1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * INET An implementation of the TCP/IP protocol suite for the LINUX * operating system. INET is implemented using the BSD Socket * interface as the means of communication with the user level. * * Definitions for the IP router. * * Version: @(#)route.h 1.0.4 05/27/93 * * Authors: Ross Biro * Fred N. van Kempen, <waltje@uWalt.NL.Mugnet.ORG> * Fixes: * Alan Cox : Reformatted. Added ip_rt_local() * Alan Cox : Support for TCP parameters. * Alexey Kuznetsov: Major changes for new routing code. * Mike McLagan : Routing by source * Robert Olsson : Added rt_cache statistics */ #ifndef _ROUTE_H #define _ROUTE_H #include <net/dst.h> #include <net/inetpeer.h> #include <net/flow.h> #include <net/inet_sock.h> #include <net/ip_fib.h> #include <net/arp.h> #include <net/ndisc.h> #include <linux/in_route.h> #include <linux/rtnetlink.h> #include <linux/rcupdate.h> #include <linux/route.h> #include <linux/ip.h> #include <linux/cache.h> #include <linux/security.h> /* IPv4 datagram length is stored into 16bit field (tot_len) */ #define IP_MAX_MTU 0xFFFFU #define RTO_ONLINK 0x01 #define RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk) (RT_TOS(inet_sk(sk)->tos) | sock_flag(sk, SOCK_LOCALROUTE)) #define RT_CONN_FLAGS_TOS(sk,tos) (RT_TOS(tos) | sock_flag(sk, SOCK_LOCALROUTE)) struct fib_nh; struct fib_info; struct uncached_list; struct rtable { struct dst_entry dst; int rt_genid; unsigned int rt_flags; __u16 rt_type; __u8 rt_is_input; __u8 rt_uses_gateway; int rt_iif; u8 rt_gw_family; /* Info on neighbour */ union { __be32 rt_gw4; struct in6_addr rt_gw6; }; /* Miscellaneous cached information */ u32 rt_mtu_locked:1, rt_pmtu:31; struct list_head rt_uncached; struct uncached_list *rt_uncached_list; }; static inline bool rt_is_input_route(const struct rtable *rt) { return rt->rt_is_input != 0; } static inline bool rt_is_output_route(const struct rtable *rt) { return rt->rt_is_input == 0; } static inline __be32 rt_nexthop(const struct rtable *rt, __be32 daddr) { if (rt->rt_gw_family == AF_INET) return rt->rt_gw4; return daddr; } struct ip_rt_acct { __u32 o_bytes; __u32 o_packets; __u32 i_bytes; __u32 i_packets; }; struct rt_cache_stat { unsigned int in_slow_tot; unsigned int in_slow_mc; unsigned int in_no_route; unsigned int in_brd; unsigned int in_martian_dst; unsigned int in_martian_src; unsigned int out_slow_tot; unsigned int out_slow_mc; }; extern struct ip_rt_acct __percpu *ip_rt_acct; struct in_device; int ip_rt_init(void); void rt_cache_flush(struct net *net); void rt_flush_dev(struct net_device *dev); struct rtable *ip_route_output_key_hash(struct net *net, struct flowi4 *flp, const struct sk_buff *skb); struct rtable *ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu(struct net *net, struct flowi4 *flp, struct fib_result *res, const struct sk_buff *skb); static inline struct rtable *__ip_route_output_key(struct net *net, struct flowi4 *flp) { return ip_route_output_key_hash(net, flp, NULL); } struct rtable *ip_route_output_flow(struct net *, struct flowi4 *flp, const struct sock *sk); struct rtable *ip_route_output_tunnel(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, struct net *net, __be32 *saddr, const struct ip_tunnel_info *info, u8 protocol, bool use_cache); struct dst_entry *ipv4_blackhole_route(struct net *net, struct dst_entry *dst_orig); static inline struct rtable *ip_route_output_key(struct net *net, struct flowi4 *flp) { return ip_route_output_flow(net, flp, NULL); } static inline struct rtable *ip_route_output(struct net *net, __be32 daddr, __be32 saddr, u8 tos, int oif) { struct flowi4 fl4 = { .flowi4_oif = oif, .flowi4_tos = tos, .daddr = daddr, .saddr = saddr, }; return ip_route_output_key(net, &fl4); } static inline struct rtable *ip_route_output_ports(struct net *net, struct flowi4 *fl4, struct sock *sk, __be32 daddr, __be32 saddr, __be16 dport, __be16 sport, __u8 proto, __u8 tos, int oif) { flowi4_init_output(fl4, oif, sk ? sk->sk_mark : 0, tos, RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE, proto, sk ? inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk) : 0, daddr, saddr, dport, sport, sock_net_uid(net, sk)); if (sk) security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi4_to_flowi(fl4)); return ip_route_output_flow(net, fl4, sk); } static inline struct rtable *ip_route_output_gre(struct net *net, struct flowi4 *fl4, __be32 daddr, __be32 saddr, __be32 gre_key, __u8 tos, int oif) { memset(fl4, 0, sizeof(*fl4)); fl4->flowi4_oif = oif; fl4->daddr = daddr; fl4->saddr = saddr; fl4->flowi4_tos = tos; fl4->flowi4_proto = IPPROTO_GRE; fl4->fl4_gre_key = gre_key; return ip_route_output_key(net, fl4); } int ip_mc_validate_source(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 daddr, __be32 saddr, u8 tos, struct net_device *dev, struct in_device *in_dev, u32 *itag); int ip_route_input_noref(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 dst, __be32 src, u8 tos, struct net_device *devin); int ip_route_input_rcu(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 dst, __be32 src, u8 tos, struct net_device *devin, struct fib_result *res); int ip_route_use_hint(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 dst, __be32 src, u8 tos, struct net_device *devin, const struct sk_buff *hint); static inline int ip_route_input(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 dst, __be32 src, u8 tos, struct net_device *devin) { int err; rcu_read_lock(); err = ip_route_input_noref(skb, dst, src, tos, devin); if (!err) { skb_dst_force(skb); if (!skb_dst(skb)) err = -EINVAL; } rcu_read_unlock(); return err; } void ipv4_update_pmtu(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net *net, u32 mtu, int oif, u8 protocol); void ipv4_sk_update_pmtu(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk, u32 mtu); void ipv4_redirect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net *net, int oif, u8 protocol); void ipv4_sk_redirect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk); void ip_rt_send_redirect(struct sk_buff *skb); unsigned int inet_addr_type(struct net *net, __be32 addr); unsigned int inet_addr_type_table(struct net *net, __be32 addr, u32 tb_id); unsigned int inet_dev_addr_type(struct net *net, const struct net_device *dev, __be32 addr); unsigned int inet_addr_type_dev_table(struct net *net, const struct net_device *dev, __be32 addr); void ip_rt_multicast_event(struct in_device *); int ip_rt_ioctl(struct net *, unsigned int cmd, struct rtentry *rt); void ip_rt_get_source(u8 *src, struct sk_buff *skb, struct rtable *rt); struct rtable *rt_dst_alloc(struct net_device *dev, unsigned int flags, u16 type, bool nopolicy, bool noxfrm); struct rtable *rt_dst_clone(struct net_device *dev, struct rtable *rt); struct in_ifaddr; void fib_add_ifaddr(struct in_ifaddr *); void fib_del_ifaddr(struct in_ifaddr *, struct in_ifaddr *); void fib_modify_prefix_metric(struct in_ifaddr *ifa, u32 new_metric); void rt_add_uncached_list(struct rtable *rt); void rt_del_uncached_list(struct rtable *rt); int fib_dump_info_fnhe(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb, u32 table_id, struct fib_info *fi, int *fa_index, int fa_start, unsigned int flags); static inline void ip_rt_put(struct rtable *rt) { /* dst_release() accepts a NULL parameter. * We rely on dst being first structure in struct rtable */ BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct rtable, dst) != 0); dst_release(&rt->dst); } #define IPTOS_RT_MASK (IPTOS_TOS_MASK & ~3) extern const __u8 ip_tos2prio[16]; static inline char rt_tos2priority(u8 tos) { return ip_tos2prio[IPTOS_TOS(tos)>>1]; } /* ip_route_connect() and ip_route_newports() work in tandem whilst * binding a socket for a new outgoing connection. * * In order to use IPSEC properly, we must, in the end, have a * route that was looked up using all available keys including source * and destination ports. * * However, if a source port needs to be allocated (the user specified * a wildcard source port) we need to obtain addressing information * in order to perform that allocation. * * So ip_route_connect() looks up a route using wildcarded source and * destination ports in the key, simply so that we can get a pair of * addresses to use for port allocation. * * Later, once the ports are allocated, ip_route_newports() will make * another route lookup if needed to make sure we catch any IPSEC * rules keyed on the port information. * * The callers allocate the flow key on their stack, and must pass in * the same flowi4 object to both the ip_route_connect() and the * ip_route_newports() calls. */ static inline void ip_route_connect_init(struct flowi4 *fl4, __be32 dst, __be32 src, u32 tos, int oif, u8 protocol, __be16 sport, __be16 dport, struct sock *sk) { __u8 flow_flags = 0; if (inet_sk(sk)->transparent) flow_flags |= FLOWI_FLAG_ANYSRC; flowi4_init_output(fl4, oif, sk->sk_mark, tos, RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE, protocol, flow_flags, dst, src, dport, sport, sk->sk_uid); } static inline struct rtable *ip_route_connect(struct flowi4 *fl4, __be32 dst, __be32 src, u32 tos, int oif, u8 protocol, __be16 sport, __be16 dport, struct sock *sk) { struct net *net = sock_net(sk); struct rtable *rt; ip_route_connect_init(fl4, dst, src, tos, oif, protocol, sport, dport, sk); if (!dst || !src) { rt = __ip_route_output_key(net, fl4); if (IS_ERR(rt)) return rt; ip_rt_put(rt); flowi4_update_output(fl4, oif, tos, fl4->daddr, fl4->saddr); } security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi4_to_flowi(fl4)); return ip_route_output_flow(net, fl4, sk); } static inline struct rtable *ip_route_newports(struct flowi4 *fl4, struct rtable *rt, __be16 orig_sport, __be16 orig_dport, __be16 sport, __be16 dport, struct sock *sk) { if (sport != orig_sport || dport != orig_dport) { fl4->fl4_dport = dport; fl4->fl4_sport = sport; ip_rt_put(rt); flowi4_update_output(fl4, sk->sk_bound_dev_if, RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk), fl4->daddr, fl4->saddr); security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi4_to_flowi(fl4)); return ip_route_output_flow(sock_net(sk), fl4, sk); } return rt; } static inline int inet_iif(const struct sk_buff *skb) { struct rtable *rt = skb_rtable(skb); if (rt && rt->rt_iif) return rt->rt_iif; return skb->skb_iif; } static inline int ip4_dst_hoplimit(const struct dst_entry *dst) { int hoplimit = dst_metric_raw(dst, RTAX_HOPLIMIT); struct net *net = dev_net(dst->dev); if (hoplimit == 0) hoplimit = net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_default_ttl; return hoplimit; } static inline struct neighbour *ip_neigh_gw4(struct net_device *dev, __be32 daddr) { struct neighbour *neigh; neigh = __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref(dev, daddr); if (unlikely(!neigh)) neigh = __neigh_create(&arp_tbl, &daddr, dev, false); return neigh; } static inline struct neighbour *ip_neigh_for_gw(struct rtable *rt, struct sk_buff *skb, bool *is_v6gw) { struct net_device *dev = rt->dst.dev; struct neighbour *neigh; if (likely(rt->rt_gw_family == AF_INET)) { neigh = ip_neigh_gw4(dev, rt->rt_gw4); } else if (rt->rt_gw_family == AF_INET6) { neigh = ip_neigh_gw6(dev, &rt->rt_gw6); *is_v6gw = true; } else { neigh = ip_neigh_gw4(dev, ip_hdr(skb)->daddr); } return neigh; } #endif /* _ROUTE_H */
1 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef _ASM_X86_PAGE_64_H #define _ASM_X86_PAGE_64_H #include <asm/page_64_types.h> #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ #include <asm/alternative.h> /* duplicated to the one in bootmem.h */ extern unsigned long max_pfn; extern unsigned long phys_base; extern unsigned long page_offset_base; extern unsigned long vmalloc_base; extern unsigned long vmemmap_base; static inline unsigned long __phys_addr_nodebug(unsigned long x) { unsigned long y = x - __START_KERNEL_map; /* use the carry flag to determine if x was < __START_KERNEL_map */ x = y + ((x > y) ? phys_base : (__START_KERNEL_map - PAGE_OFFSET)); return x; } #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL extern unsigned long __phys_addr(unsigned long); extern unsigned long __phys_addr_symbol(unsigned long); #else #define __phys_addr(x) __phys_addr_nodebug(x) #define __phys_addr_symbol(x) \ ((unsigned long)(x) - __START_KERNEL_map + phys_base) #endif #define __phys_reloc_hide(x) (x) #ifdef CONFIG_FLATMEM #define pfn_valid(pfn) ((pfn) < max_pfn) #endif void clear_page_orig(void *page); void clear_page_rep(void *page); void clear_page_erms(void *page); static inline void clear_page(void *page) { alternative_call_2(clear_page_orig, clear_page_rep, X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD, clear_page_erms, X86_FEATURE_ERMS, "=D" (page), "0" (page) : "cc", "memory", "rax", "rcx"); } void copy_page(void *to, void *from); #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION # define __HAVE_ARCH_GATE_AREA 1 #endif #endif /* _ASM_X86_PAGE_64_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ /* * Copyright (c) 2016 Qualcomm Atheros, Inc * * Based on net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c */ #ifndef __NET_SCHED_FQ_IMPL_H #define __NET_SCHED_FQ_IMPL_H #include <net/fq.h> /* functions that are embedded into includer */ static void fq_adjust_removal(struct fq *fq, struct fq_flow *flow, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct fq_tin *tin = flow->tin; tin->backlog_bytes -= skb->len; tin->backlog_packets--; flow->backlog -= skb->len; fq->backlog--; fq->memory_usage -= skb->truesize; } static void fq_rejigger_backlog(struct fq *fq, struct fq_flow *flow) { struct fq_flow *i; if (flow->backlog == 0) { list_del_init(&flow->backlogchain); } else { i = flow; list_for_each_entry_continue(i, &fq->backlogs, backlogchain) if (i->backlog < flow->backlog) break; list_move_tail(&flow->backlogchain, &i->backlogchain); } } static struct sk_buff *fq_flow_dequeue(struct fq *fq, struct fq_flow *flow) { struct sk_buff *skb; lockdep_assert_held(&fq->lock); skb = __skb_dequeue(&flow->queue); if (!skb) return NULL; fq_adjust_removal(fq, flow, skb); fq_rejigger_backlog(fq, flow); return skb; } static struct sk_buff *fq_tin_dequeue(struct fq *fq, struct fq_tin *tin, fq_tin_dequeue_t dequeue_func) { struct fq_flow *flow; struct list_head *head; struct sk_buff *skb; lockdep_assert_held(&fq->lock); begin: head = &tin->new_flows; if (list_empty(head)) { head = &tin->old_flows; if (list_empty(head)) return NULL; } flow = list_first_entry(head, struct fq_flow, flowchain); if (flow->deficit <= 0) { flow->deficit += fq->quantum; list_move_tail(&flow->flowchain, &tin->old_flows); goto begin; } skb = dequeue_func(fq, tin, flow); if (!skb) { /* force a pass through old_flows to prevent starvation */ if ((head == &tin->new_flows) && !list_empty(&tin->old_flows)) { list_move_tail(&flow->flowchain, &tin->old_flows); } else { list_del_init(&flow->flowchain); flow->tin = NULL; } goto begin; } flow->deficit -= skb->len; tin->tx_bytes += skb->len; tin->tx_packets++; return skb; } static u32 fq_flow_idx(struct fq *fq, struct sk_buff *skb) { u32 hash = skb_get_hash(skb); return reciprocal_scale(hash, fq->flows_cnt); } static struct fq_flow *fq_flow_classify(struct fq *fq, struct fq_tin *tin, u32 idx, struct sk_buff *skb, fq_flow_get_default_t get_default_func) { struct fq_flow *flow; lockdep_assert_held(&fq->lock); flow = &fq->flows[idx]; if (flow->tin && flow->tin != tin) { flow = get_default_func(fq, tin, idx, skb); tin->collisions++; fq->collisions++; } if (!flow->tin) tin->flows++; return flow; } static void fq_recalc_backlog(struct fq *fq, struct fq_tin *tin, struct fq_flow *flow) { struct fq_flow *i; if (list_empty(&flow->backlogchain)) list_add_tail(&flow->backlogchain, &fq->backlogs); i = flow; list_for_each_entry_continue_reverse(i, &fq->backlogs, backlogchain) if (i->backlog > flow->backlog) break; list_move(&flow->backlogchain, &i->backlogchain); } static void fq_tin_enqueue(struct fq *fq, struct fq_tin *tin, u32 idx, struct sk_buff *skb, fq_skb_free_t free_func, fq_flow_get_default_t get_default_func) { struct fq_flow *flow; bool oom; lockdep_assert_held(&fq->lock); flow = fq_flow_classify(fq, tin, idx, skb, get_default_func); flow->tin = tin; flow->backlog += skb->len; tin->backlog_bytes += skb->len; tin->backlog_packets++; fq->memory_usage += skb->truesize; fq->backlog++; fq_recalc_backlog(fq, tin, flow); if (list_empty(&flow->flowchain)) { flow->deficit = fq->quantum; list_add_tail(&flow->flowchain, &tin->new_flows); } __skb_queue_tail(&flow->queue, skb); oom = (fq->memory_usage > fq->memory_limit); while (fq->backlog > fq->limit || oom) { flow = list_first_entry_or_null(&fq->backlogs, struct fq_flow, backlogchain); if (!flow) return; skb = fq_flow_dequeue(fq, flow); if (!skb) return; free_func(fq, flow->tin, flow, skb); flow->tin->overlimit++; fq->overlimit++; if (oom) { fq->overmemory++; oom = (fq->memory_usage > fq->memory_limit); } } } static void fq_flow_filter(struct fq *fq, struct fq_flow *flow, fq_skb_filter_t filter_func, void *filter_data, fq_skb_free_t free_func) { struct fq_tin *tin = flow->tin; struct sk_buff *skb, *tmp; lockdep_assert_held(&fq->lock); skb_queue_walk_safe(&flow->queue, skb, tmp) { if (!filter_func(fq, tin, flow, skb, filter_data)) continue; __skb_unlink(skb, &flow->queue); fq_adjust_removal(fq, flow, skb); free_func(fq, tin, flow, skb); } fq_rejigger_backlog(fq, flow); } static void fq_tin_filter(struct fq *fq, struct fq_tin *tin, fq_skb_filter_t filter_func, void *filter_data, fq_skb_free_t free_func) { struct fq_flow *flow; lockdep_assert_held(&fq->lock); list_for_each_entry(flow, &tin->new_flows, flowchain) fq_flow_filter(fq, flow, filter_func, filter_data, free_func); list_for_each_entry(flow, &tin->old_flows, flowchain) fq_flow_filter(fq, flow, filter_func, filter_data, free_func); } static void fq_flow_reset(struct fq *fq, struct fq_flow *flow, fq_skb_free_t free_func) { struct sk_buff *skb; while ((skb = fq_flow_dequeue(fq, flow))) free_func(fq, flow->tin, flow, skb); if (!list_empty(&flow->flowchain)) list_del_init(&flow->flowchain); if (!list_empty(&flow->backlogchain)) list_del_init(&flow->backlogchain); flow->tin = NULL; WARN_ON_ONCE(flow->backlog); } static void fq_tin_reset(struct fq *fq, struct fq_tin *tin, fq_skb_free_t free_func) { struct list_head *head; struct fq_flow *flow; for (;;) { head = &tin->new_flows; if (list_empty(head)) { head = &tin->old_flows; if (list_empty(head)) break; } flow = list_first_entry(head, struct fq_flow, flowchain); fq_flow_reset(fq, flow, free_func); } WARN_ON_ONCE(tin->backlog_bytes); WARN_ON_ONCE(tin->backlog_packets); } static void fq_flow_init(struct fq_flow *flow) { INIT_LIST_HEAD(&flow->flowchain); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&flow->backlogchain); __skb_queue_head_init(&flow->queue); } static void fq_tin_init(struct fq_tin *tin) { INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tin->new_flows); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tin->old_flows); } static int fq_init(struct fq *fq, int flows_cnt) { int i; memset(fq, 0, sizeof(fq[0])); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fq->backlogs); spin_lock_init(&fq->lock); fq->flows_cnt = max_t(u32, flows_cnt, 1); fq->quantum = 300; fq->limit = 8192; fq->memory_limit = 16 << 20; /* 16 MBytes */ fq->flows = kvcalloc(fq->flows_cnt, sizeof(fq->flows[0]), GFP_KERNEL); if (!fq->flows) return -ENOMEM; for (i = 0; i < fq->flows_cnt; i++) fq_flow_init(&fq->flows[i]); return 0; } static void fq_reset(struct fq *fq, fq_skb_free_t free_func) { int i; for (i = 0; i < fq->flows_cnt; i++) fq_flow_reset(fq, &fq->flows[i], free_func); kvfree(fq->flows); fq->flows = NULL; } #endif
1 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * linux/kernel/capability.c * * Copyright (C) 1997 Andrew Main <zefram@fysh.org> * * Integrated into 2.1.97+, Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> * 30 May 2002: Cleanup, Robert M. Love <rml@tech9.net> */ #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/pid_namespace.h> #include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> /* * Leveraged for setting/resetting capabilities */ const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set = CAP_EMPTY_SET; EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_empty_set); int file_caps_enabled = 1; static int __init file_caps_disable(char *str) { file_caps_enabled = 0; return 1; } __setup("no_file_caps", file_caps_disable); #ifdef CONFIG_MULTIUSER /* * More recent versions of libcap are available from: * * http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/ */ static void warn_legacy_capability_use(void) { char name[sizeof(current->comm)]; pr_info_once("warning: `%s' uses 32-bit capabilities (legacy support in use)\n", get_task_comm(name, current)); } /* * Version 2 capabilities worked fine, but the linux/capability.h file * that accompanied their introduction encouraged their use without * the necessary user-space source code changes. As such, we have * created a version 3 with equivalent functionality to version 2, but * with a header change to protect legacy source code from using * version 2 when it wanted to use version 1. If your system has code * that trips the following warning, it is using version 2 specific * capabilities and may be doing so insecurely. * * The remedy is to either upgrade your version of libcap (to 2.10+, * if the application is linked against it), or recompile your * application with modern kernel headers and this warning will go * away. */ static void warn_deprecated_v2(void) { char name[sizeof(current->comm)]; pr_info_once("warning: `%s' uses deprecated v2 capabilities in a way that may be insecure\n", get_task_comm(name, current)); } /* * Version check. Return the number of u32s in each capability flag * array, or a negative value on error. */ static int cap_validate_magic(cap_user_header_t header, unsigned *tocopy) { __u32 version; if (get_user(version, &header->version)) return -EFAULT; switch (version) { case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1: warn_legacy_capability_use(); *tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1; break; case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2: warn_deprecated_v2(); fallthrough; /* v3 is otherwise equivalent to v2 */ case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3: *tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3; break; default: if (put_user((u32)_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION, &header->version)) return -EFAULT; return -EINVAL; } return 0; } /* * The only thing that can change the capabilities of the current * process is the current process. As such, we can't be in this code * at the same time as we are in the process of setting capabilities * in this process. The net result is that we can limit our use of * locks to when we are reading the caps of another process. */ static inline int cap_get_target_pid(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *pEp, kernel_cap_t *pIp, kernel_cap_t *pPp) { int ret; if (pid && (pid != task_pid_vnr(current))) { struct task_struct *target; rcu_read_lock(); target = find_task_by_vpid(pid); if (!target) ret = -ESRCH; else ret = security_capget(target, pEp, pIp, pPp); rcu_read_unlock(); } else ret = security_capget(current, pEp, pIp, pPp); return ret; } /** * sys_capget - get the capabilities of a given process. * @header: pointer to struct that contains capability version and * target pid data * @dataptr: pointer to struct that contains the effective, permitted, * and inheritable capabilities that are returned * * Returns 0 on success and < 0 on error. */ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capget, cap_user_header_t, header, cap_user_data_t, dataptr) { int ret = 0; pid_t pid; unsigned tocopy; kernel_cap_t pE, pI, pP; ret = cap_validate_magic(header, &tocopy); if ((dataptr == NULL) || (ret != 0)) return ((dataptr == NULL) && (ret == -EINVAL)) ? 0 : ret; if (get_user(pid, &header->pid)) return -EFAULT; if (pid < 0) return -EINVAL; ret = cap_get_target_pid(pid, &pE, &pI, &pP); if (!ret) { struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S]; unsigned i; for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) { kdata[i].effective = pE.cap[i]; kdata[i].permitted = pP.cap[i]; kdata[i].inheritable = pI.cap[i]; } /* * Note, in the case, tocopy < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S, * we silently drop the upper capabilities here. This * has the effect of making older libcap * implementations implicitly drop upper capability * bits when they perform a: capget/modify/capset * sequence. * * This behavior is considered fail-safe * behavior. Upgrading the application to a newer * version of libcap will enable access to the newer * capabilities. * * An alternative would be to return an error here * (-ERANGE), but that causes legacy applications to * unexpectedly fail; the capget/modify/capset aborts * before modification is attempted and the application * fails. */ if (copy_to_user(dataptr, kdata, tocopy * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct))) { return -EFAULT; } } return ret; } /** * sys_capset - set capabilities for a process or (*) a group of processes * @header: pointer to struct that contains capability version and * target pid data * @data: pointer to struct that contains the effective, permitted, * and inheritable capabilities * * Set capabilities for the current process only. The ability to any other * process(es) has been deprecated and removed. * * The restrictions on setting capabilities are specified as: * * I: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the old permitted * P: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the old permitted * E: must be set to a subset of new permitted * * Returns 0 on success and < 0 on error. */ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capset, cap_user_header_t, header, const cap_user_data_t, data) { struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S]; unsigned i, tocopy, copybytes; kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective; struct cred *new; int ret; pid_t pid; ret = cap_validate_magic(header, &tocopy); if (ret != 0) return ret; if (get_user(pid, &header->pid)) return -EFAULT; /* may only affect current now */ if (pid != 0 && pid != task_pid_vnr(current)) return -EPERM; copybytes = tocopy * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct); if (copybytes > sizeof(kdata)) return -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&kdata, data, copybytes)) return -EFAULT; for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) { effective.cap[i] = kdata[i].effective; permitted.cap[i] = kdata[i].permitted; inheritable.cap[i] = kdata[i].inheritable; } while (i < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S) { effective.cap[i] = 0; permitted.cap[i] = 0; inheritable.cap[i] = 0; i++; } effective.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK; permitted.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK; inheritable.