nohdr(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrlen); struct nlattr *nla_reserve(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, int attrlen); struct nlattr *nla_reserve_64bit(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, int attrlen, int padattr); void *nla_reserve_nohdr(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrlen); void __nla_put(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, int attrlen, const void *data); void __nla_put_64bit(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, int attrlen, const void *data, int padattr); void __nla_put_nohdr(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrlen, const void *data); int nla_put(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, int attrlen, const void *data); int nla_put_64bit(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, int attrlen, const void *data, int padattr); int nla_put_nohdr(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrlen, const void *data); int nla_append(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrlen, const void *data); /************************************************************************** * Netlink Messages **************************************************************************/ /** * nlmsg_msg_size - length of netlink message not including padding * @payload: length of message payload */ static inline int nlmsg_msg_size(int payload) { return NLMSG_HDRLEN + payload; } /** * nlmsg_total_size - length of netlink message including padding * @payload: length of message payload */ static inline int nlmsg_total_size(int payload) { return NLMSG_ALIGN(nlmsg_msg_size(payload)); } /** * nlmsg_padlen - length of padding at the message's tail * @payload: length of message payload */ static inline int nlmsg_padlen(int payload) { return nlmsg_total_size(payload) - nlmsg_msg_size(payload); } /** * nlmsg_data - head of message payload * @nlh: netlink message header */ static inline void *nlmsg_data(const struct nlmsghdr *nlh) { return (unsigned char *) nlh + NLMSG_HDRLEN; } /** * nlmsg_len - length of message payload * @nlh: netlink message header */ static inline int nlmsg_len(const struct nlmsghdr *nlh) { return nlh->nlmsg_len - NLMSG_HDRLEN; } /** * nlmsg_attrdata - head of attributes data * @nlh: netlink message header * @hdrlen: length of family specific header */ static inline struct nlattr *nlmsg_attrdata(const struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int hdrlen) { unsigned char *data = nlmsg_data(nlh); return (struct nlattr *) (data + NLMSG_ALIGN(hdrlen)); } /** * nlmsg_attrlen - length of attributes data * @nlh: netlink message header * @hdrlen: length of family specific header */ static inline int nlmsg_attrlen(const struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int hdrlen) { return nlmsg_len(nlh) - NLMSG_ALIGN(hdrlen); } /** * nlmsg_ok - check if the netlink message fits into the remaining bytes * @nlh: netlink message header * @remaining: number of bytes remaining in message stream */ static inline int nlmsg_ok(const struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int remaining) { return (remaining >= (int) sizeof(struct nlmsghdr) && nlh->nlmsg_len >= sizeof(struct nlmsghdr) && nlh->nlmsg_len <= remaining); } /** * nlmsg_next - next netlink message in message stream * @nlh: netlink message header * @remaining: number of bytes remaining in message stream * * Returns the next netlink message in the message stream and * decrements remaining by the size of the current message. */ static inline struct nlmsghdr * nlmsg_next(const struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int *remaining) { int totlen = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len); *remaining -= totlen; return (struct nlmsghdr *) ((unsigned char *) nlh + totlen); } /** * nla_parse - Parse a stream of attributes into a tb buffer * @tb: destination array with maxtype+1 elements * @maxtype: maximum attribute type to be expected * @head: head of attribute stream * @len: length of attribute stream * @policy: validation policy * @extack: extended ACK pointer * * Parses a stream of attributes and stores a pointer to each attribute in * the tb array accessible via the attribute type. Attributes with a type * exceeding maxtype will be rejected, policy must be specified, attributes * will be validated in the strictest way possible. * * Returns 0 on success or a negative error code. */ static inline int nla_parse(struct nlattr **tb, int maxtype, const struct nlattr *head, int len, const struct nla_policy *policy, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { return __nla_parse(tb, maxtype, head, len, policy, NL_VALIDATE_STRICT, extack); } /** * nla_parse_deprecated - Parse a stream of attributes into a tb buffer * @tb: destination array with maxtype+1 elements * @maxtype: maximum attribute type to be expected * @head: head of attribute stream * @len: length of attribute stream * @policy: validation policy * @extack: extended ACK pointer * * Parses a stream of attributes and stores a pointer to each attribute in * the tb array accessible via the attribute type. Attributes with a type * exceeding maxtype will be ignored and attributes from the policy are not * always strictly validated (only for new attributes). * * Returns 0 on success or a negative error code. */ static inline int nla_parse_deprecated(struct nlattr **tb, int maxtype, const struct nlattr *head, int len, const struct nla_policy *policy, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { return __nla_parse(tb, maxtype, head, len, policy, NL_VALIDATE_LIBERAL, extack); } /** * nla_parse_deprecated_strict - Parse a stream of attributes into a tb buffer * @tb: destination array with maxtype+1 elements * @maxtype: maximum attribute type to be expected * @head: head of attribute stream * @len: length of attribute stream * @policy: validation policy * @extack: extended ACK pointer * * Parses a stream of attributes and stores a pointer to each attribute in * the tb array accessible via the attribute type. Attributes with a type * exceeding maxtype will be rejected as well as trailing data, but the * policy is not completely strictly validated (only for new attributes). * * Returns 0 on success or a negative error code. */ static inline int nla_parse_deprecated_strict(struct nlattr **tb, int maxtype, const struct nlattr *head, int len, const struct nla_policy *policy, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { return __nla_parse(tb, maxtype, head, len, policy, NL_VALIDATE_DEPRECATED_STRICT, extack); } /** * __nlmsg_parse - parse attributes of a netlink message * @nlh: netlink message header * @hdrlen: length of family specific header * @tb: destination array with maxtype+1 elements * @maxtype: maximum attribute type to be expected * @policy: validation policy * @validate: validation strictness * @extack: extended ACK report struct * * See nla_parse() */ static inline int __nlmsg_parse(const struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int hdrlen, struct nlattr *tb[], int maxtype, const struct nla_policy *policy, unsigned int validate, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { if (nlh->nlmsg_len < nlmsg_msg_size(hdrlen)) { NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Invalid header length"); return -EINVAL; } return __nla_parse(tb, maxtype, nlmsg_attrdata(nlh, hdrlen), nlmsg_attrlen(nlh, hdrlen), policy, validate, extack); } /** * nlmsg_parse - parse attributes of a netlink message * @nlh: netlink message header * @hdrlen: length of family specific header * @tb: destination array with maxtype+1 elements * @maxtype: maximum attribute type to be expected * @extack: extended ACK report struct * * See nla_parse() */ static inline int nlmsg_parse(const struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int hdrlen, struct nlattr *tb[], int maxtype, const struct nla_policy *policy, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { return __nlmsg_parse(nlh, hdrlen, tb, maxtype, policy, NL_VALIDATE_STRICT, extack); } /** * nlmsg_parse_deprecated - parse attributes of a netlink message * @nlh: netlink message header * @hdrlen: length of family specific header * @tb: destination array with maxtype+1 elements * @maxtype: maximum attribute type to be expected * @extack: extended ACK report struct * * See nla_parse_deprecated() */ static inline int nlmsg_parse_deprecated(const struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int hdrlen, struct nlattr *tb[], int maxtype, const struct nla_policy *policy, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { return __nlmsg_parse(nlh, hdrlen, tb, maxtype, policy, NL_VALIDATE_LIBERAL, extack); } /** * nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict - parse attributes of a netlink message * @nlh: netlink message header * @hdrlen: length of family specific header * @tb: destination array with maxtype+1 elements * @maxtype: maximum attribute type to be expected * @extack: extended ACK report struct * * See nla_parse_deprecated_strict() */ static inline int nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(const struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int hdrlen, struct nlattr *tb[], int maxtype, const struct nla_policy *policy, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { return __nlmsg_parse(nlh, hdrlen, tb, maxtype, policy, NL_VALIDATE_DEPRECATED_STRICT, extack); } /** * nlmsg_find_attr - find a specific attribute in a netlink message * @nlh: netlink message header * @hdrlen: length of familiy specific header * @attrtype: type of attribute to look for * * Returns the first attribute which matches the specified type. */ static inline struct nlattr *nlmsg_find_attr(const struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int hdrlen, int attrtype) { return nla_find(nlmsg_attrdata(nlh, hdrlen), nlmsg_attrlen(nlh, hdrlen), attrtype); } /** * nla_validate_deprecated - Validate a stream of attributes * @head: head of attribute stream * @len: length of attribute stream * @maxtype: maximum attribute type to be expected * @policy: validation policy * @validate: validation strictness * @extack: extended ACK report struct * * Validates all attributes in the specified attribute stream against the * specified policy. Validation is done in liberal mode. * See documenation of struct nla_policy for more details. * * Returns 0 on success or a negative error code. */ static inline int nla_validate_deprecated(const struct nlattr *head, int len, int maxtype, const struct nla_policy *policy, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { return __nla_validate(head, len, maxtype, policy, NL_VALIDATE_LIBERAL, extack); } /** * nla_validate - Validate a stream of attributes * @head: head of attribute stream * @len: length of attribute stream * @maxtype: maximum attribute type to be expected * @policy: validation policy * @extack: extended ACK report struct * * Validates all attributes in the specified attribute stream against the * specified policy. Validation is done in strict mode. * See documenation of struct nla_policy for more details. * * Returns 0 on success or a negative error code. */ static inline int nla_validate(const struct nlattr *head, int len, int maxtype, const struct nla_policy *policy, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { return __nla_validate(head, len, maxtype, policy, NL_VALIDATE_STRICT, extack); } /** * nlmsg_validate_deprecated - validate a netlink message including attributes * @nlh: netlinket message header * @hdrlen: length of familiy specific header * @maxtype: maximum attribute type to be expected * @policy: validation policy * @extack: extended ACK report struct */ static inline int nlmsg_validate_deprecated(const struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int hdrlen, int maxtype, const struct nla_policy *policy, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { if (nlh->nlmsg_len < nlmsg_msg_size(hdrlen)) return -EINVAL; return __nla_validate(nlmsg_attrdata(nlh, hdrlen), nlmsg_attrlen(nlh, hdrlen), maxtype, policy, NL_VALIDATE_LIBERAL, extack); } /** * nlmsg_report - need to report back to application? * @nlh: netlink message header * * Returns 1 if a report back to the application is requested. */ static inline int nlmsg_report(const struct nlmsghdr *nlh) { return !!(nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_ECHO); } /** * nlmsg_for_each_attr - iterate over a stream of attributes * @pos: loop counter, set to current attribute * @nlh: netlink message header * @hdrlen: length of familiy specific header * @rem: initialized to len, holds bytes currently remaining in stream */ #define nlmsg_for_each_attr(pos, nlh, hdrlen, rem) \ nla_for_each_attr(pos, nlmsg_attrdata(nlh, hdrlen), \ nlmsg_attrlen(nlh, hdrlen), rem) /** * nlmsg_put - Add a new netlink message to an skb * @skb: socket buffer to store message in * @portid: netlink PORTID of requesting application * @seq: sequence number of message * @type: message type * @payload: length of message payload * @flags: message flags * * Returns NULL if the tailroom of the skb is insufficient to store * the message header and payload. */ static inline struct nlmsghdr *nlmsg_put(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 portid, u32 seq, int type, int payload, int flags) { if (unlikely(skb_tailroom(skb) < nlmsg_total_size(payload))) return NULL; return __nlmsg_put(skb, portid, seq, type, payload, flags); } /** * nlmsg_put_answer - Add a new callback based netlink message to an skb * @skb: socket buffer to store message in * @cb: netlink callback * @type: message type * @payload: length of message payload * @flags: message flags * * Returns NULL if the tailroom of the skb is insufficient to store * the message header and payload. */ static inline struct nlmsghdr *nlmsg_put_answer(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb, int type, int payload, int flags) { return nlmsg_put(skb, NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid, cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, type, payload, flags); } /** * nlmsg_new - Allocate a new netlink message * @payload: size of the message payload * @flags: the type of memory to allocate. * * Use NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE if the size of the payload isn't known * and a good default is needed. */ static inline struct sk_buff *nlmsg_new(size_t payload, gfp_t flags) { return alloc_skb(nlmsg_total_size(payload), flags); } /** * nlmsg_end - Finalize a netlink message * @skb: socket buffer the message is stored in * @nlh: netlink message header * * Corrects the netlink message header to include the appeneded * attributes. Only necessary if attributes have been added to * the message. */ static inline void nlmsg_end(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) { nlh->nlmsg_len = skb_tail_pointer(skb) - (unsigned char *)nlh; } /** * nlmsg_get_pos - return current position in netlink message * @skb: socket buffer the message is stored in * * Returns a pointer to the current tail of the message. */ static inline void *nlmsg_get_pos(struct sk_buff *skb) { return skb_tail_pointer(skb); } /** * nlmsg_trim - Trim message to a mark * @skb: socket buffer the message is stored in * @mark: mark to trim to * * Trims the message to the provided mark. */ static inline void nlmsg_trim(struct sk_buff *skb, const void *mark) { if (mark) { WARN_ON((unsigned char *) mark < skb->data); skb_trim(skb, (unsigned char *) mark - skb->data); } } /** * nlmsg_cancel - Cancel construction of a netlink message * @skb: socket buffer the message is stored in * @nlh: netlink message header * * Removes the complete netlink message including all * attributes from the socket buffer again. */ static inline void nlmsg_cancel(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) { nlmsg_trim(skb, nlh); } /** * nlmsg_free - free a netlink message * @skb: socket buffer of netlink message */ static inline void nlmsg_free(struct sk_buff *skb) { kfree_skb(skb); } /** * nlmsg_multicast - multicast a netlink message * @sk: netlink socket to spread messages to * @skb: netlink message as socket buffer * @portid: own netlink portid to avoid sending to yourself * @group: multicast group id * @flags: allocation flags */ static inline int nlmsg_multicast(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 portid, unsigned int group, gfp_t flags) { int err; NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group = group; err = netlink_broadcast(sk, skb, portid, group, flags); if (err > 0) err = 0; return err; } /** * nlmsg_unicast - unicast a netlink message * @sk: netlink socket to spread message to * @skb: netlink message as socket buffer * @portid: netlink portid of the destination socket */ static inline int nlmsg_unicast(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 portid) { int err; err = netlink_unicast(sk, skb, portid, MSG_DONTWAIT); if (err > 0) err = 0; return err; } /** * nlmsg_for_each_msg - iterate over a stream of messages * @pos: loop counter, set to current message * @head: head of message stream * @len: length of message stream * @rem: initialized to len, holds bytes currently remaining in stream */ #define nlmsg_for_each_msg(pos, head, len, rem) \ for (pos = head, rem = len; \ nlmsg_ok(pos, rem); \ pos = nlmsg_next(pos, &(rem))) /** * nl_dump_check_consistent - check if sequence is consistent and advertise if not * @cb: netlink callback structure that stores the sequence number * @nlh: netlink message header to write the flag to * * This function checks if the sequence (generation) number changed during dump * and if it did, advertises it in the netlink message header. * * The correct way to use it is to set cb->seq to the generation counter when * all locks for dumping have been acquired, and then call this function for * each message that is generated. * * Note that due to initialisation concerns, 0 is an invalid sequence number * and must not be used by code that uses this functionality. */ static inline void nl_dump_check_consistent(struct netlink_callback *cb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) { if (cb->prev_seq && cb->seq != cb->prev_seq) nlh->nlmsg_flags |= NLM_F_DUMP_INTR; cb->prev_seq = cb->seq; } /************************************************************************** * Netlink Attributes **************************************************************************/ /** * nla_attr_size - length of attribute not including padding * @payload: length of payload */ static inline int nla_attr_size(int payload) { return NLA_HDRLEN + payload; } /** * nla_total_size - total length of attribute including padding * @payload: length of payload */ static inline int nla_total_size(int payload) { return NLA_ALIGN(nla_attr_size(payload)); } /** * nla_padlen - length of padding at the tail of attribute * @payload: length of payload */ static inline int nla_padlen(int payload) { return nla_total_size(payload) - nla_attr_size(payload); } /** * nla_type - attribute type * @nla: netlink attribute */ static inline int nla_type(const struct nlattr *nla) { return nla->nla_type & NLA_TYPE_MASK; } /** * nla_data - head of payload * @nla: netlink attribute */ static inline void *nla_data(const struct nlattr *nla) { return (char *) nla + NLA_HDRLEN; } /** * nla_len - length of payload * @nla: netlink attribute */ static inline int nla_len(const struct nlattr *nla) { return nla->nla_len - NLA_HDRLEN; } /** * nla_ok - check if the netlink attribute fits into the remaining bytes * @nla: netlink attribute * @remaining: number of bytes remaining in attribute stream */ static inline int nla_ok(const struct nlattr *nla, int remaining) { return remaining >= (int) sizeof(*nla) && nla->nla_len >= sizeof(*nla) && nla->nla_len <= remaining; } /** * nla_next - next netlink attribute in attribute stream * @nla: netlink attribute * @remaining: number of bytes remaining in attribute stream * * Returns the next netlink attribute in the attribute stream and * decrements remaining by the size of the current attribute. */ static inline struct nlattr *nla_next(const struct nlattr *nla, int *remaining) { unsigned int totlen = NLA_ALIGN(nla->nla_len); *remaining -= totlen; return (struct nlattr *) ((char *) nla + totlen); } /** * nla_find_nested - find attribute in a set of nested attributes * @nla: attribute containing the nested attributes * @attrtype: type of attribute to look for * * Returns the first attribute which matches the specified type. */ static inline struct nlattr * nla_find_nested(const struct nlattr *nla, int attrtype) { return nla_find(nla_data(nla), nla_len(nla), attrtype); } /** * nla_parse_nested - parse nested attributes * @tb: destination array with maxtype+1 elements * @maxtype: maximum attribute type to be expected * @nla: attribute containing the nested attributes * @policy: validation policy * @extack: extended ACK report struct * * See nla_parse() */ static inline int nla_parse_nested(struct nlattr *tb[], int maxtype, const struct nlattr *nla, const struct nla_policy *policy, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { if (!(nla->nla_type & NLA_F_NESTED)) { NL_SET_ERR_MSG_ATTR(extack, nla, "NLA_F_NESTED is missing"); return -EINVAL; } return __nla_parse(tb, maxtype, nla_data(nla), nla_len(nla), policy, NL_VALIDATE_STRICT, extack); } /** * nla_parse_nested_deprecated - parse nested attributes * @tb: destination array with maxtype+1 elements * @maxtype: maximum attribute type to be expected * @nla: attribute containing the nested attributes * @policy: validation policy * @extack: extended ACK report struct * * See nla_parse_deprecated() */ static inline int nla_parse_nested_deprecated(struct nlattr *tb[], int maxtype, const struct nlattr *nla, const struct nla_policy *policy, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { return __nla_parse(tb, maxtype, nla_data(nla), nla_len(nla), policy, NL_VALIDATE_LIBERAL, extack); } /** * nla_put_u8 - Add a u8 netlink attribute to a socket buffer * @skb: socket buffer to add attribute to * @attrtype: attribute type * @value: numeric value */ static inline int nla_put_u8(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, u8 value) { /* temporary variables to work around GCC PR81715 with asan-stack=1 */ u8 tmp = value; return nla_put(skb, attrtype, sizeof(u8), &tmp); } /** * nla_put_u16 - Add a u16 netlink attribute to a socket buffer * @skb: socket buffer to add attribute to * @attrtype: attribute type * @value: numeric value */ static inline int nla_put_u16(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, u16 value) { u16 tmp = value; return nla_put(skb, attrtype, sizeof(u16), &tmp); } /** * nla_put_be16 - Add a __be16 netlink attribute to a socket buffer * @skb: socket buffer to add attribute to * @attrtype: attribute type * @value: numeric value */ static inline int nla_put_be16(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, __be16 value) { __be16 tmp = value; return nla_put(skb, attrtype, sizeof(__be16), &tmp); } /** * nla_put_net16 - Add 16-bit network byte order netlink attribute to a socket buffer * @skb: socket buffer to add attribute to * @attrtype: attribute type * @value: numeric value */ static inline int nla_put_net16(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, __be16 value) { __be16 tmp = value; return nla_put_be16(skb, attrtype | NLA_F_NET_BYTEORDER, tmp); } /** * nla_put_le16 - Add a __le16 netlink attribute to a socket buffer * @skb: socket buffer to add attribute to * @attrtype: attribute type * @value: numeric value */ static inline int nla_put_le16(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, __le16 value) { __le16 tmp = value; return nla_put(skb, attrtype, sizeof(__le16), &tmp); } /** * nla_put_u32 - Add a u32 netlink attribute to a socket buffer * @skb: socket buffer to add attribute to * @attrtype: attribute type * @value: numeric value */ static inline int nla_put_u32(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, u32 value) { u32 tmp = value; return nla_put(skb, attrtype, sizeof(u32), &tmp); } /** * nla_put_be32 - Add a __be32 netlink attribute to a socket buffer * @skb: socket buffer to add attribute to * @attrtype: attribute type * @value: numeric value */ static inline int nla_put_be32(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, __be32 value) { __be32 tmp = value; return nla_put(skb, attrtype, sizeof(__be32), &tmp); } /** * nla_put_net32 - Add 32-bit network byte order netlink attribute to a socket buffer * @skb: socket buffer to add attribute to * @attrtype: attribute type * @value: numeric value */ static inline int nla_put_net32(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, __be32 value) { __be32 tmp = value; return nla_put_be32(skb, attrtype | NLA_F_NET_BYTEORDER, tmp); } /** * nla_put_le32 - Add a __le32 netlink attribute to a socket buffer * @skb: socket buffer to add attribute to * @attrtype: attribute type * @value: numeric value */ static inline int nla_put_le32(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, __le32 value) { __le32 tmp = value; return nla_put(skb, attrtype, sizeof(__le32), &tmp); } /** * nla_put_u64_64bit - Add a u64 netlink attribute to a skb and align it * @skb: socket buffer to add attribute to * @attrtype: attribute type * @value: numeric value * @padattr: attribute type for the padding */ static inline int nla_put_u64_64bit(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, u64 value, int padattr) { u64 tmp = value; return nla_put_64bit(skb, attrtype, sizeof(u64), &tmp, padattr); } /** * nla_put_be64 - Add a __be64 netlink attribute to a socket buffer and align it * @skb: socket buffer to add attribute to * @attrtype: attribute type * @value: numeric value * @padattr: attribute type for the padding */ static inline int nla_put_be64(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, __be64 value, int padattr) { __be64 tmp = value; return nla_put_64bit(skb, attrtype, sizeof(__be64), &tmp, padattr); } /** * nla_put_net64 - Add 64-bit network byte order nlattr to a skb and align it * @skb: socket buffer to add attribute to * @attrtype: attribute type * @value: numeric value * @padattr: attribute type for the padding */ static inline int nla_put_net64(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, __be64 value, int padattr) { __be64 tmp = value; return nla_put_be64(skb, attrtype | NLA_F_NET_BYTEORDER, tmp, padattr); } /** * nla_put_le64 - Add a __le64 netlink attribute to a socket buffer and align it * @skb: socket buffer to add attribute to * @attrtype: attribute type * @value: numeric value * @padattr: attribute type for the padding */ static inline int nla_put_le64(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, __le64 value, int padattr) { __le64 tmp = value; return nla_put_64bit(skb, attrtype, sizeof(__le64), &tmp, padattr); } /** * nla_put_s8 - Add a s8 netlink attribute to a socket buffer * @skb: socket buffer to add attribute to * @attrtype: attribute type * @value: numeric value */ static inline int nla_put_s8(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, s8 value) { s8 tmp = value; return nla_put(skb, attrtype, sizeof(s8), &tmp); } /** * nla_put_s16 - Add a s16 netlink attribute to a socket buffer * @skb: socket buffer to add attribute to * @attrtype: attribute type * @value: numeric value */ static inline int nla_put_s16(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, s16 value) { s16 tmp = value; return nla_put(skb, attrtype, sizeof(s16), &tmp); } /** * nla_put_s32 - Add a s32 netlink attribute to a socket buffer * @skb: socket buffer to add attribute to * @attrtype: attribute type * @value: numeric value */ static inline int nla_put_s32(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, s32 value) { s32 tmp = value; return nla_put(skb, attrtype, sizeof(s32), &tmp); } /** * nla_put_s64 - Add a s64 netlink attribute to a socket buffer and align it * @skb: socket buffer to add attribute to * @attrtype: attribute type * @value: numeric value * @padattr: attribute type for the padding */ static inline int nla_put_s64(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, s64 value, int padattr) { s64 tmp = value; return nla_put_64bit(skb, attrtype, sizeof(s64), &tmp, padattr); } /** * nla_put_string - Add a string netlink attribute to a socket buffer * @skb: socket buffer to add attribute to * @attrtype: attribute type * @str: NUL terminated string */ static inline int nla_put_string(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, const char *str) { return nla_put(skb, attrtype, strlen(str) + 1, str); } /** * nla_put_flag - Add a flag netlink attribute to a socket buffer * @skb: socket buffer to add attribute to * @attrtype: attribute type */ static inline int nla_put_flag(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype) { return nla_put(skb, attrtype, 0, NULL); } /** * nla_put_msecs - Add a msecs netlink attribute to a skb and align it * @skb: socket buffer to add attribute to * @attrtype: attribute type * @njiffies: number of jiffies to convert to msecs * @padattr: attribute type for the padding */ static inline int nla_put_msecs(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, unsigned long njiffies, int padattr) { u64 tmp = jiffies_to_msecs(njiffies); return nla_put_64bit(skb, attrtype, sizeof(u64), &tmp, padattr); } /** * nla_put_in_addr - Add an IPv4 address netlink attribute to a socket * buffer * @skb: socket buffer to add attribute to * @attrtype: attribute type * @addr: IPv4 address */ static inline int nla_put_in_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, __be32 addr) { __be32 tmp = addr; return nla_put_be32(skb, attrtype, tmp); } /** * nla_put_in6_addr - Add an IPv6 address netlink attribute to a socket * buffer * @skb: socket buffer to add attribute to * @attrtype: attribute type * @addr: IPv6 address */ static inline int nla_put_in6_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, const struct in6_addr *addr) { return nla_put(skb, attrtype, sizeof(*addr), addr); } /** * nla_put_bitfield32 - Add a bitfield32 netlink attribute to a socket buffer * @skb: socket buffer to add attribute to * @attrtype: attribute type * @value: value carrying bits * @selector: selector of valid bits */ static inline int nla_put_bitfield32(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, __u32 value, __u32 selector) { struct nla_bitfield32 tmp = { value, selector, }; return nla_put(skb, attrtype, sizeof(tmp), &tmp); } /** * nla_get_u32 - return payload of u32 attribute * @nla: u32 netlink attribute */ static inline