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK; new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) return -ENOMEM; ret = security_capset(new, current_cred(), &effective, &inheritable, &permitted); if (ret < 0) goto error; audit_log_capset(new, current_cred()); return commit_creds(new); error: abort_creds(new); return ret; } /** * has_ns_capability - Does a task have a capability in a specific user ns * @t: The task in question * @ns: target user namespace * @cap: The capability to be tested for * * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not. * * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task. */ bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { int ret; rcu_read_lock(); ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE); rcu_read_unlock(); return (ret == 0); } /** * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in init_user_ns * @t: The task in question * @cap: The capability to be tested for * * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability * currently in effect to the initial user namespace, false if not. * * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task. */ bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap) { return has_ns_capability(t, &init_user_ns, cap); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(has_capability); /** * has_ns_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited) * in a specific user ns. * @t: The task in question * @ns: target user namespace * @cap: The capability to be tested for * * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not. * Do not write an audit message for the check. * * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task. */ bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { int ret; rcu_read_lock(); ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT); rcu_read_unlock(); return (ret == 0); } /** * has_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited) in the * initial user ns * @t: The task in question * @cap: The capability to be tested for * * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability * currently in effect to init_user_ns, false if not. Don't write an * audit message for the check. * * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task. */ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap) { return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap); } static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, unsigned int opts) { int capable; if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) { pr_crit("capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap); BUG(); } capable = security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap, opts); if (capable == 0) { current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; return true; } return false; } /** * ns_capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in * @cap: The capability to be tested for * * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently * available for use, false if not. * * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the * assumption that it's about to be used. */ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable); /** * ns_capable_noaudit - Determine if the current task has a superior capability * (unaudited) in effect * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in * @cap: The capability to be tested for * * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently * available for use, false if not. * * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the * assumption that it's about to be used. */ bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable_noaudit); /** * ns_capable_setid - Determine if the current task has a superior capability * in effect, while signalling that this check is being done from within a * setid or setgroups syscall. * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in * @cap: The capability to be tested for * * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently * available for use, false if not. * * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the * assumption that it's about to be used. */ bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, CAP_OPT_INSETID); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable_setid); /** * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect * @cap: The capability to be tested for * * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently * available for use, false if not. * * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the * assumption that it's about to be used. */ bool capable(int cap) { return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable); #endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */ /** * file_ns_capable - Determine if the file's opener had a capability in effect * @file: The file we want to check * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in * @cap: The capability to be tested for * * Return true if task that opened the file had a capability in effect * when the file was opened. * * This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV because the caller may not * actually be privileged. */ bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cap_valid(cap))) return false; if (security_capable(file->f_cred, ns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE) == 0) return true; return false; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(file_ns_capable); /** * privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid - Do capabilities in the namespace work over the inode? * @ns: The user namespace in question * @inode: The inode in question * * Return true if the inode uid and gid are within the namespace. */ bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct inode *inode) { return kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) && kgid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_gid); } /** * capable_wrt_inode_uidgid - Check nsown_capable and uid and gid mapped * @inode: The inode in question * @cap: The capability in question * * Return true if the current task has the given capability targeted at * its own user namespace and that the given inode's uid and gid are * mapped into the current user namespace. */ bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap) { struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); return ns_capable(ns, cap) && privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(ns, inode); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_wrt_inode_uidgid); /** * ptracer_capable - Determine if the ptracer holds CAP_SYS_PTRACE in the namespace * @tsk: The task that may be ptraced * @ns: The user namespace to search for CAP_SYS_PTRACE in * * Return true if the task that is ptracing the current task had CAP_SYS_PTRACE * in the specified user namespace. */ bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns) { int ret = 0; /* An absent tracer adds no restrictions */ const struct cred *cred; rcu_read_lock(); cred = rcu_dereference(tsk->ptracer_cred); if (cred) ret = security_capable(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT); rcu_read_unlock(); return (ret == 0); }
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * INET An implementation of the TCP/IP protocol suite for the LINUX * operating system. INET is implemented using the BSD Socket * interface as the means of communication with the user level. * * Checksumming functions for IPv6 * * Authors: Jorge Cwik, <jorge@laser.satlink.net> * Arnt Gulbrandsen, <agulbra@nvg.unit.no> * Borrows very liberally from tcp.c and ip.c, see those * files for more names. */ /* * Fixes: * * Ralf Baechle : generic ipv6 checksum * <ralf@waldorf-gmbh.de> */ #ifndef _CHECKSUM_IPV6_H #define _CHECKSUM_IPV6_H #include <asm/types.h> #include <asm/byteorder.h> #include <net/ip.h> #include <asm/checksum.h> #include <linux/in6.h> #include <linux/tcp.h> #include <linux/ipv6.h> #ifndef _HAVE_ARCH_IPV6_CSUM __sum16 csum_ipv6_magic(const struct in6_addr *saddr, const struct in6_addr *daddr, __u32 len, __u8 proto, __wsum csum); #endif static inline __wsum ip6_compute_pseudo(struct sk_buff *skb, int proto) { return ~csum_unfold(csum_ipv6_magic(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr, skb->len, proto, 0)); } static inline __wsum ip6_gro_compute_pseudo(struct sk_buff *skb, int proto) { const struct ipv6hdr *iph = skb_gro_network_header(skb); return ~csum_unfold(csum_ipv6_magic(&iph->saddr, &iph->daddr, skb_gro_len(skb), proto, 0)); } static __inline__ __sum16 tcp_v6_check(int len, const struct in6_addr *saddr, const struct in6_addr *daddr, __wsum base) { return csum_ipv6_magic(saddr, daddr, len, IPPROTO_TCP, base); } static inline void __tcp_v6_send_check(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct in6_addr *saddr, const struct in6_addr *daddr) { struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb); if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) { th->check = ~tcp_v6_check(skb->len, saddr, daddr, 0); skb->csum_start = skb_transport_header(skb) - skb->head; skb->csum_offset = offsetof(struct tcphdr, check); } else { th->check = tcp_v6_check(skb->len, saddr, daddr, csum_partial(th, th->doff << 2, skb->csum)); } } static inline void tcp_v6_gso_csum_prep(struct sk_buff *skb) { struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h = ipv6_hdr(skb); struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb); ipv6h->payload_len = 0; th->check = ~tcp_v6_check(0, &ipv6h->saddr, &ipv6h->daddr, 0); } static inline __sum16 udp_v6_check(int len, const struct in6_addr *saddr, const struct in6_addr *daddr, __wsum base) { return csum_ipv6_magic(saddr, daddr, len, IPPROTO_UDP, base); } void udp6_set_csum(bool nocheck, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct in6_addr *saddr, const struct in6_addr *daddr, int len); int udp6_csum_init(struct sk_buff *skb, struct udphdr *uh, int proto); #endif
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* Asymmetric public-key cryptography key subtype * * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst * * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) */ #ifndef _KEYS_ASYMMETRIC_SUBTYPE_H #define _KEYS_ASYMMETRIC_SUBTYPE_H #include <linux/seq_file.h> #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> struct kernel_pkey_query; struct kernel_pkey_params; struct public_key_signature; /* * Keys of this type declare a subtype that indicates the handlers and * capabilities. */ struct asymmetric_key_subtype { struct module *owner; const char *name; unsigned short name_len; /* length of name */ /* Describe a key of this subtype for /proc/keys */ void (*describe)(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m); /* Destroy a key of this subtype */ void (*destroy)(void *payload_crypto, void *payload_auth); int (*query)(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params, struct kernel_pkey_query *info); /* Encrypt/decrypt/sign data */ int (*eds_op)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, const void *in, void *out); /* Verify the signature on a key of this subtype (optional) */ int (*verify_signature)(const struct key *key, const struct public_key_signature *sig); }; /** * asymmetric_key_subtype - Get the subtype from an asymmetric key * @key: The key of interest. * * Retrieves and returns the subtype pointer of the asymmetric key from the * type-specific data attached to the key. */ static inline struct asymmetric_key_subtype *asymmetric_key_subtype(const struct key *key) { return key->payload.data[asym_subtype]; } #endif /* _KEYS_ASYMMETRIC_SUBTYPE_H */
1 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef _X86_IRQFLAGS_H_ #define _X86_IRQFLAGS_H_ #include <asm/processor-flags.h> #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ #include <asm/nospec-branch.h> /* Provide __cpuidle; we can't safely include <linux/cpu.h> */ #define __cpuidle __section(".cpuidle.text") /* * Interrupt control: */ /* Declaration required for gcc < 4.9 to prevent -Werror=missing-prototypes */ extern inline unsigned long native_save_fl(void); extern __always_inline unsigned long native_save_fl(void) { unsigned long flags; /* * "=rm" is safe here, because "pop" adjusts the stack before * it evaluates its effective address -- this is part of the * documented behavior of the "pop" instruction. */ asm volatile("# __raw_save_flags\n\t" "pushf ; pop %0" : "=rm" (flags) : /* no input */ : "memory"); return flags; } extern inline void native_restore_fl(unsigned long flags); extern inline void native_restore_fl(unsigned long flags) { asm volatile("push %0 ; popf" : /* no output */ :"g" (flags) :"memory", "cc"); } static __always_inline void native_irq_disable(void) { asm volatile("cli": : :"memory"); } static __always_inline void native_irq_enable(void) { asm volatile("sti": : :"memory"); } static inline __cpuidle void native_safe_halt(void) { mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(); asm volatile("sti; hlt": : :"memory"); } static inline __cpuidle void native_halt(void) { mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(); asm volatile("hlt": : :"memory"); } #endif #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL #include <asm/paravirt.h> #else #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ #include <linux/types.h> static __always_inline unsigned long arch_local_save_flags(void) { return native_save_fl(); } static __always_inline void arch_local_irq_restore(unsigned long flags) { native_restore_fl(flags); } static __always_inline void arch_local_irq_disable(void) { native_irq_disable(); } static __always_inline void arch_local_irq_enable(void) { native_irq_enable(); } /* * Used in the idle loop; sti takes one instruction cycle * to complete: */ static inline __cpuidle void arch_safe_halt(void) { native_safe_halt(); } /* * Used when interrupts are already enabled or to * shutdown the processor: */ static inline __cpuidle void halt(void) { native_halt(); } /* * For spinlocks, etc: */ static __always_inline unsigned long arch_local_irq_save(void) { unsigned long flags = arch_local_save_flags(); arch_local_irq_disable(); return flags; } #else #define ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(x) sti #define DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(x) cli #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY #define SAVE_FLAGS(x) pushfq; popq %rax #endif #define INTERRUPT_RETURN jmp native_iret #define USERGS_SYSRET64 \ swapgs; \ sysretq; #define USERGS_SYSRET32 \ swapgs; \ sysretl #else #define INTERRUPT_RETURN iret #endif #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL */ #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ static __always_inline int arch_irqs_disabled_flags(unsigned long flags) { return !(flags & X86_EFLAGS_IF); } static __always_inline int arch_irqs_disabled(void) { unsigned long flags = arch_local_save_flags(); return arch_irqs_disabled_flags(flags); } #else #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 #ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV #define SWAPGS ALTERNATIVE "swapgs", "", X86_FEATURE_XENPV #else #define SWAPGS swapgs #endif #endif #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * Descending-priority-sorted double-linked list * * (C) 2002-2003 Intel Corp * Inaky Perez-Gonzalez <inaky.perez-gonzalez@intel.com>. * * 2001-2005 (c) MontaVista Software, Inc. * Daniel Walker <dwalker@mvista.com> * * (C) 2005 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> * * Simplifications of the original code by * Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> * * Based on simple lists (include/linux/list.h). * * This is a priority-sorted list of nodes; each node has a * priority from INT_MIN (highest) to INT_MAX (lowest). * * Addition is O(K), removal is O(1), change of priority of a node is * O(K) and K is the number of RT priority levels used in the system. * (1 <= K <= 99) * * This list is really a list of lists: * * - The tier 1 list is the prio_list, different priority nodes. * * - The tier 2 list is the node_list, serialized nodes. * * Simple ASCII art explanation: * * pl:prio_list (only for plist_node) * nl:node_list * HEAD| NODE(S) * | * ||------------------------------------| * ||->|pl|<->|pl|<--------------->|pl|<-| * | |10| |21| |21| |21| |40| (prio) * | | | | | | | | | | | * | | | | | | | | | | | * |->|nl|<->|nl|<->|nl|<->|nl|<->|nl|<->|nl|<-| * |-------------------------------------------| * * The nodes on the prio_list list are sorted by priority to simplify * the insertion of new nodes. There are no nodes with duplicate * priorites on the list. * * The nodes on the node_list are ordered by priority and can contain * entries which have the same priority. Those entries are ordered * FIFO * * Addition means: look for the prio_list node in the prio_list * for the priority of the node and insert it before the node_list * entry of the next prio_list node. If it is the first node of * that priority, add it to the prio_list in the right position and * insert it into the serialized node_list list * * Removal means remove it from the node_list and remove it from * the prio_list if the node_list list_head is non empty. In case * of removal from the prio_list it must be checked whether other * entries of the same priority are on the list or not. If there * is another entry of the same priority then this entry has to * replace the removed entry on the prio_list. If the entry which * is removed is the only entry of this priority then a simple * remove from both list is sufficient. * * INT_MIN is the highest priority, 0 is the medium highest, INT_MAX * is lowest priority. * * No locking is done, up to the caller. */ #ifndef _LINUX_PLIST_H_ #define _LINUX_PLIST_H_ #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/list.h> struct plist_head { struct list_head node_list; }; struct plist_node { int prio; struct list_head prio_list; struct list_head node_list; }; /** * PLIST_HEAD_INIT - static struct plist_head initializer * @head: struct plist_head variable name */ #define PLIST_HEAD_INIT(head) \ { \ .node_list = LIST_HEAD_INIT((head).node_list) \ } /** * PLIST_HEAD - declare and init plist_head * @head: name for struct plist_head variable */ #define PLIST_HEAD(head) \ struct plist_head head = PLIST_HEAD_INIT(head) /** * PLIST_NODE_INIT - static struct plist_node initializer * @node: struct plist_node variable name * @__prio: initial node priority */ #define PLIST_NODE_INIT(node, __prio) \ { \ .prio = (__prio), \ .prio_list = LIST_HEAD_INIT((node).prio_list), \ .node_list = LIST_HEAD_INIT((node).node_list), \ } /** * plist_head_init - dynamic struct plist_head initializer * @head: &struct plist_head pointer */ static inline void plist_head_init(struct plist_head *head) { INIT_LIST_HEAD(&head->node_list); } /** * plist_node_init - Dynamic struct plist_node initializer * @node: &struct plist_node pointer * @prio: initial node priority */ static inline void plist_node_init(struct plist_node *node, int prio) { node->prio = prio; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&node->prio_list); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&node->node_list); } extern void plist_add(struct plist_node *node, struct plist_head *head); extern void plist_del(struct plist_node *node, struct plist_head *head); extern void plist_requeue(struct plist_node *node, struct plist_head *head); /** * plist_for_each - iterate over the plist * @pos: the type * to use as a loop counter * @head: the head for your list */ #define plist_for_each(pos, head) \ list_for_each_entry(pos, &(head)->node_list, node_list) /** * plist_for_each_continue - continue iteration over the plist * @pos: the type * to use as a loop cursor * @head: the head for your list * * Continue to iterate over plist, continuing after the current position. */ #define plist_for_each_continue(pos, head) \ list_for_each_entry_continue(pos, &(head)->node_list, node_list) /** * plist_for_each_safe - iterate safely over a plist of given type * @pos: the type * to use as a loop counter * @n: another type * to use as temporary storage * @head: the head for your list * * Iterate over a plist of given type, safe against removal of list entry. */ #define plist_for_each_safe(pos, n, head) \ list_for_each_entry_safe(pos, n, &(head)->node_list, node_list) /** * plist_for_each_entry - iterate over list of given type * @pos: the type * to use as a loop counter * @head: the head for your list * @mem: the name of the list_head within the struct */ #define plist_for_each_entry(pos, head, mem) \ list_for_each_entry(pos, &(head)->node_list, mem.node_list) /** * plist_for_each_entry_continue - continue iteration over list of given type * @pos: the type * to use as a loop cursor * @head: the head for your list * @m: the name of the list_head within the struct * * Continue to iterate over list of given type, continuing after * the current position. */ #define plist_for_each_entry_continue(pos, head, m) \ list_for_each_entry_continue(pos, &(head)->node_list, m.node_list) /** * plist_for_each_entry_safe - iterate safely over list of given type * @pos: the type * to use as a loop counter * @n: another type * to use as temporary storage * @head: the head for your list * @m: the name of the list_head within the struct * * Iterate over list of given type, safe against removal of list entry. */ #define plist_for_each_entry_safe(pos, n, head, m) \ list_for_each_entry_safe(pos, n, &(head)->node_list, m.node_list) /** * plist_head_empty - return !0 if a plist_head is empty * @head: &struct plist_head pointer */ static inline int plist_head_empty(const struct plist_head *head) { return list_empty(&head->node_list); } /** * plist_node_empty - return !0 if plist_node is not on a list * @node: &struct plist_node pointer */ static inline int plist_node_empty(const struct plist_node *node) { return list_empty(&node->node_list); } /* All functions below assume the plist_head is not empty. */ /** * plist_first_entry - get the struct for the first entry * @head: the &struct plist_head pointer * @type: the type of the struct this is embedded in * @member: the name of the list_head within the struct */ #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PLIST # define plist_first_entry(head, type, member) \ ({ \ WARN_ON(plist_head_empty(head)); \ container_of(plist_first(head), type, member); \ }) #else # define plist_first_entry(head, type, member) \ container_of(plist_first(head), type, member) #endif /** * plist_last_entry - get the struct for the last entry * @head: the &struct plist_head pointer * @type: the type of the struct this is embedded in * @member: the name of the list_head within the struct */ #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PLIST # define plist_last_entry(head, type, member) \ ({ \ WARN_ON(plist_head_empty(head)); \ container_of(plist_last(head), type, member); \ }) #else # define plist_last_entry(head, type, member) \ container_of(plist_last(head), type, member) #endif /** * plist_next - get the next entry in list * @pos: the type * to cursor */ #define plist_next(pos) \ list_next_entry(pos, node_list) /** * plist_prev - get the prev entry in list * @pos: the type * to cursor */ #define plist_prev(pos) \ list_prev_entry(pos, node_list) /** * plist_first - return the first node (and thus, highest priority) * @head: the &struct plist_head pointer * * Assumes the plist is _not_ empty. */ static inline struct plist_node *plist_first(const struct plist_head *head) { return list_entry(head->node_list.next, struct plist_node, node_list); } /** * plist_last - return the last node (and thus, lowest priority) * @head: the &struct plist_head pointer * * Assumes the plist is _not_ empty. */ static inline struct plist_node *plist_last(const struct plist_head *head) { return list_entry(head->node_list.prev, struct plist_node, node_list); } #endif
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ /* * Copyright (c) 2008 Intel Corporation * Author: Matthew Wilcox <willy@linux.intel.com> * * Please see kernel/locking/semaphore.c for documentation of these functions */ #ifndef __LINUX_SEMAPHORE_H #define __LINUX_SEMAPHORE_H #include <linux/list.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> /* Please don't access any members of this structure directly */ struct semaphore { raw_spinlock_t lock; unsigned int count; struct list_head wait_list; }; #define __SEMAPHORE_INITIALIZER(name, n) \ { \ .lock = __RAW_SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED((name).lock), \ .count = n, \ .wait_list = LIST_HEAD_INIT((name).wait_list), \ } #define DEFINE_SEMAPHORE(name) \ struct semaphore name = __SEMAPHORE_INITIALIZER(name, 1) static inline void sema_init(struct semaphore *sem, int val) { static struct lock_class_key __key; *sem = (struct semaphore) __SEMAPHORE_INITIALIZER(*sem, val); lockdep_init_map(&sem->lock.dep_map, "semaphore->lock", &__key, 0); } extern void down(struct semaphore *sem); extern int __must_check down_interruptible(struct semaphore *sem); extern int __must_check down_killable(struct semaphore *sem); extern int __must_check down_trylock(struct semaphore *sem); extern int __must_check down_timeout(struct semaphore *sem, long jiffies); extern void up(struct semaphore *sem); #endif /* __LINUX_SEMAPHORE_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef _LINUX_UTSNAME_H #define _LINUX_UTSNAME_H #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/kref.h> #include <linux/nsproxy.h> #include <linux/ns_common.h> #include <linux/err.h> #include <uapi/linux/utsname.h> enum uts_proc { UTS_PROC_OSTYPE, UTS_PROC_OSRELEASE, UTS_PROC_VERSION, UTS_PROC_HOSTNAME, UTS_PROC_DOMAINNAME, }; struct user_namespace; extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns; struct uts_namespace { struct kref kref; struct new_utsname name; struct user_namespace *user_ns; struct ucounts *ucounts; struct ns_common ns; } __randomize_layout; extern struct uts_namespace init_uts_ns; #ifdef CONFIG_UTS_NS static inline void get_uts_ns(struct uts_namespace *ns) { kref_get(&ns->kref); } extern struct uts_namespace *copy_utsname(unsigned long flags, struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct uts_namespace *old_ns); extern void free_uts_ns(struct kref *kref); static inline void put_uts_ns(struct uts_namespace *ns) { kref_put(&ns->kref, free_uts_ns); } void uts_ns_init(void); #else static inline void get_uts_ns(struct uts_namespace *ns) { } static inline void put_uts_ns(struct uts_namespace *ns) { } static inline struct uts_namespace *copy_utsname(unsigned long flags, struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct uts_namespace *old_ns) { if (flags & CLONE_NEWUTS) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); return old_ns; } static inline void uts_ns_init(void) { } #endif #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL extern void uts_proc_notify(enum uts_proc proc); #else static inline void uts_proc_notify(enum uts_proc proc) { } #endif static inline struct new_utsname *utsname(void) { return &current->nsproxy->uts_ns->name; } static inline struct new_utsname *init_utsname(void) { return &init_uts_ns.name; } extern struct rw_semaphore uts_sem; #endif /* _LINUX_UTSNAME_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef __PROCFS_FD_H__ #define __PROCFS_FD_H__ #include <linux/fs.h> extern const struct file_operations proc_fd_operations; extern const struct inode_operations proc_fd_inode_operations; extern const struct file_operations proc_fdinfo_operations; extern const struct inode_operations proc_fdinfo_inode_operations; extern int proc_fd_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask); static inline unsigned int proc_fd(struct inode *inode) { return PROC_I(inode)->fd; } #endif /* __PROCFS_FD_H__ */
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SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only /* * Implementation of the security services. * * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> * * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> * * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure. * Support for context based audit filters. * * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com> * * Added conditional policy language extensions * * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com> * * Added support for NetLabel * Added support for the policy capability bitmap * * Updated: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com> * * Added validation of kernel classes and permissions * * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> * * Added support for bounds domain and audit messaged on masked permissions * * Updated: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com> * * Added support for runtime switching of the policy type * * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 NEC Corporation * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> */ #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/rcupdate.h> #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/in.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/vmalloc.h> #include <net/netlabel.h> #include "flask.h" #include "avc.h" #include "avc_ss.h" #include "security.h" #include "context.h" #include "policydb.h" #include "sidtab.h" #include "services.h" #include "conditional.h" #include "mls.h" #include "objsec.h" #include "netlabel.h" #include "xfrm.h" #include "ebitmap.h" #include "audit.h" #include "policycap_names.h" struct convert_context_args { struct selinux_state *state; struct policydb *oldp; struct policydb *newp; }; struct selinux_policy_convert_data { struct convert_context_args args; struct sidtab_convert_params sidtab_params; }; /* Forward declaration. */ static int context_struct_to_string(struct policydb *policydb, struct context *context, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len); static int sidtab_entry_to_string(struct policydb *policydb, struct sidtab *sidtab, struct sidtab_entry *entry, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len); static void context_struct_compute_av(struct policydb *policydb, struct context *scontext, struct context *tcontext, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms); static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol, struct security_class_mapping *map, struct selinux_map *out_map) { u16 i, j; unsigned k; bool print_unknown_handle = false; /* Find number of classes in the input mapping */ if (!map) return -EINVAL; i = 0; while (map[i].name) i++; /* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */ out_map->mapping = kcalloc(++i, sizeof(*out_map->mapping), GFP_ATOMIC); if (!out_map->mapping) return -ENOMEM; /* Store the raw class and permission values */ j = 0; while (map[j].name) { struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++); struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map->mapping + j; /* An empty class string skips ahead */ if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) { p_out->num_perms = 0; continue; } p_out->value = string_to_security_class(pol, p_in->name); if (!p_out->value) { pr_info("SELinux: Class %s not defined in policy.\n", p_in->name); if (pol->reject_unknown) goto err; p_out->num_perms = 0; print_unknown_handle = true; continue; } k = 0; while (p_in->perms[k]) { /* An empty permission string skips ahead */ if (!*p_in->perms[k]) { k++; continue; } p_out->perms[k] = string_to_av_perm(pol, p_out->value, p_in->perms[k]); if (!p_out->perms[k]) { pr_info("SELinux: Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n", p_in->perms[k], p_in->name); if (pol->reject_unknown) goto err; print_unknown_handle = true; } k++; } p_out->num_perms = k; } if (print_unknown_handle) pr_info("SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n", pol->allow_unknown ? "allowed" : "denied"); out_map->size = i; return 0; err: kfree(out_map->mapping); out_map->mapping = NULL; return -EINVAL; } /* * Get real, policy values from mapped values */ static u16 unmap_class(struct selinux_map *map, u16 tclass) { if (tclass < map->size) return map->mapping[tclass].value; return tclass; } /* * Get kernel value for class from its policy value */ static u16 map_class(struct selinux_map *map, u16 pol_value) { u16 i; for (i = 1; i < map->size; i++) { if (map->mapping[i].value == pol_value) return i; } return SECCLASS_NULL; } static void map_decision(struct selinux_map *map, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd, int allow_unknown) { if (tclass < map->size) { struct selinux_mapping *mapping = &map->mapping[tclass]; unsigned int i, n = mapping->num_perms; u32 result; for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) { if (avd->allowed & mapping->perms[i]) result |= 1<<i; if (allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i]) result |= 1<<i; } avd->allowed = result; for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) if (avd->auditallow & mapping->perms[i]) result |= 1<<i; avd->auditallow = result; for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) { if (avd->auditdeny & mapping->perms[i]) result |= 1<<i; if (!allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i]) result |= 1<<i; } /* * In case the kernel has a bug and requests a permission * between num_perms and the maximum permission number, we * should audit that denial */ for (; i < (sizeof(u32)*8); i++) result |= 1<<i; avd->auditdeny = result; } } int security_mls_enabled(struct selinux_state *state) { int mls_enabled; struct selinux_policy *policy; if (!selinux_initialized(state)) return 0; rcu_read_lock(); policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy); mls_enabled = policy->policydb.mls_enabled; rcu_read_unlock(); return mls_enabled; } /* * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression * when it is applied to the specified source and target * security contexts. * * xcontext is a special beast... It is used by the validatetrans rules * only. For these rules, scontext is the context before the transition, * tcontext is the context after the transition, and xcontext is the context * of the process performing the transition. All other callers of * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext. */ static int constraint_expr_eval(struct policydb *policydb, struct context *scontext, struct context *tcontext, struct context *xcontext, struct constraint_expr *cexpr) { u32 val1, val2; struct context *c; struct role_datum *r1, *r2; struct mls_level *l1, *l2; struct constraint_expr *e; int s[CEXPR_MAXDEPTH]; int sp = -1; for (e = cexpr; e; e = e->next) { switch (e->expr_type) { case CEXPR_NOT: BUG_ON(sp < 0); s[sp] = !s[sp]; break; case CEXPR_AND: BUG_ON(sp < 1); sp--; s[sp] &= s[sp + 1]; break; case CEXPR_OR: BUG_ON(sp < 1); sp--; s[sp] |= s[sp + 1]; break; case CEXPR_ATTR: if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1)) return 0; switch (e->attr) { case CEXPR_USER: val1 = scontext->user; val2 = tcontext->user; break; case CEXPR_TYPE: val1 = scontext->type; val2 = tcontext->type; break; case CEXPR_ROLE: val1 = scontext->role; val2 = tcontext->role; r1 = policydb->role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1]; r2 = policydb->role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1]; switch (e->op) { case CEXPR_DOM: s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates, val2 - 1); continue; case CEXPR_DOMBY: s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates, val1 - 1); continue; case CEXPR_INCOMP: s[++sp] = (!ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates, val2 - 1) && !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates, val1 - 1)); continue; default: break; } break; case CEXPR_L1L2: l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]); l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]); goto mls_ops; case CEXPR_L1H2: l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]); l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]); goto mls_ops; case CEXPR_H1L2: l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]); l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]); goto mls_ops; case CEXPR_H1H2: l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]); l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]); goto mls_ops; case CEXPR_L1H1: l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]); l2 = &(scontext->range.level[1]); goto mls_ops; case CEXPR_L2H2: l1 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]); l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]); goto mls_ops; mls_ops: switch (e->op) { case CEXPR_EQ: s[++sp] = mls_level_eq(l1, l2); continue; case CEXPR_NEQ: s[++sp] = !mls_level_eq(l1, l2); continue; case CEXPR_DOM: s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l1, l2); continue; case CEXPR_DOMBY: s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l2, l1); continue; case CEXPR_INCOMP: s[++sp] = mls_level_incomp(l2, l1); continue; default: BUG(); return 0; } break; default: BUG(); return 0; } switch (e->op) { case CEXPR_EQ: s[++sp] = (val1 == val2); break; case CEXPR_NEQ: s[++sp] = (val1 != val2); break; default: BUG(); return 0; } break; case CEXPR_NAMES: if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1)) return 0; c = scontext; if (e->attr & CEXPR_TARGET) c = tcontext; else if (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET) { c = xcontext; if (!c) { BUG(); return 0; } } if (e->attr & CEXPR_USER) val1 = c->user; else if (e->attr & CEXPR_ROLE) val1 = c->role; else if (e->attr & CEXPR_TYPE) val1 = c->type; else { BUG(); return 0; } switch (e->op) { case CEXPR_EQ: s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1); break; case CEXPR_NEQ: s[++sp] = !ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1); break; default: BUG(); return 0; } break; default: BUG(); return 0; } } BUG_ON(sp != 0); return s[0]; } /* * security_dump_masked_av - dumps masked permissions during * security_compute_av due to RBAC, MLS/Constraint and Type bounds. */ static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args) { struct perm_datum *pdatum = d; char **permission_names = args; BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32); permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k; return 0; } static void security_dump_masked_av(struct policydb *policydb, struct context *scontext, struct context *tcontext, u16 tclass, u32 permissions, const char *reason) { struct common_datum *common_dat; struct class_datum *tclass_dat; struct audit_buffer *ab; char *tclass_name; char *scontext_name = NULL; char *tcontext_name = NULL; char *permission_names[32]; int index; u32 length; bool need_comma = false; if (!permissions) return; tclass_name = sym_name(policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass - 1); tclass_dat = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1]; common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum; /* init permission_names */ if (common_dat && hashtab_map(&common_dat->permissions.table, dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0) goto out; if (hashtab_map(&tclass_dat->permissions.table, dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0) goto out; /* get scontext/tcontext in text form */ if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, scontext, &scontext_name, &length) < 0) goto out; if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, tcontext, &tcontext_name, &length) < 0) goto out; /* audit a message */ ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR); if (!ab) goto out; audit_log_format(ab, "op=security_compute_av reason=%s " "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=", reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name); for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) { u32 mask = (1 << index); if ((mask & permissions) == 0) continue; audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s", need_comma ? "," : "", permission_names[index] ? permission_names[index] : "????"); need_comma = true; } audit_log_end(ab); out: /* release scontext/tcontext */ kfree(tcontext_name); kfree(scontext_name); return; } /* * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions * on boundary constraint. */ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct policydb *policydb, struct context *scontext, struct context *tcontext, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd) { struct context lo_scontext; struct context lo_tcontext, *tcontextp = tcontext; struct av_decision lo_avd; struct type_datum *source; struct type_datum *target; u32 masked = 0; source = policydb->type_val_to_struct[scontext->type - 1]; BUG_ON(!source); if (!source->bounds) return; target = policydb->type_val_to_struct[tcontext->type - 1]; BUG_ON(!target); memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd)); memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext)); lo_scontext.type = source->bounds; if (target->bounds) { memcpy(&lo_tcontext, tcontext, sizeof(lo_tcontext)); lo_tcontext.type = target->bounds; tcontextp = &lo_tcontext; } context_struct_compute_av(policydb, &lo_scontext, tcontextp, tclass, &lo_avd, NULL); masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed; if (likely(!masked)) return; /* no masked permission */ /* mask violated permissions */ avd->allowed &= ~masked; /* audit masked permissions */ security_dump_masked_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, masked, "bounds"); } /* * flag which drivers have permissions * only looking for ioctl based extended permssions */ void services_compute_xperms_drivers( struct extended_perms *xperms, struct avtab_node *node) { unsigned int i; if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) { /* if one or more driver has all permissions allowed */ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xperms->drivers.p); i++) xperms->drivers.p[i] |= node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i]; } else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) { /* if allowing permissions within a driver */ security_xperm_set(xperms->drivers.p, node->datum.u.xperms->driver); } /* If no ioctl commands are allowed, ignore auditallow and auditdeny */ if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED) xperms->len = 1; } /* * Compute access vectors and extended permissions based on a context * structure pair for the permissions in a particular class. */ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct policydb *policydb, struct context *scontext, struct context *tcontext, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms) { struct constraint_node *constraint; struct role_allow *ra; struct avtab_key avkey; struct avtab_node *node; struct class_datum *tclass_datum; struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr; struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode; unsigned int i, j; avd->allowed = 0; avd->auditallow = 0; avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff; if (xperms) { memset(&xperms->drivers, 0, sizeof(xperms->drivers)); xperms->len = 0; } if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim)) { if (printk_ratelimit()) pr_warn("SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass); return; } tclass_datum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1]; /* * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for * this permission check, then use it. */ avkey.target_class = tclass; avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_XPERMS; sattr = &policydb->type_attr_map_array[scontext->type - 1]; tattr = &policydb->type_attr_map_array[tcontext->type - 1]; ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) { ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) { avkey.source_type = i + 1; avkey.target_type = j + 1; for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab, &avkey); node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) { if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED) avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data; else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITALLOW) avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data; else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITDENY) avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data; else if (xperms && (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)) services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node); } /* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */ cond_compute_av(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey, avd, xperms); } } /* * Remove any permissions prohibited by a constraint (this includes * the MLS policy). */ constraint = tclass_datum->constraints; while (constraint) { if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) && !constraint_expr_eval(policydb, scontext, tcontext, NULL, constraint->expr)) { avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions); } constraint = constraint->next; } /* * If checking process transition permission and the * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role) * pair. */ if (tclass == policydb->process_class && (avd->allowed & policydb->process_trans_perms) && scontext->role != tcontext->role) { for (ra = policydb->role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) { if (scontext->role == ra->role && tcontext->role == ra->new_role) break; } if (!ra) avd->allowed &= ~policydb->process_trans_perms; } /* * If the given source and target types have boundary * constraint, lazy checks have to mask any violated * permission and notice it to userspace via audit. */ type_attribute_bounds_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd); } static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct selinux_state *state, struct selinux_policy *policy, struct sidtab_entry *oentry, struct sidtab_entry *nentry, struct sidtab_entry *tentry, u16 tclass) { struct policydb *p = &policy->policydb; struct sidtab *sidtab = policy->sidtab; char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL; u32 olen, nlen, tlen; if (sidtab_entry_to_string(p, sidtab, oentry, &o, &olen)) goto out; if (sidtab_entry_to_string(p, sidtab, nentry, &n, &nlen)) goto out; if (sidtab_entry_to_string(p, sidtab, tentry, &t, &tlen)) goto out; audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR, "op=security_validate_transition seresult=denied" " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s", o, n, t, sym_name(p, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1)); out: kfree(o); kfree(n); kfree(t); if (!enforcing_enabled(state)) return 0; return -EPERM; } static int security_compute_validatetrans(struct selinux_state *state, u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, u16 orig_tclass, bool user) { struct selinux_policy *policy; struct policydb *policydb; struct sidtab *sidtab; struct sidtab_entry *oentry; struct sidtab_entry *nentry; struct sidtab_entry *tentry; struct class_datum *tclass_datum; struct constraint_node *constraint; u16 tclass; int rc = 0; if (!selinux_initialized(state)) return 0; rcu_read_lock(); policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy); policydb = &policy->policydb; sidtab = policy->sidtab; if (!user) tclass = unmap_class(&policy->map, orig_tclass); else tclass = orig_tclass; if (!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim) { rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } tclass_datum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1]; oentry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, oldsid); if (!oentry) { pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, oldsid); rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } nentry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, newsid); if (!nentry) { pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, newsid); rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } tentry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, tasksid); if (!tentry) { pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, tasksid); rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans; while (constraint) { if (!constraint_expr_eval(policydb, &oentry->context, &nentry->context, &tentry->context, constraint->expr)) { if (user) rc = -EPERM; else rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(state, policy, oentry, nentry, tentry, tclass); goto out; } constraint = constraint->next; } out: rcu_read_unlock(); return rc; } int security_validate_transition_user(struct selinux_state *state, u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, u16 tclass) { return security_compute_validatetrans(state, oldsid, newsid, tasksid, tclass, true); } int security_validate_transition(struct selinux_state *state, u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, u16 orig_tclass) { return security_compute_validatetrans(state, oldsid, newsid, tasksid, orig_tclass, false); } /* * security_bounded_transition - check whether the given * transition is directed to bounded, or not. * It returns 0, if @newsid is bounded by @oldsid. * Otherwise, it returns error code. * * @oldsid : current security identifier * @newsid : destinated security identifier */ int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state, u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid) { struct selinux_policy *policy; struct policydb *policydb; struct sidtab *sidtab; struct sidtab_entry *old_entry, *new_entry; struct type_datum *type; int index; int rc; if (!selinux_initialized(state)) return 0; rcu_read_lock(); policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy); policydb = &policy->policydb; sidtab = policy->sidtab; rc = -EINVAL; old_entry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, old_sid); if (!old_entry) { pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n", __func__, old_sid); goto out; } rc = -EINVAL; new_entry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, new_sid); if (!new_entry) { pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n", __func__, new_sid); goto out; } rc = 0; /* type/domain unchanged */ if (old_entry->context.type == new_entry->context.type) goto out; index = new_entry->context.type; while (true) { type = policydb->type_val_to_struct[index - 1]; BUG_ON(!type); /* not bounded anymore */ rc = -EPERM; if (!type->bounds) break; /* @newsid is bounded by @oldsid */ rc = 0; if (type->bounds == old_entry->context.type) break; index = type->bounds; } if (rc) { char *old_name = NULL; char *new_name = NULL; u32 length; if (!sidtab_entry_to_string(policydb, sidtab, old_entry, &old_name, &length) && !sidtab_entry_to_string(policydb, sidtab, new_entry, &new_name, &length)) { audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR, "op=security_bounded_transition " "seresult=denied " "oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s", old_name, new_name); } kfree(new_name); kfree(old_name); } out: rcu_read_unlock(); return rc; } static void avd_init(struct selinux_policy *policy, struct av_decision *avd) { avd->allowed = 0; avd->auditallow = 0; avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff; if (policy) avd->seqno = policy->latest_granting; else avd->seqno = 0; avd->flags = 0; } void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd, struct avtab_node *node) { unsigned int i; if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) { if (xpermd->driver != node->datum.u.xperms->driver) return; } else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) { if (!security_xperm_test(node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p, xpermd->driver)) return; } else { BUG(); } if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED) { xpermd->used |= XPERMS_ALLOWED; if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) { memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p)); } if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) { for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->allowed->p); i++) xpermd->allowed->p[i] |= node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i]; } } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) { xpermd->used |= XPERMS_AUDITALLOW; if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) { memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0xff, sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p)); } if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) { for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->auditallow->p); i++) xpermd->auditallow->p[i] |= node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i]; } } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) { xpermd->used |= XPERMS_DONTAUDIT; if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) { memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0xff, sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p)); } if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) { for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->dontaudit->p); i++) xpermd->dontaudit->p[i] |= node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i]; } } else { BUG(); } } void security_compute_xperms_decision(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 orig_tclass, u8 driver, struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd) { struct selinux_policy *policy; struct policydb *policydb; struct sidtab *sidtab; u16 tclass; struct context *scontext, *tcontext; struct avtab_key avkey; struct avtab_node *node; struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr; struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode; unsigned int i, j; xpermd->driver = driver; xpermd->used = 0; memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p)); memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p)); memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p)); rcu_read_lock(); if (!selinux_initialized(state)) goto allow; policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy); policydb = &policy->policydb; sidtab = policy->sidtab; scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid); if (!scontext) { pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, ssid); goto out; } tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid); if (!tcontext) { pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, tsid); goto out; } tclass = unmap_class(&policy->map, orig_tclass); if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) { if (policydb->allow_unknown) goto allow; goto out; } if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim)) { pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass); goto out; } avkey.target_class = tclass; avkey.specified = AVTAB_XPERMS; sattr = &policydb->type_attr_map_array[scontext->type - 1]; tattr = &policydb->type_attr_map_array[tcontext->type - 1]; ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) { ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) { avkey.source_type = i + 1; avkey.target_type = j + 1; for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab, &avkey); node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node); cond_compute_xperms(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey, xpermd); } } out: rcu_read_unlock(); return; allow: memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p)); goto out; } /** * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions. * @ssid: source security identifier * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class * @avd: access vector decisions * @xperms: extended permissions * * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass. */ void security_compute_av(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 orig_tclass, struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms) { struct selinux_policy *policy; struct policydb *policydb; struct sidtab *sidtab; u16 tclass; struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL; rcu_read_lock(); policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy); avd_init(policy, avd); xperms->len = 0; if (!selinux_initialized(state)) goto allow; policydb = &policy->policydb; sidtab = policy->sidtab; scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid); if (!scontext) { pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, ssid); goto out; } /* permissive domain? */ if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->permissive_map, scontext->type)) avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE; tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid); if (!tcontext) { pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, tsid); goto out; } tclass = unmap_class(&policy->map, orig_tclass); if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) { if (policydb->allow_unknown) goto allow; goto out; } context_struct_compute_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, xperms); map_decision(&policy->map, orig_tclass, avd, policydb->allow_unknown); out: rcu_read_unlock(); return; allow: avd->allowed = 0xffffffff; goto out; } void security_compute_av_user(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd) { struct selinux_policy *policy; struct policydb *policydb; struct sidtab *sidtab; struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL; rcu_read_lock(); policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy); avd_init(policy, avd); if (!selinux_initialized(state)) goto allow; policydb = &policy->policydb; sidtab = policy->sidtab; scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid); if (!scontext) { pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, ssid); goto out; } /* permissive domain? */ if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->permissive_map, scontext->type)) avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE; tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid); if (!tcontext) { pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, tsid); goto out; } if (unlikely(!tclass)) { if (policydb->allow_unknown) goto allow; goto out; } context_struct_compute_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, NULL); out: rcu_read_unlock(); return; allow: avd->allowed = 0xffffffff; goto out; } /* * Write the security context string representation of * the context structure `context' into a dynamically * allocated string of the correct size. Set `*scontext' * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to * the length of the string. */ static int context_struct_to_string(struct policydb *p, struct context *context, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len) { char *scontextp; if (scontext) *scontext = NULL; *scontext_len = 0; if (context->len) { *scontext_len = context->len; if (scontext) { *scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!