u32 nla_get_u32(const struct nlattr *nla) { return *(u32 *) nla_data(nla); } /** * nla_get_be32 - return payload of __be32 attribute * @nla: __be32 netlink attribute */ static inline __be32 nla_get_be32(const struct nlattr *nla) { return *(__be32 *) nla_data(nla); } /** * nla_get_le32 - return payload of __le32 attribute * @nla: __le32 netlink attribute */ static inline __le32 nla_get_le32(const struct nlattr *nla) { return *(__le32 *) nla_data(nla); } /** * nla_get_u16 - return payload of u16 attribute * @nla: u16 netlink attribute */ static inline u16 nla_get_u16(const struct nlattr *nla) { return *(u16 *) nla_data(nla); } /** * nla_get_be16 - return payload of __be16 attribute * @nla: __be16 netlink attribute */ static inline __be16 nla_get_be16(const struct nlattr *nla) { return *(__be16 *) nla_data(nla); } /** * nla_get_le16 - return payload of __le16 attribute * @nla: __le16 netlink attribute */ static inline __le16 nla_get_le16(const struct nlattr *nla) { return *(__le16 *) nla_data(nla); } /** * nla_get_u8 - return payload of u8 attribute * @nla: u8 netlink attribute */ static inline u8 nla_get_u8(const struct nlattr *nla) { return *(u8 *) nla_data(nla); } /** * nla_get_u64 - return payload of u64 attribute * @nla: u64 netlink attribute */ static inline u64 nla_get_u64(const struct nlattr *nla) { u64 tmp; nla_memcpy(&tmp, nla, sizeof(tmp)); return tmp; } /** * nla_get_be64 - return payload of __be64 attribute * @nla: __be64 netlink attribute */ static inline __be64 nla_get_be64(const struct nlattr *nla) { __be64 tmp; nla_memcpy(&tmp, nla, sizeof(tmp)); return tmp; } /** * nla_get_le64 - return payload of __le64 attribute * @nla: __le64 netlink attribute */ static inline __le64 nla_get_le64(const struct nlattr *nla) { return *(__le64 *) nla_data(nla); } /** * nla_get_s32 - return payload of s32 attribute * @nla: s32 netlink attribute */ static inline s32 nla_get_s32(const struct nlattr *nla) { return *(s32 *) nla_data(nla); } /** * nla_get_s16 - return payload of s16 attribute * @nla: s16 netlink attribute */ static inline s16 nla_get_s16(const struct nlattr *nla) { return *(s16 *) nla_data(nla); } /** * nla_get_s8 - return payload of s8 attribute * @nla: s8 netlink attribute */ static inline s8 nla_get_s8(const struct nlattr *nla) { return *(s8 *) nla_data(nla); } /** * nla_get_s64 - return payload of s64 attribute * @nla: s64 netlink attribute */ static inline s64 nla_get_s64(const struct nlattr *nla) { s64 tmp; nla_memcpy(&tmp, nla, sizeof(tmp)); return tmp; } /** * nla_get_flag - return payload of flag attribute * @nla: flag netlink attribute */ static inline int nla_get_flag(const struct nlattr *nla) { return !!nla; } /** * nla_get_msecs - return payload of msecs attribute * @nla: msecs netlink attribute * * Returns the number of milliseconds in jiffies. */ static inline unsigned long nla_get_msecs(const struct nlattr *nla) { u64 msecs = nla_get_u64(nla); return msecs_to_jiffies((unsigned long) msecs); } /** * nla_get_in_addr - return payload of IPv4 address attribute * @nla: IPv4 address netlink attribute */ static inline __be32 nla_get_in_addr(const struct nlattr *nla) { return *(__be32 *) nla_data(nla); } /** * nla_get_in6_addr - return payload of IPv6 address attribute * @nla: IPv6 address netlink attribute */ static inline struct in6_addr nla_get_in6_addr(const struct nlattr *nla) { struct in6_addr tmp; nla_memcpy(&tmp, nla, sizeof(tmp)); return tmp; } /** * nla_get_bitfield32 - return payload of 32 bitfield attribute * @nla: nla_bitfield32 attribute */ static inline struct nla_bitfield32 nla_get_bitfield32(const struct nlattr *nla) { struct nla_bitfield32 tmp; nla_memcpy(&tmp, nla, sizeof(tmp)); return tmp; } /** * nla_memdup - duplicate attribute memory (kmemdup) * @src: netlink attribute to duplicate from * @gfp: GFP mask */ static inline void *nla_memdup(const struct nlattr *src, gfp_t gfp) { return kmemdup(nla_data(src), nla_len(src), gfp); } /** * nla_nest_start_noflag - Start a new level of nested attributes * @skb: socket buffer to add attributes to * @attrtype: attribute type of container * * This function exists for backward compatibility to use in APIs which never * marked their nest attributes with NLA_F_NESTED flag. New APIs should use * nla_nest_start() which sets the flag. * * Returns the container attribute or NULL on error */ static inline struct nlattr *nla_nest_start_noflag(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype) { struct nlattr *start = (struct nlattr *)skb_tail_pointer(skb); if (nla_put(skb, attrtype, 0, NULL) < 0) return NULL; return start; } /** * nla_nest_start - Start a new level of nested attributes, with NLA_F_NESTED * @skb: socket buffer to add attributes to * @attrtype: attribute type of container * * Unlike nla_nest_start_noflag(), mark the nest attribute with NLA_F_NESTED * flag. This is the preferred function to use in new code. * * Returns the container attribute or NULL on error */ static inline struct nlattr *nla_nest_start(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype) { return nla_nest_start_noflag(skb, attrtype | NLA_F_NESTED); } /** * nla_nest_end - Finalize nesting of attributes * @skb: socket buffer the attributes are stored in * @start: container attribute * * Corrects the container attribute header to include the all * appeneded attributes. * * Returns the total data length of the skb. */ static inline int nla_nest_end(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlattr *start) { start->nla_len = skb_tail_pointer(skb) - (unsigned char *)start; return skb->len; } /** * nla_nest_cancel - Cancel nesting of attributes * @skb: socket buffer the message is stored in * @start: container attribute * * Removes the container attribute and including all nested * attributes. Returns -EMSGSIZE */ static inline void nla_nest_cancel(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlattr *start) { nlmsg_trim(skb, start); } /** * __nla_validate_nested - Validate a stream of nested attributes * @start: container attribute * @maxtype: maximum attribute type to be expected * @policy: validation policy * @validate: validation strictness * @extack: extended ACK report struct * * Validates all attributes in the nested attribute stream against the * specified policy. Attributes with a type exceeding maxtype will be * ignored. See documenation of struct nla_policy for more details. * * Returns 0 on success or a negative error code. */ static inline int __nla_validate_nested(const struct nlattr *start, int maxtype, const struct nla_policy *policy, unsigned int validate, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { return __nla_validate(nla_data(start), nla_len(start), maxtype, policy, validate, extack); } static inline int nla_validate_nested(const struct nlattr *start, int maxtype, const struct nla_policy *policy, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { return __nla_validate_nested(start, maxtype, policy, NL_VALIDATE_STRICT, extack); } static inline int nla_validate_nested_deprecated(const struct nlattr *start, int maxtype, const struct nla_policy *policy, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { return __nla_validate_nested(start, maxtype, policy, NL_VALIDATE_LIBERAL, extack); } /** * nla_need_padding_for_64bit - test 64-bit alignment of the next attribute * @skb: socket buffer the message is stored in * * Return true if padding is needed to align the next attribute (nla_data()) to * a 64-bit aligned area. */ static inline bool nla_need_padding_for_64bit(struct sk_buff *skb) { #ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS /* The nlattr header is 4 bytes in size, that's why we test * if the skb->data _is_ aligned. A NOP attribute, plus * nlattr header for next attribute, will make nla_data() * 8-byte aligned. */ if (IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)skb_tail_pointer(skb), 8)) return true; #endif return false; } /** * nla_align_64bit - 64-bit align the nla_data() of next attribute * @skb: socket buffer the message is stored in * @padattr: attribute type for the padding * * Conditionally emit a padding netlink attribute in order to make * the next attribute we emit have a 64-bit aligned nla_data() area. * This will only be done in architectures which do not have * CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS defined. * * Returns zero on success or a negative error code. */ static inline int nla_align_64bit(struct sk_buff *skb, int padattr) { if (nla_need_padding_for_64bit(skb) && !nla_reserve(skb, padattr, 0)) return -EMSGSIZE; return 0; } /** * nla_total_size_64bit - total length of attribute including padding * @payload: length of payload */ static inline int nla_total_size_64bit(int payload) { return NLA_ALIGN(nla_attr_size(payload)) #ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS + NLA_ALIGN(nla_attr_size(0)) #endif ; } /** * nla_for_each_attr - iterate over a stream of attributes * @pos: loop counter, set to current attribute * @head: head of attribute stream * @len: length of attribute stream * @rem: initialized to len, holds bytes currently remaining in stream */ #define nla_for_each_attr(pos, head, len, rem) \ for (pos = head, rem = len; \ nla_ok(pos, rem); \ pos = nla_next(pos, &(rem))) /** * nla_for_each_nested - iterate over nested attributes * @pos: loop counter, set to current attribute * @nla: attribute containing the nested attributes * @rem: initialized to len, holds bytes currently remaining in stream */ #define nla_for_each_nested(pos, nla, rem) \ nla_for_each_attr(pos, nla_data(nla), nla_len(nla), rem) /** * nla_is_last - Test if attribute is last in stream * @nla: attribute to test * @rem: bytes remaining in stream */ static inline bool nla_is_last(const struct nlattr *nla, int rem) { return nla->nla_len == rem; } void nla_get_range_unsigned(const struct nla_policy *pt, struct netlink_range_validation *range); void nla_get_range_signed(const struct nla_policy *pt, struct netlink_range_validation_signed *range); struct netlink_policy_dump_state; int netlink_policy_dump_add_policy(struct netlink_policy_dump_state **pstate, const struct nla_policy *policy, unsigned int maxtype); int netlink_policy_dump_get_policy_idx(struct netlink_policy_dump_state *state, const struct nla_policy *policy, unsigned int maxtype); bool netlink_policy_dump_loop(struct netlink_policy_dump_state *state); int netlink_policy_dump_write(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_policy_dump_state *state); int netlink_policy_dump_attr_size_estimate(const struct nla_policy *pt); int netlink_policy_dump_write_attr(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nla_policy *pt, int nestattr); void netlink_policy_dump_free(struct netlink_policy_dump_state *state); #endif
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ /* * Access to user system call parameters and results * * Copyright (C) 2008-2009 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. * * See asm-generic/syscall.h for descriptions of what we must do here. */ #ifndef _ASM_X86_SYSCALL_H #define _ASM_X86_SYSCALL_H #include <uapi/linux/audit.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/err.h> #include <asm/thread_info.h> /* for TS_COMPAT */ #include <asm/unistd.h> typedef long (*sys_call_ptr_t)(const struct pt_regs *); extern const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[]; #if defined(CONFIG_X86_32) #define ia32_sys_call_table sys_call_table #endif #if defined(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) extern const sys_call_ptr_t ia32_sys_call_table[]; #endif #ifdef CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI extern const sys_call_ptr_t x32_sys_call_table[]; #endif /* * Only the low 32 bits of orig_ax are meaningful, so we return int. * This importantly ignores the high bits on 64-bit, so comparisons * sign-extend the low 32 bits. */ static inline int syscall_get_nr(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs) { return regs->orig_ax; } static inline void syscall_rollback(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs) { regs->ax = regs->orig_ax; } static inline long syscall_get_error(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs) { unsigned long error = regs->ax; #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION /* * TS_COMPAT is set for 32-bit syscall entries and then * remains set until we return to user mode. */ if (task->thread_info.status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED)) /* * Sign-extend the value so (int)-EFOO becomes (long)-EFOO * and will match correctly in comparisons. */ error = (long) (int) error; #endif return IS_ERR_VALUE(error) ? error : 0; } static inline long syscall_get_return_value(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs) { return regs->ax; } static inline void syscall_set_return_value(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs, int error, long val) { regs->ax = (long) error ?: val; } #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 static inline void syscall_get_arguments(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long *args) { memcpy(args, &regs->bx, 6 * sizeof(args[0])); } static inline void syscall_set_arguments(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int i, unsigned int n, const unsigned long *args) { BUG_ON(i + n > 6); memcpy(&regs->bx + i, args, n * sizeof(args[0])); } static inline int syscall_get_arch(struct task_struct *task) { return AUDIT_ARCH_I386; } #else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ static inline void syscall_get_arguments(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long *args) { # ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION if (task->thread_info.status & TS_COMPAT) { *args++ = regs->bx; *args++ = regs->cx; *args++ = regs->dx; *args++ = regs->si; *args++ = regs->di; *args = regs->bp; } else # endif { *args++ = regs->di; *args++ = regs->si; *args++ = regs->dx; *args++ = regs->r10; *args++ = regs->r8; *args = regs->r9; } } static inline void syscall_set_arguments(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs, const unsigned long *args) { # ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION if (task->thread_info.status & TS_COMPAT) { regs->bx = *args++; regs->cx = *args++; regs->dx = *args++; regs->si = *args++; regs->di = *args++; regs->bp = *args; } else # endif { regs->di = *args++; regs->si = *args++; regs->dx = *args++; regs->r10 = *args++; regs->r8 = *args++; regs->r9 = *args; } } static inline int syscall_get_arch(struct task_struct *task) { /* x32 tasks should be considered AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64. */ return (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) && task->thread_info.status & TS_COMPAT) ? AUDIT_ARCH_I386 : AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64; } void do_syscall_64(unsigned long nr, struct pt_regs *regs); void do_int80_syscall_32(struct pt_regs *regs); long do_fast_syscall_32(struct pt_regs *regs); #endif /* CONFIG_X86_32 */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_SYSCALL_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef _LINUX_PIPE_FS_I_H #define _LINUX_PIPE_FS_I_H #define PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS 16 #define PIPE_BUF_FLAG_LRU 0x01 /* page is on the LRU */ #define PIPE_BUF_FLAG_ATOMIC 0x02 /* was atomically mapped */ #define PIPE_BUF_FLAG_GIFT 0x04 /* page is a gift */ #define PIPE_BUF_FLAG_PACKET 0x08 /* read() as a packet */ #define PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE 0x10 /* can merge buffers */ #define PIPE_BUF_FLAG_WHOLE 0x20 /* read() must return entire buffer or error */ #ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE #define PIPE_BUF_FLAG_LOSS 0x40 /* Message loss happened after this buffer */ #endif /** * struct pipe_buffer - a linux kernel pipe buffer * @page: the page containing the data for the pipe buffer * @offset: offset of data inside the @page * @len: length of data inside the @page * @ops: operations associated with this buffer. See @pipe_buf_operations. * @flags: pipe buffer flags. See above. * @private: private data owned by the ops. **/ struct pipe_buffer { struct page *page; unsigned int offset, len; const struct pipe_buf_operations *ops; unsigned int flags; unsigned long private; }; /** * struct pipe_inode_info - a linux kernel pipe * @mutex: mutex protecting the whole thing * @rd_wait: reader wait point in case of empty pipe * @wr_wait: writer wait point in case of full pipe * @head: The point of buffer production * @tail: The point of buffer consumption * @note_loss: The next read() should insert a data-lost message * @max_usage: The maximum number of slots that may be used in the ring * @ring_size: total number of buffers (should be a power of 2) * @nr_accounted: The amount this pipe accounts for in user->pipe_bufs * @tmp_page: cached released page * @readers: number of current readers of this pipe * @writers: number of current writers of this pipe * @files: number of struct file referring this pipe (protected by ->i_lock) * @r_counter: reader counter * @w_counter: writer counter * @poll_usage: is this pipe used for epoll, which has crazy wakeups? * @fasync_readers: reader side fasync * @fasync_writers: writer side fasync * @bufs: the circular array of pipe buffers * @user: the user who created this pipe * @watch_queue: If this pipe is a watch_queue, this is the stuff for that **/ struct pipe_inode_info { struct mutex mutex; wait_queue_head_t rd_wait, wr_wait; unsigned int head; unsigned int tail; unsigned int max_usage; unsigned int ring_size; #ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE bool note_loss; #endif unsigned int nr_accounted; unsigned int readers; unsigned int writers; unsigned int files; unsigned int r_counter; unsigned int w_counter; unsigned int poll_usage; struct page *tmp_page; struct fasync_struct *fasync_readers; struct fasync_struct *fasync_writers; struct pipe_buffer *bufs; struct user_struct *user; #ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE struct watch_queue *watch_queue; #endif }; /* * Note on the nesting of these functions: * * ->confirm() * ->try_steal() * * That is, ->try_steal() must be called on a confirmed buffer. See below for * the meaning of each operation. Also see the kerneldoc in fs/pipe.c for the * pipe and generic variants of these hooks. */ struct pipe_buf_operations { /* * ->confirm() verifies that the data in the pipe buffer is there * and that the contents are good. If the pages in the pipe belong * to a file system, we may need to wait for IO completion in this * hook. Returns 0 for good, or a negative error value in case of * error. If not present all pages are considered good. */ int (*confirm)(struct pipe_inode_info *, struct pipe_buffer *); /* * When the contents of this pipe buffer has been completely * consumed by a reader, ->release() is called. */ void (*release)(struct pipe_inode_info *, struct pipe_buffer *); /* * Attempt to take ownership of the pipe buffer and its contents. * ->try_steal() returns %true for success, in which case the contents * of the pipe (the buf->page) is locked and now completely owned by the * caller. The page may then be transferred to a different mapping, the * most often used case is insertion into different file address space * cache. */ bool (*try_steal)(struct pipe_inode_info *, struct pipe_buffer *); /* * Get a reference to the pipe buffer. */ bool (*get)(struct pipe_inode_info *, struct pipe_buffer *); }; /** * pipe_empty - Return true if the pipe is empty * @head: The pipe ring head pointer * @tail: The pipe ring tail pointer */ static inline bool pipe_empty(unsigned int head, unsigned int tail) { return head == tail; } /** * pipe_occupancy - Return number of slots used in the pipe * @head: The pipe ring head pointer * @tail: The pipe ring tail pointer */ static inline unsigned int pipe_occupancy(unsigned int head, unsigned int tail) { return head - tail; } /** * pipe_full - Return true if the pipe is full * @head: The pipe ring head pointer * @tail: The pipe ring tail pointer * @limit: The maximum amount of slots available. */ static inline bool pipe_full(unsigned int head, unsigned int tail, unsigned int limit) { return pipe_occupancy(head, tail) >= limit; } /** * pipe_space_for_user - Return number of slots available to userspace * @head: The pipe ring head pointer * @tail: The pipe ring tail pointer * @pipe: The pipe info structure */ static inline unsigned int pipe_space_for_user(unsigned int head, unsigned int tail, struct pipe_inode_info *pipe) { unsigned int p_occupancy, p_space; p_occupancy = pipe_occupancy(head, tail); if (p_occupancy >= pipe->max_usage) return 0; p_space = pipe->ring_size - p_occupancy; if (p_space > pipe->max_usage) p_space = pipe->max_usage; return p_space; } /** * pipe_buf_get - get a reference to a pipe_buffer * @pipe: the pipe that the buffer belongs to * @buf: the buffer to get a reference to * * Return: %true if the reference was successfully obtained. */ static inline __must_check bool pipe_buf_get(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct pipe_buffer *buf) { return buf->ops->get(pipe, buf); } /** * pipe_buf_release - put a reference to a pipe_buffer * @pipe: the pipe that the buffer belongs to * @buf: the buffer to put a reference to */ static inline void pipe_buf_release(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct pipe_buffer *buf) { const struct pipe_buf_operations *ops = buf->ops; buf->ops = NULL; ops->release(pipe, buf); } /** * pipe_buf_confirm - verify contents of the pipe buffer * @pipe: the pipe that the buffer belongs to * @buf: the buffer to confirm */ static inline int pipe_buf_confirm(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct pipe_buffer *buf) { if (!buf->ops->confirm) return 0; return buf->ops->confirm(pipe, buf); } /** * pipe_buf_try_steal - attempt to take ownership of a pipe_buffer * @pipe: the pipe that the buffer belongs to * @buf: the buffer to attempt to steal */ static inline bool pipe_buf_try_steal(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct pipe_buffer *buf) { if (!buf->ops->try_steal) return false; return buf->ops->try_steal(pipe, buf); } /* Differs from PIPE_BUF in that PIPE_SIZE is the length of the actual memory allocation, whereas PIPE_BUF makes atomicity guarantees. */ #define PIPE_SIZE PAGE_SIZE /* Pipe lock and unlock operations */ void pipe_lock(struct pipe_inode_info *); void pipe_unlock(struct pipe_inode_info *); void pipe_double_lock(struct pipe_inode_info *, struct pipe_inode_info *); extern unsigned int pipe_max_size; extern unsigned long pipe_user_pages_hard; extern unsigned long pipe_user_pages_soft; /* Wait for a pipe to be readable/writable while dropping the pipe lock */ void pipe_wait_readable(struct pipe_inode_info *); void pipe_wait_writable(struct pipe_inode_info *); struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void); void free_pipe_info(struct pipe_inode_info *); /* Generic pipe buffer ops functions */ bool generic_pipe_buf_get(struct pipe_inode_info *, struct pipe_buffer *); bool generic_pipe_buf_try_steal(struct pipe_inode_info *, struct pipe_buffer *); void generic_pipe_buf_release(struct pipe_inode_info *, struct pipe_buffer *); extern const struct pipe_buf_operations nosteal_pipe_buf_ops; #ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE unsigned long account_pipe_buffers(struct user_struct *user, unsigned long old, unsigned long new); bool too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(unsigned long user_bufs); bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(unsigned long user_bufs); bool pipe_is_unprivileged_user(void); #endif /* for F_SETPIPE_SZ and F_GETPIPE_SZ */ #ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE int pipe_resize_ring(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned int nr_slots); #endif long pipe_fcntl(struct file *, unsigned int, unsigned long arg); struct pipe_inode_info *get_pipe_info(struct file *file, bool for_splice); int create_pipe_files(struct file **, int); unsigned int round_pipe_size(unsigned long size); #endif
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * linux/ipc/util.h * Copyright (C) 1999 Christoph Rohland * * ipc helper functions (c) 1999 Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com> * namespaces support. 2006 OpenVZ, SWsoft Inc. * Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org> */ #ifndef _IPC_UTIL_H #define _IPC_UTIL_H #include <linux/unistd.h> #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/ipc_namespace.h> /* * The IPC ID contains 2 separate numbers - index and sequence number. * By default, * bits 0-14: index (32k, 15 bits) * bits 15-30: sequence number (64k, 16 bits) * * When IPCMNI extension mode is turned on, the composition changes: * bits 0-23: index (16M, 24 bits) * bits 24-30: sequence number (128, 7 bits) */ #define IPCMNI_SHIFT 15 #define IPCMNI_EXTEND_SHIFT 24 #define IPCMNI_EXTEND_MIN_CYCLE (RADIX_TREE_MAP_SIZE * RADIX_TREE_MAP_SIZE) #define IPCMNI (1 << IPCMNI_SHIFT) #define IPCMNI_EXTEND (1 << IPCMNI_EXTEND_SHIFT) #ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC_SYSCTL extern int ipc_mni; extern int ipc_mni_shift; extern int ipc_min_cycle; #define ipcmni_seq_shift() ipc_mni_shift #define IPCMNI_IDX_MASK ((1 << ipc_mni_shift) - 1) #else /* CONFIG_SYSVIPC_SYSCTL */ #define ipc_mni IPCMNI #define ipc_min_cycle ((int)RADIX_TREE_MAP_SIZE) #define ipcmni_seq_shift() IPCMNI_SHIFT #define IPCMNI_IDX_MASK ((1 << IPCMNI_SHIFT) - 1) #endif /* CONFIG_SYSVIPC_SYSCTL */ void sem_init(void); void msg_init(void); void shm_init(void); struct ipc_namespace; struct pid_namespace; #ifdef CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE extern void mq_clear_sbinfo(struct ipc_namespace *ns); extern void mq_put_mnt(struct ipc_namespace *ns); #else static inline void mq_clear_sbinfo(struct ipc_namespace *ns) { } static inline void mq_put_mnt(struct ipc_namespace *ns) { } #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC void sem_init_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns); void msg_init_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns); void shm_init_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns); void sem_exit_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns); void msg_exit_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns); void shm_exit_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns); #else static inline void sem_init_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns) { } static inline void msg_init_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns) { } static inline void shm_init_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns) { } static inline void sem_exit_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns) { } static inline void msg_exit_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns) { } static inline void shm_exit_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns) { } #endif /* * Structure that holds the parameters needed by the ipc operations * (see after) */ struct ipc_params { key_t key; int flg; union { size_t size; /* for shared memories */ int nsems; /* for semaphores */ } u; /* holds the getnew() specific param */ }; /* * Structure that holds some ipc operations. This structure is used to unify * the calls to sys_msgget(), sys_semget(), sys_shmget() * . routine to call to create a new ipc object. Can be one of newque, * newary, newseg * . routine to call to check permissions for a new ipc object. * Can be one of security_msg_associate, security_sem_associate, * security_shm_associate * . routine to call for an extra check if needed */ struct ipc_ops { int (*getnew)(struct ipc_namespace *, struct ipc_params *); int (*associate)(struct kern_ipc_perm *, int); int (*more_checks)(struct kern_ipc_perm *, struct ipc_params *); }; struct seq_file; struct ipc_ids; void ipc_init_ids(struct ipc_ids *ids); #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS void __init ipc_init_proc_interface(const char *path, const char *header, int ids, int (*show)(struct seq_file *, void *)); struct pid_namespace *ipc_seq_pid_ns(struct seq_file *); #else #define ipc_init_proc_interface(path, header, ids, show) do {} while (0) #endif #define IPC_SEM_IDS 0 #define IPC_MSG_IDS 1 #define IPC_SHM_IDS 2 #define ipcid_to_idx(id) ((id) & IPCMNI_IDX_MASK) #define ipcid_to_seqx(id) ((id) >> ipcmni_seq_shift()) #define ipcid_seq_max() (INT_MAX >> ipcmni_seq_shift()) /* must be called with ids->rwsem acquired for writing */ int ipc_addid(struct ipc_ids *, struct kern_ipc_perm *, int); /* must be called with both locks acquired. */ void ipc_rmid(struct ipc_ids *, struct kern_ipc_perm *); /* must be called with both locks acquired. */ void ipc_set_key_private(struct ipc_ids *, struct kern_ipc_perm *); /* must be called with ipcp locked */ int ipcperms(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flg); /** * ipc_get_maxidx - get the highest assigned index * @ids: ipc identifier set * * Called with ipc_ids.rwsem held for reading. */ static inline int ipc_get_maxidx(struct ipc_ids *ids) { if (ids->in_use == 0) return -1; if (ids->in_use == ipc_mni) return ipc_mni - 1; return ids->max_idx; } /* * For allocation that need to be freed by RCU. * Objects are reference counted, they start with reference count 1. * getref increases the refcount, the putref call that reduces the recount * to 0 schedules the rcu destruction. Caller must guarantee locking. * * refcount is initialized by ipc_addid(), before that point call_rcu() * must be used. */ bool ipc_rcu_getref(struct kern_ipc_perm *ptr); void ipc_rcu_putref(struct kern_ipc_perm *ptr, void (*func)(struct rcu_head *head)); struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_obtain_object_idr(struct ipc_ids *ids, int id); void kernel_to_ipc64_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *in, struct ipc64_perm *out); void ipc64_perm_to_ipc_perm(struct ipc64_perm *in, struct ipc_perm *out); int ipc_update_perm(struct ipc64_perm *in, struct kern_ipc_perm *out); struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcctl_obtain_check(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct ipc_ids *ids, int id, int cmd, struct ipc64_perm *perm, int extra_perm); static inline void ipc_update_pid(struct pid **pos, struct pid *pid) { struct pid *old = *pos; if (old != pid) { *pos = get_pid(pid); put_pid(old); } } #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION int ipc_parse_version(int *cmd); #endif extern void free_msg(struct msg_msg *msg); extern struct msg_msg *load_msg(const void __user *src, size_t len); extern struct msg_msg *copy_msg(struct msg_msg *src, struct msg_msg *dst); extern int store_msg(void __user *dest, struct msg_msg *msg, size_t len); static inline int ipc_checkid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, int id) { return ipcid_to_seqx(id) != ipcp->seq; } static inline void ipc_lock_object(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm) { spin_lock(&perm->lock); } static inline void ipc_unlock_object(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm) { spin_unlock(&perm->lock); } static inline void ipc_assert_locked_object(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm) { assert_spin_locked(&perm->lock); } static inline void ipc_unlock(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm) { ipc_unlock_object(perm); rcu_read_unlock(); } /* * ipc_valid_object() - helper to sort out IPC_RMID races for codepaths * where the respective ipc_ids.rwsem is not being held down. * Checks whether the ipc object is still around or if it's gone already, as * ipc_rmid() may have already freed the ID while the ipc lock was spinning. * Needs to be called with kern_ipc_perm.lock held -- exception made for one * checkpoint case at sys_semtimedop() as noted in code commentary. */ static inline bool ipc_valid_object(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm) { return !perm->deleted; } struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_obtain_object_check(struct ipc_ids *ids, int id); int ipcget(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct ipc_ids *ids, const struct ipc_ops *ops, struct ipc_params *params); void free_ipcs(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct ipc_ids *ids, void (*free)(struct ipc_namespace *, struct kern_ipc_perm *)); static inline int sem_check_semmni(struct ipc_namespace *ns) { /* * Check semmni range [0, ipc_mni] * semmni is the last element of sem_ctls[4] array */ return ((ns->sem_ctls[3] < 0) || (ns->sem_ctls[3] > ipc_mni)) ? -ERANGE : 0; } #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT #include <linux/compat.h> struct compat_ipc_perm { key_t key; __compat_uid_t uid; __compat_gid_t gid; __compat_uid_t cuid; __compat_gid_t cgid; compat_mode_t mode; unsigned short seq; }; void to_compat_ipc_perm(struct compat_ipc_perm *, struct ipc64_perm *); void to_compat_ipc64_perm(struct compat_ipc64_perm *, struct ipc64_perm *); int get_compat_ipc_perm(struct ipc64_perm *, struct compat_ipc_perm __user *); int get_compat_ipc64_perm(struct ipc64_perm *, struct compat_ipc64_perm __user *); static inline int compat_ipc_parse_version(int *cmd) { int version = *cmd & IPC_64; *cmd &= ~IPC_64; return version; } long compat_ksys_old_semctl(int semid, int semnum, int cmd, int arg); long compat_ksys_old_msgctl(int msqid, int cmd, void __user *uptr); long compat_ksys_msgrcv(int msqid, compat_uptr_t msgp, compat_ssize_t msgsz, compat_long_t msgtyp, int msgflg); long compat_ksys_msgsnd(int msqid, compat_uptr_t msgp, compat_ssize_t msgsz, int msgflg); long compat_ksys_old_shmctl(int shmid, int cmd, void __user *uptr); #endif #endif