(*scontext)) return -ENOMEM; } return 0; } /* Compute the size of the context. */ *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) + 1; *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) + 1; *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)) + 1; *scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(p, context); if (!scontext) return 0; /* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */ scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!scontextp) return -ENOMEM; *scontext = scontextp; /* * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context. */ scontextp += sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s", sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1), sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1), sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)); mls_sid_to_context(p, context, &scontextp); *scontextp = 0; return 0; } static int sidtab_entry_to_string(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *sidtab, struct sidtab_entry *entry, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len) { int rc = sidtab_sid2str_get(sidtab, entry, scontext, scontext_len); if (rc != -ENOENT) return rc; rc = context_struct_to_string(p, &entry->context, scontext, scontext_len); if (!rc && scontext) sidtab_sid2str_put(sidtab, entry, *scontext, *scontext_len); return rc; } #include "initial_sid_to_string.h" int security_sidtab_hash_stats(struct selinux_state *state, char *page) { struct selinux_policy *policy; int rc; if (!selinux_initialized(state)) { pr_err("SELinux: %s: called before initial load_policy\n", __func__); return -EINVAL; } rcu_read_lock(); policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy); rc = sidtab_hash_stats(policy->sidtab, page); rcu_read_unlock(); return rc; } const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid) { if (unlikely(sid > SECINITSID_NUM)) return NULL; return initial_sid_to_string[sid]; } static int security_sid_to_context_core(struct selinux_state *state, u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len, int force, int only_invalid) { struct selinux_policy *policy; struct policydb *policydb; struct sidtab *sidtab; struct sidtab_entry *entry; int rc = 0; if (scontext) *scontext = NULL; *scontext_len = 0; if (!selinux_initialized(state)) { if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) { char *scontextp; const char *s = initial_sid_to_string[sid]; if (!s) return -EINVAL; *scontext_len = strlen(s) + 1; if (!scontext) return 0; scontextp = kmemdup(s, *scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!scontextp) return -ENOMEM; *scontext = scontextp; return 0; } pr_err("SELinux: %s: called before initial " "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", __func__, sid); return -EINVAL; } rcu_read_lock(); policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy); policydb = &policy->policydb; sidtab = policy->sidtab; if (force) entry = sidtab_search_entry_force(sidtab, sid); else entry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, sid); if (!entry) { pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, sid); rc = -EINVAL; goto out_unlock; } if (only_invalid && !entry->context.len) goto out_unlock; rc = sidtab_entry_to_string(policydb, sidtab, entry, scontext, scontext_len); out_unlock: rcu_read_unlock(); return rc; } /** * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID. * @sid: security identifier, SID * @scontext: security context * @scontext_len: length in bytes * * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size. Set @scontext * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string. */ int security_sid_to_context(struct selinux_state *state, u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len) { return security_sid_to_context_core(state, sid, scontext, scontext_len, 0, 0); } int security_sid_to_context_force(struct selinux_state *state, u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len) { return security_sid_to_context_core(state, sid, scontext, scontext_len, 1, 0); } /** * security_sid_to_context_inval - Obtain a context for a given SID if it * is invalid. * @sid: security identifier, SID * @scontext: security context * @scontext_len: length in bytes * * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size, but only if the * context is invalid in the current policy. Set @scontext to point to * this string (or NULL if the context is valid) and set @scontext_len to * the length of the string (or 0 if the context is valid). */ int security_sid_to_context_inval(struct selinux_state *state, u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len) { return security_sid_to_context_core(state, sid, scontext, scontext_len, 1, 1); } /* * Caveat: Mutates scontext. */ static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol, struct sidtab *sidtabp, char *scontext, struct context *ctx, u32 def_sid) { struct role_datum *role; struct type_datum *typdatum; struct user_datum *usrdatum; char *scontextp, *p, oldc; int rc = 0; context_init(ctx); /* Parse the security context. */ rc = -EINVAL; scontextp = (char *) scontext; /* Extract the user. */ p = scontextp; while (*p && *p != ':') p++; if (*p == 0) goto out; *p++ = 0; usrdatum = symtab_search(&pol->p_users, scontextp); if (!usrdatum) goto out; ctx->user = usrdatum->value; /* Extract role. */ scontextp = p; while (*p && *p != ':') p++; if (*p == 0) goto out; *p++ = 0; role = symtab_search(&pol->p_roles, scontextp); if (!role) goto out; ctx->role = role->value; /* Extract type. */ scontextp = p; while (*p && *p != ':') p++; oldc = *p; *p++ = 0; typdatum = symtab_search(&pol->p_types, scontextp); if (!typdatum || typdatum->attribute) goto out; ctx->type = typdatum->value; rc = mls_context_to_sid(pol, oldc, p, ctx, sidtabp, def_sid); if (rc) goto out; /* Check the validity of the new context. */ rc = -EINVAL; if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx)) goto out; rc = 0; out: if (rc) context_destroy(ctx); return rc; } static int security_context_to_sid_core(struct selinux_state *state, const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags, int force) { struct selinux_policy *policy; struct policydb *policydb; struct sidtab *sidtab; char *scontext2, *str = NULL; struct context context; int rc = 0; /* An empty security context is never valid. */ if (!scontext_len) return -EINVAL; /* Copy the string to allow changes and ensure a NUL terminator */ scontext2 = kmemdup_nul(scontext, scontext_len, gfp_flags); if (!scontext2) return -ENOMEM; if (!selinux_initialized(state)) { int i; for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) { const char *s = initial_sid_to_string[i]; if (s && !strcmp(s, scontext2)) { *sid = i; goto out; } } *sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; goto out; } *sid = SECSID_NULL; if (force) { /* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */ rc = -ENOMEM; str = kstrdup(scontext2, gfp_flags); if (!str) goto out; } retry: rcu_read_lock(); policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy); policydb = &policy->policydb; sidtab = policy->sidtab; rc = string_to_context_struct(policydb, sidtab, scontext2, &context, def_sid); if (rc == -EINVAL && force) { context.str = str; context.len = strlen(str) + 1; str = NULL; } else if (rc) goto out_unlock; rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &context, sid); if (rc == -ESTALE) { rcu_read_unlock(); if (context.str) { str = context.str; context.str = NULL; } context_destroy(&context); goto retry; } context_destroy(&context); out_unlock: rcu_read_unlock(); out: kfree(scontext2); kfree(str); return rc; } /** * security_context_to_sid - Obtain a SID for a given security context. * @scontext: security context * @scontext_len: length in bytes * @sid: security identifier, SID * @gfp: context for the allocation * * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that * has the string representation specified by @scontext. * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient * memory is available, or 0 on success. */ int security_context_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state, const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid, gfp_t gfp) { return security_context_to_sid_core(state, scontext, scontext_len, sid, SECSID_NULL, gfp, 0); } int security_context_str_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state, const char *scontext, u32 *sid, gfp_t gfp) { return security_context_to_sid(state, scontext, strlen(scontext), sid, gfp); } /** * security_context_to_sid_default - Obtain a SID for a given security context, * falling back to specified default if needed. * * @scontext: security context * @scontext_len: length in bytes * @sid: security identifier, SID * @def_sid: default SID to assign on error * * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that * has the string representation specified by @scontext. * The default SID is passed to the MLS layer to be used to allow * kernel labeling of the MLS field if the MLS field is not present * (for upgrading to MLS without full relabel). * Implicitly forces adding of the context even if it cannot be mapped yet. * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient * memory is available, or 0 on success. */ int security_context_to_sid_default(struct selinux_state *state, const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags) { return security_context_to_sid_core(state, scontext, scontext_len, sid, def_sid, gfp_flags, 1); } int security_context_to_sid_force(struct selinux_state *state, const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid) { return security_context_to_sid_core(state, scontext, scontext_len, sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 1); } static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context( struct selinux_state *state, struct selinux_policy *policy, struct sidtab_entry *sentry, struct sidtab_entry *tentry, u16 tclass, struct context *newcontext) { struct policydb *policydb = &policy->policydb; struct sidtab *sidtab = policy->sidtab; char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL; u32 slen, tlen, nlen; struct audit_buffer *ab; if (sidtab_entry_to_string(policydb, sidtab, sentry, &s, &slen)) goto out; if (sidtab_entry_to_string(policydb, sidtab, tentry, &t, &tlen)) goto out; if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, newcontext, &n, &nlen)) goto out; ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR); audit_log_format(ab, "op=security_compute_sid invalid_context="); /* no need to record the NUL with untrusted strings */ audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n, nlen - 1); audit_log_format(ab, " scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s", s, t, sym_name(policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1)); audit_log_end(ab); out: kfree(s); kfree(t); kfree(n); if (!enforcing_enabled(state)) return 0; return -EACCES; } static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *policydb, struct context *newcontext, u32 stype, u32 ttype, u16 tclass, const char *objname) { struct filename_trans_key ft; struct filename_trans_datum *datum; /* * Most filename trans rules are going to live in specific directories * like /dev or /var/run. This bitmap will quickly skip rule searches * if the ttype does not contain any rules. */ if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype)) return; ft.ttype = ttype; ft.tclass = tclass; ft.name = objname; datum = policydb_filenametr_search(policydb, &ft); while (datum) { if (ebitmap_get_bit(&datum->stypes, stype - 1)) { newcontext->type = datum->otype; return; } datum = datum->next; } } static int security_compute_sid(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 orig_tclass, u32 specified, const char *objname, u32 *out_sid, bool kern) { struct selinux_policy *policy; struct policydb *policydb; struct sidtab *sidtab; struct class_datum *cladatum; struct context *scontext, *tcontext, newcontext; struct sidtab_entry *sentry, *tentry; struct avtab_key avkey; struct avtab_datum *avdatum; struct avtab_node *node; u16 tclass; int rc = 0; bool sock; if (!selinux_initialized(state)) { switch (orig_tclass) { case SECCLASS_PROCESS: /* kernel value */ *out_sid = ssid; break; default: *out_sid = tsid; break; } goto out; } retry: cladatum = NULL; context_init(&newcontext); rcu_read_lock(); policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy); if (kern) { tclass = unmap_class(&policy->map, orig_tclass); sock = security_is_socket_class(orig_tclass); } else { tclass = orig_tclass; sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(&policy->map, tclass)); } policydb = &policy->policydb; sidtab = policy->sidtab; sentry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, ssid); if (!sentry) { pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, ssid); rc = -EINVAL; goto out_unlock; } tentry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, tsid); if (!tentry) { pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, tsid); rc = -EINVAL; goto out_unlock; } scontext = &sentry->context; tcontext = &tentry->context; if (tclass && tclass <= policydb->p_classes.nprim) cladatum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1]; /* Set the user identity. */ switch (specified) { case AVTAB_TRANSITION: case AVTAB_CHANGE: if (cladatum && cladatum->default_user == DEFAULT_TARGET) { newcontext.user = tcontext->user; } else { /* notice this gets both DEFAULT_SOURCE and unset */ /* Use the process user identity. */ newcontext.user = scontext->user; } break; case AVTAB_MEMBER: /* Use the related object owner. */ newcontext.user = tcontext->user; break; } /* Set the role to default values. */ if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_SOURCE) { newcontext.role = scontext->role; } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_TARGET) { newcontext.role = tcontext->role; } else { if ((tclass == policydb->process_class) || sock) newcontext.role = scontext->role; else newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL; } /* Set the type to default values. */ if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_SOURCE) { newcontext.type = scontext->type; } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_TARGET) { newcontext.type = tcontext->type; } else { if ((tclass == policydb->process_class) || sock) { /* Use the type of process. */ newcontext.type = scontext->type; } else { /* Use the type of the related object. */ newcontext.type = tcontext->type; } } /* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */ avkey.source_type = scontext->type; avkey.target_type = tcontext->type; avkey.target_class = tclass; avkey.specified = specified; avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb->te_avtab, &avkey); /* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */ if (!avdatum) { node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey); for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) { if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) { avdatum = &node->datum; break; } } } if (avdatum) { /* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */ newcontext.type = avdatum->u.data; } /* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */ if (objname) filename_compute_type(policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type, tcontext->type, tclass, objname); /* Check for class-specific changes. */ if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) { /* Look for a role transition rule. */ struct role_trans_datum *rtd; struct role_trans_key rtk = { .role = scontext->role, .type = tcontext->type, .tclass = tclass, }; rtd = policydb_roletr_search(policydb, &rtk); if (rtd) newcontext.role = rtd->new_role; } /* Set the MLS attributes. This is done last because it may allocate memory. */ rc = mls_compute_sid(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified, &newcontext, sock); if (rc) goto out_unlock; /* Check the validity of the context. */ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(policydb, &newcontext)) { rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(state, policy, sentry, tentry, tclass, &newcontext); if (rc) goto out_unlock; } /* Obtain the sid for the context. */ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid); if (rc == -ESTALE) { rcu_read_unlock(); context_destroy(&newcontext); goto retry; } out_unlock: rcu_read_unlock(); context_destroy(&newcontext); out: return rc; } /** * security_transition_sid - Compute the SID for a new subject/object. * @ssid: source security identifier * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class * @out_sid: security identifier for new subject/object * * Compute a SID to use for labeling a new subject or object in the * class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid). * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was * computed successfully. */ int security_transition_sid(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid) { return security_compute_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION, qstr ? qstr->name : NULL, out_sid, true); } int security_transition_sid_user(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, const char *objname, u32 *out_sid) { return security_compute_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION, objname, out_sid, false); } /** * security_member_sid - Compute the SID for member selection. * @ssid: source security identifier * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member * * Compute a SID to use when selecting a member of a polyinstantiated * object of class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid). * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was * computed successfully. */ int security_member_sid(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid) { return security_compute_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, NULL, out_sid, false); } /** * security_change_sid - Compute the SID for object relabeling. * @ssid: source security identifier * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member * * Compute a SID to use for relabeling an object of class @tclass * based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid). * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was * computed successfully. */ int security_change_sid(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid) { return security_compute_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, NULL, out_sid, false); } static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context( struct selinux_state *state, struct policydb *policydb, struct context *context) { char *s; u32 len; if (enforcing_enabled(state)) return -EINVAL; if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, context, &s, &len)) { pr_warn("SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n", s); kfree(s); } return 0; } /* * Convert the values in the security context * structure `oldc' from the values specified * in the policy `p->oldp' to the values specified * in the policy `p->newp', storing the new context * in `newc'. Verify that the context is valid * under the new policy. */ static int convert_context(struct context *oldc, struct context *newc, void *p) { struct convert_context_args *args; struct ocontext *oc; struct role_datum *role; struct type_datum *typdatum; struct user_datum *usrdatum; char *s; u32 len; int rc; args = p; if (oldc->str) { s = kstrdup(oldc->str, GFP_KERNEL); if (!s) return -ENOMEM; rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, s, newc, SECSID_NULL); if (rc == -EINVAL) { /* * Retain string representation for later mapping. * * IMPORTANT: We need to copy the contents of oldc->str * back into s again because string_to_context_struct() * may have garbled it. */ memcpy(s, oldc->str, oldc->len); context_init(newc); newc->str = s; newc->len = oldc->len; return 0; } kfree(s); if (rc) { /* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */ pr_err("SELinux: Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n", oldc->str, -rc); return rc; } pr_info("SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n", oldc->str); return 0; } context_init(newc); /* Convert the user. */ rc = -EINVAL; usrdatum = symtab_search(&args->newp->p_users, sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_USERS, oldc->user - 1)); if (!usrdatum) goto bad; newc->user = usrdatum->value; /* Convert the role. */ rc = -EINVAL; role = symtab_search(&args->newp->p_roles, sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_ROLES, oldc->role - 1)); if (!role) goto bad; newc->role = role->value; /* Convert the type. */ rc = -EINVAL; typdatum = symtab_search(&args->newp->p_types, sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_TYPES, oldc->type - 1)); if (!typdatum) goto bad; newc->type = typdatum->value; /* Convert the MLS fields if dealing with MLS policies */ if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) { rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, oldc, newc); if (rc) goto bad; } else if (!args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) { /* * Switching between non-MLS and MLS policy: * ensure that the MLS fields of the context for all * existing entries in the sidtab are filled in with a * suitable default value, likely taken from one of the * initial SIDs. */ oc = args->newp->ocontexts[OCON_ISID]; while (oc && oc->sid[0] != SECINITSID_UNLABELED) oc = oc->next; rc = -EINVAL; if (!oc) { pr_err("SELinux: unable to look up" " the initial SIDs list\n"); goto bad; } rc = mls_range_set(newc, &oc->context[0].range); if (rc) goto bad; } /* Check the validity of the new context. */ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, newc)) { rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(args->state, args->oldp, oldc); if (rc) goto bad; } return 0; bad: /* Map old representation to string and save it. */ rc = context_struct_to_string(args->oldp, oldc, &s, &len); if (rc) return rc; context_destroy(newc); newc->str = s; newc->len = len; pr_info("SELinux: Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n", newc->str); return 0; } static void security_load_policycaps(struct selinux_state *state, struct selinux_policy *policy) { struct policydb *p; unsigned int i; struct ebitmap_node *node; p = &policy->policydb; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(state->policycap); i++) WRITE_ONCE(state->policycap[i], ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps, i)); for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names); i++) pr_info("SELinux: policy capability %s=%d\n", selinux_policycap_names[i], ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps, i)); ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&p->policycaps, node, i) { if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names)) pr_info("SELinux: unknown policy capability %u\n", i); } } static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_policy *oldpolicy, struct selinux_policy *newpolicy); static void selinux_policy_free(struct selinux_policy *policy) { if (!policy) return; sidtab_destroy(policy->sidtab); kfree(policy->map.mapping); policydb_destroy(&policy->policydb); kfree(policy->sidtab); kfree(policy); } static void selinux_policy_cond_free(struct selinux_policy *policy) { cond_policydb_destroy_dup(&policy->policydb); kfree(policy); } void selinux_policy_cancel(struct selinux_state *state, struct selinux_load_state *load_state) { struct selinux_policy *oldpolicy; oldpolicy = rcu_dereference_protected(state->policy, lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex)); sidtab_cancel_convert(oldpolicy->sidtab); selinux_policy_free(load_state->policy); kfree(load_state->convert_data); } static void selinux_notify_policy_change(struct selinux_state *state, u32 seqno) { /* Flush external caches and notify userspace of policy load */ avc_ss_reset(state->avc, seqno); selnl_notify_policyload(seqno); selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno); selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(); selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(); } void selinux_policy_commit(struct selinux_state *state, struct selinux_load_state *load_state) { struct selinux_policy *oldpolicy, *newpolicy = load_state->policy; unsigned long flags; u32 seqno; oldpolicy = rcu_dereference_protected(state->policy, lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex)); /* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */ if (oldpolicy) { if (oldpolicy->policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicy->policydb.mls_enabled) pr_info("SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n"); else if (!oldpolicy->policydb.mls_enabled && newpolicy->policydb.mls_enabled) pr_info("SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n"); } /* Set latest granting seqno for new policy. */ if (oldpolicy) newpolicy->latest_granting = oldpolicy->latest_granting + 1; else newpolicy->latest_granting = 1; seqno = newpolicy->latest_granting; /* Install the new policy. */ if (oldpolicy) { sidtab_freeze_begin(oldpolicy->sidtab, &flags); rcu_assign_pointer(state->policy, newpolicy); sidtab_freeze_end(oldpolicy->sidtab, &flags); } else { rcu_assign_pointer(state->policy, newpolicy); } /* Load the policycaps from the new policy */ security_load_policycaps(state, newpolicy); if (!selinux_initialized(state)) { /* * After first policy load, the security server is * marked as initialized and ready to handle requests and * any objects created prior to policy load are then labeled. */ selinux_mark_initialized(state); selinux_complete_init(); } /* Free the old policy */ synchronize_rcu(); selinux_policy_free(oldpolicy); kfree(load_state->convert_data); /* Notify others of the policy change */ selinux_notify_policy_change(state, seqno); } /** * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration. * @data: binary policy data * @len: length of data in bytes * * Load a new set of security policy configuration data, * validate it and convert the SID table as necessary. * This function will flush the access vector cache after * loading the new policy. */ int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len, struct selinux_load_state *load_state) { struct selinux_policy *newpolicy, *oldpolicy; struct selinux_policy_convert_data *convert_data; int rc = 0; struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file; newpolicy = kzalloc(sizeof(*newpolicy), GFP_KERNEL); if (!newpolicy) return -ENOMEM; newpolicy->sidtab = kzalloc(sizeof(*newpolicy->sidtab), GFP_KERNEL); if (!newpolicy->sidtab) { rc = -ENOMEM; goto err_policy; } rc = policydb_read(&newpolicy->policydb, fp); if (rc) goto err_sidtab; newpolicy->policydb.len = len; rc = selinux_set_mapping(&newpolicy->policydb, secclass_map, &newpolicy->map); if (rc) goto err_policydb; rc = policydb_load_isids(&newpolicy->policydb, newpolicy->sidtab); if (rc) { pr_err("SELinux: unable to load the initial SIDs\n"); goto err_mapping; } if (!selinux_initialized(state)) { /* First policy load, so no need to preserve state from old policy */ load_state->policy = newpolicy; load_state->convert_data = NULL; return 0; } oldpolicy = rcu_dereference_protected(state->policy, lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex)); /* Preserve active boolean values from the old policy */ rc = security_preserve_bools(oldpolicy, newpolicy); if (rc) { pr_err("SELinux: unable to preserve booleans\n"); goto err_free_isids; } convert_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*convert_data), GFP_KERNEL); if (!convert_data) { rc = -ENOMEM; goto err_free_isids; } /* * Convert the internal representations of contexts * in the new SID table. */ convert_data->args.state = state; convert_data->args.oldp = &oldpolicy->policydb; convert_data->args.newp = &newpolicy->policydb; convert_data->sidtab_params.func = convert_context; convert_data->sidtab_params.args = &convert_data->args; convert_data->sidtab_params.target = newpolicy->sidtab; rc = sidtab_convert(oldpolicy->sidtab, &convert_data->sidtab_params); if (rc) { pr_err("SELinux: unable to convert the internal" " representation of contexts in the new SID" " table\n"); goto err_free_convert_data; } load_state->policy = newpolicy; load_state->convert_data = convert_data; return 0; err_free_convert_data: kfree(convert_data); err_free_isids: sidtab_destroy(newpolicy->sidtab); err_mapping: kfree(newpolicy->map.mapping); err_policydb: policydb_destroy(&newpolicy->policydb); err_sidtab: kfree(newpolicy->sidtab); err_policy: kfree(newpolicy); return rc; } /** * ocontext_to_sid - Helper to safely get sid for an ocontext * @sidtab: SID table * @c: ocontext structure * @index: index of the context entry (0 or 1) * @out_sid: pointer to the resulting SID value * * For all ocontexts except OCON_ISID the SID fields are populated * on-demand when needed. Since updating the SID value is an SMP-sensitive * operation, this helper must be used to do that safely. * * WARNING: This function may return -ESTALE, indicating that the caller * must retry the operation after re-acquiring the policy pointer! */ static int ocontext_to_sid(struct sidtab *sidtab, struct ocontext *c, size_t index, u32 *out_sid) { int rc; u32 sid; /* Ensure the associated sidtab entry is visible to this thread. */ sid = smp_load_acquire(&c->sid[index]); if (!sid) { rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[index], &sid); if (rc) return rc; /* * Ensure the new sidtab entry is visible to other threads * when they see the SID. */ smp_store_release(&c->sid[index], sid); } *out_sid = sid; return 0; } /** * security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port. * @protocol: protocol number * @port: port number * @out_sid: security identifier */ int security_port_sid(struct selinux_state *state, u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid) { struct selinux_policy *policy; struct policydb *policydb; struct sidtab *sidtab; struct ocontext *c; int rc; if (!selinux_initialized(state)) { *out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT; return 0; } retry: rc = 0; rcu_read_lock(); policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy); policydb = &policy->policydb; sidtab = policy->sidtab; c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_PORT]; while (c) { if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol && c->u.port.low_port <= port && c->u.port.high_port >= port) break; c = c->next; } if (c) { rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid); if (rc == -ESTALE) { rcu_read_unlock(); goto retry; } if (rc) goto out; } else { *out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT; } out: rcu_read_unlock(); return rc; } /** * security_pkey_sid - Obtain the SID for a pkey. * @subnet_prefix: Subnet Prefix * @pkey_num: pkey number * @out_sid: security identifier */ int security_ib_pkey_sid(struct selinux_state *state, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid) { struct selinux_policy *policy; struct policydb *policydb; struct sidtab *sidtab; struct ocontext *c; int rc; if (!selinux_initialized(state)) { *out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; return 0; } retry: rc = 0; rcu_read_lock(); policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy); policydb = &policy->policydb; sidtab = policy->sidtab; c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_IBPKEY]; while (c) { if (c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey <= pkey_num && c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey >= pkey_num && c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix == subnet_prefix) break; c = c->next; } if (c) { rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid); if (rc == -ESTALE) { rcu_read_unlock(); goto retry; } if (rc) goto out; } else *out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; out: rcu_read_unlock(); return rc; } /** * security_ib_endport_sid - Obtain the SID for a subnet management interface. * @dev_name: device name * @port: port number * @out_sid: security identifier */ int security_ib_endport_sid(struct selinux_state *state, const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid) { struct selinux_policy *policy; struct policydb *policydb; struct sidtab *sidtab; struct ocontext *c; int rc; if (!selinux_initialized(state)) { *out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; return 0; } retry: rc = 0; rcu_read_lock(); policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy); policydb = &policy->policydb; sidtab = policy->sidtab; c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_IBENDPORT]; while (c) { if (c->u.ibendport.port == port_num && !strncmp(c->u.ibendport.dev_name, dev_name, IB_DEVICE_NAME_MAX)) break; c = c->next; } if (c) { rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid); if (rc == -ESTALE) { rcu_read_unlock(); goto retry; } if (rc) goto out; } else *out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; out: rcu_read_unlock(); return rc; } /** * security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface. * @name: interface name * @if_sid: interface SID */ int security_netif_sid(struct selinux_state *state, char *name, u32 *if_sid) { struct selinux_policy *policy; struct policydb *policydb; struct sidtab *sidtab; int rc; struct ocontext *c; if (!selinux_initialized(state)) { *if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF; return 0; } retry: rc = 0; rcu_read_lock(); policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy); policydb = &policy->policydb; sidtab = policy->sidtab; c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NETIF]; while (c) { if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0) break; c = c->next; } if (c) { rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, if_sid); if (rc == -ESTALE) { rcu_read_unlock(); goto retry; } if (rc) goto out; } else *if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF; out: rcu_read_unlock(); return rc; } static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask) { int i, fail = 0; for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) if (addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) { fail = 1; break; } return !fail; } /** * security_node_sid - Obtain the SID for a node (host). * @domain: communication domain aka address family * @addrp: address * @addrlen: address length in bytes * @out_sid: security identifier */ int security_node_sid(struct selinux_state *state, u16 domain, void *addrp, u32 addrlen, u32 *out_sid) { struct selinux_policy *policy; struct policydb *policydb; struct sidtab *sidtab; int rc; struct ocontext *c; if (!selinux_initialized(state)) { *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE; return 0; } retry: rcu_read_lock(); policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy); policydb = &policy->policydb; sidtab = policy->sidtab; switch (domain) { case AF_INET: { u32 addr; rc = -EINVAL; if (addrlen != sizeof(u32)) goto out; addr = *((u32 *)addrp); c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NODE]; while (c) { if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask)) break; c = c->next; } break; } case AF_INET6: rc = -EINVAL; if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2) goto out; c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NODE6]; while (c) { if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr, c->u.node6.mask)) break; c = c->next; } break; default: rc = 0; *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE; goto out; } if (c) { rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid); if (rc == -ESTALE) { rcu_read_unlock(); goto retry; } if (rc) goto out; } else { *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE; } rc = 0; out: rcu_read_unlock(); return rc; } #define SIDS_NEL 25 /** * security_get_user_sids - Obtain reachable SIDs for a user. * @fromsid: starting SID * @username: username * @sids: array of reachable SIDs for user * @nel: number of elements in @sids * * Generate the set of SIDs for legal security contexts * for a given user that can be reached by @fromsid. * Set *@sids to point to a dynamically allocated * array containing the set of SIDs. Set *@nel to the * number of elements in the array. */ int security_get_user_sids(struct selinux_state *state, u32 fromsid, char *username, u32 **sids, u32 *nel) { struct selinux_policy *policy; struct policydb *policydb; struct sidtab *sidtab; struct context *fromcon, usercon; u32 *mysids = NULL, *mysids2, sid; u32 i, j, mynel, maxnel = SIDS_NEL; struct user_datum *user; struct role_datum *role; struct ebitmap_node *rnode, *tnode; int rc; *sids = NULL; *nel = 0; if (!selinux_initialized(state)) return 0; mysids = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids), GFP_KERNEL); if (!mysids) return -ENOMEM; retry: mynel = 0; rcu_read_lock(); policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy); policydb = &policy->policydb; sidtab = policy->sidtab; context_init(&usercon); rc = -EINVAL; fromcon = sidtab_search(sidtab, fromsid); if (!fromcon) goto out_unlock; rc = -EINVAL; user = symtab_search(&policydb->p_users, username); if (!user) goto out_unlock; usercon.user = user->value; ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) { role = policydb->role_val_to_struct[i]; usercon.role = i + 1; ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) { usercon.type = j + 1; if (mls_setup_user_range(policydb, fromcon, user, &usercon)) continue; rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &usercon, &sid); if (rc == -ESTALE) { rcu_read_unlock(); goto retry; } if (rc) goto out_unlock; if (mynel < maxnel) { mysids[mynel++] = sid; } else { rc = -ENOMEM; maxnel += SIDS_NEL; mysids2 = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC); if (!mysids2) goto out_unlock; memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2)); kfree(mysids); mysids = mysids2; mysids[mynel++] = sid; } } } rc = 0; out_unlock: rcu_read_unlock(); if (rc || !mynel) { kfree(mysids); return rc; } rc = -ENOMEM; mysids2 = kcalloc(mynel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_KERNEL); if (!mysids2) { kfree(mysids); return rc; } for (i = 0, j = 0; i < mynel; i++) { struct av_decision dummy_avd; rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(state, fromsid, mysids[i], SECCLASS_PROCESS, /* kernel value */ PROCESS__TRANSITION, AVC_STRICT, &dummy_avd); if (!rc) mysids2[j++] = mysids[i]; cond_resched(); } kfree(mysids); *sids = mysids2; *nel = j; return 0; } /** * __security_genfs_sid - Helper to obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem * @fstype: filesystem type * @path: path from root of mount * @sclass: file security class * @sid: SID for path * * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like * transition SIDs or task SIDs. * * WARNING: This function may return -ESTALE, indicating that the caller * must retry the operation after re-acquiring the policy pointer! */ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy, const char *fstype, char *path, u16 orig_sclass, u32 *sid) { struct policydb *policydb = &policy->policydb; struct sidtab *sidtab = policy->sidtab; int len; u16 sclass; struct genfs *genfs; struct ocontext *c; int cmp = 0; while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/') path++; sclass = unmap_class(&policy->map, orig_sclass); *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; for (genfs = policydb->genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) { cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype); if (cmp <= 0) break; } if (!genfs || cmp) return -ENOENT; for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) { len = strlen(c->u.name); if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) && (strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0)) break; } if (!c) return -ENOENT; return ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, sid); } /** * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem * @fstype: filesystem type * @path: path from root of mount * @sclass: file security class * @sid: SID for path * * Acquire policy_rwlock before calling __security_genfs_sid() and release * it afterward. */ int security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state, const char *fstype, char *path, u16 orig_sclass, u32 *sid) { struct selinux_policy *policy; int retval; if (!selinux_initialized(state)) { *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; return 0; } do { rcu_read_lock(); policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy); retval = __security_genfs_sid(policy, fstype, path, orig_sclass, sid); rcu_read_unlock(); } while (retval == -ESTALE); return retval; } int selinux_policy_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy, const char *fstype, char *path, u16 orig_sclass, u32 *sid) { /* no lock required, policy is not yet accessible by other threads */ return __security_genfs_sid(policy, fstype, path, orig_sclass, sid); } /** * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem. * @sb: superblock in question */ int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb) { struct selinux_policy *policy; struct policydb *policydb; struct sidtab *sidtab; int rc; struct ocontext *c; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name; if (!selinux_initialized(state)) { sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE; sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; return 0; } retry: rc = 0; rcu_read_lock(); policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy); policydb = &policy->policydb; sidtab = policy->sidtab; c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE]; while (c) { if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0) break; c = c->next; } if (c) { sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior; rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, &sbsec->sid); if (rc == -ESTALE) { rcu_read_unlock(); goto retry; } if (rc) goto out; } else { rc = __security_genfs_sid(policy, fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, &sbsec->sid); if (rc == -ESTALE) { rcu_read_unlock(); goto retry; } if (rc) { sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE; rc = 0; } else { sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS; } } out: rcu_read_unlock(); return rc; } int security_get_bools(struct selinux_policy *policy, u32 *len, char ***names, int **values) { struct policydb *policydb; u32 i; int rc; policydb = &policy->policydb; *names = NULL; *values = NULL; rc = 0; *len = policydb->p_bools.nprim; if (!*len) goto out; rc = -ENOMEM; *names = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC); if (!*names) goto err; rc = -ENOMEM; *values = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC); if (!*values) goto err; for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) { (*values)[i] = policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state; rc = -ENOMEM; (*names)[i] = kstrdup(sym_name(policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i), GFP_ATOMIC); if (!(*names)[i]) goto err; } rc = 0; out: return rc; err: if (*names) { for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) kfree((*names)[i]); kfree(*names); } kfree(*values); *len = 0; *names = NULL; *values = NULL; goto out; } int security_set_bools(struct selinux_state *state, u32 len, int *values) { struct selinux_policy *newpolicy, *oldpolicy; int rc; u32 i, seqno = 0; if (!selinux_initialized(state)) return -EINVAL; oldpolicy = rcu_dereference_protected(state->policy, lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex)); /* Consistency check on number of booleans, should never fail */ if (WARN_ON(len != oldpolicy->policydb.p_bools.nprim)) return -EINVAL; newpolicy = kmemdup(oldpolicy, sizeof(*newpolicy), GFP_KERNEL); if (!newpolicy) return -ENOMEM; /* * Deep copy only the parts of the policydb that might be * modified as a result of changing booleans. */ rc = cond_policydb_dup(&newpolicy->policydb, &oldpolicy->policydb); if (rc) { kfree(newpolicy); return -ENOMEM; } /* Update the boolean states in the copy */ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { int new_state = !!values[i]; int old_state = newpolicy->policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state; if (new_state != old_state) { audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE, "bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u", sym_name(&newpolicy->policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i), new_state, old_state, from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); newpolicy->policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = new_state; } } /* Re-evaluate the conditional rules in the copy */ evaluate_cond_nodes(&newpolicy->policydb); /* Set latest granting seqno for new policy */ newpolicy->latest_granting = oldpolicy->latest_granting + 1; seqno = newpolicy->latest_granting; /* Install the new policy */ rcu_assign_pointer(state->policy, newpolicy); /* * Free the conditional portions of the old policydb * that were copied for the new policy, and the oldpolicy * structure itself but not what it references. */ synchronize_rcu(); selinux_policy_cond_free(oldpolicy); /* Notify others of the policy change */ selinux_notify_policy_change(state, seqno); return 0; } int security_get_bool_value(struct selinux_state *state, u32 index) { struct selinux_policy *policy; struct policydb *policydb; int rc; u32 len; if (!selinux_initialized(state)) return 0; rcu_read_lock(); policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy); policydb = &policy->policydb; rc = -EFAULT; len = policydb->p_bools.nprim; if (index >= len) goto out; rc = policydb->bool_val_to_struct[index]->state; out: rcu_read_unlock(); return rc; } static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_policy *oldpolicy, struct selinux_policy *newpolicy) { int rc, *bvalues = NULL; char **bnames = NULL; struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum; u32 i, nbools = 0; rc = security_get_bools(oldpolicy, &nbools, &bnames, &bvalues); if (rc) goto out; for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++) { booldatum = symtab_search(&newpolicy->policydb.p_bools, bnames[i]); if (booldatum) booldatum->state = bvalues[i]; } evaluate_cond_nodes(&newpolicy->policydb); out: if (bnames) { for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++) kfree(bnames[i]); } kfree(bnames); kfree(bvalues); return rc; } /* * security_sid_mls_copy() - computes a new sid based on the given * sid and the mls portion of mls_sid. */ int security_sid_mls_copy(struct selinux_state *state, u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid) { struct selinux_policy *policy; struct policydb *policydb; struct sidtab *sidtab; struct context *context1; struct context *context2; struct context newcon; char *s; u32 len; int rc; if (!selinux_initialized(state)) { *new_sid = sid; return 0; } retry: rc = 0; context_init(&newcon); rcu_read_lock(); policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy); policydb = &policy->policydb; sidtab = policy->sidtab; if (!policydb->mls_enabled) { *new_sid = sid; goto out_unlock; } rc = -EINVAL; context1 = sidtab_search(sidtab, sid); if (!context1) { pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, sid); goto out_unlock; } rc = -EINVAL; context2 = sidtab_search(sidtab, mls_sid); if (!context2) { pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, mls_sid); goto out_unlock; } newcon.user = context1->user; newcon.role = context1->role; newcon.type = context1->type; rc = mls_context_cpy(&newcon, context2); if (rc) goto out_unlock; /* Check the validity of the new context. */ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(policydb, &newcon)) { rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(state, policydb, &newcon); if (rc) { if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, &newcon, &s, &len)) { struct audit_buffer *ab; ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR); audit_log_format(ab, "op=security_sid_mls_copy invalid_context="); /* don't record NUL with untrusted strings */ audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, s, len - 1); audit_log_end(ab); kfree(s); } goto out_unlock; } } rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcon, new_sid); if (rc == -ESTALE) { rcu_read_unlock(); context_destroy(&newcon); goto retry; } out_unlock: rcu_read_unlock(); context_destroy(&newcon); return rc; } /** * security_net_peersid_resolve - Compare and resolve two network peer SIDs * @nlbl_sid: NetLabel SID * @nlbl_type: NetLabel labeling protocol type * @xfrm_sid: XFRM SID * * Description: * Compare the @nlbl_sid and @xfrm_sid values and if the two SIDs can be * resolved into a single SID it is returned via @peer_sid and the function * returns zero. Otherwise @peer_sid is set to SECSID_NULL and the function * returns a negative value. A table summarizing the behavior is below: * * | function return | @sid * ------------------------------+-----------------+----------------- * no peer labels | 0 | SECSID_NULL * single peer label | 0 | <peer_label> * multiple, consistent labels | 0 | <peer_label> * multiple, inconsistent labels | -<errno> | SECSID_NULL * */ int security_net_peersid_resolve(struct selinux_state *state, u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type, u32 xfrm_sid, u32 *peer_sid) { struct selinux_policy *policy; struct policydb *policydb; struct sidtab *sidtab; int rc; struct context *nlbl_ctx; struct context *xfrm_ctx; *peer_sid = SECSID_NULL; /* handle the common (which also happens to be the set of easy) cases * right away, these two if statements catch everything involving a * single or absent peer SID/label */ if (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL) { *peer_sid = nlbl_sid; return 0; } /* NOTE: an nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED is a "fallback" label * and is treated as if nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL when a XFRM SID/label * is present */ if (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL || nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED) { *peer_sid = xfrm_sid; return 0; } if (!selinux_initialized(state)) return 0; rcu_read_lock(); policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy); policydb = &policy->policydb; sidtab = policy->sidtab; /* * We don't need to check initialized here since the only way both * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the * security server was initialized and state->initialized was true. */ if (!policydb->mls_enabled) { rc = 0; goto out; } rc = -EINVAL; nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, nlbl_sid); if (!nlbl_ctx) { pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, nlbl_sid); goto out; } rc = -EINVAL; xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, xfrm_sid); if (!xfrm_ctx) { pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, xfrm_sid); goto out; } rc = (mls_context_cmp(nlbl_ctx, xfrm_ctx) ? 0 : -EACCES); if (rc) goto out; /* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS * information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID * matches the MLS portion of the labeled XFRM SID/label * then pass along the XFRM SID as it is the most * expressive */ *peer_sid = xfrm_sid; out: rcu_read_unlock(); return rc; } static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args) { struct class_datum *datum = d; char *name = k, **classes = args; int value = datum->value - 1; classes[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!classes[value]) return -ENOMEM; return 0; } int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy, char ***classes, int *nclasses) { struct policydb *policydb; int rc; policydb = &policy->policydb; rc = -ENOMEM; *nclasses = policydb->p_classes.nprim; *classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(**classes), GFP_ATOMIC); if (!*classes) goto out; rc = hashtab_map(&policydb->p_classes.table, get_classes_callback, *classes); if (rc) { int i; for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++) kfree((*classes)[i]); kfree(*classes); } out: return rc; } static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args) { struct perm_datum *datum = d; char *name = k, **perms = args; int value = datum->value - 1; perms[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!perms[value]) return -ENOMEM; return 0; } int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_policy *policy, char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms) { struct policydb *policydb; int rc, i; struct class_datum *match; policydb = &policy->policydb; rc = -EINVAL; match = symtab_search(&policydb->p_classes, class); if (!match) { pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %s\n", __func__, class); goto out; } rc = -ENOMEM; *nperms = match->permissions.nprim; *perms = kcalloc(*nperms, sizeof(**perms), GFP_ATOMIC); if (!*perms) goto out; if (match->comdatum) { rc = hashtab_map(&match->comdatum->permissions.table, get_permissions_callback, *perms); if (rc) goto err; } rc = hashtab_map(&match->permissions.table, get_permissions_callback, *perms); if (rc) goto err; out: return rc; err: for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++) kfree((*perms)[i]); kfree(*perms); return rc; } int security_get_reject_unknown(struct selinux_state *state) { struct selinux_policy *policy; int value; if (!selinux_initialized(state)) return 0; rcu_read_lock(); policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy); value = policy->policydb.reject_unknown; rcu_read_unlock(); return value; } int security_get_allow_unknown(struct selinux_state *state) { struct selinux_policy *policy; int value; if (!selinux_initialized(state)) return 0; rcu_read_lock(); policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy); value = policy->policydb.allow_unknown; rcu_read_unlock(); return value; } /** * security_policycap_supported - Check for a specific policy capability * @req_cap: capability * * Description: * This function queries the currently loaded policy to see if it supports the * capability specified by @req_cap. Returns true (1) if the capability is * supported, false (0) if it isn't supported. * */ int security_policycap_supported(struct selinux_state *state, unsigned int req_cap) { struct selinux_policy *policy; int rc; if (!selinux_initialized(state)) return 0; rcu_read_lock(); policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy); rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policy->policydb.policycaps, req_cap); rcu_read_unlock(); return rc; } struct selinux_audit_rule { u32 au_seqno; struct context au_ctxt; }; void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) { struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule; if (rule) { context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt); kfree(rule); } } int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) { struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; struct selinux_policy *policy; struct policydb *policydb; struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule; struct role_datum *roledatum; struct type_datum *typedatum; struct user_datum *userdatum; struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule **)vrule; int rc = 0; *rule = NULL; if (!selinux_initialized(state)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; switch (field) { case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: /* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */ if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal) return -EINVAL; break; case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presence of '-' */ if (strchr(rulestr, '-')) return -EINVAL; break; default: /* only the above fields are valid */ return -EINVAL; } tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL); if (!tmprule) return -ENOMEM; context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt); rcu_read_lock(); policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy); policydb = &policy->policydb; tmprule->au_seqno = policy->latest_granting; switch (field) { case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: rc = -EINVAL; userdatum = symtab_search(&policydb->p_users, rulestr); if (!userdatum) goto out; tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value; break; case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: rc = -EINVAL; roledatum = symtab_search(&policydb->p_roles, rulestr); if (!roledatum) goto out; tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value; break; case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: rc = -EINVAL; typedatum = symtab_search(&policydb->p_types, rulestr); if (!typedatum) goto out; tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value; break; case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: rc = mls_from_string(policydb, rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC); if (rc) goto out; break; } rc = 0; out: rcu_read_unlock(); if (rc) { selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule); tmprule = NULL; } *rule = tmprule; return rc; } /* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */ int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule) { int i; for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: return 1; } } return 0; } int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule) { struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; struct selinux_policy *policy; struct context *ctxt; struct mls_level *level; struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule; int match = 0; if (unlikely(!rule)) { WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n"); return -ENOENT; } if (!selinux_initialized(state)) return 0; rcu_read_lock(); policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy); if (rule->au_seqno < policy->latest_granting) { match = -ESTALE; goto out; } ctxt = sidtab_search(policy->sidtab, sid); if (unlikely(!ctxt)) { WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n", sid); match = -ENOENT; goto out; } /* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through without a match */ switch (field) { case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: switch (op) { case Audit_equal: match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user); break; case Audit_not_equal: match = (ctxt->user != rule->au_ctxt.user); break; } break; case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: switch (op) { case Audit_equal: match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role); break; case Audit_not_equal: match = (ctxt->role != rule->au_ctxt.role); break; } break; case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: switch (op) { case Audit_equal: match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type); break; case Audit_not_equal: match = (ctxt->type != rule->au_ctxt.type); break; } break; case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: level = ((field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN || field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ? &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]); switch (op) { case Audit_equal: match = mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0], level); break; case Audit_not_equal: match = !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0], level); break; case Audit_lt: match = (mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0], level) && !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0], level)); break; case Audit_le: match = mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0], level); break; case Audit_gt: match = (mls_level_dom(level, &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]) && !mls_level_eq(level, &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0])); break; case Audit_ge: match = mls_level_dom(level, &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]); break; } } out: rcu_read_unlock(); return match; } static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules; static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event) { int err = 0; if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET && aurule_callback) err = aurule_callback(); return err; } static int __init aurule_init(void) { int err; err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET); if (err) panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err); return err; } __initcall(aurule_init); #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL /** * security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes * @sid: the SELinux SID * * Description: * Attempt to cache the context in @ctx, which was derived from the packet in * @skb, in the NetLabel subsystem cache. This function assumes @secattr has * already been initialized. * */ static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr, u32 sid) { u32 *sid_cache; sid_cache = kmalloc(sizeof(*sid_cache), GFP_ATOMIC); if (sid_cache == NULL) return; secattr->cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC); if (secattr->cache == NULL) { kfree(sid_cache); return; } *sid_cache = sid; secattr->cache->free = kfree; secattr->cache->data = sid_cache; secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE; } /** * security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid - Convert a NetLabel secattr to a SELinux SID * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes * @sid: the SELinux SID * * Description: * Convert the given NetLabel security attributes in @secattr into a * SELinux SID. If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation. If possible the * 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set; this is to * allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to SID * conversion for future lookups. Returns zero on success, negative values on * failure. * */ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr, u32 *sid) { struct selinux_policy *policy; struct policydb *policydb; struct sidtab *sidtab; int rc; struct context *ctx; struct context ctx_new; if (!selinux_initialized(state)) { *sid = SECSID_NULL; return 0; } retry: rc = 0; rcu_read_lock(); policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy); policydb = &policy->policydb; sidtab = policy->sidtab; if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE) *sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data; else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) *sid = secattr->attr.secid; else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) { rc = -EIDRM; ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG); if (ctx == NULL) goto out; context_init(&ctx_new); ctx_new.user = ctx->user; ctx_new.role = ctx->role; ctx_new.type = ctx->type; mls_import_netlbl_lvl(policydb, &ctx_new, secattr); if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) { rc = mls_import_netlbl_cat(policydb, &ctx_new, secattr); if (rc) goto out; } rc = -EIDRM; if (!mls_context_isvalid(policydb, &ctx_new)) { ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat); goto out; } rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &ctx_new, sid); ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat); if (rc == -ESTALE) { rcu_read_unlock(); goto retry; } if (rc) goto out; security_netlbl_cache_add(secattr, *sid); } else *sid = SECSID_NULL; out: rcu_read_unlock(); return rc; } /** * security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr - Convert a SELinux SID to a NetLabel secattr * @sid: the SELinux SID * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes * * Description: * Convert the given SELinux SID in @sid into a NetLabel security attribute. * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure. * */ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state, u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr) { struct selinux_policy *policy; struct policydb *policydb; int rc; struct context *ctx; if (!selinux_initialized(state)) return 0; rcu_read_lock(); policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy); policydb = &policy->policydb; rc = -ENOENT; ctx = sidtab_search(policy->sidtab, sid); if (ctx == NULL) goto out; rc = -ENOMEM; secattr->domain = kstrdup(sym_name(policydb, SYM_TYPES, ctx->type - 1), GFP_ATOMIC); if (secattr->domain == NULL) goto out; secattr->attr.secid = sid; secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID; mls_export_netlbl_lvl(policydb, ctx, secattr); rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(policydb, ctx, secattr); out: rcu_read_unlock(); return rc; } #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */ /** * security_read_policy - read the policy. * @data: binary policy data * @len: length of data in bytes * */ int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void **data, size_t *len) { struct selinux_policy *policy; int rc; struct policy_file fp; policy = rcu_dereference_protected( state->policy, lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex)); if (!policy) return -EINVAL; *len = policy->policydb.len; *data = vmalloc_user(*len); if (!*data) return -ENOMEM; fp.data = *data; fp.len = *len; rc = policydb_write(&policy->policydb, &fp); if (rc) return rc; *len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)*data; return 0; }