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef __NET_IP_TUNNELS_H #define __NET_IP_TUNNELS_H 1 #include <linux/if_tunnel.h> #include <linux/netdevice.h> #include <linux/skbuff.h> #include <linux/socket.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/u64_stats_sync.h> #include <linux/bitops.h> #include <net/dsfield.h> #include <net/gro_cells.h> #include <net/inet_ecn.h> #include <net/netns/generic.h> #include <net/rtnetlink.h> #include <net/lwtunnel.h> #include <net/dst_cache.h> #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) #include <net/ipv6.h> #include <net/ip6_fib.h> #include <net/ip6_route.h> #endif /* Keep error state on tunnel for 30 sec */ #define IPTUNNEL_ERR_TIMEO (30*HZ) /* Used to memset ip_tunnel padding. */ #define IP_TUNNEL_KEY_SIZE offsetofend(struct ip_tunnel_key, tp_dst) /* Used to memset ipv4 address padding. */ #define IP_TUNNEL_KEY_IPV4_PAD offsetofend(struct ip_tunnel_key, u.ipv4.dst) #define IP_TUNNEL_KEY_IPV4_PAD_LEN \ (sizeof_field(struct ip_tunnel_key, u) - \ sizeof_field(struct ip_tunnel_key, u.ipv4)) struct ip_tunnel_key { __be64 tun_id; union { struct { __be32 src; __be32 dst; } ipv4; struct { struct in6_addr src; struct in6_addr dst; } ipv6; } u; __be16 tun_flags; u8 tos; /* TOS for IPv4, TC for IPv6 */ u8 ttl; /* TTL for IPv4, HL for IPv6 */ __be32 label; /* Flow Label for IPv6 */ __be16 tp_src; __be16 tp_dst; }; /* Flags for ip_tunnel_info mode. */ #define IP_TUNNEL_INFO_TX 0x01 /* represents tx tunnel parameters */ #define IP_TUNNEL_INFO_IPV6 0x02 /* key contains IPv6 addresses */ #define IP_TUNNEL_INFO_BRIDGE 0x04 /* represents a bridged tunnel id */ /* Maximum tunnel options length. */ #define IP_TUNNEL_OPTS_MAX \ GENMASK((sizeof_field(struct ip_tunnel_info, \ options_len) * BITS_PER_BYTE) - 1, 0) struct ip_tunnel_info { struct ip_tunnel_key key; #ifdef CONFIG_DST_CACHE struct dst_cache dst_cache; #endif u8 options_len; u8 mode; }; /* 6rd prefix/relay information */ #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SIT_6RD struct ip_tunnel_6rd_parm { struct in6_addr prefix; __be32 relay_prefix; u16 prefixlen; u16 relay_prefixlen; }; #endif struct ip_tunnel_encap { u16 type; u16 flags; __be16 sport; __be16 dport; }; struct ip_tunnel_prl_entry { struct ip_tunnel_prl_entry __rcu *next; __be32 addr; u16 flags; struct rcu_head rcu_head; }; struct metadata_dst; struct ip_tunnel { struct ip_tunnel __rcu *next; struct hlist_node hash_node; struct net_device *dev; struct net *net; /* netns for packet i/o */ unsigned long err_time; /* Time when the last ICMP error * arrived */ int err_count; /* Number of arrived ICMP errors */ /* These four fields used only by GRE */ u32 i_seqno; /* The last seen seqno */ u32 o_seqno; /* The last output seqno */ int tun_hlen; /* Precalculated header length */ /* These four fields used only by ERSPAN */ u32 index; /* ERSPAN type II index */ u8 erspan_ver; /* ERSPAN version */ u8 dir; /* ERSPAN direction */ u16 hwid; /* ERSPAN hardware ID */ struct dst_cache dst_cache; struct ip_tunnel_parm parms; int mlink; int encap_hlen; /* Encap header length (FOU,GUE) */ int hlen; /* tun_hlen + encap_hlen */ struct ip_tunnel_encap encap; /* for SIT */ #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SIT_6RD struct ip_tunnel_6rd_parm ip6rd; #endif struct ip_tunnel_prl_entry __rcu *prl; /* potential router list */ unsigned int prl_count; /* # of entries in PRL */ unsigned int ip_tnl_net_id; struct gro_cells gro_cells; __u32 fwmark; bool collect_md; bool ignore_df; }; struct tnl_ptk_info { __be16 flags; __be16 proto; __be32 key; __be32 seq; int hdr_len; }; #define PACKET_RCVD 0 #define PACKET_REJECT 1 #define PACKET_NEXT 2 #define IP_TNL_HASH_BITS 7 #define IP_TNL_HASH_SIZE (1 << IP_TNL_HASH_BITS) struct ip_tunnel_net { struct net_device *fb_tunnel_dev; struct rtnl_link_ops *rtnl_link_ops; struct hlist_head tunnels[IP_TNL_HASH_SIZE]; struct ip_tunnel __rcu *collect_md_tun; int type; }; static inline void ip_tunnel_key_init(struct ip_tunnel_key *key, __be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, u8 tos, u8 ttl, __be32 label, __be16 tp_src, __be16 tp_dst, __be64 tun_id, __be16 tun_flags) { key->tun_id = tun_id; key->u.ipv4.src = saddr; key->u.ipv4.dst = daddr; memset((unsigned char *)key + IP_TUNNEL_KEY_IPV4_PAD, 0, IP_TUNNEL_KEY_IPV4_PAD_LEN); key->tos = tos; key->ttl = ttl; key->label = label; key->tun_flags = tun_flags; /* For the tunnel types on the top of IPsec, the tp_src and tp_dst of * the upper tunnel are used. * E.g: GRE over IPSEC, the tp_src and tp_port are zero. */ key->tp_src = tp_src; key->tp_dst = tp_dst; /* Clear struct padding. */ if (sizeof(*key) != IP_TUNNEL_KEY_SIZE) memset((unsigned char *)key + IP_TUNNEL_KEY_SIZE, 0, sizeof(*key) - IP_TUNNEL_KEY_SIZE); } static inline bool ip_tunnel_dst_cache_usable(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct ip_tunnel_info *info) { if (skb->mark) return false; if (!info) return true; if (info->key.tun_flags & TUNNEL_NOCACHE) return false; return true; } static inline unsigned short ip_tunnel_info_af(const struct ip_tunnel_info *tun_info) { return tun_info->mode & IP_TUNNEL_INFO_IPV6 ? AF_INET6 : AF_INET; } static inline __be64 key32_to_tunnel_id(__be32 key) { #ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN return (__force __be64)key; #else return (__force __be64)((__force u64)key << 32); #endif } /* Returns the least-significant 32 bits of a __be64. */ static inline __be32 tunnel_id_to_key32(__be64 tun_id) { #ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN return (__force __be32)tun_id; #else return (__force __be32)((__force u64)tun_id >> 32); #endif } #ifdef CONFIG_INET static inline void ip_tunnel_init_flow(struct flowi4 *fl4, int proto, __be32 daddr, __be32 saddr, __be32 key, __u8 tos, int oif, __u32 mark, __u32 tun_inner_hash) { memset(fl4, 0, sizeof(*fl4)); fl4->flowi4_oif = oif; fl4->daddr = daddr; fl4->saddr = saddr; fl4->flowi4_tos = tos; fl4->flowi4_proto = proto; fl4->fl4_gre_key = key; fl4->flowi4_mark = mark; fl4->flowi4_multipath_hash = tun_inner_hash; } int ip_tunnel_init(struct net_device *dev); void ip_tunnel_uninit(struct net_device *dev); void ip_tunnel_dellink(struct net_device *dev, struct list_head *head); struct net *ip_tunnel_get_link_net(const struct net_device *dev); int ip_tunnel_get_iflink(const struct net_device *dev); int ip_tunnel_init_net(struct net *net, unsigned int ip_tnl_net_id, struct rtnl_link_ops *ops, char *devname); void ip_tunnel_delete_nets(struct list_head *list_net, unsigned int id, struct rtnl_link_ops *ops); void ip_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, const struct iphdr *tnl_params, const u8 protocol); void ip_md_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, const u8 proto, int tunnel_hlen); int ip_tunnel_ctl(struct net_device *dev, struct ip_tunnel_parm *p, int cmd); int ip_tunnel_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd); int __ip_tunnel_change_mtu(struct net_device *dev, int new_mtu, bool strict); int ip_tunnel_change_mtu(struct net_device *dev, int new_mtu); void ip_tunnel_get_stats64(struct net_device *dev, struct rtnl_link_stats64 *tot); struct ip_tunnel *ip_tunnel_lookup(struct ip_tunnel_net *itn, int link, __be16 flags, __be32 remote, __be32 local, __be32 key); int ip_tunnel_rcv(struct ip_tunnel *tunnel, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tnl_ptk_info *tpi, struct metadata_dst *tun_dst, bool log_ecn_error); int ip_tunnel_changelink(struct net_device *dev, struct nlattr *tb[], struct ip_tunnel_parm *p, __u32 fwmark); int ip_tunnel_newlink(struct net_device *dev, struct nlattr *tb[], struct ip_tunnel_parm *p, __u32 fwmark); void ip_tunnel_setup(struct net_device *dev, unsigned int net_id); extern const struct header_ops ip_tunnel_header_ops; __be16 ip_tunnel_parse_protocol(const struct sk_buff *skb); struct ip_tunnel_encap_ops { size_t (*encap_hlen)(struct ip_tunnel_encap *e); int (*build_header)(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ip_tunnel_encap *e, u8 *protocol, struct flowi4 *fl4); int (*err_handler)(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 info); }; #define MAX_IPTUN_ENCAP_OPS 8 extern const struct ip_tunnel_encap_ops __rcu * iptun_encaps[MAX_IPTUN_ENCAP_OPS]; int ip_tunnel_encap_add_ops(const struct ip_tunnel_encap_ops *op, unsigned int num); int ip_tunnel_encap_del_ops(const struct ip_tunnel_encap_ops *op, unsigned int num); int ip_tunnel_encap_setup(struct ip_tunnel *t, struct ip_tunnel_encap *ipencap); static inline bool pskb_inet_may_pull(struct sk_buff *skb) { int nhlen; switch (skb->protocol) { #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) case htons(ETH_P_IPV6): nhlen = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr); break; #endif case htons(ETH_P_IP): nhlen = sizeof(struct iphdr); break; default: nhlen = 0; } return pskb_network_may_pull(skb, nhlen); } static inline int ip_encap_hlen(struct ip_tunnel_encap *e) { const struct ip_tunnel_encap_ops *ops; int hlen = -EINVAL; if (e->type == TUNNEL_ENCAP_NONE) return 0; if (e->type >= MAX_IPTUN_ENCAP_OPS) return -EINVAL; rcu_read_lock(); ops = rcu_dereference(iptun_encaps[e->type]); if (likely(ops && ops->encap_hlen)) hlen = ops->encap_hlen(e); rcu_read_unlock(); return hlen; } static inline int ip_tunnel_encap(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ip_tunnel *t, u8 *protocol, struct flowi4 *fl4) { const struct ip_tunnel_encap_ops *ops; int ret = -EINVAL; if (t->encap.type == TUNNEL_ENCAP_NONE) return 0; if (t->encap.type >= MAX_IPTUN_ENCAP_OPS) return -EINVAL; rcu_read_lock(); ops = rcu_dereference(iptun_encaps[t->encap.type]); if (likely(ops && ops->build_header)) ret = ops->build_header(skb, &t->encap, protocol, fl4); rcu_read_unlock(); return ret; } /* Extract dsfield from inner protocol */ static inline u8 ip_tunnel_get_dsfield(const struct iphdr *iph, const struct sk_buff *skb) { if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) return iph->tos; else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) return ipv6_get_dsfield((const struct ipv6hdr *)iph); else return 0; } static inline u8 ip_tunnel_get_ttl(const struct iphdr *iph, const struct sk_buff *skb) { if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) return iph->ttl; else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) return ((const struct ipv6hdr *)iph)->hop_limit; else return 0; } /* Propogate ECN bits out */ static inline u8 ip_tunnel_ecn_encap(u8 tos, const struct iphdr *iph, const struct sk_buff *skb) { u8 inner = ip_tunnel_get_dsfield(iph, skb); return INET_ECN_encapsulate(tos, inner); } int __iptunnel_pull_header(struct sk_buff *skb, int hdr_len, __be16 inner_proto, bool raw_proto, bool xnet); static inline int iptunnel_pull_header(struct sk_buff *skb, int hdr_len, __be16 inner_proto, bool xnet) { return __iptunnel_pull_header(skb, hdr_len, inner_proto, false, xnet); } void iptunnel_xmit(struct sock *sk, struct rtable *rt, struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 src, __be32 dst, u8 proto, u8 tos, u8 ttl, __be16 df, bool xnet); struct metadata_dst *iptunnel_metadata_reply(struct metadata_dst *md, gfp_t flags); int skb_tunnel_check_pmtu(struct sk_buff *skb, struct dst_entry *encap_dst, int headroom, bool reply); int iptunnel_handle_offloads(struct sk_buff *skb, int gso_type_mask); static inline int iptunnel_pull_offloads(struct sk_buff *skb) { if (skb_is_gso(skb)) { int err; err = skb_unclone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); if (unlikely(err)) return err; skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type &= ~(NETIF_F_GSO_ENCAP_ALL >> NETIF_F_GSO_SHIFT); } skb->encapsulation = 0; return 0; } static inline void iptunnel_xmit_stats(struct net_device *dev, int pkt_len) { if (pkt_len > 0) { struct pcpu_sw_netstats *tstats = get_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats); u64_stats_update_begin(&tstats->syncp); tstats->tx_bytes += pkt_len; tstats->tx_packets++; u64_stats_update_end(&tstats->syncp); put_cpu_ptr(tstats); } else { struct net_device_stats *err_stats = &dev->stats; if (pkt_len < 0) { err_stats->tx_errors++; err_stats->tx_aborted_errors++; } else { err_stats->tx_dropped++; } } } static inline void *ip_tunnel_info_opts(struct ip_tunnel_info *info) { return info + 1; } static inline void ip_tunnel_info_opts_get(void *to, const struct ip_tunnel_info *info) { memcpy(to, info + 1, info->options_len); } static inline void ip_tunnel_info_opts_set(struct ip_tunnel_info *info, const void *from, int len, __be16 flags) { info->options_len = len; if (len > 0) { memcpy(ip_tunnel_info_opts(info), from, len); info->key.tun_flags |= flags; } } static inline struct ip_tunnel_info *lwt_tun_info(struct lwtunnel_state *lwtstate) { return (struct ip_tunnel_info *)lwtstate->data; } DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(ip_tunnel_metadata_cnt); /* Returns > 0 if metadata should be collected */ static inline int ip_tunnel_collect_metadata(void) { return static_branch_unlikely(&ip_tunnel_metadata_cnt); } void __init ip_tunnel_core_init(void); void ip_tunnel_need_metadata(void); void ip_tunnel_unneed_metadata(void); #else /* CONFIG_INET */ static inline struct ip_tunnel_info *lwt_tun_info(struct lwtunnel_state *lwtstate) { return NULL; } static inline void ip_tunnel_need_metadata(void) { } static inline void ip_tunnel_unneed_metadata(void) { } static inline void ip_tunnel_info_opts_get(void *to, const struct ip_tunnel_info *info) { } static inline void ip_tunnel_info_opts_set(struct ip_tunnel_info *info, const void *from, int len, __be16 flags) { info->options_len = 0; } #endif /* CONFIG_INET */ #endif /* __NET_IP_TUNNELS_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * Common values for AES algorithms */ #ifndef _CRYPTO_AES_H #define _CRYPTO_AES_H #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/crypto.h> #define AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE 16 #define AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE 32 #define AES_KEYSIZE_128 16 #define AES_KEYSIZE_192 24 #define AES_KEYSIZE_256 32 #define AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16 #define AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH (15 * 16) #define AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH_U32 (AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH / sizeof(u32)) /* * Please ensure that the first two fields are 16-byte aligned * relative to the start of the structure, i.e., don't move them! */ struct crypto_aes_ctx { u32 key_enc[AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH_U32]; u32 key_dec[AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH_U32]; u32 key_length; }; extern const u32 crypto_ft_tab[4][256] ____cacheline_aligned; extern const u32 crypto_it_tab[4][256] ____cacheline_aligned; /* * validate key length for AES algorithms */ static inline int aes_check_keylen(unsigned int keylen) { switch (keylen) { case AES_KEYSIZE_128: case AES_KEYSIZE_192: case AES_KEYSIZE_256: break; default: return -EINVAL; } return 0; } int crypto_aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key, unsigned int key_len); /** * aes_expandkey - Expands the AES key as described in FIPS-197 * @ctx: The location where the computed key will be stored. * @in_key: The supplied key. * @key_len: The length of the supplied key. * * Returns 0 on success. The function fails only if an invalid key size (or * pointer) is supplied. * The expanded key size is 240 bytes (max of 14 rounds with a unique 16 bytes * key schedule plus a 16 bytes key which is used before the first round). * The decryption key is prepared for the "Equivalent Inverse Cipher" as * described in FIPS-197. The first slot (16 bytes) of each key (enc or dec) is * for the initial combination, the second slot for the first round and so on. */ int aes_expandkey(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, const u8 *in_key, unsigned int key_len); /** * aes_encrypt - Encrypt a single AES block * @ctx: Context struct containing the key schedule * @out: Buffer to store the ciphertext * @in: Buffer containing the plaintext */ void aes_encrypt(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out, const u8 *in); /** * aes_decrypt - Decrypt a single AES block * @ctx: Context struct containing the key schedule * @out: Buffer to store the plaintext * @in: Buffer containing the ciphertext */ void aes_decrypt(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out, const u8 *in); extern const u8 crypto_aes_sbox[]; extern const u8 crypto_aes_inv_sbox[]; #endif
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef _LINUX_SCHED_COREDUMP_H #define _LINUX_SCHED_COREDUMP_H #include <linux/mm_types.h> #define SUID_DUMP_DISABLE 0 /* No setuid dumping */ #define SUID_DUMP_USER 1 /* Dump as user of process */ #define SUID_DUMP_ROOT 2 /* Dump as root */ /* mm flags */ /* for SUID_DUMP_* above */ #define MMF_DUMPABLE_BITS 2 #define MMF_DUMPABLE_MASK ((1 << MMF_DUMPABLE_BITS) - 1) extern void set_dumpable(struct mm_struct *mm, int value); /* * This returns the actual value of the suid_dumpable flag. For things * that are using this for checking for privilege transitions, it must * test against SUID_DUMP_USER rather than treating it as a boolean * value. */ static inline int __get_dumpable(unsigned long mm_flags) { return mm_flags & MMF_DUMPABLE_MASK; } static inline int get_dumpable(struct mm_struct *mm) { return __get_dumpable(mm->flags); } /* coredump filter bits */ #define MMF_DUMP_ANON_PRIVATE 2 #define MMF_DUMP_ANON_SHARED 3 #define MMF_DUMP_MAPPED_PRIVATE 4 #define MMF_DUMP_MAPPED_SHARED 5 #define MMF_DUMP_ELF_HEADERS 6 #define MMF_DUMP_HUGETLB_PRIVATE 7 #define MMF_DUMP_HUGETLB_SHARED 8 #define MMF_DUMP_DAX_PRIVATE 9 #define MMF_DUMP_DAX_SHARED 10 #define MMF_DUMP_FILTER_SHIFT MMF_DUMPABLE_BITS #define MMF_DUMP_FILTER_BITS 9 #define MMF_DUMP_FILTER_MASK \ (((1 << MMF_DUMP_FILTER_BITS) - 1) << MMF_DUMP_FILTER_SHIFT) #define MMF_DUMP_FILTER_DEFAULT \ ((1 << MMF_DUMP_ANON_PRIVATE) | (1 << MMF_DUMP_ANON_SHARED) |\ (1 << MMF_DUMP_HUGETLB_PRIVATE) | MMF_DUMP_MASK_DEFAULT_ELF) #ifdef CONFIG_CORE_DUMP_DEFAULT_ELF_HEADERS # define MMF_DUMP_MASK_DEFAULT_ELF (1 << MMF_DUMP_ELF_HEADERS) #else # define MMF_DUMP_MASK_DEFAULT_ELF 0 #endif /* leave room for more dump flags */ #define MMF_VM_MERGEABLE 16 /* KSM may merge identical pages */ #define MMF_VM_HUGEPAGE 17 /* set when VM_HUGEPAGE is set on vma */ /* * This one-shot flag is dropped due to necessity of changing exe once again * on NFS restore */ //#define MMF_EXE_FILE_CHANGED 18 /* see prctl_set_mm_exe_file() */ #define MMF_HAS_UPROBES 19 /* has uprobes */ #define MMF_RECALC_UPROBES 20 /* MMF_HAS_UPROBES can be wrong */ #define MMF_OOM_SKIP 21 /* mm is of no interest for the OOM killer */ #define MMF_UNSTABLE 22 /* mm is unstable for copy_from_user */ #define MMF_HUGE_ZERO_PAGE 23 /* mm has ever used the global huge zero page */ #define MMF_DISABLE_THP 24 /* disable THP for all VMAs */ #define MMF_OOM_VICTIM 25 /* mm is the oom victim */ #define MMF_OOM_REAP_QUEUED 26 /* mm was queued for oom_reaper */ #define MMF_MULTIPROCESS 27 /* mm is shared between processes */ #define MMF_DISABLE_THP_MASK (1 << MMF_DISABLE_THP) #define MMF_INIT_MASK (MMF_DUMPABLE_MASK | MMF_DUMP_FILTER_MASK |\ MMF_DISABLE_THP_MASK) #endif /* _LINUX_SCHED_COREDUMP_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef _FIB_LOOKUP_H #define _FIB_LOOKUP_H #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/list.h> #include <net/ip_fib.h> #include <net/nexthop.h> struct fib_alias { struct hlist_node fa_list; struct fib_info *fa_info; u8 fa_tos; u8 fa_type; u8 fa_state; u8 fa_slen; u32 tb_id; s16 fa_default; u8 offload:1, trap:1, unused:6; struct rcu_head rcu; }; #define FA_S_ACCESSED 0x01 /* Dont write on fa_state unless needed, to keep it shared on all cpus */ static inline void fib_alias_accessed(struct fib_alias *fa) { if (!(fa->fa_state & FA_S_ACCESSED)) fa->fa_state |= FA_S_ACCESSED; } /* Exported by fib_semantics.c */ void fib_release_info(struct fib_info *); struct fib_info *fib_create_info(struct fib_config *cfg, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack); int fib_nh_match(struct net *net, struct fib_config *cfg, struct fib_info *fi, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack); bool fib_metrics_match(struct fib_config *cfg, struct fib_info *fi); int fib_dump_info(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 pid, u32 seq, int event, struct fib_rt_info *fri, unsigned int flags); void rtmsg_fib(int event, __be32 key, struct fib_alias *fa, int dst_len, u32 tb_id, const struct nl_info *info, unsigned int nlm_flags); static inline void fib_result_assign(struct fib_result *res, struct fib_info *fi) { /* we used to play games with refcounts, but we now use RCU */ res->fi = fi; res->nhc = fib_info_nhc(fi, 0); } struct fib_prop { int error; u8 scope; }; extern const struct fib_prop fib_props[RTN_MAX + 1]; #endif /* _FIB_LOOKUP_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef _LINUX_BYTEORDER_GENERIC_H #define _LINUX_BYTEORDER_GENERIC_H /* * linux/byteorder/generic.h * Generic Byte-reordering support * * The "... p" macros, like le64_to_cpup, can be used with pointers * to unaligned data, but there will be a performance penalty on * some architectures. Use get_unaligned for unaligned data. * * Francois-Rene Rideau <fare@tunes.org> 19970707 * gathered all the good ideas from all asm-foo/byteorder.h into one file, * cleaned them up. * I hope it is compliant with non-GCC compilers. * I decided to put __BYTEORDER_HAS_U64__ in byteorder.h, * because I wasn't sure it would be ok to put it in types.h * Upgraded it to 2.1.43 * Francois-Rene Rideau <fare@tunes.org> 19971012 * Upgraded it to 2.1.57 * to please Linus T., replaced huge #ifdef's between little/big endian * by nestedly #include'd files. * Francois-Rene Rideau <fare@tunes.org> 19971205 * Made it to 2.1.71; now a facelift: * Put files under include/linux/byteorder/ * Split swab from generic support. * * TODO: * = Regular kernel maintainers could also replace all these manual * byteswap macros that remain, disseminated among drivers, * after some grep or the sources... * = Linus might want to rename all these macros and files to fit his taste, * to fit his personal naming scheme. * = it seems that a few drivers would also appreciate * nybble swapping support... * = every architecture could add their byteswap macro in asm/byteorder.h * see how some architectures already do (i386, alpha, ppc, etc) * = cpu_to_beXX and beXX_to_cpu might some day need to be well * distinguished throughout the kernel. This is not the case currently, * since little endian, big endian, and pdp endian machines needn't it. * But this might be the case for, say, a port of Linux to 20/21 bit * architectures (and F21 Linux addict around?). */ /* * The following macros are to be defined by <asm/byteorder.h>: * * Conversion of long and short int between network and host format * ntohl(__u32 x) * ntohs(__u16 x) * htonl(__u32 x) * htons(__u16 x) * It seems that some programs (which? where? or perhaps a standard? POSIX?) * might like the above to be functions, not macros (why?). * if that's true, then detect them, and take measures. * Anyway, the measure is: define only ___ntohl as a macro instead, * and in a separate file, have * unsigned long inline ntohl(x){return ___ntohl(x);} * * The same for constant arguments * __constant_ntohl(__u32 x) * __constant_ntohs(__u16 x) * __constant_htonl(__u32 x) * __constant_htons(__u16 x) * * Conversion of XX-bit integers (16- 32- or 64-) * between native CPU format and little/big endian format * 64-bit stuff only defined for proper architectures * cpu_to_[bl]eXX(__uXX x) * [bl]eXX_to_cpu(__uXX x) * * The same, but takes a pointer to the value to convert * cpu_to_[bl]eXXp(__uXX x) * [bl]eXX_to_cpup(__uXX x) * * The same, but change in situ * cpu_to_[bl]eXXs(__uXX x) * [bl]eXX_to_cpus(__uXX x) * * See asm-foo/byteorder.h for examples of how to provide * architecture-optimized versions * */ #define cpu_to_le64 __cpu_to_le64 #define le64_to_cpu __le64_to_cpu #define cpu_to_le32 __cpu_to_le32 #define le32_to_cpu __le32_to_cpu #define cpu_to_le16 __cpu_to_le16 #define le16_to_cpu __le16_to_cpu #define cpu_to_be64 __cpu_to_be64 #define be64_to_cpu __be64_to_cpu #define cpu_to_be32 __cpu_to_be32 #define be32_to_cpu __be32_to_cpu #define cpu_to_be16 __cpu_to_be16 #define be16_to_cpu __be16_to_cpu #define cpu_to_le64p __cpu_to_le64p #define le64_to_cpup __le64_to_cpup #define cpu_to_le32p __cpu_to_le32p #define le32_to_cpup __le32_to_cpup #define cpu_to_le16p __cpu_to_le16p #define le16_to_cpup __le16_to_cpup #define cpu_to_be64p __cpu_to_be64p #define be64_to_cpup __be64_to_cpup #define cpu_to_be32p __cpu_to_be32p #define be32_to_cpup __be32_to_cpup #define cpu_to_be16p __cpu_to_be16p #define be16_to_cpup __be16_to_cpup #define cpu_to_le64s __cpu_to_le64s #define le64_to_cpus __le64_to_cpus #define cpu_to_le32s __cpu_to_le32s #define le32_to_cpus __le32_to_cpus #define cpu_to_le16s __cpu_to_le16s #define le16_to_cpus __le16_to_cpus #define cpu_to_be64s __cpu_to_be64s #define be64_to_cpus __be64_to_cpus #define cpu_to_be32s __cpu_to_be32s #define be32_to_cpus __be32_to_cpus #define cpu_to_be16s __cpu_to_be16s #define be16_to_cpus __be16_to_cpus /* * They have to be macros in order to do the constant folding * correctly - if the argument passed into a inline function * it is no longer constant according to gcc.. */ #undef ntohl #undef ntohs #undef htonl #undef htons #define ___htonl(x) __cpu_to_be32(x) #define ___htons(x) __cpu_to_be16(x) #define ___ntohl(x) __be32_to_cpu(x) #define ___ntohs(x) __be16_to_cpu(x) #define htonl(x) ___htonl(x) #define ntohl(x) ___ntohl(x) #define htons(x) ___htons(x) #define ntohs(x) ___ntohs(x) static inline void le16_add_cpu(__le16 *var, u16 val) { *var = cpu_to_le16(le16_to_cpu(*var) + val); } static inline void le32_add_cpu(__le32 *var, u32 val) { *var = cpu_to_le32(le32_to_cpu(*var) + val); } static inline void le64_add_cpu(__le64 *var, u64 val) { *var = cpu_to_le64(le64_to_cpu(*var) + val); } /* XXX: this stuff can be optimized */ static inline void le32_to_cpu_array(u32 *buf, unsigned int words) { while (words--) { __le32_to_cpus(buf); buf++; } } static inline void cpu_to_le32_array(u32 *buf, unsigned int words) { while (words--) { __cpu_to_le32s(buf); buf++; } } static inline void be16_add_cpu(__be16 *var, u16 val) { *var = cpu_to_be16(be16_to_cpu(*var) + val); } static inline void be32_add_cpu(__be32 *var, u32 val) { *var = cpu_to_be32(be32_to_cpu(*var) + val); } static inline void be64_add_cpu(__be64 *var, u64 val) { *var = cpu_to_be64(be64_to_cpu(*var) + val); } static inline void cpu_to_be32_array(__be32 *dst, const u32 *src, size_t len) { int i; for (i = 0; i < len; i++) dst[i] = cpu_to_be32(src[i]); } static inline void be32_to_cpu_array(u32 *dst, const __be32 *src, size_t len) { int i; for (i = 0; i < len; i++) dst[i] = be32_to_cpu(src[i]); } #endif /* _LINUX_BYTEORDER_GENERIC_H */