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1421 1422 1423 1424 1425 1426 1427 1428 1429 1430 1431 1432 1433 1434 1435 1436 1437 1438 1439 1440 1441 1442 1443 1444 1445 1446 1447 1448 1449 1450 1451 1452 1453 1454 1455 1456 1457 1458 1459 1460 1461 1462 1463 1464 1465 1466 1467 1468 1469 1470 1471 1472 1473 1474 1475 1476 1477 1478 1479 1480 1481 1482 1483 1484 1485 1486 1487 1488 1489 1490 1491 1492 1493 1494 1495 1496 1497 1498 1499 1500 1501 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef _LINUX_PGTABLE_H #define _LINUX_PGTABLE_H #include <linux/pfn.h> #include <asm/pgtable.h> #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ #ifdef CONFIG_MMU #include <linux/mm_types.h> #include <linux/bug.h> #include <linux/errno.h> #include <asm-generic/pgtable_uffd.h> #if 5 - defined(__PAGETABLE_P4D_FOLDED) - defined(__PAGETABLE_PUD_FOLDED) - \ defined(__PAGETABLE_PMD_FOLDED) != CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS #error CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS is not consistent with __PAGETABLE_{P4D,PUD,PMD}_FOLDED #endif /* * On almost all architectures and configurations, 0 can be used as the * upper ceiling to free_pgtables(): on many architectures it has the same * effect as using TASK_SIZE. However, there is one configuration which * must impose a more careful limit, to avoid freeing kernel pgtables. */ #ifndef USER_PGTABLES_CEILING #define USER_PGTABLES_CEILING 0UL #endif /* * A page table page can be thought of an array like this: pXd_t[PTRS_PER_PxD] * * The pXx_index() functions return the index of the entry in the page * table page which would control the given virtual address * * As these functions may be used by the same code for different levels of * the page table folding, they are always available, regardless of * CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS value. For the folded levels they simply return 0 * because in such cases PTRS_PER_PxD equals 1. */ static inline unsigned long pte_index(unsigned long address) { return (address >> PAGE_SHIFT) & (PTRS_PER_PTE - 1); } #ifndef pmd_index static inline unsigned long pmd_index(unsigned long address) { return (address >> PMD_SHIFT) & (PTRS_PER_PMD - 1); } #define pmd_index pmd_index #endif #ifndef pud_index static inline unsigned long pud_index(unsigned long address) { return (address >> PUD_SHIFT) & (PTRS_PER_PUD - 1); } #define pud_index pud_index #endif #ifndef pgd_index /* Must be a compile-time constant, so implement it as a macro */ #define pgd_index(a) (((a) >> PGDIR_SHIFT) & (PTRS_PER_PGD - 1)) #endif #ifndef pte_offset_kernel static inline pte_t *pte_offset_kernel(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long address) { return (pte_t *)pmd_page_vaddr(*pmd) + pte_index(address); } #define pte_offset_kernel pte_offset_kernel #endif #if defined(CONFIG_HIGHPTE) #define pte_offset_map(dir, address) \ ((pte_t *)kmap_atomic(pmd_page(*(dir))) + \ pte_index((address))) #define pte_unmap(pte) kunmap_atomic((pte)) #else #define pte_offset_map(dir, address) pte_offset_kernel((dir), (address)) #define pte_unmap(pte) ((void)(pte)) /* NOP */ #endif /* Find an entry in the second-level page table.. */ #ifndef pmd_offset static inline pmd_t *pmd_offset(pud_t *pud, unsigned long address) { return (pmd_t *)pud_page_vaddr(*pud) + pmd_index(address); } #define pmd_offset pmd_offset #endif #ifndef pud_offset static inline pud_t *pud_offset(p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long address) { return (pud_t *)p4d_page_vaddr(*p4d) + pud_index(address); } #define pud_offset pud_offset #endif static inline pgd_t *pgd_offset_pgd(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long address) { return (pgd + pgd_index(address)); }; /* * a shortcut to get a pgd_t in a given mm */ #ifndef pgd_offset #define pgd_offset(mm, address) pgd_offset_pgd((mm)->pgd, (address)) #endif /* * a shortcut which implies the use of the kernel's pgd, instead * of a process's */ #ifndef pgd_offset_k #define pgd_offset_k(address) pgd_offset(&init_mm, (address)) #endif /* * In many cases it is known that a virtual address is mapped at PMD or PTE * level, so instead of traversing all the page table levels, we can get a * pointer to the PMD entry in user or kernel page table or translate a virtual * address to the pointer in the PTE in the kernel page tables with simple * helpers. */ static inline pmd_t *pmd_off(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long va) { return pmd_offset(pud_offset(p4d_offset(pgd_offset(mm, va), va), va), va); } static inline pmd_t *pmd_off_k(unsigned long va) { return pmd_offset(pud_offset(p4d_offset(pgd_offset_k(va), va), va), va); } static inline pte_t *virt_to_kpte(unsigned long vaddr) { pmd_t *pmd = pmd_off_k(vaddr); return pmd_none(*pmd) ? NULL : pte_offset_kernel(pmd, vaddr); } #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PTEP_SET_ACCESS_FLAGS extern int ptep_set_access_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, pte_t *ptep, pte_t entry, int dirty); #endif #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PMDP_SET_ACCESS_FLAGS #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE extern int pmdp_set_access_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp, pmd_t entry, int dirty); extern int pudp_set_access_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, pud_t *pudp, pud_t entry, int dirty); #else static inline int pmdp_set_access_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp, pmd_t entry, int dirty) { BUILD_BUG(); return 0; } static inline int pudp_set_access_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, pud_t *pudp, pud_t entry, int dirty) { BUILD_BUG(); return 0; } #endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */ #endif #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PTEP_TEST_AND_CLEAR_YOUNG static inline int ptep_test_and_clear_young(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, pte_t *ptep) { pte_t pte = *ptep; int r = 1; if (!pte_young(pte)) r = 0; else set_pte_at(vma->vm_mm, address, ptep, pte_mkold(pte)); return r; } #endif #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PMDP_TEST_AND_CLEAR_YOUNG #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE static inline int pmdp_test_and_clear_young(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp) { pmd_t pmd = *pmdp; int r = 1; if (!pmd_young(pmd)) r = 0; else set_pmd_at(vma->vm_mm, address, pmdp, pmd_mkold(pmd)); return r; } #else static inline int pmdp_test_and_clear_young(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp) { BUILD_BUG(); return 0; } #endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */ #endif #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PTEP_CLEAR_YOUNG_FLUSH int ptep_clear_flush_young(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, pte_t *ptep); #endif #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PMDP_CLEAR_YOUNG_FLUSH #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE extern int pmdp_clear_flush_young(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp); #else /* * Despite relevant to THP only, this API is called from generic rmap code * under PageTransHuge(), hence needs a dummy implementation for !THP */ static inline int pmdp_clear_flush_young(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp) { BUILD_BUG(); return 0; } #endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */ #endif #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PTEP_GET_AND_CLEAR static inline pte_t ptep_get_and_clear(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address, pte_t *ptep) { pte_t pte = *ptep; pte_clear(mm, address, ptep); return pte; } #endif #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PTEP_GET static inline pte_t ptep_get(pte_t *ptep) { return READ_ONCE(*ptep); } #endif #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PMDP_HUGE_GET_AND_CLEAR static inline pmd_t pmdp_huge_get_and_clear(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp) { pmd_t pmd = *pmdp; pmd_clear(pmdp); return pmd; } #endif /* __HAVE_ARCH_PMDP_HUGE_GET_AND_CLEAR */ #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PUDP_HUGE_GET_AND_CLEAR static inline pud_t pudp_huge_get_and_clear(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address, pud_t *pudp) { pud_t pud = *pudp; pud_clear(pudp); return pud; } #endif /* __HAVE_ARCH_PUDP_HUGE_GET_AND_CLEAR */ #endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */ #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PMDP_HUGE_GET_AND_CLEAR_FULL static inline pmd_t pmdp_huge_get_and_clear_full(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp, int full) { return pmdp_huge_get_and_clear(vma->vm_mm, address, pmdp); } #endif #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PUDP_HUGE_GET_AND_CLEAR_FULL static inline pud_t pudp_huge_get_and_clear_full(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address, pud_t *pudp, int full) { return pudp_huge_get_and_clear(mm, address, pudp); } #endif #endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */ #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PTEP_GET_AND_CLEAR_FULL static inline pte_t ptep_get_and_clear_full(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address, pte_t *ptep, int full) { pte_t pte; pte = ptep_get_and_clear(mm, address, ptep); return pte; } #endif /* * If two threads concurrently fault at the same page, the thread that * won the race updates the PTE and its local TLB/Cache. The other thread * gives up, simply does nothing, and continues; on architectures where * software can update TLB, local TLB can be updated here to avoid next page * fault. This function updates TLB only, do nothing with cache or others. * It is the difference with function update_mmu_cache. */ #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_UPDATE_MMU_TLB static inline void update_mmu_tlb(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, pte_t *ptep) { } #define __HAVE_ARCH_UPDATE_MMU_TLB #endif /* * Some architectures may be able to avoid expensive synchronization * primitives when modifications are made to PTE's which are already * not present, or in the process of an address space destruction. */ #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PTE_CLEAR_NOT_PRESENT_FULL static inline void pte_clear_not_present_full(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address, pte_t *ptep, int full) { pte_clear(mm, address, ptep); } #endif #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PTEP_CLEAR_FLUSH extern pte_t ptep_clear_flush(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, pte_t *ptep); #endif #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PMDP_HUGE_CLEAR_FLUSH extern pmd_t pmdp_huge_clear_flush(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp); extern pud_t pudp_huge_clear_flush(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, pud_t *pudp); #endif #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PTEP_SET_WRPROTECT struct mm_struct; static inline void ptep_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address, pte_t *ptep) { pte_t old_pte = *ptep; set_pte_at(mm, address, ptep, pte_wrprotect(old_pte)); } #endif /* * On some architectures hardware does not set page access bit when accessing * memory page, it is responsibilty of software setting this bit. It brings * out extra page fault penalty to track page access bit. For optimization page * access bit can be set during all page fault flow on these arches. * To be differentiate with macro pte_mkyoung, this macro is used on platforms * where software maintains page access bit. */ #ifndef pte_sw_mkyoung static inline pte_t pte_sw_mkyoung(pte_t pte) { return pte; } #define pte_sw_mkyoung pte_sw_mkyoung #endif #ifndef pte_savedwrite #define pte_savedwrite pte_write #endif #ifndef pte_mk_savedwrite #define pte_mk_savedwrite pte_mkwrite #endif #ifndef pte_clear_savedwrite #define pte_clear_savedwrite pte_wrprotect #endif #ifndef pmd_savedwrite #define pmd_savedwrite pmd_write #endif #ifndef pmd_mk_savedwrite #define pmd_mk_savedwrite pmd_mkwrite #endif #ifndef pmd_clear_savedwrite #define pmd_clear_savedwrite pmd_wrprotect #endif #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PMDP_SET_WRPROTECT #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE static inline void pmdp_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp) { pmd_t old_pmd = *pmdp; set_pmd_at(mm, address, pmdp, pmd_wrprotect(old_pmd)); } #else static inline void pmdp_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp) { BUILD_BUG(); } #endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */ #endif #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PUDP_SET_WRPROTECT #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD static inline void pudp_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address, pud_t *pudp) { pud_t old_pud = *pudp; set_pud_at(mm, address, pudp, pud_wrprotect(old_pud)); } #else static inline void pudp_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address, pud_t *pudp) { BUILD_BUG(); } #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD */ #endif #ifndef pmdp_collapse_flush #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE extern pmd_t pmdp_collapse_flush(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp); #else static inline pmd_t pmdp_collapse_flush(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp) { BUILD_BUG(); return *pmdp; } #define pmdp_collapse_flush pmdp_collapse_flush #endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */ #endif #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PGTABLE_DEPOSIT extern void pgtable_trans_huge_deposit(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmdp, pgtable_t pgtable); #endif #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PGTABLE_WITHDRAW extern pgtable_t pgtable_trans_huge_withdraw(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmdp); #endif #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE /* * This is an implementation of pmdp_establish() that is only suitable for an * architecture that doesn't have hardware dirty/accessed bits. In this case we * can't race with CPU which sets these bits and non-atomic aproach is fine. */ static inline pmd_t generic_pmdp_establish(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp, pmd_t pmd) { pmd_t old_pmd = *pmdp; set_pmd_at(vma->vm_mm, address, pmdp, pmd); return old_pmd; } #endif #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PMDP_INVALIDATE extern pmd_t pmdp_invalidate(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp); #endif #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PTE_SAME static inline int pte_same(pte_t pte_a, pte_t pte_b) { return pte_val(pte_a) == pte_val(pte_b); } #endif #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PTE_UNUSED /* * Some architectures provide facilities to virtualization guests * so that they can flag allocated pages as unused. This allows the * host to transparently reclaim unused pages. This function returns * whether the pte's page is unused. */ static inline int pte_unused(pte_t pte) { return 0; } #endif #ifndef pte_access_permitted #define pte_access_permitted(pte, write) \ (pte_present(pte) && (!(write) || pte_write(pte))) #endif #ifndef pmd_access_permitted #define pmd_access_permitted(pmd, write) \ (pmd_present(pmd) && (!(write) || pmd_write(pmd))) #endif #ifndef pud_access_permitted #define pud_access_permitted(pud, write) \ (pud_present(pud) && (!(write) || pud_write(pud))) #endif #ifndef p4d_access_permitted #define p4d_access_permitted(p4d, write) \ (p4d_present(p4d) && (!(write) || p4d_write(p4d))) #endif #ifndef pgd_access_permitted #define pgd_access_permitted(pgd, write) \ (pgd_present(pgd) && (!(write) || pgd_write(pgd))) #endif #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PMD_SAME static inline int pmd_same(pmd_t pmd_a, pmd_t pmd_b) { return pmd_val(pmd_a) == pmd_val(pmd_b); } static inline int pud_same(pud_t pud_a, pud_t pud_b) { return pud_val(pud_a) == pud_val(pud_b); } #endif #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_P4D_SAME static inline int p4d_same(p4d_t p4d_a, p4d_t p4d_b) { return p4d_val(p4d_a) == p4d_val(p4d_b); } #endif #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PGD_SAME static inline int pgd_same(pgd_t pgd_a, pgd_t pgd_b) { return pgd_val(pgd_a) == pgd_val(pgd_b); } #endif /* * Use set_p*_safe(), and elide TLB flushing, when confident that *no* * TLB flush will be required as a result of the "set". For example, use * in scenarios where it is known ahead of time that the routine is * setting non-present entries, or re-setting an existing entry to the * same value. Otherwise, use the typical "set" helpers and flush the * TLB. */ #define set_pte_safe(ptep, pte) \ ({ \ WARN_ON_ONCE(pte_present(*ptep) && !pte_same(*ptep, pte)); \ set_pte(ptep, pte); \ }) #define set_pmd_safe(pmdp, pmd) \ ({ \ WARN_ON_ONCE(pmd_present(*pmdp) && !pmd_same(*pmdp, pmd)); \ set_pmd(pmdp, pmd); \ }) #define set_pud_safe(pudp, pud) \ ({ \ WARN_ON_ONCE(pud_present(*pudp) && !pud_same(*pudp, pud)); \ set_pud(pudp, pud); \ }) #define set_p4d_safe(p4dp, p4d) \ ({ \ WARN_ON_ONCE(p4d_present(*p4dp) && !p4d_same(*p4dp, p4d)); \ set_p4d(p4dp, p4d); \ }) #define set_pgd_safe(pgdp, pgd) \ ({ \ WARN_ON_ONCE(pgd_present(*pgdp) && !pgd_same(*pgdp, pgd)); \ set_pgd(pgdp, pgd); \ }) #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_DO_SWAP_PAGE /* * Some architectures support metadata associated with a page. When a * page is being swapped out, this metadata must be saved so it can be * restored when the page is swapped back in. SPARC M7 and newer * processors support an ADI (Application Data Integrity) tag for the * page as metadata for the page. arch_do_swap_page() can restore this * metadata when a page is swapped back in. */ static inline void arch_do_swap_page(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, pte_t pte, pte_t oldpte) { } #endif #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_UNMAP_ONE /* * Some architectures support metadata associated with a page. When a * page is being swapped out, this metadata must be saved so it can be * restored when the page is swapped back in. SPARC M7 and newer * processors support an ADI (Application Data Integrity) tag for the * page as metadata for the page. arch_unmap_one() can save this * metadata on a swap-out of a page. */ static inline int arch_unmap_one(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, pte_t orig_pte) { return 0; } #endif /* * Allow architectures to preserve additional metadata associated with * swapped-out pages. The corresponding __HAVE_ARCH_SWAP_* macros and function * prototypes must be defined in the arch-specific asm/pgtable.h file. */ #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PREPARE_TO_SWAP static inline int arch_prepare_to_swap(struct page *page) { return 0; } #endif #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_SWAP_INVALIDATE static inline void arch_swap_invalidate_page(int type, pgoff_t offset) { } static inline void arch_swap_invalidate_area(int type) { } #endif #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_SWAP_RESTORE static inline void arch_swap_restore(swp_entry_t entry, struct page *page) { } #endif #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PGD_OFFSET_GATE #define pgd_offset_gate(mm, addr) pgd_offset(mm, addr) #endif #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MOVE_PTE #define move_pte(pte, prot, old_addr, new_addr) (pte) #endif #ifndef pte_accessible # define pte_accessible(mm, pte) ((void)(pte), 1) #endif #ifndef flush_tlb_fix_spurious_fault #define flush_tlb_fix_spurious_fault(vma, address) flush_tlb_page(vma, address) #endif /* * When walking page tables, get the address of the next boundary, * or the end address of the range if that comes earlier. Although no * vma end wraps to 0, rounded up __boundary may wrap to 0 throughout. */ #define pgd_addr_end(addr, end) \ ({ unsigned long __boundary = ((addr) + PGDIR_SIZE) & PGDIR_MASK; \ (__boundary - 1 < (end) - 1)? __boundary: (end); \ }) #ifndef p4d_addr_end #define p4d_addr_end(addr, end) \ ({ unsigned long __boundary = ((addr) + P4D_SIZE) & P4D_MASK; \ (__boundary - 1 < (end) - 1)? __boundary: (end); \ }) #endif #ifndef pud_addr_end #define pud_addr_end(addr, end) \ ({ unsigned long __boundary = ((addr) + PUD_SIZE) & PUD_MASK; \ (__boundary - 1 < (end) - 1)? __boundary: (end); \ }) #endif #ifndef pmd_addr_end #define pmd_addr_end(addr, end) \ ({ unsigned long __boundary = ((addr) + PMD_SIZE) & PMD_MASK; \ (__boundary - 1 < (end) - 1)? __boundary: (end); \ }) #endif /* * When walking page tables, we usually want to skip any p?d_none entries; * and any p?d_bad entries - reporting the error before resetting to none. * Do the tests inline, but report and clear the bad entry in mm/memory.c. */ void pgd_clear_bad(pgd_t *); #ifndef __PAGETABLE_P4D_FOLDED void p4d_clear_bad(p4d_t *); #else #define p4d_clear_bad(p4d) do { } while (0) #endif #ifndef __PAGETABLE_PUD_FOLDED void pud_clear_bad(pud_t *); #else #define pud_clear_bad(p4d) do { } while (0) #endif void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *); static inline int pgd_none_or_clear_bad(pgd_t *pgd) { if (pgd_none(*pgd)) return 1; if (unlikely(pgd_bad(*pgd))) { pgd_clear_bad(pgd); return 1; } return 0; } static inline int p4d_none_or_clear_bad(p4d_t *p4d) { if (p4d_none(*p4d)) return 1; if (unlikely(p4d_bad(*p4d))) { p4d_clear_bad(p4d); return 1; } return 0; } static inline int pud_none_or_clear_bad(pud_t *pud) { if (pud_none(*pud)) return 1; if (unlikely(pud_bad(*pud))) { pud_clear_bad(pud); return 1; } return 0; } static inline int pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd) { if (pmd_none(*pmd)) return 1; if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd))) { pmd_clear_bad(pmd); return 1; } return 0; } static inline pte_t __ptep_modify_prot_start(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep) { /* * Get the current pte state, but zero it out to make it * non-present, preventing the hardware from asynchronously * updating it. */ return ptep_get_and_clear(vma->vm_mm, addr, ptep); } static inline void __ptep_modify_prot_commit(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte) { /* * The pte is non-present, so there's no hardware state to * preserve. */ set_pte_at(vma->vm_mm, addr, ptep, pte); } #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PTEP_MODIFY_PROT_TRANSACTION /* * Start a pte protection read-modify-write transaction, which * protects against asynchronous hardware modifications to the pte. * The intention is not to prevent the hardware from making pte * updates, but to prevent any updates it may make from being lost. * * This does not protect against other software modifications of the * pte; the appropriate pte lock must be held over the transation. * * Note that this interface is intended to be batchable, meaning that * ptep_modify_prot_commit may not actually update the pte, but merely * queue the update to be done at some later time. The update must be * actually committed before the pte lock is released, however. */ static inline pte_t ptep_modify_prot_start(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep) { return __ptep_modify_prot_start(vma, addr, ptep); } /* * Commit an update to a pte, leaving any hardware-controlled bits in * the PTE unmodified. */ static inline void ptep_modify_prot_commit(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep, pte_t old_pte, pte_t pte) { __ptep_modify_prot_commit(vma, addr, ptep, pte); } #endif /* __HAVE_ARCH_PTEP_MODIFY_PROT_TRANSACTION */ #endif /* CONFIG_MMU */ /* * No-op macros that just return the current protection value. Defined here * because these macros can be used even if CONFIG_MMU is not defined. */ #ifndef pgprot_nx #define pgprot_nx(prot) (prot) #endif #ifndef pgprot_noncached #define pgprot_noncached(prot) (prot) #endif #ifndef pgprot_writecombine #define pgprot_writecombine pgprot_noncached #endif #ifndef pgprot_writethrough #define pgprot_writethrough pgprot_noncached #endif #ifndef pgprot_device #define pgprot_device pgprot_noncached #endif #ifndef pgprot_mhp #define pgprot_mhp(prot) (prot) #endif #ifdef CONFIG_MMU #ifndef pgprot_modify #define pgprot_modify pgprot_modify static inline pgprot_t pgprot_modify(pgprot_t oldprot, pgprot_t newprot) { if (pgprot_val(oldprot) == pgprot_val(pgprot_noncached(oldprot))) newprot = pgprot_noncached(newprot); if (pgprot_val(oldprot) == pgprot_val(pgprot_writecombine(oldprot))) newprot = pgprot_writecombine(newprot); if (pgprot_val(oldprot) == pgprot_val(pgprot_device(oldprot))) newprot = pgprot_device(newprot); return newprot; } #endif #endif /* CONFIG_MMU */ #ifndef pgprot_encrypted #define pgprot_encrypted(prot) (prot) #endif #ifndef pgprot_decrypted #define pgprot_decrypted(prot) (prot) #endif /* * A facility to provide lazy MMU batching. This allows PTE updates and * page invalidations to be delayed until a call to leave lazy MMU mode * is issued. Some architectures may benefit from doing this, and it is * beneficial for both shadow and direct mode hypervisors, which may batch * the PTE updates which happen during this window. Note that using this * interface requires that read hazards be removed from the code. A read * hazard could result in the direct mode hypervisor case, since the actual * write to the page tables may not yet have taken place, so reads though * a raw PTE pointer after it has been modified are not guaranteed to be * up to date. This mode can only be entered and left under the protection of * the page table locks for all page tables which may be modified. In the UP * case, this is required so that preemption is disabled, and in the SMP case, * it must synchronize the delayed page table writes properly on other CPUs. */ #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_ENTER_LAZY_MMU_MODE #define arch_enter_lazy_mmu_mode() do {} while (0) #define arch_leave_lazy_mmu_mode() do {} while (0) #define arch_flush_lazy_mmu_mode() do {} while (0) #endif /* * A facility to provide batching of the reload of page tables and * other process state with the actual context switch code for * paravirtualized guests. By convention, only one of the batched * update (lazy) modes (CPU, MMU) should be active at any given time, * entry should never be nested, and entry and exits should always be * paired. This is for sanity of maintaining and reasoning about the * kernel code. In this case, the exit (end of the context switch) is * in architecture-specific code, and so doesn't need a generic * definition. */ #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_START_CONTEXT_SWITCH #define arch_start_context_switch(prev) do {} while (0) #endif #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY #ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_THP_MIGRATION static inline pmd_t pmd_swp_mksoft_dirty(pmd_t pmd) { return pmd; } static inline int pmd_swp_soft_dirty(pmd_t pmd) { return 0; } static inline pmd_t pmd_swp_clear_soft_dirty(pmd_t pmd) { return pmd; } #endif #else /* !CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY */ static inline int pte_soft_dirty(pte_t pte) { return 0; } static inline int pmd_soft_dirty(pmd_t pmd) { return 0; } static inline pte_t pte_mksoft_dirty(pte_t pte) { return pte; } static inline pmd_t pmd_mksoft_dirty(pmd_t pmd) { return pmd; } static inline pte_t pte_clear_soft_dirty(pte_t pte) { return