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7419 7420 7421 7422 7423 7424 7425 7426 7427 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only /* * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module * * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations. * * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com> * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com> * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> * * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd. * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp> * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies */ #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/kd.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h> #include <linux/tracehook.h> #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/sched/signal.h> #include <linux/sched/task.h> #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <linux/xattr.h> #include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/unistd.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/mman.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/pagemap.h> #include <linux/proc_fs.h> #include <linux/swap.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/dcache.h> #include <linux/file.h> #include <linux/fdtable.h> #include <linux/namei.h> #include <linux/mount.h> #include <linux/fs_context.h> #include <linux/fs_parser.h> #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h> #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h> #include <linux/tty.h> #include <net/icmp.h> #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */ #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */ #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h> #include <net/net_namespace.h> #include <net/netlabel.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <asm/ioctls.h> #include <linux/atomic.h> #include <linux/bitops.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */ #include <net/netlink.h> #include <linux/tcp.h> #include <linux/udp.h> #include <linux/dccp.h> #include <linux/sctp.h> #include <net/sctp/structs.h> #include <linux/quota.h> #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */ #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */ #include <linux/parser.h> #include <linux/nfs_mount.h> #include <net/ipv6.h> #include <linux/hugetlb.h> #include <linux/personality.h> #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/posix-timers.h> #include <linux/syslog.h> #include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/msg.h> #include <linux/shm.h> #include <linux/bpf.h> #include <linux/kernfs.h> #include <linux/stringhash.h> /* for hashlen_string() */ #include <uapi/linux/mount.h> #include <linux/fsnotify.h> #include <linux/fanotify.h> #include "avc.h" #include "objsec.h" #include "netif.h" #include "netnode.h" #include "netport.h" #include "ibpkey.h" #include "xfrm.h" #include "netlabel.h" #include "audit.h" #include "avc_ss.h" struct selinux_state selinux_state; /* SECMARK reference count */ static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP static int selinux_enforcing_boot __initdata; static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str) { unsigned long enforcing; if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing)) selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0; return 1; } __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup); #else #define selinux_enforcing_boot 1 #endif int selinux_enabled_boot __initdata = 1; #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str) { unsigned long enabled; if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled)) selinux_enabled_boot = enabled ? 1 : 0; return 1; } __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup); #endif static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE; static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str) { unsigned long checkreqprot; if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) { selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0; if (checkreqprot) pr_warn("SELinux: checkreqprot set to 1 via kernel parameter. This is deprecated and will be rejected in a future kernel release.\n"); } return 1; } __setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup); /** * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled * * Description: * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled. * */ static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void) { return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount)); } /** * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled * * Description: * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling * is always considered enabled. * */ static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void) { return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()); } static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event) { if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) { sel_netif_flush(); sel_netnode_flush(); sel_netport_flush(); synchronize_net(); } return 0; } static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event) { if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) { sel_ib_pkey_flush(); call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL); } return 0; } /* * initialise the security for the init task */ static void cred_init_security(void) { struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred; struct task_security_struct *tsec; tsec = selinux_cred(cred); tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; } /* * get the security ID of a set of credentials */ static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec; tsec = selinux_cred(cred); return tsec->sid; } /* * get the objective security ID of a task */ static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task) { u32 sid; rcu_read_lock(); sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task)); rcu_read_unlock(); return sid; } static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry); /* * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is * invalid. The @dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode. */ static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry, bool may_sleep) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); might_sleep_if(may_sleep); if (selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) && isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) { if (!may_sleep) return -ECHILD; /* * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be * found; in that case, continue using the old label. */ inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry); } return 0; } static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode) { return selinux_inode(inode); } static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu) { int error; error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu); if (error) return ERR_PTR(error); return selinux_inode(inode); } /* * Get the security label of an inode. */ static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode) { __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true); return selinux_inode(inode); } static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); return selinux_inode(inode); } /* * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode. */ static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true); return selinux_inode(inode); } static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; if (!isec) return; sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; /* * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste * time taking a lock doing nothing. * * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once. * It should not be possible for this function to be called with * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here. */ if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) { spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); list_del_init(&isec->list); spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); } } static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; sb->s_security = NULL; kfree(sbsec); } struct selinux_mnt_opts { const char *fscontext, *context, *rootcontext, *defcontext; }; static void selinux_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts) { struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts; kfree(opts->fscontext); kfree(opts->context); kfree(opts->rootcontext); kfree(opts->defcontext); kfree(opts); } enum { Opt_error = -1, Opt_context = 0, Opt_defcontext = 1, Opt_fscontext = 2, Opt_rootcontext = 3, Opt_seclabel = 4, }; #define A(s, has_arg) {#s, sizeof(#s) - 1, Opt_##s, has_arg} static struct { const char *name; int len; int opt; bool has_arg; } tokens[] = { A(context, true), A(fscontext, true), A(defcontext, true), A(rootcontext, true), A(seclabel, false), }; #undef A static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg) { int i; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) { size_t len = tokens[i].len; if (len > l || memcmp(s, tokens[i].name, len)) continue; if (tokens[i].has_arg) { if (len == l || s[len] != '=') continue; *arg = s + len + 1; } else if (len != l) continue; return tokens[i].opt; } return Opt_error; } #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n" static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid, struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, const struct cred *cred) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred); int rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); if (rc) return rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL); return rc; } static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid, struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, const struct cred *cred) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred); int rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); if (rc) return rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL); return rc; } static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb) { /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */ return !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") || (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() && (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))); } static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; /* * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new * SECURITY_FS_USE_* definition! */ BUILD_BUG_ON(SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX != 7); switch (sbsec->behavior) { case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR: case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS: case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK: case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE: return 1; case SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS: return selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(sb); /* Never allow relabeling on context mounts */ case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT: case SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE: default: return 0; } } static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; struct dentry *root = sb->s_root; struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root); int rc = 0; if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */ if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) { pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no " "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; goto out; } rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) { if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type " "%s) has no security xattr handler\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); else pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type " "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, -rc); goto out; } } sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED; /* * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared. */ if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb)) sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT; else sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT; /* Initialize the root inode. */ rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root); /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g. inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly populates itself. */ spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); while (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = list_first_entry(&sbsec->isec_head, struct inode_security_struct, list); struct inode *inode = isec->inode; list_del_init(&isec->list); spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); inode = igrab(inode); if (inode) { if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode)) inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL); iput(inode); } spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); } spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); out: return rc; } static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag, u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid) { char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK; /* check if the old mount command had the same options */ if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) || (old_sid != new_sid)) return 1; /* check if we were passed the same options twice, * aka someone passed context=a,context=b */ if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) if (mnt_flags & flag) return 1; return 0; } static int parse_sid(struct super_block *sb, const char *s, u32 *sid) { int rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, s, sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid" "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", s, sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc); return rc; } /* * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point * labeling information. */ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts, unsigned long kern_flags, unsigned long *set_kern_flags) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root; struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts; struct inode_security_struct *root_isec; u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0; u32 defcontext_sid = 0; int rc = 0; mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock); if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) { if (!opts) { /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, after the initial policy is loaded and the security server is ready to handle calls. */ goto out; } rc = -EINVAL; pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options " "before the security server is initialized\n"); goto out; } if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) { /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to * place the results is not allowed */ rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } /* * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs. * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data * we need to skip the double mount verification. * * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options * will be used for both mounts) */ if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) && !opts) goto out; root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root); /* * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids. * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more * than once with different security options. */ if (opts) { if (opts->fscontext) { rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &fscontext_sid); if (rc) goto out; if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, fscontext_sid)) goto out_double_mount; sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT; } if (opts->context) { rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &context_sid); if (rc) goto out; if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, context_sid)) goto out_double_mount; sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT; } if (opts->rootcontext) { rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &rootcontext_sid); if (rc) goto out; if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, rootcontext_sid)) goto out_double_mount; sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT; } if (opts->defcontext) { rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &defcontext_sid); if (rc) goto out; if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, defcontext_sid)) goto out_double_mount; sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT; } } if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) { /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */ if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !opts) goto out_double_mount; rc = 0; goto out; } if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0) sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS; if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore")) sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS; if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")) sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR; if (!sbsec->behavior) { /* * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this * filesystem type. */ rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, sb); if (rc) { pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n", __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc); goto out; } } /* * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command * line and security labels must be ignored. */ if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns && strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") && strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") && strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts")) { if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid || defcontext_sid) { rc = -EACCES; goto out; } if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT; rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, current_sid(), current_sid(), SECCLASS_FILE, NULL, &sbsec->mntpoint_sid); if (rc) goto out; } goto out_set_opts; } /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */ if (fscontext_sid) { rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred); if (rc) goto out; sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid; } /* * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior. * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set * the superblock context if not already set. */ if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) { sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE; *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS; } if (context_sid) { if (!fscontext_sid) { rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, cred); if (rc) goto out; sbsec->sid = context_sid; } else { rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, cred); if (rc) goto out; } if (!rootcontext_sid) rootcontext_sid = context_sid; sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid; sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT; } if (rootcontext_sid) { rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, cred); if (rc) goto out; root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid; root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; } if (defcontext_sid) { if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) { rc = -EINVAL; pr_warn("SELinux: defcontext option is " "invalid for this filesystem type\n"); goto out; } if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) { rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid, sbsec, cred); if (rc) goto out; } sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid; } out_set_opts: rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb); out: mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock); return rc; out_double_mount: rc = -EINVAL; pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different " "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); goto out; } static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb, const struct super_block *newsb) { struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security; struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security; char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK; char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK; if (oldflags != newflags) goto mismatch; if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid) goto mismatch; if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid) goto mismatch; if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid) goto mismatch; if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) { struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root); struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root); if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid) goto mismatch; } return 0; mismatch: pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, " "different security settings for (dev %s, " "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name); return -EBUSY; } static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, struct super_block *newsb, unsigned long kern_flags, unsigned long *set_kern_flags) { int rc = 0; const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security; struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security; int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT); int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT); int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT); /* * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later */ if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) return 0; /* * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to * place the results is not allowed. */ if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) return -EINVAL; /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */ BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)); /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */ if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) { if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS; return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb); } mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock); newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags; newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid; newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid; newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior; if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE && !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) { rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, newsb); if (rc) goto out; } if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) { newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE; *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS; } if (set_context) { u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid; if (!set_fscontext) newsbsec->sid = sid; if (!set_rootcontext) { struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root); newisec->sid = sid; } newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid; } if (set_rootcontext) { const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root); struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root); newisec->sid = oldisec->sid; } sb_finish_set_opts(newsb); out: mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock); return rc; } static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts) { struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts; if (token == Opt_seclabel) /* eaten and completely ignored */ return 0; if (!opts) { opts = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL); if (!opts) return -ENOMEM; *mnt_opts = opts; } if (!s) return -ENOMEM; switch (token) { case Opt_context: if (opts->context || opts->defcontext) goto Einval; opts->context = s; break; case Opt_fscontext: if (opts->fscontext) goto Einval; opts->fscontext = s; break; case Opt_rootcontext: if (opts->rootcontext) goto Einval; opts->rootcontext = s; break; case Opt_defcontext: if (opts->context || opts->defcontext) goto Einval; opts->defcontext = s; break; } return 0; Einval: pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); return -EINVAL; } static int selinux_add_mnt_opt(const char *option, const char *val, int len, void **mnt_opts) { int token = Opt_error; int rc, i; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) { if (strcmp(option, tokens[i].name) == 0) { token = tokens[i].opt; break; } } if (token == Opt_error) return -EINVAL; if (token != Opt_seclabel) { val = kmemdup_nul(val, len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!val) { rc = -ENOMEM; goto free_opt; } } rc = selinux_add_opt(token, val, mnt_opts); if (unlikely(rc)) { kfree(val); goto free_opt; } return rc; free_opt: if (*mnt_opts) { selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts); *mnt_opts = NULL; } return rc; } static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid) { char *context = NULL; u32 len; int rc; rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, &context, &len); if (!rc) { bool has_comma = context && strchr(context, ','); seq_putc(m, '='); if (has_comma) seq_putc(m, '\"'); seq_escape(m, context, "\"\n\\"); if (has_comma) seq_putc(m, '\"'); } kfree(context); return rc; } static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; int rc; if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) return 0; if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) return 0; if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) { seq_putc(m, ','); seq_puts(m, FSCONTEXT_STR); rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->sid); if (rc) return rc; } if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) { seq_putc(m, ','); seq_puts(m, CONTEXT_STR); rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->mntpoint_sid); if (rc) return rc; } if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) { seq_putc(m, ','); seq_puts(m, DEFCONTEXT_STR); rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->def_sid); if (rc) return rc; } if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) { struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root; struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root); seq_putc(m, ','); seq_puts(m, ROOTCONTEXT_STR); rc = show_sid(m, isec->sid); if (rc) return rc; } if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) { seq_putc(m, ','); seq_puts(m, SECLABEL_STR); } return 0; } static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode) { switch (mode & S_IFMT) { case S_IFSOCK: return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE; case S_IFLNK: return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE; case S_IFREG: return SECCLASS_FILE; case S_IFBLK: return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE; case S_IFDIR: return SECCLASS_DIR; case S_IFCHR: return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE; case S_IFIFO: return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE; } return SECCLASS_FILE; } static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol) { return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP); } static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol) { return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP); } static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol) { int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass(); switch (family) { case PF_UNIX: switch (type) { case SOCK_STREAM: case SOCK_SEQPACKET: return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET; case SOCK_DGRAM: case SOCK_RAW: return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET; } break; case PF_INET: case PF_INET6: switch (type) { case SOCK_STREAM: case SOCK_SEQPACKET: if (default_protocol_stream(protocol)) return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET; else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP) return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET; else return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; case SOCK_DGRAM: if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol)) return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET; else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP || protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6)) return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET; else return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; case SOCK_DCCP: return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET; default: return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; } break; case PF_NETLINK: switch (protocol) { case NETLINK_ROUTE: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET; case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET; case NETLINK_NFLOG: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET; case NETLINK_XFRM: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET; case NETLINK_SELINUX: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET; case NETLINK_ISCSI: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET; case NETLINK_AUDIT: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET; case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET; case NETLINK_CONNECTOR: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET; case NETLINK_NETFILTER: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET; case NETLINK_DNRTMSG: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET; case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET; case NETLINK_GENERIC: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET; case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET; case NETLINK_RDMA: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET; case NETLINK_CRYPTO: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET; default: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET; } case PF_PACKET: return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET; case PF_KEY: return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET; case PF_APPLETALK: return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET; } if (extsockclass) { switch (family) { case PF_AX25: return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET; case PF_IPX: return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET; case PF_NETROM: return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET; case PF_ATMPVC: return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET; case PF_X25: return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET; case PF_ROSE: return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET; case PF_DECnet: return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET; case PF_ATMSVC: return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET; case PF_RDS: return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET; case PF_IRDA: return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET; case PF_PPPOX: return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET; case PF_LLC: return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET; case PF_CAN: return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET; case PF_TIPC: return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET; case PF_BLUETOOTH: return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET; case PF_IUCV: return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET; case PF_RXRPC: return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET; case PF_ISDN: return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET; case PF_PHONET: return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET; case PF_IEEE802154: return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET; case PF_CAIF: return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET; case PF_ALG: return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET; case PF_NFC: return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET; case PF_VSOCK: return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET; case PF_KCM: return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET; case PF_QIPCRTR: return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET; case PF_SMC: return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET; case PF_XDP: return SECCLASS_XDP_SOCKET; #if PF_MAX > 45 #error New address family defined, please update this function. #endif } } return SECCLASS_SOCKET; } static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry, u16 tclass, u16 flags, u32 *sid) { int rc; struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb; char *buffer, *path; buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); if (!buffer) return -ENOMEM; path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE); if (IS_ERR(path)) rc = PTR_ERR(path); else { if (flags & SE_SBPROC) { /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling. * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */ while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') { path[1] = '/'; path++; } } rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name, path, tclass, sid); if (rc == -ENOENT) { /* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */ *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; rc = 0; } } free_page((unsigned long)buffer); return rc; } static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry, u32 def_sid, u32 *sid) { #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255 char *context; unsigned int len; int rc; len = INITCONTEXTLEN; context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS); if (!context) return -ENOMEM; context[len] = '\0'; rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len); if (rc == -ERANGE) { kfree(context); /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */ rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); if (rc < 0) return rc; len = rc; context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS); if (!context) return -ENOMEM; context[len] = '\0'; rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len); } if (rc < 0) { kfree(context); if (rc != -ENODATA) { pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); return rc; } *sid = def_sid; return 0; } rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state, context, rc, sid, def_sid, GFP_NOFS); if (rc) { char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id; unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino; if (rc == -EINVAL) { pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context); } else { pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino); } } kfree(context); return 0; } /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL; struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); u32 task_sid, sid = 0; u16 sclass; struct dentry *dentry; int rc = 0; if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED) return 0; spin_lock(&isec->lock); if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED) goto out_unlock; if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE) isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) { /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, after the initial policy is loaded and the security server is ready to handle calls. */ spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); if (list_empty(&isec->list)) list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head); spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); goto out_unlock; } sclass = isec->sclass; task_sid = isec->task_sid; sid = isec->sid; isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING; spin_unlock(&isec->lock); switch (sbsec->behavior) { case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE: break; case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR: if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) { sid = sbsec->def_sid; break; } /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one. Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */ if (opt_dentry) { /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */ dentry = dget(opt_dentry); } else { /* * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try * that first. We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in * two, depending upon that... */ dentry = d_find_alias(inode); if (!dentry) dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode); } if (!dentry) { /* * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we * may find inodes that have no dentry on the * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these * will get fixed up the next time we go through * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could * be used again by userspace. */ goto out_invalid; } rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid, &sid); dput(dentry); if (rc) goto out; break; case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK: sid = task_sid; break; case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS: /* Default to the fs SID. */ sid = sbsec->sid; /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */ rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, task_sid, sid, sclass, NULL, &sid); if (rc) goto out; break; case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT: sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid; break; default: /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */ sid = sbsec->sid; if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) && (!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) || selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks())) { /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on * procfs inodes */ if (opt_dentry) { /* Called from d_instantiate or * d_splice_alias. */ dentry = dget(opt_dentry); } else { /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to * find a dentry. Some filesystems really want * a connected one, so try that first. */ dentry = d_find_alias(inode); if (!dentry) dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode); } /* * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we * may find inodes that have no dentry on the * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as * these will get fixed up the next time we go through * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes * could be used again by userspace. */ if (!dentry) goto out_invalid; rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass, sbsec->flags, &sid); if (rc) { dput(dentry); goto out; } if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) && (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) { rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sid, &sid); if (rc) { dput(dentry); goto out; } } dput(dentry); } break; } out: spin_lock(&isec->lock); if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) { if (rc) { isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID; goto out_unlock; } isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; isec->sid = sid; } out_unlock: spin_unlock(&isec->lock); return rc; out_invalid: spin_lock(&isec->lock); if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) { isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID; isec->sid = sid; } spin_unlock(&isec->lock); return 0; } /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */ static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig) { u32 perm = 0; switch (sig) { case SIGCHLD: /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */ perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD; break; case SIGKILL: /* Cannot be caught or ignored */ perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL; break; case SIGSTOP: /* Cannot be caught or ignored */ perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP; break; default: /* All other signals. */ perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL; break; } return perm; } #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63. #endif /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred, int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns) { struct common_audit_data ad; struct av_decision avd; u16 sclass; u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap); int rc; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP; ad.u.cap = cap; switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) { case 0: sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS; break; case 1: sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS; break; default: pr_err("SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap); BUG(); return -EINVAL; } rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state, sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd); if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) { int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state, sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0); if (rc2) return rc2; } return rc; } /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode. The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct inode *inode, u32 perms, struct common_audit_data *adp) { struct inode_security_struct *isec; u32 sid; validate_creds(cred); if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return 0; sid = cred_sid(cred); isec = selinux_inode(inode); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp); } /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the pathname if needed. */ static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct dentry *dentry, u32 av) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct common_audit_data ad; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true); return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); } /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the pathname if needed. */ static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, const struct path *path, u32 av) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry); struct common_audit_data ad; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; ad.u.path = *path; __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true); return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); } /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */ static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, u32 av) { struct common_audit_data ad; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; ad.u.file = file; return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad); } #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid); #endif /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to access an inode in a given way. Check access to the descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to check a particular permission to the file. Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, u32 av) { struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file); struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); int rc; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; ad.u.file = file; if (sid != fsec->sid) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad); if (rc) goto out; } #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred)); if (rc) return rc; #endif /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */ rc = 0; if (av) rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); out: return rc; } /* * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned. */ static int selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass, u32 *_new_isid) { const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) { *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid; } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) && tsec->create_sid) { *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid; } else { const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir); return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass, name, _new_isid); } return 0; } /* Check whether a task can create a file. */ static int may_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, u16 tclass) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); struct inode_security_struct *dsec; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; u32 sid, newsid; struct common_audit_data ad; int rc; dsec = inode_security(dir); sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; sid = tsec->sid; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad); if (rc) return rc; rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass, &newsid); if (rc) return rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad); if (rc) return rc; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, newsid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); } #define MAY_LINK 0 #define MAY_UNLINK 1 #define MAY_RMDIR 2 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */ static int may_link(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int kind) { struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); u32 av; int rc; dsec = inode_security(dir); isec = backing_inode_security(dentry); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; av = DIR__SEARCH; av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME); rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad); if (rc) return rc; switch (kind) { case MAY_LINK: av = FILE__LINK; break; case MAY_UNLINK: av = FILE__UNLINK; break; case MAY_RMDIR: av = DIR__RMDIR; break; default: pr_warn("SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n", __func__, kind); return 0; } rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad); return rc; } static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) { struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); u32 av; int old_is_dir, new_is_dir; int rc; old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir); old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry); old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry); new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = old_dentry; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad); if (rc) return rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, old_isec->sid, old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad); if (rc) return rc; if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, old_isec->sid, old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad); if (rc) return rc; } ad.u.dentry = new_dentry; av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH; if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad); if (rc) return rc; if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) { new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry); new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry); rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, new_isec->sid, new_isec->sclass, (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad); if (rc) return rc; } return 0; } /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */ static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct super_block *sb, u32 perms, struct common_audit_data *ad) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); sbsec = sb->s_security; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad); } /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */ static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask) { u32 av = 0; if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) { if (mask & MAY_EXEC) av |= FILE__EXECUTE; if (mask & MAY_READ) av |= FILE__READ; if (mask & MAY_APPEND) av |= FILE__APPEND; else if (mask & MAY_WRITE) av |= FILE__WRITE; } else { if (mask & MAY_EXEC) av |= DIR__SEARCH; if (mask & MAY_WRITE) av |= DIR__WRITE; if (mask & MAY_READ) av |= DIR__READ; } return av; } /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */ static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file) { u32 av = 0; if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) av |= FILE__READ; if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) { if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND) av |= FILE__APPEND; else av |= FILE__WRITE; } if (!av) { /* * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use. */ av = FILE__IOCTL; } return av; } /* * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct * open permission. */ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file) { u32 av = file_to_av(file); struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); if (selinux_policycap_openperm() && inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC) av |= FILE__OPEN; return av; } /* Hook functions begin here. */ static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), cred_sid(mgr), SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL); } static int selinux_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from, const struct cred *to) { u32 mysid = current_sid(); u32 fromsid = cred_sid(from); u32 tosid = cred_sid(to); int rc; if (mysid != fromsid) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL); if (rc) return rc; } return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL, NULL); } static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from, const struct cred *to) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, cred_sid(from), cred_sid(to), SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER, NULL); } static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from, const struct cred *to, struct file *file) { u32 sid = cred_sid(to); struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file); struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry; struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; int rc; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; ad.u.path = file->f_path; if (sid != fsec->sid) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad); if (rc) return rc; } #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid); if (rc) return rc; #endif if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; isec = backing_inode_security(dentry); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file), &ad); } static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) { u32 sid = current_sid(); u32 csid = task_sid(child); if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); } static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, task_sid(parent), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); } static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL); } static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, const kernel_cap_t *effective, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *permitted) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL); } /* * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook, * which was removed). * * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook. */ static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, unsigned int opts) { return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns); } static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); int rc = 0; if (!sb) return 0; switch (cmds) { case Q_SYNC: case Q_QUOTAON: case Q_QUOTAOFF: case Q_SETINFO: case Q_SETQUOTA: case Q_XQUOTAOFF: case Q_XQUOTAON: case Q_XSETQLIM: rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL); break; case Q_GETFMT: case Q_GETINFO: case Q_GETQUOTA: case Q_XGETQUOTA: case Q_XGETQSTAT: case Q_XGETQSTATV: case Q_XGETNEXTQUOTA: rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL); break; default: rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */ break; } return rc; } static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON); } static int selinux_syslog(int type) { switch (type) { case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */ case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL); case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */ case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */ /* Set level of messages printed to console */ case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL: return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE, NULL); } /* All other syslog types */ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL); } /* * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not. * * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all * processes that allocate mappings. */ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) { int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0; rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true); if (rc == 0) cap_sys_admin = 1; return cap_sys_admin; } /* binprm security operations */ static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void) { u32 sid = 0; struct task_struct *tracer; rcu_read_lock(); tracer = ptrace_parent(current); if (tracer) sid = task_sid(tracer); rcu_read_unlock(); return sid; } static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec, const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec) { int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS); int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt); int rc; u32 av; if (!nnp && !nosuid) return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */ if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) return 0; /* No change in credentials */ /* * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability, * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the * policy allows the corresponding permission between * the old and new contexts. */ if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) { av = 0; if (nnp) av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION; if (nosuid) av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL); if (!rc) return 0; } /* * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs, * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset * of the permissions of the current SID. */ rc = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid); if (!rc) return 0; /* * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid. * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller. * nosuid: Permission denied to file. */ if (nnp) return -EPERM; return -EACCES; } static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec; struct task_security_struct *new_tsec; struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file); int rc; /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not * the script interpreter */ old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred); isec = inode_security(inode); /* Default to the current task SID. */ new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid; new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid; /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */ new_tsec->create_sid = 0; new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0; new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0; if (old_tsec->exec_sid) { new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid; /* Reset exec SID on execve. */ new_tsec->exec_sid = 0; /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */ rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec); if (rc) return rc; } else { /* Check for a default transition on this program. */ rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL, &new_tsec->sid); if (rc) return rc; /* * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed * transition. */ rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec); if (rc) new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid; } ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; ad.u.file = bprm->file; if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad); if (rc) return rc; } else { /* Check permissions for the transition. */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad); if (rc) return rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, new_tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad); if (rc) return rc; /* Check for shared state */ if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE, NULL); if (rc) return -EPERM; } /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */ if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) { u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid(); if (ptsid != 0) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, ptsid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); if (rc) return -EPERM; } } /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */ bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless the noatsecure permission is granted between the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL); bprm->secureexec |= !!rc; } return 0; } static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd) { return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0; } /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, struct files_struct *files) { struct file *file, *devnull = NULL; struct tty_struct *tty; int drop_tty = 0; unsigned n; tty = get_current_tty(); if (tty) { spin_lock(&tty->files_lock); if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) { struct tty_file_private *file_priv; /* Revalidate access to controlling tty. Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular open file may belong to another process and we are only interested in the inode-based check here. */ file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct tty_file_private, list); file = file_priv->file; if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE)) drop_tty = 1; } spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock); tty_kref_put(tty); } /* Reset controlling tty. */ if (drop_tty) no_tty(); /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */ n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred); if (!n) /* none found? */ return; devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred); if (IS_ERR(devnull)) devnull = NULL; /* replace all the matching ones with this */ do { replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0); } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0); if (devnull) fput(devnull); } /* * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec */ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { struct task_security_struct *new_tsec; struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim; int rc, i; new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred); if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid) return; /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */ flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files); /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */ current->pdeath_signal = 0; /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit. * * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK. */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL); if (rc) { /* protect against do_prlimit() */ task_lock(current); for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) { rlim = current->signal->rlim + i; initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i; rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur); } task_unlock(current); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS)) update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU)); } } /* * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials * due to exec */ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); u32 osid, sid; int rc; osid = tsec->osid; sid = tsec->sid; if (sid == osid) return; /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID. * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and * flush and unblock signals. * * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID. */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL); if (rc) { clear_itimer(); spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock); if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) { flush_sigqueue(&current->pending); flush_sigqueue(&current->signal->shared_pending); flush_signal_handlers(current, 1); sigemptyset(&current->blocked); recalc_sigpending(); } spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock); } /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck * wait permission to the new task SID. */ read_lock(&tasklist_lock); __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent); read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); } /* superblock security operations */ static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); if (!sbsec) return -ENOMEM; mutex_init(&sbsec->lock); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head); spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock); sbsec->sb = sb; sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE; sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; sb->s_security = sbsec; return 0; } static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb) { superblock_free_security(sb); } static inline int opt_len(const char *s) { bool open_quote = false; int len; char c; for (len = 0; (c = s[len]) != '\0'; len++) { if (c == '"') open_quote = !open_quote; if (c == ',' && !open_quote) break; } return len; } static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts) { char *from = options; char *to = options; bool first = true; int rc; while (1) { int len = opt_len(from); int token; char *arg = NULL; token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg); if (token != Opt_error) { char *p, *q; /* strip quotes */ if (arg) { for (p = q = arg; p < from + len; p++) { char c = *p; if (c != '"') *q++ = c; } arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, q - arg, GFP_KERNEL); if (!arg) { rc = -ENOMEM; goto free_opt; } } rc = selinux_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts); if (unlikely(rc)) { kfree(arg); goto free_opt; } } else { if (!first) { // copy with preceding comma from--; len++; } if (to != from) memmove(to, from, len); to += len; first = false; } if (!from[len]) break; from += len + 1; } *to = '\0'; return 0; free_opt: if (*mnt_opts) { selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts); *mnt_opts = NULL; } return rc; } static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts) { struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; u32 sid; int rc; if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) return 0; if (!opts) return 0; if (opts->fscontext) { rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &sid); if (rc) return rc; if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid)) goto out_bad_option; } if (opts->context) { rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &sid); if (rc) return rc; if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid)) goto out_bad_option; } if (opts->rootcontext) { struct inode_security_struct *root_isec; root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root); rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &sid); if (rc) return rc; if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid)) goto out_bad_option; } if (opts->defcontext) { rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &sid); if (rc) return rc; if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid)) goto out_bad_option; } return 0; out_bad_option: pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options " "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); return -EINVAL; } static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct common_audit_data ad; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root; return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad); } static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct common_audit_data ad; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root; return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad); } static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL); else return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON); } static int selinux_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, const struct path *to_path) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return path_has_perm(cred, to_path, FILE__MOUNTON); } static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb, FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL); } static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc) { const struct selinux_mnt_opts *src = src_fc->security; struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts; if (!src) return 0; fc->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL); if (!fc->security) return -ENOMEM; opts = fc->security; if (src->fscontext) { opts->fscontext = kstrdup(src->fscontext, GFP_KERNEL); if (!opts->fscontext) return -ENOMEM; } if (src->context) { opts->context = kstrdup(src->context, GFP_KERNEL); if (!opts->context) return -ENOMEM; } if (src->rootcontext) { opts->rootcontext = kstrdup(src->rootcontext, GFP_KERNEL); if (!opts->rootcontext) return -ENOMEM; } if (src->defcontext) { opts->defcontext = kstrdup(src->defcontext, GFP_KERNEL); if (!opts->defcontext) return -ENOMEM; } return 0; } static const struct fs_parameter_spec selinux_fs_parameters[] = { fsparam_string(CONTEXT_STR, Opt_context), fsparam_string(DEFCONTEXT_STR, Opt_defcontext), fsparam_string(FSCONTEXT_STR, Opt_fscontext), fsparam_string(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, Opt_rootcontext), fsparam_flag (SECLABEL_STR, Opt_seclabel), {} }; static int selinux_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param) { struct fs_parse_result result; int opt, rc; opt = fs_parse(fc, selinux_fs_parameters, param, &result); if (opt < 0) return opt; rc = selinux_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security); if (!rc) { param->string = NULL; rc = 1; } return rc; } /* inode security operations */ static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); u32 sid = current_sid(); spin_lock_init(&isec->lock); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list); isec->inode = inode; isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE; isec->task_sid = sid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID; return 0; } static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) { inode_free_security(inode); } static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, const struct qstr *name, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) { u32 newsid; int rc; rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()), d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode), &newsid); if (rc) return rc; return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen); } static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, struct qstr *name, const struct cred *old, struct cred *new) { u32 newsid; int rc; struct task_security_struct *tsec; rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old), d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode), &newsid); if (rc) return rc; tsec = selinux_cred(new); tsec->create_sid = newsid; return 0; } static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name, void **value, size_t *len) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; u32 newsid, clen; int rc; char *context; sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; newsid = tsec->create_sid; rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, qstr, inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode), &newsid); if (rc) return rc; /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */ if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); isec->sid = newsid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; } if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (name) *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX; if (value && len) { rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid, &context, &clen); if (rc) return rc; *value = context; *len = clen; } return 0; } static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) { return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE); } static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) { return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK); } static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) { return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK); } static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) { return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE); } static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask) { return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR); } static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) { return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR); } static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev) { return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode)); } static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry) { return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry); } static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ); } static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, bool rcu) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct common_audit_data ad; struct inode_security_struct *isec; u32 sid; validate_creds(cred); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; sid = cred_sid(cred); isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu); if (IS_ERR(isec)) return PTR_ERR(isec); return avc_has_perm_flags(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad, rcu ? MAY_NOT_BLOCK : 0); } static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result) { struct common_audit_data ad; struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); int rc; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE; ad.u.inode = inode; rc = slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state, current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, audited, denied, result, &ad); if (rc) return rc; return 0; } static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); u32 perms; bool from_access; bool no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK; struct inode_security_struct *isec; u32 sid; struct av_decision avd; int rc, rc2; u32 audited, denied; from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS; mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND); /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ if (!mask) return 0; validate_creds(cred); if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return 0; perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask); sid = cred_sid(cred); isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, no_block); if (IS_ERR(isec)) return PTR_ERR(isec); rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, no_block ? AVC_NONBLOCKING : 0, &avd); audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc, from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0, &denied); if (likely(!audited)) return rc; /* fall back to ref-walk if we have to generate audit */ if (no_block) return -ECHILD; rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc); if (rc2) return rc2; return rc; } static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid; __u32 av = FILE__WRITE; /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */ if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) { ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE | ATTR_FORCE); if (!ia_valid) return 0; } if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID | ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET)) return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); if (selinux_policycap_openperm() && inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) && !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE)) av |= FILE__OPEN; return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av); } static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) { return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR); } static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); unsigned int opts = audit ? CAP_OPT_NONE : CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT; if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts)) return false; if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true)) return false; return true; } static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 newsid, sid = current_sid(); int rc = 0; if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); if (rc) return rc; /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the ordinary setattr permission. */ return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR); } if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) return (inode_owner_or_capable(inode) ? 0 : -EPERM); sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode)) return -EPERM; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; isec = backing_inode_security(dentry); rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad); if (rc) return rc; rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc == -EINVAL) { if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) { struct audit_buffer *ab; size_t audit_size; /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the * context contains a nul and we should audit that */ if (value) { const char *str = value; if (str[size - 1] == '\0') audit_size = size - 1; else audit_size = size; } else { audit_size = 0; } ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR); audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context="); audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size); audit_log_end(ab); return rc; } rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid); } if (rc) return rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, newsid, isec->sclass, FILE__RELABELTO, &ad); if (rc) return rc; rc = security_validate_transition(&selinux_state, isec->sid, newsid, sid, isec->sclass); if (rc) return rc; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, newsid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); } static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct inode_security_struct *isec; u32 newsid; int rc; if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */ return; } if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) { /* If we haven't even been initialized, then we can't validate * against a policy, so leave the label as invalid. It may * resolve to a valid label on the next revalidation try if * we've since initialized. */ return; } rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid); if (rc) { pr_err("SELinux: unable to map context to SID" "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n", inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc); return; } isec = backing_inode_security(dentry); spin_lock(&isec->lock); isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); isec->sid = newsid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; spin_unlock(&isec->lock); return; } static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); } static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); } static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) { if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); if (rc) return rc; /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the ordinary setattr permission. */ return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR); } if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) return 0; /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label. You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */ return -EACCES; } static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask, unsigned int obj_type) { int ret; u32 perm; struct common_audit_data ad; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; ad.u.path = *path; /* * Set permission needed based on the type of mark being set. * Performs an additional check for sb watches. */ switch (obj_type) { case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT: perm = FILE__WATCH_MOUNT; break; case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB: perm = FILE__WATCH_SB; ret = superblock_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__WATCH, &ad); if (ret) return ret; break; case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE: perm = FILE__WATCH; break; default: return -EINVAL; } /* blocking watches require the file:watch_with_perm permission */ if (mask & (ALL_FSNOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS)) perm |= FILE__WATCH_WITH_PERM; /* watches on read-like events need the file:watch_reads permission */ if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_ACCESS_PERM | FS_CLOSE_NOWRITE)) perm |= FILE__WATCH_READS; return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, perm); } /* * Copy the inode security context value to the user. * * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook. */ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) { u32 size; int error; char *context = NULL; struct inode_security_struct *isec; /* * If we're not initialized yet, then we can't validate contexts, so * just let vfs_getxattr fall back to using the on-disk xattr. */ if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) || strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; /* * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise, * use the in-core value under current policy. * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the * in-core context value, not a denial. */ isec = inode_security(inode); if (has_cap_mac_admin(false)) error = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, isec->sid, &context, &size); else error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid, &context, &size); if (error) return error; error = size; if (alloc) { *buffer = context; goto out_nofree; } kfree(context); out_nofree: return error; } static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode); struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; u32 newsid; int rc; if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (!value || !size) return -EACCES; rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) return rc; spin_lock(&isec->lock); isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); isec->sid = newsid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; spin_unlock(&isec->lock); return 0; } static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) { const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX); if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) return 0; if (buffer && len <= buffer_size) memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len); return len; } static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode); *secid = isec->sid; } static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) { u32 sid; struct task_security_struct *tsec; struct cred *new_creds = *new; if (new_creds == NULL) { new_creds = prepare_creds(); if (!new_creds) return -ENOMEM; } tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds); /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */ selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid); tsec->create_sid = sid; *new = new_creds; return 0; } static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) { /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower * xattrs up. Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs. */ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0) return 1; /* Discard */ /* * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported * by selinux. */ return -EOPNOTSUPP; } /* kernfs node operations */ static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, struct kernfs_node *kn) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen; int rc; char *context; rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); if (rc == -ENODATA) return 0; else if (rc < 0) return rc; clen = (u32)rc; context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL); if (!context) return -ENOMEM; rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen); if (rc < 0) { kfree(context); return rc; } rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, context, clen, &parent_sid, GFP_KERNEL); kfree(context); if (rc) return rc; if (tsec->create_sid) { newsid = tsec->create_sid; } else { u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode); struct qstr q; q.name = kn->name; q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name); rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, parent_sid, secclass, &q, &newsid); if (rc) return rc; } rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid, &context, &clen); if (rc) return rc; rc = kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen, XATTR_CREATE); kfree(context); return rc; } /* file security operations */ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */ if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE)) mask |= MAY_APPEND; return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask)); } static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file); struct inode_security_struct *isec; u32 sid = current_sid(); if (!mask) /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ return 0; isec = inode_security(inode); if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state)) /* No change since file_open check. */ return 0; return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask); } static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) { struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file); u32 sid = current_sid(); fsec->sid = sid; fsec->fown_sid = sid; return 0; } /* * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd * operation to an inode. */ static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, u32 requested, u16 cmd) { struct common_audit_data ad; struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file); struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl; u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred); int rc; u8 driver = cmd >> 8; u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP; ad.u.op = &ioctl; ad.u.op->cmd = cmd; ad.u.op->path = file->f_path; if (ssid != fsec->sid) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, ssid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad); if (rc) goto out; } if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return 0; isec = inode_security(inode); rc = avc_has_extended_perms(&selinux_state, ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, requested, driver, xperm, &ad); out: return rc; } static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); int error = 0; switch (cmd) { case FIONREAD: case FIBMAP: case FIGETBSZ: case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS: case FS_IOC_GETVERSION: error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR); break; case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS: case FS_IOC_SETVERSION: error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR); break; /* sys_ioctl() checks */ case FIONBIO: case FIOASYNC: error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0); break; case KDSKBENT: case KDSKBSENT: error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG, CAP_OPT_NONE, true); break; /* default case assumes that the command will go * to the file's ioctl() function. */ default: error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd); } return error; } static int default_noexec __ro_after_init; static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); int rc = 0; if (default_noexec && (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) { /* * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a * private file mapping that will also be writable. * This has an additional check. */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL); if (rc) goto error; } if (file) { /* read access is always possible with a mapping */ u32 av = FILE__READ; /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */ if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)) av |= FILE__WRITE; if (prot & PROT_EXEC) av |= FILE__EXECUTE; return file_has_perm(cred, file, av); } error: return rc; } static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) { int rc = 0; if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) { u32 sid = current_sid(); rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT, MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL); } return rc; } static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) { struct common_audit_data ad; int rc; if (file) { ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; ad.u.file = file; rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file), FILE__MAP, &ad); if (rc) return rc; } if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state)) prot = reqprot; return file_map_prot_check(file, prot, (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED); } static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state)) prot = reqprot; if (default_noexec && (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) { int rc = 0; if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk && vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL); } else if (!vma->vm_file && ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack && vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) || vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL); } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) { /* * We are making executable a file mapping that has * had some COW done. Since pages might have been * written, check ability to execute the possibly * modified content. This typically should only * occur for text relocations. */ rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD); } if (rc) return rc; } return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED); } static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK); } static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); int err = 0; switch (cmd) { case F_SETFL: if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) { err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE); break; } fallthrough; case F_SETOWN: case F_SETSIG: case F_GETFL: case F_GETOWN: case F_GETSIG: case F_GETOWNER_UIDS: /* Just check FD__USE permission */ err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0); break; case F_GETLK: case F_SETLK: case F_SETLKW: case F_OFD_GETLK: case F_OFD_SETLK: case F_OFD_SETLKW: #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32 case F_GETLK64: case F_SETLK64: case F_SETLKW64: #endif err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK); break; } return err; } static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) { struct file_security_struct *fsec; fsec = selinux_file(file); fsec->fown_sid = current_sid(); } static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, struct fown_struct *fown, int signum) { struct file *file; u32 sid = task_sid(tsk); u32 perm; struct file_security_struct *fsec; /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */ file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner); fsec = selinux_file(file); if (!signum) perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */ else perm = signal_to_av(signum); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, fsec->fown_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); } static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file)); } static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file) { struct file_security_struct *fsec; struct inode_security_struct *isec; fsec = selinux_file(file); isec = inode_security(file_inode(file)); /* * Save inode label and policy sequence number * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission * can determine whether revalidation is necessary. * Task label is already saved in the file security * struct as its SID. */ fsec->isid = isec->sid; fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state); /* * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted. * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the * new inode label or new policy. * This check is not redundant - do not remove. */ return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file)); } /* task security operations */ static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags) { u32 sid = current_sid(); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL); } /* * prepare a new set of credentials for modification */ static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) { const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old); struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); *tsec = *old_tsec; return 0; } /* * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds */ static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) { const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old); struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); *tsec = *old_tsec; } static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) { *secid = cred_sid(c); } /* * set the security data for a kernel service * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled */ static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) { struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); u32 sid = current_sid(); int ret; ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, secid, SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE, KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE, NULL); if (ret == 0) { tsec->sid = secid; tsec->create_sid = 0; tsec->keycreate_sid = 0; tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0; } return ret; } /* * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the * objective context of the specified inode */ static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode); struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); u32 sid = current_sid(); int ret; ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE, KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS, NULL); if (ret == 0) tsec->create_sid = isec->sid; return ret; } static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) { struct common_audit_data ad; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD; ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad); } static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file) { struct common_audit_data ad; struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct file_security_struct *fsec; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; /* init_module */ if (file == NULL) return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL); /* finit_module */ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; ad.u.file = file; fsec = selinux_file(file); if (sid != fsec->sid) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad); if (rc) return rc; } isec = inode_security(file_inode(file)); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad); } static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, bool contents) { int rc = 0; switch (id) { case READING_MODULE: rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(contents ? file : NULL); break; default: break; } return rc; } static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) { int rc = 0; switch (id) { case LOADING_MODULE: rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL); default: break; } return rc; } static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL); } static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL); } static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL); } static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) { *secid = task_sid(p); } static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL); } static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL); } static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL); } static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred, unsigned