pte; } static inline pmd_t pmd_clear_soft_dirty(pmd_t pmd) { return pmd; } static inline pte_t pte_swp_mksoft_dirty(pte_t pte) { return pte; } static inline int pte_swp_soft_dirty(pte_t pte) { return 0; } static inline pte_t pte_swp_clear_soft_dirty(pte_t pte) { return pte; } static inline pmd_t pmd_swp_mksoft_dirty(pmd_t pmd) { return pmd; } static inline int pmd_swp_soft_dirty(pmd_t pmd) { return 0; } static inline pmd_t pmd_swp_clear_soft_dirty(pmd_t pmd) { return pmd; } #endif #ifndef __HAVE_PFNMAP_TRACKING /* * Interfaces that can be used by architecture code to keep track of * memory type of pfn mappings specified by the remap_pfn_range, * vmf_insert_pfn. */ /* * track_pfn_remap is called when a _new_ pfn mapping is being established * by remap_pfn_range() for physical range indicated by pfn and size. */ static inline int track_pfn_remap(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pgprot_t *prot, unsigned long pfn, unsigned long addr, unsigned long size) { return 0; } /* * track_pfn_insert is called when a _new_ single pfn is established * by vmf_insert_pfn(). */ static inline void track_pfn_insert(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pgprot_t *prot, pfn_t pfn) { } /* * track_pfn_copy is called when vma that is covering the pfnmap gets * copied through copy_page_range(). */ static inline int track_pfn_copy(struct vm_area_struct *vma) { return 0; } /* * untrack_pfn is called while unmapping a pfnmap for a region. * untrack can be called for a specific region indicated by pfn and size or * can be for the entire vma (in which case pfn, size are zero). */ static inline void untrack_pfn(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long pfn, unsigned long size) { } /* * untrack_pfn_moved is called while mremapping a pfnmap for a new region. */ static inline void untrack_pfn_moved(struct vm_area_struct *vma) { } #else extern int track_pfn_remap(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pgprot_t *prot, unsigned long pfn, unsigned long addr, unsigned long size); extern void track_pfn_insert(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pgprot_t *prot, pfn_t pfn); extern int track_pfn_copy(struct vm_area_struct *vma); extern void untrack_pfn(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long pfn, unsigned long size); extern void untrack_pfn_moved(struct vm_area_struct *vma); #endif #ifdef __HAVE_COLOR_ZERO_PAGE static inline int is_zero_pfn(unsigned long pfn) { extern unsigned long zero_pfn; unsigned long offset_from_zero_pfn = pfn - zero_pfn; return offset_from_zero_pfn <= (zero_page_mask >> PAGE_SHIFT); } #define my_zero_pfn(addr) page_to_pfn(ZERO_PAGE(addr)) #else static inline int is_zero_pfn(unsigned long pfn) { extern unsigned long zero_pfn; return pfn == zero_pfn; } static inline unsigned long my_zero_pfn(unsigned long addr) { extern unsigned long zero_pfn; return zero_pfn; } #endif #ifdef CONFIG_MMU #ifndef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE static inline int pmd_trans_huge(pmd_t pmd) { return 0; } #ifndef pmd_write static inline int pmd_write(pmd_t pmd) { BUG(); return 0; } #endif /* pmd_write */ #endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */ #ifndef pud_write static inline int pud_write(pud_t pud) { BUG(); return 0; } #endif /* pud_write */ #if !defined(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PTE_DEVMAP) || !defined(CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE) static inline int pmd_devmap(pmd_t pmd) { return 0; } static inline int pud_devmap(pud_t pud) { return 0; } static inline int pgd_devmap(pgd_t pgd) { return 0; } #endif #if !defined(CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE) || \ (defined(CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE) && \ !defined(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD)) static inline int pud_trans_huge(pud_t pud) { return 0; } #endif /* See pmd_none_or_trans_huge_or_clear_bad for discussion. */ static inline int pud_none_or_trans_huge_or_dev_or_clear_bad(pud_t *pud) { pud_t pudval = READ_ONCE(*pud); if (pud_none(pudval) || pud_trans_huge(pudval) || pud_devmap(pudval)) return 1; if (unlikely(pud_bad(pudval))) { pud_clear_bad(pud); return 1; } return 0; } /* See pmd_trans_unstable for discussion. */ static inline int pud_trans_unstable(pud_t *pud) { #if defined(CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE) && \ defined(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD) return pud_none_or_trans_huge_or_dev_or_clear_bad(pud); #else return 0; #endif } #ifndef pmd_read_atomic static inline pmd_t pmd_read_atomic(pmd_t *pmdp) { /* * Depend on compiler for an atomic pmd read. NOTE: this is * only going to work, if the pmdval_t isn't larger than * an unsigned long. */ return *pmdp; } #endif #ifndef arch_needs_pgtable_deposit #define arch_needs_pgtable_deposit() (false) #endif /* * This function is meant to be used by sites walking pagetables with * the mmap_lock held in read mode to protect against MADV_DONTNEED and * transhuge page faults. MADV_DONTNEED can convert a transhuge pmd * into a null pmd and the transhuge page fault can convert a null pmd * into an hugepmd or into a regular pmd (if the hugepage allocation * fails). While holding the mmap_lock in read mode the pmd becomes * stable and stops changing under us only if it's not null and not a * transhuge pmd. When those races occurs and this function makes a * difference vs the standard pmd_none_or_clear_bad, the result is * undefined so behaving like if the pmd was none is safe (because it * can return none anyway). The compiler level barrier() is critically * important to compute the two checks atomically on the same pmdval. * * For 32bit kernels with a 64bit large pmd_t this automatically takes * care of reading the pmd atomically to avoid SMP race conditions * against pmd_populate() when the mmap_lock is hold for reading by the * caller (a special atomic read not done by "gcc" as in the generic * version above, is also needed when THP is disabled because the page * fault can populate the pmd from under us). */ static inline int pmd_none_or_trans_huge_or_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd) { pmd_t pmdval = pmd_read_atomic(pmd); /* * The barrier will stabilize the pmdval in a register or on * the stack so that it will stop changing under the code. * * When CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE=y on x86 32bit PAE, * pmd_read_atomic is allowed to return a not atomic pmdval * (for example pointing to an hugepage that has never been * mapped in the pmd). The below checks will only care about * the low part of the pmd with 32bit PAE x86 anyway, with the * exception of pmd_none(). So the important thing is that if * the low part of the pmd is found null, the high part will * be also null or the pmd_none() check below would be * confused. */ #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE barrier(); #endif /* * !pmd_present() checks for pmd migration entries * * The complete check uses is_pmd_migration_entry() in linux/swapops.h * But using that requires moving current function and pmd_trans_unstable() * to linux/swapops.h to resovle dependency, which is too much code move. * * !pmd_present() is equivalent to is_pmd_migration_entry() currently, * because !pmd_present() pages can only be under migration not swapped * out. * * pmd_none() is preseved for future condition checks on pmd migration * entries and not confusing with this function name, although it is * redundant with !pmd_present(). */ if (pmd_none(pmdval) || pmd_trans_huge(pmdval) || (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_THP_MIGRATION) && !pmd_present(pmdval))) return 1; if (unlikely(pmd_bad(pmdval))) { pmd_clear_bad(pmd); return 1; } return 0; } /* * This is a noop if Transparent Hugepage Support is not built into * the kernel. Otherwise it is equivalent to * pmd_none_or_trans_huge_or_clear_bad(), and shall only be called in * places that already verified the pmd is not none and they want to * walk ptes while holding the mmap sem in read mode (write mode don't * need this). If THP is not enabled, the pmd can't go away under the * code even if MADV_DONTNEED runs, but if THP is enabled we need to * run a pmd_trans_unstable before walking the ptes after * split_huge_pmd returns (because it may have run when the pmd become * null, but then a page fault can map in a THP and not a regular page). */ static inline int pmd_trans_unstable(pmd_t *pmd) { #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE return pmd_none_or_trans_huge_or_clear_bad(pmd); #else return 0; #endif } #ifndef CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING /* * Technically a PTE can be PROTNONE even when not doing NUMA balancing but * the only case the kernel cares is for NUMA balancing and is only ever set * when the VMA is accessible. For PROT_NONE VMAs, the PTEs are not marked * _PAGE_PROTNONE so by default, implement the helper as "always no". It * is the responsibility of the caller to distinguish between PROT_NONE * protections and NUMA hinting fault protections. */ static inline int pte_protnone(pte_t pte) { return 0; } static inline int pmd_protnone(pmd_t pmd) { return 0; } #endif /* CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING */ #endif /* CONFIG_MMU */ #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP #ifndef __PAGETABLE_P4D_FOLDED int p4d_set_huge(p4d_t *p4d, phys_addr_t addr, pgprot_t prot); int p4d_clear_huge(p4d_t *p4d); #else static inline int p4d_set_huge(p4d_t *p4d, phys_addr_t addr, pgprot_t prot) { return 0; } static inline int p4d_clear_huge(p4d_t *p4d) { return 0; } #endif /* !__PAGETABLE_P4D_FOLDED */ int pud_set_huge(pud_t *pud, phys_addr_t addr, pgprot_t prot); int pmd_set_huge(pmd_t *pmd, phys_addr_t addr, pgprot_t prot); int pud_clear_huge(pud_t *pud); int pmd_clear_huge(pmd_t *pmd); int p4d_free_pud_page(p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long addr); int pud_free_pmd_page(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr); int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr); #else /* !CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP */ static inline int p4d_set_huge(p4d_t *p4d, phys_addr_t addr, pgprot_t prot) { return 0; } static inline int pud_set_huge(pud_t *pud, phys_addr_t addr, pgprot_t prot) { return 0; } static inline int pmd_set_huge(pmd_t *pmd, phys_addr_t addr, pgprot_t prot) { return 0; } static inline int p4d_clear_huge(p4d_t *p4d) { return 0; } static inline int pud_clear_huge(pud_t *pud) { return 0; } static inline int pmd_clear_huge(pmd_t *pmd) { return 0; } static inline int p4d_free_pud_page(p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long addr) { return 0; } static inline int pud_free_pmd_page(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr) { return 0; } static inline int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr) { return 0; } #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP */ #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_FLUSH_PMD_TLB_RANGE #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE /* * ARCHes with special requirements for evicting THP backing TLB entries can * implement this. Otherwise also, it can help optimize normal TLB flush in * THP regime. Stock flush_tlb_range() typically has optimization to nuke the * entire TLB if flush span is greater than a threshold, which will * likely be true for a single huge page. Thus a single THP flush will * invalidate the entire TLB which is not desirable. * e.g. see arch/arc: flush_pmd_tlb_range */ #define flush_pmd_tlb_range(vma, addr, end) flush_tlb_range(vma, addr, end) #define flush_pud_tlb_range(vma, addr, end) flush_tlb_range(vma, addr, end) #else #define flush_pmd_tlb_range(vma, addr, end) BUILD_BUG() #define flush_pud_tlb_range(vma, addr, end) BUILD_BUG() #endif #endif struct file; int phys_mem_access_prot_allowed(struct file *file, unsigned long pfn, unsigned long size, pgprot_t *vma_prot); #ifndef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64 static inline void init_espfix_bsp(void) { } #endif extern void __init pgtable_cache_init(void); #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED static inline bool pfn_modify_allowed(unsigned long pfn, pgprot_t prot) { return true; } static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void) { return false; } #endif /* !_HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED */ /* * Architecture PAGE_KERNEL_* fallbacks * * Some architectures don't define certain PAGE_KERNEL_* flags. This is either * because they really don't support them, or the port needs to be updated to * reflect the required functionality. Below are a set of relatively safe * fallbacks, as best effort, which we can count on in lieu of the architectures * not defining them on their own yet. */ #ifndef PAGE_KERNEL_RO # define PAGE_KERNEL_RO PAGE_KERNEL #endif #ifndef PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC # define PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC PAGE_KERNEL #endif /* * Page Table Modification bits for pgtbl_mod_mask. * * These are used by the p?d_alloc_track*() set of functions an in the generic * vmalloc/ioremap code to track at which page-table levels entries have been * modified. Based on that the code can better decide when vmalloc and ioremap * mapping changes need to be synchronized to other page-tables in the system. */ #define __PGTBL_PGD_MODIFIED 0 #define __PGTBL_P4D_MODIFIED 1 #define __PGTBL_PUD_MODIFIED 2 #define __PGTBL_PMD_MODIFIED 3 #define __PGTBL_PTE_MODIFIED 4 #define PGTBL_PGD_MODIFIED BIT(__PGTBL_PGD_MODIFIED) #define PGTBL_P4D_MODIFIED BIT(__PGTBL_P4D_MODIFIED) #define PGTBL_PUD_MODIFIED BIT(__PGTBL_PUD_MODIFIED) #define PGTBL_PMD_MODIFIED BIT(__PGTBL_PMD_MODIFIED) #define PGTBL_PTE_MODIFIED BIT(__PGTBL_PTE_MODIFIED) /* Page-Table Modification Mask */ typedef unsigned int pgtbl_mod_mask; #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */ #if !defined(MAX_POSSIBLE_PHYSMEM_BITS) && !defined(CONFIG_64BIT) #ifdef CONFIG_PHYS_ADDR_T_64BIT /* * ZSMALLOC needs to know the highest PFN on 32-bit architectures * with physical address space extension, but falls back to * BITS_PER_LONG otherwise. */ #error Missing MAX_POSSIBLE_PHYSMEM_BITS definition #else #define MAX_POSSIBLE_PHYSMEM_BITS 32 #endif #endif #ifndef has_transparent_hugepage #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE #define has_transparent_hugepage() 1 #else #define has_transparent_hugepage() 0 #endif #endif /* * On some architectures it depends on the mm if the p4d/pud or pmd * layer of the page table hierarchy is folded or not. */ #ifndef mm_p4d_folded #define mm_p4d_folded(mm) __is_defined(__PAGETABLE_P4D_FOLDED) #endif #ifndef mm_pud_folded #define mm_pud_folded(mm) __is_defined(__PAGETABLE_PUD_FOLDED) #endif #ifndef mm_pmd_folded #define mm_pmd_folded(mm) __is_defined(__PAGETABLE_PMD_FOLDED) #endif #ifndef p4d_offset_lockless #define p4d_offset_lockless(pgdp, pgd, address) p4d_offset(&(pgd), address) #endif #ifndef pud_offset_lockless #define pud_offset_lockless(p4dp, p4d, address) pud_offset(&(p4d), address) #endif #ifndef pmd_offset_lockless #define pmd_offset_lockless(pudp, pud, address) pmd_offset(&(pud), address) #endif /* * p?d_leaf() - true if this entry is a final mapping to a physical address. * This differs from p?d_huge() by the fact that they are always available (if * the architecture supports large pages at the appropriate level) even * if CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE is not defined. * Only meaningful when called on a valid entry. */ #ifndef pgd_leaf #define pgd_leaf(x) 0 #endif #ifndef p4d_leaf #define p4d_leaf(x) 0 #endif #ifndef pud_leaf #define pud_leaf(x) 0 #endif #ifndef pmd_leaf #define pmd_leaf(x) 0 #endif #endif /* _LINUX_PGTABLE_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef _LINUX_PTRACE_H #define _LINUX_PTRACE_H #include <linux/compiler.h> /* For unlikely. */ #include <linux/sched.h> /* For struct task_struct. */ #include <linux/sched/signal.h> /* For send_sig(), same_thread_group(), etc. */ #include <linux/err.h> /* for IS_ERR_VALUE */ #include <linux/bug.h> /* For BUG_ON. */ #include <linux/pid_namespace.h> /* For task_active_pid_ns. */ #include <uapi/linux/ptrace.h> #include <linux/seccomp.h> /* Add sp to seccomp_data, as seccomp is user API, we don't want to modify it */ struct syscall_info { __u64 sp; struct seccomp_data data; }; extern int ptrace_access_vm(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr, void *buf, int len, unsigned int gup_flags); /* * Ptrace flags * * The owner ship rules for task->ptrace which holds the ptrace * flags is simple. When a task is running it owns it's task->ptrace * flags. When the a task is stopped the ptracer owns task->ptrace. */ #define PT_SEIZED 0x00010000 /* SEIZE used, enable new behavior */ #define PT_PTRACED 0x00000001 #define PT_DTRACE 0x00000002 /* delayed trace (used on m68k, i386) */ #define PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT 3 /* PT_TRACE_* event enable flags */ #define PT_EVENT_FLAG(event) (1 << (PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT + (event))) #define PT_TRACESYSGOOD PT_EVENT_FLAG(0) #define PT_TRACE_FORK PT_EVENT_FLAG(PTRACE_EVENT_FORK) #define PT_TRACE_VFORK PT_EVENT_FLAG(PTRACE_EVENT_VFORK) #define PT_TRACE_CLONE PT_EVENT_FLAG(PTRACE_EVENT_CLONE) #define PT_TRACE_EXEC PT_EVENT_FLAG(PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC) #define PT_TRACE_VFORK_DONE PT_EVENT_FLAG(PTRACE_EVENT_VFORK_DONE) #define PT_TRACE_EXIT PT_EVENT_FLAG(PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT) #define PT_TRACE_SECCOMP PT_EVENT_FLAG(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP) #define PT_EXITKILL (PTRACE_O_EXITKILL << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT) #define PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP (PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT) /* single stepping state bits (used on ARM and PA-RISC) */ #define PT_SINGLESTEP_BIT 31 #define PT_SINGLESTEP (1<<PT_SINGLESTEP_BIT) #define PT_BLOCKSTEP_BIT 30 #define PT_BLOCKSTEP (1<<PT_BLOCKSTEP_BIT) extern long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request, unsigned long addr, unsigned long data); extern int ptrace_readdata(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long src, char __user *dst, int len); extern int ptrace_writedata(struct task_struct *tsk, char __user *src, unsigned long dst, int len); extern void ptrace_disable(struct task_struct *); extern int ptrace_request(struct task_struct *child, long request, unsigned long addr, unsigned long data); extern void ptrace_notify(int exit_code); extern void __ptrace_link(struct task_struct *child, struct task_struct *new_parent, const struct cred *ptracer_cred); extern void __ptrace_unlink(struct task_struct *child); extern void exit_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct list_head *dead); #define PTRACE_MODE_READ 0x01 #define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH 0x02 #define PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT 0x04 #define PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS 0x08 #define PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS 0x10 /* shorthands for READ/ATTACH and FSCREDS/REALCREDS combinations */ #define PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS) #define PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS) #define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS) #define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH | PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS) /** * ptrace_may_access - check whether the caller is permitted to access * a target task. * @task: target task * @mode: selects type of access and caller credentials * * Returns true on success, false on denial. * * One of the flags PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS and PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS must * be set in @mode to specify whether the access was requested through * a filesystem syscall (should use effective capabilities and fsuid * of the caller) or through an explicit syscall such as * process_vm_writev or ptrace (and should use the real credentials). */ extern bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode); static inline int ptrace_reparented(struct task_struct *child) { return !same_thread_group(child->real_parent, child->parent); } static inline void ptrace_unlink(struct task_struct *child) { if (unlikely(child->ptrace)) __ptrace_unlink(child); } int generic_ptrace_peekdata(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr, unsigned long data); int generic_ptrace_pokedata(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr, unsigned long data); /** * ptrace_parent - return the task that is tracing the given task * @task: task to consider * * Returns %NULL if no one is tracing @task, or the &struct task_struct * pointer to its tracer. * * Must called under rcu_read_lock(). The pointer returned might be kept * live only by RCU. During exec, this may be called with task_lock() held * on @task, still held from when check_unsafe_exec() was called. */ static inline struct task_struct *ptrace_parent(struct task_struct *task) { if (unlikely(task->ptrace)) return rcu_dereference(task->parent); return NULL; } /** * ptrace_event_enabled - test whether a ptrace event is enabled * @task: ptracee of interest * @event: %PTRACE_EVENT_* to test * * Test whether @event is enabled for ptracee @task. * * Returns %true if @event is enabled, %false otherwise. */ static inline bool ptrace_event_enabled(struct task_struct *task, int event) { return task->ptrace & PT_EVENT_FLAG(event); } /** * ptrace_event - possibly stop for a ptrace event notification * @event: %PTRACE_EVENT_* value to report * @message: value for %PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG to return * * Check whether @event is enabled and, if so, report @event and @message * to the ptrace parent. * * Called without locks. */ static inline void ptrace_event(int event, unsigned long message) { if (unlikely(ptrace_event_enabled(current, event))) { current->ptrace_message = message; ptrace_notify((event << 8) | SIGTRAP); } else if (event == PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC) { /* legacy EXEC report via SIGTRAP */ if ((current->ptrace & (PT_PTRACED|PT_SEIZED)) == PT_PTRACED) send_sig(SIGTRAP, current, 0); } } /** * ptrace_event_pid - possibly stop for a ptrace event notification * @event: %PTRACE_EVENT_* value to report * @pid: process identifier for %PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG to return * * Check whether @event is enabled and, if so, report @event and @pid * to the ptrace parent. @pid is reported as the pid_t seen from the * the ptrace parent's pid namespace. * * Called without locks. */ static inline void ptrace_event_pid(int event, struct pid *pid) { /* * FIXME: There's a potential race if a ptracer in a different pid * namespace than parent attaches between computing message below and * when we acquire tasklist_lock in ptrace_stop(). If this happens, * the ptracer will get a bogus pid from PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG. */ unsigned long message = 0; struct pid_namespace *ns; rcu_read_lock(); ns = task_active_pid_ns(rcu_dereference(current->parent)); if (ns) message = pid_nr_ns(pid, ns); rcu_read_unlock(); ptrace_event(event, message); } /** * ptrace_init_task - initialize ptrace state for a new child * @child: new child task * @ptrace: true if child should be ptrace'd by parent's tracer * * This is called immediately after adding @child to its parent's children * list. @ptrace is false in the normal case, and true to ptrace @child. * * Called with current's siglock and write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock) held. */ static inline void ptrace_init_task(struct task_struct *child, bool ptrace) { INIT_LIST_HEAD(&child->ptrace_entry); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&child->ptraced); child->jobctl = 0; child->ptrace = 0; child->parent = child->real_parent; if (unlikely(ptrace) && current->ptrace) { child->ptrace = current->ptrace; __ptrace_link(child, current->parent, current->ptracer_cred); if (child->ptrace & PT_SEIZED) task_set_jobctl_pending(child, JOBCTL_TRAP_STOP); else sigaddset(&child->pending.signal, SIGSTOP); } else child->ptracer_cred = NULL; } /** * ptrace_release_task - final ptrace-related cleanup of a zombie being reaped * @task: task in %EXIT_DEAD state * * Called with write_lock(&tasklist_lock) held. */ static inline void ptrace_release_task(struct task_struct *task) { BUG_ON(!list_empty(&task->ptraced)); ptrace_unlink(task); BUG_ON(!list_empty(&task->ptrace_entry)); } #ifndef force_successful_syscall_return /* * System call handlers that, upon successful completion, need to return a * negative value should call force_successful_syscall_return() right before * returning. On architectures where the syscall convention provides for a * separate error flag (e.g., alpha, ia64, ppc{,64}, sparc{,64}, possibly * others), this macro can be used to ensure that the error flag will not get * set. On architectures which do not support a separate error flag, the macro * is a no-op and the spurious error condition needs to be filtered out by some * other means (e.g., in user-level, by passing an extra argument to the * syscall handler, or something along those lines). */ #define force_successful_syscall_return() do { } while (0) #endif #ifndef is_syscall_success /* * On most systems we can tell if a syscall is a success based on if the retval * is an error value. On some systems like ia64 and powerpc they have different * indicators of success/failure and must define their own. */ #define is_syscall_success(regs) (!IS_ERR_VALUE((unsigned long)(regs_return_value(regs)))) #endif /* * <asm/ptrace.h> should define the following things inside #ifdef __KERNEL__. * * These do-nothing inlines are used when the arch does not * implement single-step. The kerneldoc comments are here * to document the interface for all arch definitions. */ #ifndef arch_has_single_step /** * arch_has_single_step - does this CPU support user-mode single-step? * * If this is defined, then there must be function declarations or * inlines for user_enable_single_step() and user_disable_single_step(). * arch_has_single_step() should evaluate to nonzero iff the machine * supports instruction single-step for user mode. * It can be a constant or it can test a CPU feature bit. */ #define arch_has_single_step() (0) /** * user_enable_single_step - single-step in user-mode task * @task: either current or a task stopped in %TASK_TRACED * * This can only be called when arch_has_single_step() has returned nonzero. * Set @task so that when it returns to user mode, it will trap after the * next single instruction executes. If arch_has_block_step() is defined, * this must clear the effects of user_enable_block_step() too. */ static inline void user_enable_single_step(struct task_struct *task) { BUG(); /* This can never be called. */ } /** * user_disable_single_step - cancel user-mode single-step * @task: either current or a task stopped in %TASK_TRACED * * Clear @task of the effects of user_enable_single_step() and * user_enable_block_step(). This can be called whether or not either * of those was ever called on @task, and even if arch_has_single_step() * returned zero. */ static inline void user_disable_single_step(struct task_struct *task) { } #else extern void user_enable_single_step(struct task_struct *); extern void user_disable_single_step(struct task_struct *); #endif /* arch_has_single_step */ #ifndef arch_has_block_step /** * arch_has_block_step - does this CPU support user-mode block-step? * * If this is defined, then there must be a function declaration or inline * for user_enable_block_step(), and arch_has_single_step() must be defined * too. arch_has_block_step() should evaluate to nonzero iff the machine * supports step-until-branch for user mode. It can be a constant or it * can test a CPU feature bit. */ #define arch_has_block_step() (0) /** * user_enable_block_step - step until branch in user-mode task * @task: either current or a task stopped in %TASK_TRACED * * This can only be called when arch_has_block_step() has returned nonzero, * and will never be called when single-instruction stepping is being used. * Set @task so that when it returns to user mode, it will trap after the * next branch or trap taken. */ static inline void user_enable_block_step(struct task_struct *task) { BUG(); /* This can never be called. */ } #else extern void user_enable_block_step(struct task_struct *); #endif /* arch_has_block_step */ #ifdef ARCH_HAS_USER_SINGLE_STEP_REPORT extern void user_single_step_report(struct pt_regs *regs); #else static inline void user_single_step_report(struct pt_regs *regs) { kernel_siginfo_t info; clear_siginfo(&info); info.si_signo = SIGTRAP; info.si_errno = 0; info.si_code = SI_USER; info.si_pid = 0; info.si_uid = 0; force_sig_info(&info); } #endif #ifndef arch_ptrace_stop_needed /** * arch_ptrace_stop_needed - Decide whether arch_ptrace_stop() should be called * @code: current->exit_code value ptrace will stop with * @info: siginfo_t pointer (or %NULL) for signal ptrace will stop with * * This is called with the siglock held, to decide whether or not it's * necessary to release the siglock and call arch_ptrace_stop() with the * same @code and @info arguments. It can be defined to a constant if * arch_ptrace_stop() is never required, or always is. On machines where * this makes sense, it should be defined to a quick test to optimize out * calling arch_ptrace_stop() when it would be superfluous. For example, * if the thread has not been back to user mode since the last stop, the * thread state might indicate that nothing needs to be done. * * This is guaranteed to be invoked once before a task stops for ptrace and * may include arch-specific operations necessary prior to a ptrace stop. */ #define arch_ptrace_stop_needed(code, info) (0) #endif #ifndef arch_ptrace_stop /** * arch_ptrace_stop - Do machine-specific work before stopping for ptrace * @code: current->exit_code value ptrace will stop with * @info: siginfo_t pointer (or %NULL) for signal ptrace will stop with * * This is called with no locks held when arch_ptrace_stop_needed() has * just returned nonzero. It is allowed to block, e.g. for user memory * access. The arch can have machine-specific work to be done before * ptrace stops. On ia64, register backing store gets written back to user * memory here. Since this can be costly (requires dropping the siglock), * we only do it when the arch requires it for this particular stop, as * indicated by arch_ptrace_stop_needed(). */ #define arch_ptrace_stop(code, info) do { } while (0) #endif #ifndef current_pt_regs #define current_pt_regs() task_pt_regs(current) #endif /* * unlike current_pt_regs(), this one is equal to task_pt_regs(current) * on *all* architectures; the only reason to have a per-arch definition * is optimisation. */ #ifndef signal_pt_regs #define signal_pt_regs() task_pt_regs(current) #endif #ifndef current_user_stack_pointer #define current_user_stack_pointer() user_stack_pointer(current_pt_regs()) #endif extern int task_current_syscall(struct task_struct *target, struct syscall_info *info); extern void sigaction_compat_abi(struct k_sigaction *act, struct k_sigaction *oact); #endif