int flags) { u32 av = 0; if (!flags) return 0; if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE) av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT; if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ) av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred), SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL); } static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) { struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource; /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */ if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max) return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL); return 0; } static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL); } static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL); } static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL); } static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info, int sig, const struct cred *cred) { u32 secid; u32 perm; if (!sig) perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */ else perm = signal_to_av(sig); if (!cred) secid = current_sid(); else secid = cred_sid(cred); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); } static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); u32 sid = task_sid(p); spin_lock(&isec->lock); isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); isec->sid = sid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; spin_unlock(&isec->lock); } /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto) { int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL; struct iphdr _iph, *ih; offset = skb_network_offset(skb); ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph); if (ih == NULL) goto out; ihlen = ih->ihl * 4; if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph)) goto out; ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr; ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr; ret = 0; if (proto) *proto = ih->protocol; switch (ih->protocol) { case IPPROTO_TCP: { struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) break; offset += ihlen; th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph); if (th == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = th->source; ad->u.net->dport = th->dest; break; } case IPPROTO_UDP: { struct udphdr _udph, *uh; if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) break; offset += ihlen; uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph); if (uh == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = uh->source; ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest; break; } case IPPROTO_DCCP: { struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh; if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) break; offset += ihlen; dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph); if (dh == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport; ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport; break; } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP) case IPPROTO_SCTP: { struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh; if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) break; offset += ihlen; sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph); if (sh == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = sh->source; ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest; break; } #endif default: break; } out: return ret; } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto) { u8 nexthdr; int ret = -EINVAL, offset; struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6; __be16 frag_off; offset = skb_network_offset(skb); ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h); if (ip6 == NULL) goto out; ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr; ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr; ret = 0; nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr; offset += sizeof(_ipv6h); offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off); if (offset < 0) goto out; if (proto) *proto = nexthdr; switch (nexthdr) { case IPPROTO_TCP: { struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph); if (th == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = th->source; ad->u.net->dport = th->dest; break; } case IPPROTO_UDP: { struct udphdr _udph, *uh; uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph); if (uh == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = uh->source; ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest; break; } case IPPROTO_DCCP: { struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh; dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph); if (dh == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport; ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport; break; } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP) case IPPROTO_SCTP: { struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh; sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph); if (sh == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = sh->source; ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest; break; } #endif /* includes fragments */ default: break; } out: return ret; } #endif /* IPV6 */ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad, char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto) { char *addrp; int ret; switch (ad->u.net->family) { case PF_INET: ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto); if (ret) goto parse_error; addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr : &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr); goto okay; #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) case PF_INET6: ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto); if (ret) goto parse_error; addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr : &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr); goto okay; #endif /* IPV6 */ default: addrp = NULL; goto okay; } parse_error: pr_warn( "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb()," " unable to parse packet\n"); return ret; okay: if (_addrp) *_addrp = addrp; return 0; } /** * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet * @skb: the packet * @family: protocol family * @sid: the packet's peer label SID * * Description: * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL) * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different * peer labels. * */ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid) { int err; u32 xfrm_sid; u32 nlbl_sid; u32 nlbl_type; err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid); if (unlikely(err)) return -EACCES; err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid); if (unlikely(err)) return -EACCES; err = security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state, nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid); if (unlikely(err)) { pr_warn( "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid()," " unable to determine packet's peer label\n"); return -EACCES; } return 0; } /** * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID * @skb_sid: the packet's SID * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID * * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then @conn_sid is simply a copy * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure. * */ static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid) { int err = 0; if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL) err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid); else *conn_sid = sk_sid; return err; } /* socket security operations */ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec, u16 secclass, u32 *socksid) { if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) { *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid; return 0; } return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL, socksid); } static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL) return 0; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sk = sk; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad); } static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); u32 newsid; u16 secclass; int rc; if (kern) return 0; secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid); if (rc) return rc; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL); } static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock)); struct sk_security_struct *sksec; u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; int err = 0; if (!kern) { err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid); if (err) return err; } isec->sclass = sclass; isec->sid = sid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; if (sock->sk) { sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; sksec->sclass = sclass; sksec->sid = sid; /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */ if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET; err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family); } return err; } static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security; sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid; sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid; return 0; } /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind. Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind permission check between the socket and the port number. */ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; u16 family; int err; err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND); if (err) goto out; /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */ family = sk->sk_family; if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) { char *addrp; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; u16 family_sa; unsigned short snum; u32 sid, node_perm; /* * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect() * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET. */ if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family)) return -EINVAL; family_sa = address->sa_family; switch (family_sa) { case AF_UNSPEC: case AF_INET: if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) return -EINVAL; addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address; if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) { /* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY */ if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY)) goto err_af; family_sa = AF_INET; } snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port); addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr; break; case AF_INET6: if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) return -EINVAL; addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port); addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr; break; default: goto err_af; } ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum); ad.u.net->family = family_sa; if (snum) { int low, high; inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high); if (inet_port_requires_bind_service(sock_net(sk), snum) || snum < low || snum > high) { err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid); if (err) goto out; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad); if (err) goto out; } } switch (sksec->sclass) { case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET: node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; break; case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET: node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; break; case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET: node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; break; case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET: node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; break; default: node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; break; } err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid); if (err) goto out; if (family_sa == AF_INET) ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr; else ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad); if (err) goto out; } out: return err; err_af: /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */ if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) return -EINVAL; return -EAFNOSUPPORT; } /* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3) * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/SCTP.rst */ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; int err; err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT); if (err) return err; if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family)) return -EINVAL; /* connect(AF_UNSPEC) has special handling, as it is a documented * way to disconnect the socket */ if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) return 0; /* * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission * for the port. */ if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET || sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET || sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) { struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; unsigned short snum; u32 sid, perm; /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect() * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET. */ switch (address->sa_family) { case AF_INET: addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address; if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) return -EINVAL; snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port); break; case AF_INET6: addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) return -EINVAL; snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port); break; default: /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT. */ if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) return -EINVAL; else return -EAFNOSUPPORT; } err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid); if (err) return err; switch (sksec->sclass) { case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET: perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT; break; case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET: perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT; break; case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET: perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT; break; } ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum); ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad); if (err) return err; } return 0; } /* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { int err; struct sock *sk = sock->sk; err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen); if (err) return err; return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address); } static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) { return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN); } static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) { int err; struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct inode_security_struct *newisec; u16 sclass; u32 sid; err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT); if (err) return err; isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock)); spin_lock(&isec->lock); sclass = isec->sclass; sid = isec->sid; spin_unlock(&isec->lock); newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock)); newisec->sclass = sclass; newisec->sid = sid; newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; return 0; } static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size) { return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE); } static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags) { return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ); } static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) { return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR); } static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) { return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR); } static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) { int err; err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT); if (err) return err; return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname); } static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) { return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT); } static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) { return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN); } static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; int err; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sk = other; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid, sksec_other->sclass, UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad); if (err) return err; /* server child socket */ sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid; err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid); if (err) return err; /* connecting socket */ sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid; return 0; } static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) { struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sk = other->sk; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad); } static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid, struct common_audit_data *ad) { int err; u32 if_sid; u32 node_sid; err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid); if (err) return err; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, peer_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad); if (err) return err; err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid); if (err) return err; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, peer_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad); } static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family) { int err = 0; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; char *addrp; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; ad.u.net->family = family; err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL); if (err) return err; if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) { err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RECV, &ad); if (err) return err; } err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad); if (err) return err; err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad); return err; } static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { int err; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; u16 family = sk->sk_family; u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; char *addrp; u8 secmark_active; u8 peerlbl_active; if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6) return 0; /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) family = PF_INET; /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function * as fast and as clean as possible. */ if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer()) return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family); secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) return 0; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; ad.u.net->family = family; err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL); if (err) return err; if (peerlbl_active) { u32 peer_sid; err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid); if (err) return err; err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif, addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad); if (err) { selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0); return err; } err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad); if (err) { selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0); return err; } } if (secmark_active) { err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RECV, &ad); if (err) return err; } return err; } static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen, unsigned len) { int err = 0; char *scontext; u32 scontext_len; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL; if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET || sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET || sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid; if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) return -ENOPROTOOPT; err = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len); if (err) return err; if (scontext_len > len) { err = -ERANGE; goto out_len; } if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len)) err = -EFAULT; out_len: if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen)) err = -EFAULT; kfree(scontext); return err; } static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) { u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL; u16 family; struct inode_security_struct *isec; if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) family = PF_INET; else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) family = PF_INET6; else if (sock) family = sock->sk->sk_family; else goto out; if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) { isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock)); peer_secid = isec->sid; } else if (skb) selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid); out: *secid = peer_secid; if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL) return -EINVAL; return 0; } static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec; sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority); if (!sksec) return -ENOMEM; sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET; selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec); sk->sk_security = sksec; return 0; } static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; sk->sk_security = NULL; selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec); kfree(sksec); } static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; newsksec->sid = sksec->sid; newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid; newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass; selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec); } static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid) { if (!sk) *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET; else { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; *secid = sksec->sid; } } static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent)); struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 || sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) isec->sid = sksec->sid; sksec->sclass = isec->sclass; } /* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT chunk. This happens when an incoming * connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association * already present). */ static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; u8 peerlbl_active; u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; u32 conn_sid; int err = 0; if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass()) return 0; peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); if (peerlbl_active) { /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve(). */ err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, ep->base.sk->sk_family, &peer_sid); if (err) return err; if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; } if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) { sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET; /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks), * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary * peer SID for getpeercon(3). */ sksec->peer_sid = peer_sid; } else if (sksec->peer_sid != peer_sid) { /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce * consistency among the peer SIDs. */ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sk = ep->base.sk; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid, sksec->sclass, SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad); if (err) return err; } /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store * the information in ep. This will be used by SCTP TCP type * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then * plug this into the new socket. */ err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peer_sid, &conn_sid); if (err) return err; ep->secid = conn_sid; ep->peer_secid = peer_sid; /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */ return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(ep, skb); } /* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting * based on their @optname. */ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0; void *addr_buf; struct sockaddr *addr; struct socket *sock; if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass()) return 0; /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */ sock = sk->sk_socket; addr_buf = address; while (walk_size < addrlen) { if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrlen) return -EINVAL; addr = addr_buf; switch (addr->sa_family) { case AF_UNSPEC: case AF_INET: len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); break; case AF_INET6: len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); break; default: return -EINVAL; } if (walk_size + len > addrlen) return -EINVAL; err = -EINVAL; switch (optname) { /* Bind checks */ case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR: case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR: case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD: err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len); break; /* Connect checks */ case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX: case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY: case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP: case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT: err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len); if (err) return err; /* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked, * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked() * is called here. The situations handled are: * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2), * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new * primary address is selected. * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via * selinux_socket_connect(). */ err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr); break; } if (err) return err; addr_buf += len; walk_size += len; } return 0; } /* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call * the non-sctp clone version. */ if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass()) return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk); newsksec->sid = ep->secid; newsksec->peer_sid = ep->peer_secid; newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass; selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk); } static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; int err; u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family; u32 connsid; u32 peersid; err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid); if (err) return err; err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid); if (err) return err; req->secid = connsid; req->peer_secid = peersid; return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family); } static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, const struct request_sock *req) { struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; newsksec->sid = req->secid; newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid; /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet. So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which time it will have been created and available. */ /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only * thread with access to newsksec */ selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family); } static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { u16 family = sk->sk_family; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) family = PF_INET; selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid); } static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid) { const struct task_security_struct *__tsec; u32 tsid; __tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); tsid = __tsec->sid; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL); } static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void) { atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount); } static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void) { atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount); } static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl) { fl->flowi_secid = req->secid; } static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security) { struct tun_security_struct *tunsec; tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL); if (!tunsec) return -ENOMEM; tunsec->sid = current_sid(); *security = tunsec; return 0; } static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security) { kfree(security); } static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void) { u32 sid = current_sid(); /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense, * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE, NULL); } static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security) { struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL); } static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security) { struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling * protocols were being used */ sksec->sid = tunsec->sid; sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET; return 0; } static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security) { struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; u32 sid = current_sid(); int err; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL); if (err) return err; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL); if (err) return err; tunsec->sid = sid; return 0; } #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *indev, u16 family) { int err; char *addrp; u32 peer_sid; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; u8 secmark_active; u8 netlbl_active; u8 peerlbl_active; if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer()) return NF_ACCEPT; secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled(); peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) return NF_ACCEPT; if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0) return NF_DROP; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex; ad.u.net->family = family; if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0) return NF_DROP; if (peerlbl_active) { err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex, addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad); if (err) { selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1); return NF_DROP; } } if (secmark_active) if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, peer_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad)) return NF_DROP; if (netlbl_active) /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH * protection */ if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0) return NF_DROP; return NF_ACCEPT; } static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state) { return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET); } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state) { return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6); } #endif /* IPV6 */ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family) { struct sock *sk; u32 sid; if (!netlbl_enabled()) return NF_ACCEPT; /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */ sk = skb->sk; if (sk) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec; if (sk_listener(sk)) /* if the socket is the listening state then this * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent. * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is * as any IP option based labeling should be copied * from the initial connection request (in the IP * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a * security label in the packet itself this is the * best we can do. */ return NF_ACCEPT; /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */ sksec = sk->sk_security; sid = sksec->sid; } else sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0) return NF_DROP; return NF_ACCEPT; } static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state) { return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET); } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state) { return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET6); } #endif /* IPV6 */ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, u16 family) { struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb); struct sk_security_struct *sksec; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; char *addrp; u8 proto = 0; if (sk == NULL) return NF_ACCEPT; sksec = sk->sk_security; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->netif = ifindex; ad.u.net->family = family; if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto)) return NF_DROP; if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad)) return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto)) return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); return NF_ACCEPT; } static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *outdev, u16 family) { u32 secmark_perm; u32 peer_sid; int ifindex = outdev->ifindex; struct sock *sk; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; char *addrp; u8 secmark_active; u8 peerlbl_active; /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function * as fast and as clean as possible. */ if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer()) return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family); secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) return NF_ACCEPT; sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb); #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks * when the packet is on it's final way out. * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do; * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per * connection. */ if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL && !(sk && sk_listener(sk))) return NF_ACCEPT; #endif if (sk == NULL) { /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */ if (skb->skb_iif) { secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT; if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid)) return NF_DROP; } else { secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; } } else if (sk_listener(sk)) { /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In * this particular case the correct security label is assigned * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output() * for similar problems. */ u32 skb_sid; struct sk_security_struct *sksec; sksec = sk->sk_security; if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid)) return NF_DROP; /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final" * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely * pass the packet. */ if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) { switch (family) { case PF_INET: if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED) return NF_ACCEPT; break; case PF_INET6: if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED) return NF_ACCEPT; break; default: return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); } } if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid)) return NF_DROP; secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; } else { /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the * associated socket. */ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; peer_sid = sksec->sid; secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; } ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->netif = ifindex; ad.u.net->family = family; if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL)) return NF_DROP; if (secmark_active) if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, peer_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad)) return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); if (peerlbl_active) { u32 if_sid; u32 node_sid; if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid)) return NF_DROP; if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, peer_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad)) return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid)) return NF_DROP; if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, peer_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad)) return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); } return NF_ACCEPT; } static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state) { return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET); } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state) { return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6); } #endif /* IPV6 */ #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { int rc = 0; unsigned int msg_len; unsigned int data_len = skb->len; unsigned char *data = skb->data; struct nlmsghdr *nlh; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; u16 sclass = sksec->sclass; u32 perm; while (data_len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) { nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)data; /* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink * users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus * length fields; our solution is to follow what * netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at * messages with length fields that are clearly junk */ if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || nlh->nlmsg_len > data_len) return 0; rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm); if (rc == 0) { rc = sock_has_perm(sk, perm); if (rc) return rc; } else if (rc == -EINVAL) { /* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */ pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink" " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s" " pid=%d comm=%s\n", sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, secclass_map[sclass - 1].name, task_pid_nr(current), current->comm); if (enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) && !security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state)) return rc; rc = 0; } else if (rc == -ENOENT) { /* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */ rc = 0; } else { return rc; } /* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */ msg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len); if (msg_len >= data_len) return 0; data_len -= msg_len; data += msg_len; } return rc; } static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass) { isec->sclass = sclass; isec->sid = current_sid(); } static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms, u32 perms) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); isec = selinux_ipc(ipc_perms); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad); } static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg) { struct msg_security_struct *msec; msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg); msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; return 0; } /* message queue security operations */ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; isec = selinux_ipc(msq); ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_MSGQ); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__CREATE, &ad); return rc; } static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); isec = selinux_ipc(msq); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad); } static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd) { int err; int perms; switch (cmd) { case IPC_INFO: case MSG_INFO: /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL); case IPC_STAT: case MSG_STAT: case MSG_STAT_ANY: perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE; break; case IPC_SET: perms = MSGQ__SETATTR; break; case IPC_RMID: perms = MSGQ__DESTROY; break; default: return 0; } err = ipc_has_perm(msq, perms); return err; } static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct msg_security_struct *msec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; isec = selinux_ipc(msq); msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg); /* * First time through, need to assign label to the message */ if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) { /* * Compute new sid based on current process and * message queue this message will be stored in */ rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid); if (rc) return rc; } ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key; /* Can this process write to the queue? */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__WRITE, &ad); if (!rc) /* Can this process send the message */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad); if (!rc) /* Can the message be put in the queue? */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad); return rc; } static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct msg_security_struct *msec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = task_sid(target); int rc; isec = selinux_ipc(msq); msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad); if (!rc) rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad); return rc; } /* Shared Memory security operations */ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; isec = selinux_ipc(shp); ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SHM); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, SHM__CREATE, &ad); return rc; } static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); isec = selinux_ipc(shp); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); } /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */ static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd) { int perms; int err; switch (cmd) { case IPC_INFO: case SHM_INFO: /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL); case IPC_STAT: case SHM_STAT: case SHM_STAT_ANY: perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE; break; case IPC_SET: perms = SHM__SETATTR; break; case SHM_LOCK: case SHM_UNLOCK: perms = SHM__LOCK; break; case IPC_RMID: perms = SHM__DESTROY; break; default: return 0; } err = ipc_has_perm(shp, perms); return err; } static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg) { u32 perms; if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY) perms = SHM__READ; else perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE; return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms); } /* Semaphore security operations */ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; isec = selinux_ipc(sma); ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SEM); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, SEM__CREATE, &ad); return rc; } static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); isec = selinux_ipc(sma); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); } /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */ static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd) { int err; u32 perms; switch (cmd) { case IPC_INFO: case SEM_INFO: /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL); case GETPID: case GETNCNT: case GETZCNT: perms = SEM__GETATTR; break; case GETVAL: case GETALL: perms = SEM__READ; break; case SETVAL: case SETALL: perms = SEM__WRITE; break; case IPC_RMID: perms = SEM__DESTROY; break; case IPC_SET: perms = SEM__SETATTR; break; case IPC_STAT: case SEM_STAT: case SEM_STAT_ANY: perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE; break; default: return 0; } err = ipc_has_perm(sma, perms); return err; } static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter) { u32 perms; if (alter) perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE; else perms = SEM__READ; return ipc_has_perm(sma, perms); } static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) { u32 av = 0; av = 0; if (flag & S_IRUGO) av |= IPC__UNIX_READ; if (flag & S_IWUGO) av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE; if (av == 0) return 0; return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av); } static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp); *secid = isec->sid; } static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) { if (inode) inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry); } static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) { const struct task_security_struct *__tsec; u32 sid; int error; unsigned len; rcu_read_lock(); __tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p)); if (current != p) { error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), __tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL); if (error) goto bad; } if (!strcmp(name, "current")) sid = __tsec->sid; else if (!strcmp(name, "prev")) sid = __tsec->osid; else if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) sid = __tsec->exec_sid; else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) sid = __tsec->create_sid; else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid; else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid; else { error = -EINVAL; goto bad; } rcu_read_unlock(); if (!sid) return 0; error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, value, &len); if (error) return error; return len; bad: rcu_read_unlock(); return error; } static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) { struct task_security_struct *tsec; struct cred *new; u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid; int error; char *str = value; /* * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all. */ if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL); else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL); else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL); else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL); else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL); else error = -EINVAL; if (error) return error; /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */ if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') { if (str[size-1] == '\n') { str[size-1] = 0; size--; } error = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) { if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) { struct audit_buffer *ab; size_t audit_size; /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the * context contains a nul and we should audit that */ if (str[size - 1] == '\0') audit_size = size - 1; else audit_size = size; ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR); audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context="); audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size); audit_log_end(ab); return error; } error = security_context_to_sid_force( &selinux_state, value, size, &sid); } if (error) return error; } new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) return -ENOMEM; /* Permission checking based on the specified context is performed during the actual operation (execve, open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the operation. See selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec for the execve checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */ tsec = selinux_cred(new); if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) { tsec->exec_sid = sid; } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) { tsec->create_sid = sid; } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) { if (sid) { error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL); if (error) goto abort_change; } tsec->keycreate_sid = sid; } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) { tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid; } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) { error = -EINVAL; if (sid == 0) goto abort_change; /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */ error = -EPERM; if (!current_is_single_threaded()) { error = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, sid); if (error) goto abort_change; } /* Check permissions for the transition. */ error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL); if (error) goto abort_change; /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok. Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */ ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid(); if (ptsid != 0) { error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); if (error) goto abort_change; } tsec->sid = sid; } else { error = -EINVAL; goto abort_change; } commit_creds(new); return size; abort_change: abort_creds(new); return error; } static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name) { return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0); } static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) { return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid, secdata, seclen); } static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) { return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL); } static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) { kfree(secdata); } static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); spin_lock(&isec->lock); isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID; spin_unlock(&isec->lock); } /* * called with inode->i_mutex locked */ static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) { int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0); /* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */ return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc; } /* * called with inode->i_mutex locked */ static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) { return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0); } static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) { int len = 0; len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, true); if (len < 0) return len; *ctxlen = len; return 0; } #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec; struct key_security_struct *ksec; ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); if (!ksec) return -ENOMEM; tsec = selinux_cred(cred); if (tsec->keycreate_sid) ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid; else ksec->sid = tsec->sid; k->security = ksec; return 0; } static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k) { struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security; k->security = NULL; kfree(ksec); } static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, enum key_need_perm need_perm) { struct key *key; struct key_security_struct *ksec; u32 perm, sid; switch (need_perm) { case KEY_NEED_VIEW: perm = KEY__VIEW; break; case KEY_NEED_READ: perm = KEY__READ; break; case KEY_NEED_WRITE: perm = KEY__WRITE; break; case KEY_NEED_SEARCH: perm = KEY__SEARCH; break; case KEY_NEED_LINK: perm = KEY__LINK; break; case KEY_NEED_SETATTR: perm = KEY__SETATTR; break; case KEY_NEED_UNLINK: case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE: case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE: case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK: return 0; default: WARN_ON(1); return -EPERM; } sid = cred_sid(cred); key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); ksec = key->security; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL); } static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) { struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security; char *context = NULL; unsigned len; int rc; rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ksec->sid, &context, &len); if (!rc) rc = len; *_buffer = context; return rc; } #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS static int selinux_watch_key(struct key *key) { struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security; u32 sid = current_sid(); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, NULL); } #endif #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val) { struct common_audit_data ad; int err; u32 sid = 0; struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec; struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey; err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid); if (err) return err; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY; ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix; ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val; ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY, INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad); } static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name, u8 port_num) { struct common_audit_data ad; int err; u32 sid = 0; struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec; struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport; err = security_ib_endport_sid(&selinux_state, dev_name, port_num, &sid); if (err) return err; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT; strncpy(ibendport.dev_name, dev_name, sizeof(ibendport.dev_name)); ibendport.port = port_num; ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT, INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad); } static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec) { struct ib_security_struct *sec; sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL); if (!sec) return -ENOMEM; sec->sid = current_sid(); *ib_sec = sec; return 0; } static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec) { kfree(ib_sec); } #endif #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size) { u32 sid = current_sid(); int ret; switch (cmd) { case BPF_MAP_CREATE: ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE, NULL); break; case BPF_PROG_LOAD: ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD, NULL); break; default: ret = 0; break; } return ret; } static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode) { u32 av = 0; if (fmode & FMODE_READ) av |= BPF__MAP_READ; if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE) av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE; return av; } /* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see * if it is a bpf related object. And apply correspinding checks on the bpf * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode. * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files. */ static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid) { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; struct bpf_prog *prog; struct bpf_map *map; int ret; if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) { map = file->private_data; bpfsec = map->security; ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL); if (ret) return ret; } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) { prog = file->private_data; bpfsec = prog->aux->security; ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL); if (ret) return ret; } return 0; } static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode) { u32 sid = current_sid(); struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; bpfsec = map->security; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL); } static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) { u32 sid = current_sid(); struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; bpfsec = prog->aux->security; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL); } static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map) { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL); if (!bpfsec) return -ENOMEM; bpfsec->sid = current_sid(); map->security = bpfsec; return 0; } static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security; map->security = NULL; kfree(bpfsec); } static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL); if (!bpfsec) return -ENOMEM; bpfsec->sid = current_sid(); aux->security = bpfsec; return 0; } static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security; aux->security = NULL; kfree(bpfsec); } #endif static int selinux_lockdown(enum lockdown_reason what) { struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); int invalid_reason = (what <= LOCKDOWN_NONE) || (what == LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX) || (what >= LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX); if (WARN(invalid_reason, "Invalid lockdown reason")) { audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR, "lockdown_reason=invalid"); return -EINVAL; } ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_LOCKDOWN; ad.u.reason = what; if (what <= LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX) return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_LOCKDOWN, LOCKDOWN__INTEGRITY, &ad); else return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_LOCKDOWN, LOCKDOWN__CONFIDENTIALITY, &ad); } struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct), .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct), .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), }; #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type) { u32 requested, sid = current_sid(); if (type == PERF_SECURITY_OPEN) requested = PERF_EVENT__OPEN; else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_CPU) requested = PERF_EVENT__CPU; else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL) requested = PERF_EVENT__KERNEL; else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT) requested = PERF_EVENT__TRACEPOINT; else return -EINVAL; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, requested, NULL); } static int selinux_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event) { struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec; perfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*perfsec), GFP_KERNEL); if (!perfsec) return -ENOMEM; perfsec->sid = current_sid(); event->security = perfsec; return 0; } static void selinux_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event) { struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security; event->security = NULL; kfree(perfsec); } static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event) { struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security; u32 sid = current_sid(); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__READ, NULL); } static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event) { struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security; u32 sid = current_sid(); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__WRITE, NULL); } #endif /* * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order: * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below, * 2. hooks that both access structures allocated by other hooks, and allocate * structures that can be later accessed by other hooks (mostly "cloning" * hooks), * 3. hooks that only allocate structures that can be later accessed by other * hooks ("allocating" hooks). * * Please follow block comment delimiters in the list to keep this order. * * This ordering is needed for SELinux runtime disable to work at least somewhat * safely. Breaking the ordering rules above might lead to NULL pointer derefs * when disabling SELinux at runtime. */ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction), LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder), LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable), LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on), LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog), LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory), LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts), LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, selinux_move_mount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify, selinux_path_notify), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file), LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate), LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd), LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv), LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate), LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop), LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate), LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel), LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect), LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, selinux_socket_socketpair), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established), LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet), LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc), LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec), LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open), #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet, selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity), #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key, selinux_watch_key), #endif #endif #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known), LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match), LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_pro