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3984 3985 3986 3987 3988 3989 3990 3991 3992 3993 3994 3995 3996 3997 3998 3999 4000 4001 4002 4003 4004 4005 4006 4007 4008 4009 4010 4011 4012 4013 4014 4015 4016 4017 4018 4019 4020 4021 4022 4023 4024 4025 4026 4027 4028 4029 4030 4031 4032 4033 4034 4035 4036 4037 4038 4039 4040 4041 4042 4043 4044 4045 4046 4047 4048 4049 4050 4051 4052 4053 4054 4055 4056 4057 4058 4059 4060 4061 4062 4063 4064 4065 4066 4067 4068 4069 4070 4071 4072 4073 4074 4075 4076 4077 4078 4079 4080 4081 4082 4083 4084 4085 4086 4087 4088 4089 4090 4091 4092 4093 4094 4095 4096 4097 4098 4099 4100 4101 4102 4103 4104 4105 4106 4107 4108 4109 4110 4111 4112 4113 4114 4115 4116 4117 4118 4119 4120 4121 4122 4123 4124 4125 4126 4127 4128 4129 4130 4131 4132 4133 4134 4135 4136 4137 4138 4139 4140 4141 4142 4143 4144 4145 4146 4147 4148 4149 4150 4151 4152 4153 4154 4155 4156 4157 4158 4159 4160 4161 4162 4163 4164 4165 4166 4167 4168 4169 4170 4171 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * linux/fs/ext4/namei.c * * Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995 * Remy Card (card@masi.ibp.fr) * Laboratoire MASI - Institut Blaise Pascal * Universite Pierre et Marie Curie (Paris VI) * * from * * linux/fs/minix/namei.c * * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds * * Big-endian to little-endian byte-swapping/bitmaps by * David S. Miller (davem@caip.rutgers.edu), 1995 * Directory entry file type support and forward compatibility hooks * for B-tree directories by Theodore Ts'o (tytso@mit.edu), 1998 * Hash Tree Directory indexing (c) * Daniel Phillips, 2001 * Hash Tree Directory indexing porting * Christopher Li, 2002 * Hash Tree Directory indexing cleanup * Theodore Ts'o, 2002 */ #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/pagemap.h> #include <linux/time.h> #include <linux/fcntl.h> #include <linux/stat.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/quotaops.h> #include <linux/buffer_head.h> #include <linux/bio.h> #include <linux/iversion.h> #include <linux/unicode.h> #include "ext4.h" #include "ext4_jbd2.h" #include "xattr.h" #include "acl.h" #include <trace/events/ext4.h> /* * define how far ahead to read directories while searching them. */ #define NAMEI_RA_CHUNKS 2 #define NAMEI_RA_BLOCKS 4 #define NAMEI_RA_SIZE (NAMEI_RA_CHUNKS * NAMEI_RA_BLOCKS) static struct buffer_head *ext4_append(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, ext4_lblk_t *block) { struct buffer_head *bh; int err; if (unlikely(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_max_dir_size_kb && ((inode->i_size >> 10) >= EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_max_dir_size_kb))) return ERR_PTR(-ENOSPC); *block = inode->i_size >> inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits; bh = ext4_bread(handle, inode, *block, EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE); if (IS_ERR(bh)) return bh; inode->i_size += inode->i_sb->s_blocksize; EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize = inode->i_size; BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "get_write_access"); err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, bh); if (err) { brelse(bh); ext4_std_error(inode->i_sb, err); return ERR_PTR(err); } return bh; } static int ext4_dx_csum_verify(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_dir_entry *dirent); /* * Hints to ext4_read_dirblock regarding whether we expect a directory * block being read to be an index block, or a block containing * directory entries (and if the latter, whether it was found via a * logical block in an htree index block). This is used to control * what sort of sanity checkinig ext4_read_dirblock() will do on the * directory block read from the storage device. EITHER will means * the caller doesn't know what kind of directory block will be read, * so no specific verification will be done. */ typedef enum { EITHER, INDEX, DIRENT, DIRENT_HTREE } dirblock_type_t; #define ext4_read_dirblock(inode, block, type) \ __ext4_read_dirblock((inode), (block), (type), __func__, __LINE__) static struct buffer_head *__ext4_read_dirblock(struct inode *inode, ext4_lblk_t block, dirblock_type_t type, const char *func, unsigned int line) { struct buffer_head *bh; struct ext4_dir_entry *dirent; int is_dx_block = 0; if (ext4_simulate_fail(inode->i_sb, EXT4_SIM_DIRBLOCK_EIO)) bh = ERR_PTR(-EIO); else bh = ext4_bread(NULL, inode, block, 0); if (IS_ERR(bh)) { __ext4_warning(inode->i_sb, func, line, "inode #%lu: lblock %lu: comm %s: " "error %ld reading directory block", inode->i_ino, (unsigned long)block, current->comm, PTR_ERR(bh)); return bh; } if (!bh && (type == INDEX || type == DIRENT_HTREE)) { ext4_error_inode(inode, func, line, block, "Directory hole found for htree %s block", (type == INDEX) ? "index" : "leaf"); return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED); } if (!bh) return NULL; dirent = (struct ext4_dir_entry *) bh->b_data; /* Determine whether or not we have an index block */ if (is_dx(inode)) { if (block == 0) is_dx_block = 1; else if (ext4_rec_len_from_disk(dirent->rec_len, inode->i_sb->s_blocksize) == inode->i_sb->s_blocksize) is_dx_block = 1; } if (!is_dx_block && type == INDEX) { ext4_error_inode(inode, func, line, block, "directory leaf block found instead of index block"); brelse(bh); return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED); } if (!ext4_has_metadata_csum(inode->i_sb) || buffer_verified(bh)) return bh; /* * An empty leaf block can get mistaken for a index block; for * this reason, we can only check the index checksum when the * caller is sure it should be an index block. */ if (is_dx_block && type == INDEX) { if (ext4_dx_csum_verify(inode, dirent) && !ext4_simulate_fail(inode->i_sb, EXT4_SIM_DIRBLOCK_CRC)) set_buffer_verified(bh); else { ext4_error_inode_err(inode, func, line, block, EFSBADCRC, "Directory index failed checksum"); brelse(bh); return ERR_PTR(-EFSBADCRC); } } if (!is_dx_block) { if (ext4_dirblock_csum_verify(inode, bh) && !ext4_simulate_fail(inode->i_sb, EXT4_SIM_DIRBLOCK_CRC)) set_buffer_verified(bh); else { ext4_error_inode_err(inode, func, line, block, EFSBADCRC, "Directory block failed checksum"); brelse(bh); return ERR_PTR(-EFSBADCRC); } } return bh; } #ifndef assert #define assert(test) J_ASSERT(test) #endif #ifdef DX_DEBUG #define dxtrace(command) command #else #define dxtrace(command) #endif struct fake_dirent { __le32 inode; __le16 rec_len; u8 name_len; u8 file_type; }; struct dx_countlimit { __le16 limit; __le16 count; }; struct dx_entry { __le32 hash; __le32 block; }; /* * dx_root_info is laid out so that if it should somehow get overlaid by a * dirent the two low bits of the hash version will be zero. Therefore, the * hash version mod 4 should never be 0. Sincerely, the paranoia department. */ struct dx_root { struct fake_dirent dot; char dot_name[4]; struct fake_dirent dotdot; char dotdot_name[4]; struct dx_root_info { __le32 reserved_zero; u8 hash_version; u8 info_length; /* 8 */ u8 indirect_levels; u8 unused_flags; } info; struct dx_entry entries[]; }; struct dx_node { struct fake_dirent fake; struct dx_entry entries[]; }; struct dx_frame { struct buffer_head *bh; struct dx_entry *entries; struct dx_entry *at; }; struct dx_map_entry { u32 hash; u16 offs; u16 size; }; /* * This goes at the end of each htree block. */ struct dx_tail { u32 dt_reserved; __le32 dt_checksum; /* crc32c(uuid+inum+dirblock) */ }; static inline ext4_lblk_t dx_get_block(struct dx_entry *entry); static void dx_set_block(struct dx_entry *entry, ext4_lblk_t value); static inline unsigned dx_get_hash(struct dx_entry *entry); static void dx_set_hash(struct dx_entry *entry, unsigned value); static unsigned dx_get_count(struct dx_entry *entries); static unsigned dx_get_limit(struct dx_entry *entries); static void dx_set_count(struct dx_entry *entries, unsigned value); static void dx_set_limit(struct dx_entry *entries, unsigned value); static unsigned dx_root_limit(struct inode *dir, unsigned infosize); static unsigned dx_node_limit(struct inode *dir); static struct dx_frame *dx_probe(struct ext4_filename *fname, struct inode *dir, struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, struct dx_frame *frame); static void dx_release(struct dx_frame *frames); static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, unsigned blocksize, struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, struct dx_map_entry map[]); static void dx_sort_map(struct dx_map_entry *map, unsigned count); static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *dx_move_dirents(char *from, char *to, struct dx_map_entry *offsets, int count, unsigned blocksize); static struct ext4_dir_entry_2* dx_pack_dirents(char *base, unsigned blocksize); static void dx_insert_block(struct dx_frame *frame, u32 hash, ext4_lblk_t block); static int ext4_htree_next_block(struct inode *dir, __u32 hash, struct dx_frame *frame, struct dx_frame *frames, __u32 *start_hash); static struct buffer_head * ext4_dx_find_entry(struct inode *dir, struct ext4_filename *fname, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **res_dir); static int ext4_dx_add_entry(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_filename *fname, struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode); /* checksumming functions */ void ext4_initialize_dirent_tail(struct buffer_head *bh, unsigned int blocksize) { struct ext4_dir_entry_tail *t = EXT4_DIRENT_TAIL(bh->b_data, blocksize); memset(t, 0, sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail)); t->det_rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk( sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail), blocksize); t->det_reserved_ft = EXT4_FT_DIR_CSUM; } /* Walk through a dirent block to find a checksum "dirent" at the tail */ static struct ext4_dir_entry_tail *get_dirent_tail(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head *bh) { struct ext4_dir_entry_tail *t; #ifdef PARANOID struct ext4_dir_entry *d, *top; d = (struct ext4_dir_entry *)bh->b_data; top = (struct ext4_dir_entry *)(bh->b_data + (EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(inode->i_sb) - sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail))); while (d < top && d->rec_len) d = (struct ext4_dir_entry *)(((void *)d) + le16_to_cpu(d->rec_len)); if (d != top) return NULL; t = (struct ext4_dir_entry_tail *)d; #else t = EXT4_DIRENT_TAIL(bh->b_data, EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(inode->i_sb)); #endif if (t->det_reserved_zero1 || le16_to_cpu(t->det_rec_len) != sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail) || t->det_reserved_zero2 || t->det_reserved_ft != EXT4_FT_DIR_CSUM) return NULL; return t; } static __le32 ext4_dirblock_csum(struct inode *inode, void *dirent, int size) { struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb); struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode); __u32 csum; csum = ext4_chksum(sbi, ei->i_csum_seed, (__u8 *)dirent, size); return cpu_to_le32(csum); } #define warn_no_space_for_csum(inode) \ __warn_no_space_for_csum((inode), __func__, __LINE__) static void __warn_no_space_for_csum(struct inode *inode, const char *func, unsigned int line) { __ext4_warning_inode(inode, func, line, "No space for directory leaf checksum. Please run e2fsck -D."); } int ext4_dirblock_csum_verify(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head *bh) { struct ext4_dir_entry_tail *t; if (!ext4_has_metadata_csum(inode->i_sb)) return 1; t = get_dirent_tail(inode, bh); if (!t) { warn_no_space_for_csum(inode); return 0; } if (t->det_checksum != ext4_dirblock_csum(inode, bh->b_data, (char *)t - bh->b_data)) return 0; return 1; } static void ext4_dirblock_csum_set(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head *bh) { struct ext4_dir_entry_tail *t; if (!ext4_has_metadata_csum(inode->i_sb)) return; t = get_dirent_tail(inode, bh); if (!t) { warn_no_space_for_csum(inode); return; } t->det_checksum = ext4_dirblock_csum(inode, bh->b_data, (char *)t - bh->b_data); } int ext4_handle_dirty_dirblock(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head *bh) { ext4_dirblock_csum_set(inode, bh); return ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, inode, bh); } static struct dx_countlimit *get_dx_countlimit(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_dir_entry *dirent, int *offset) { struct ext4_dir_entry *dp; struct dx_root_info *root; int count_offset; if (le16_to_cpu(dirent->rec_len) == EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(inode->i_sb)) count_offset = 8; else if (le16_to_cpu(dirent->rec_len) == 12) { dp = (struct ext4_dir_entry *)(((void *)dirent) + 12); if (le16_to_cpu(dp->rec_len) != EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(inode->i_sb) - 12) return NULL; root = (struct dx_root_info *)(((void *)dp + 12)); if (root->reserved_zero || root->info_length != sizeof(struct dx_root_info)) return NULL; count_offset = 32; } else return NULL; if (offset) *offset = count_offset; return (struct dx_countlimit *)(((void *)dirent) + count_offset); } static __le32 ext4_dx_csum(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_dir_entry *dirent, int count_offset, int count, struct dx_tail *t) { struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb); struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode); __u32 csum; int size; __u32 dummy_csum = 0; int offset = offsetof(struct dx_tail, dt_checksum); size = count_offset + (count * sizeof(struct dx_entry)); csum = ext4_chksum(sbi, ei->i_csum_seed, (__u8 *)dirent, size); csum = ext4_chksum(sbi, csum, (__u8 *)t, offset); csum = ext4_chksum(sbi, csum, (__u8 *)&dummy_csum, sizeof(dummy_csum)); return cpu_to_le32(csum); } static int ext4_dx_csum_verify(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_dir_entry *dirent) { struct dx_countlimit *c; struct dx_tail *t; int count_offset, limit, count; if (!ext4_has_metadata_csum(inode->i_sb)) return 1; c = get_dx_countlimit(inode, dirent, &count_offset); if (!c) { EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "dir seems corrupt? Run e2fsck -D."); return 0; } limit = le16_to_cpu(c->limit); count = le16_to_cpu(c->count); if (count_offset + (limit * sizeof(struct dx_entry)) > EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(inode->i_sb) - sizeof(struct dx_tail)) { warn_no_space_for_csum(inode); return 0; } t = (struct dx_tail *)(((struct dx_entry *)c) + limit); if (t->dt_checksum != ext4_dx_csum(inode, dirent, count_offset, count, t)) return 0; return 1; } static void ext4_dx_csum_set(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_dir_entry *dirent) { struct dx_countlimit *c; struct dx_tail *t; int count_offset, limit, count; if (!ext4_has_metadata_csum(inode->i_sb)) return; c = get_dx_countlimit(inode, dirent, &count_offset); if (!c) { EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "dir seems corrupt? Run e2fsck -D."); return; } limit = le16_to_cpu(c->limit); count = le16_to_cpu(c->count); if (count_offset + (limit * sizeof(struct dx_entry)) > EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(inode->i_sb) - sizeof(struct dx_tail)) { warn_no_space_for_csum(inode); return; } t = (struct dx_tail *)(((struct dx_entry *)c) + limit); t->dt_checksum = ext4_dx_csum(inode, dirent, count_offset, count, t); } static inline int ext4_handle_dirty_dx_node(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head *bh) { ext4_dx_csum_set(inode, (struct ext4_dir_entry *)bh->b_data); return ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, inode, bh); } /* * p is at least 6 bytes before the end of page */ static inline struct ext4_dir_entry_2 * ext4_next_entry(struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *p, unsigned long blocksize) { return (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *)((char *)p + ext4_rec_len_from_disk(p->rec_len, blocksize)); } /* * Future: use high four bits of block for coalesce-on-delete flags * Mask them off for now. */ static inline ext4_lblk_t dx_get_block(struct dx_entry *entry) { return le32_to_cpu(entry->block) & 0x0fffffff; } static inline void dx_set_block(struct dx_entry *entry, ext4_lblk_t value) { entry->block = cpu_to_le32(value); } static inline unsigned dx_get_hash(struct dx_entry *entry) { return le32_to_cpu(entry->hash); } static inline void dx_set_hash(struct dx_entry *entry, unsigned value) { entry->hash = cpu_to_le32(value); } static inline unsigned dx_get_count(struct dx_entry *entries) { return le16_to_cpu(((struct dx_countlimit *) entries)->count); } static inline unsigned dx_get_limit(struct dx_entry *entries) { return le16_to_cpu(((struct dx_countlimit *) entries)->limit); } static inline void dx_set_count(struct dx_entry *entries, unsigned value) { ((struct dx_countlimit *) entries)->count = cpu_to_le16(value); } static inline void dx_set_limit(struct dx_entry *entries, unsigned value) { ((struct dx_countlimit *) entries)->limit = cpu_to_le16(value); } static inline unsigned dx_root_limit(struct inode *dir, unsigned infosize) { unsigned entry_space = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1) - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(2) - infosize; if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(dir->i_sb)) entry_space -= sizeof(struct dx_tail); return entry_space / sizeof(struct dx_entry); } static inline unsigned dx_node_limit(struct inode *dir) { unsigned entry_space = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(0); if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(dir->i_sb)) entry_space -= sizeof(struct dx_tail); return entry_space / sizeof(struct dx_entry); } /* * Debug */ #ifdef DX_DEBUG static void dx_show_index(char * label, struct dx_entry *entries) { int i, n = dx_get_count (entries); printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s index", label); for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { printk(KERN_CONT " %x->%lu", i ? dx_get_hash(entries + i) : 0, (unsigned long)dx_get_block(entries + i)); } printk(KERN_CONT "\n"); } struct stats { unsigned names; unsigned space; unsigned bcount; }; static struct stats dx_show_leaf(struct inode *dir, struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, int size, int show_names) { unsigned names = 0, space = 0; char *base = (char *) de; struct dx_hash_info h = *hinfo; printk("names: "); while ((char *) de < base + size) { if (de->inode) { if (show_names) { #ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION int len; char *name; struct fscrypt_str fname_crypto_str = FSTR_INIT(NULL, 0); int res = 0; name = de->name; len = de->name_len; if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) res = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(dir); if (res) { printk(KERN_WARNING "Error setting up" " fname crypto: %d\n", res); } if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(dir)) { /* Directory is not encrypted */ ext4fs_dirhash(dir, de->name, de->name_len, &h); printk("%*.s:(U)%x.%u ", len, name, h.hash, (unsigned) ((char *) de - base)); } else { struct fscrypt_str de_name = FSTR_INIT(name, len); /* Directory is encrypted */ res = fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer( len, &fname_crypto_str); if (res) printk(KERN_WARNING "Error " "allocating crypto " "buffer--skipping " "crypto\n"); res = fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(dir, 0, 0, &de_name, &fname_crypto_str); if (res) { printk(KERN_WARNING "Error " "converting filename " "from disk to usr" "\n"); name = "??"; len = 2; } else { name = fname_crypto_str.name; len = fname_crypto_str.len; } ext4fs_dirhash(dir, de->name, de->name_len, &h); printk("%*.s:(E)%x.%u ", len, name, h.hash, (unsigned) ((char *) de - base)); fscrypt_fname_free_buffer( &fname_crypto_str); } #else int len = de->name_len; char *name = de->name; ext4fs_dirhash(dir, de->name, de->name_len, &h); printk("%*.s:%x.%u ", len, name, h.hash, (unsigned) ((char *) de - base)); #endif } space += EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len); names++; } de = ext4_next_entry(de, size); } printk(KERN_CONT "(%i)\n", names); return (struct stats) { names, space, 1 }; } struct stats dx_show_entries(struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, struct inode *dir, struct dx_entry *entries, int levels) { unsigned blocksize = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize; unsigned count = dx_get_count(entries), names = 0, space = 0, i; unsigned bcount = 0; struct buffer_head *bh; printk("%i indexed blocks...\n", count); for (i = 0; i < count; i++, entries++) { ext4_lblk_t block = dx_get_block(entries); ext4_lblk_t hash = i ? dx_get_hash(entries): 0; u32 range = i < count - 1? (dx_get_hash(entries + 1) - hash): ~hash; struct stats stats; printk("%s%3u:%03u hash %8x/%8x ",levels?"":" ", i, block, hash, range); bh = ext4_bread(NULL,dir, block, 0); if (!bh || IS_ERR(bh)) continue; stats = levels? dx_show_entries(hinfo, dir, ((struct dx_node *) bh->b_data)->entries, levels - 1): dx_show_leaf(dir, hinfo, (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) bh->b_data, blocksize, 0); names += stats.names; space += stats.space; bcount += stats.bcount; brelse(bh); } if (bcount) printk(KERN_DEBUG "%snames %u, fullness %u (%u%%)\n", levels ? "" : " ", names, space/bcount, (space/bcount)*100/blocksize); return (struct stats) { names, space, bcount}; } #endif /* DX_DEBUG */ /* * Probe for a directory leaf block to search. * * dx_probe can return ERR_BAD_DX_DIR, which means there was a format * error in the directory index, and the caller should fall back to * searching the directory normally. The callers of dx_probe **MUST** * check for this error code, and make sure it never gets reflected * back to userspace. */ static struct dx_frame * dx_probe(struct ext4_filename *fname, struct inode *dir, struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, struct dx_frame *frame_in) { unsigned count, indirect; struct dx_entry *at, *entries, *p, *q, *m; struct dx_root *root; struct dx_frame *frame = frame_in; struct dx_frame *ret_err = ERR_PTR(ERR_BAD_DX_DIR); u32 hash; memset(frame_in, 0, EXT4_HTREE_LEVEL * sizeof(frame_in[0])); frame->bh = ext4_read_dirblock(dir, 0, INDEX); if (IS_ERR(frame->bh)) return (struct dx_frame *) frame->bh; root = (struct dx_root *) frame->bh->b_data; if (root->info.hash_version != DX_HASH_TEA && root->info.hash_version != DX_HASH_HALF_MD4 && root->info.hash_version != DX_HASH_LEGACY) { ext4_warning_inode(dir, "Unrecognised inode hash code %u", root->info.hash_version); goto fail; } if (fname) hinfo = &fname->hinfo; hinfo->hash_version = root->info.hash_version; if (hinfo->hash_version <= DX_HASH_TEA) hinfo->hash_version += EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_hash_unsigned; hinfo->seed = EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_hash_seed; if (fname && fname_name(fname)) ext4fs_dirhash(dir, fname_name(fname), fname_len(fname), hinfo); hash = hinfo->hash; if (root->info.unused_flags & 1) { ext4_warning_inode(dir, "Unimplemented hash flags: %#06x", root->info.unused_flags); goto fail; } indirect = root->info.indirect_levels; if (indirect >= ext4_dir_htree_level(dir->i_sb)) { ext4_warning(dir->i_sb, "Directory (ino: %lu) htree depth %#06x exceed" "supported value", dir->i_ino, ext4_dir_htree_level(dir->i_sb)); if (ext4_dir_htree_level(dir->i_sb) < EXT4_HTREE_LEVEL) { ext4_warning(dir->i_sb, "Enable large directory " "feature to access it"); } goto fail; } entries = (struct dx_entry *)(((char *)&root->info) + root->info.info_length); if (dx_get_limit(entries) != dx_root_limit(dir, root->info.info_length)) { ext4_warning_inode(dir, "dx entry: limit %u != root limit %u", dx_get_limit(entries), dx_root_limit(dir, root->info.info_length)); goto fail; } dxtrace(printk("Look up %x", hash)); while (1) { count = dx_get_count(entries); if (!count || count > dx_get_limit(entries)) { ext4_warning_inode(dir, "dx entry: count %u beyond limit %u", count, dx_get_limit(entries)); goto fail; } p = entries + 1; q = entries + count - 1; while (p <= q) { m = p + (q - p) / 2; dxtrace(printk(KERN_CONT ".")); if (dx_get_hash(m) > hash) q = m - 1; else p = m + 1; } if (0) { // linear search cross check unsigned n = count - 1; at = entries; while (n--) { dxtrace(printk(KERN_CONT ",")); if (dx_get_hash(++at) > hash) { at--; break; } } assert (at == p - 1); } at = p - 1; dxtrace(printk(KERN_CONT " %x->%u\n", at == entries ? 0 : dx_get_hash(at), dx_get_block(at))); frame->entries = entries; frame->at = at; if (!indirect--) return frame; frame++; frame->bh = ext4_read_dirblock(dir, dx_get_block(at), INDEX); if (IS_ERR(frame->bh)) { ret_err = (struct dx_frame *) frame->bh; frame->bh = NULL; goto fail; } entries = ((struct dx_node *) frame->bh->b_data)->entries; if (dx_get_limit(entries) != dx_node_limit(dir)) { ext4_warning_inode(dir, "dx entry: limit %u != node limit %u", dx_get_limit(entries), dx_node_limit(dir)); goto fail; } } fail: while (frame >= frame_in) { brelse(frame->bh); frame--; } if (ret_err == ERR_PTR(ERR_BAD_DX_DIR)) ext4_warning_inode(dir, "Corrupt directory, running e2fsck is recommended"); return ret_err; } static void dx_release(struct dx_frame *frames) { struct dx_root_info *info; int i; unsigned int indirect_levels; if (frames[0].bh == NULL) return; info = &((struct dx_root *)frames[0].bh->b_data)->info; /* save local copy, "info" may be freed after brelse() */ indirect_levels = info->indirect_levels; for (i = 0; i <= indirect_levels; i++) { if (frames[i].bh == NULL) break; brelse(frames[i].bh); frames[i].bh = NULL; } } /* * This function increments the frame pointer to search the next leaf * block, and reads in the necessary intervening nodes if the search * should be necessary. Whether or not the search is necessary is * controlled by the hash parameter. If the hash value is even, then * the search is only continued if the next block starts with that * hash value. This is used if we are searching for a specific file. * * If the hash value is HASH_NB_ALWAYS, then always go to the next block. * * This function returns 1 if the caller should continue to search, * or 0 if it should not. If there is an error reading one of the * index blocks, it will a negative error code. * * If start_hash is non-null, it will be filled in with the starting * hash of the next page. */ static int ext4_htree_next_block(struct inode *dir, __u32 hash, struct dx_frame *frame, struct dx_frame *frames, __u32 *start_hash) { struct dx_frame *p; struct buffer_head *bh; int num_frames = 0; __u32 bhash; p = frame; /* * Find the next leaf page by incrementing the frame pointer. * If we run out of entries in the interior node, loop around and * increment pointer in the parent node. When we break out of * this loop, num_frames indicates the number of interior * nodes need to be read. */ while (1) { if (++(p->at) < p->entries + dx_get_count(p->entries)) break; if (p == frames) return 0; num_frames++; p--; } /* * If the hash is 1, then continue only if the next page has a * continuation hash of any value. This is used for readdir * handling. Otherwise, check to see if the hash matches the * desired contiuation hash. If it doesn't, return since * there's no point to read in the successive index pages. */ bhash = dx_get_hash(p->at); if (start_hash) *start_hash = bhash; if ((hash & 1) == 0) { if ((bhash & ~1) != hash) return 0; } /* * If the hash is HASH_NB_ALWAYS, we always go to the next * block so no check is necessary */ while (num_frames--) { bh = ext4_read_dirblock(dir, dx_get_block(p->at), INDEX); if (IS_ERR(bh)) return PTR_ERR(bh); p++; brelse(p->bh); p->bh = bh; p->at = p->entries = ((struct dx_node *) bh->b_data)->entries; } return 1; } /* * This function fills a red-black tree with information from a * directory block. It returns the number directory entries loaded * into the tree. If there is an error it is returned in err. */ static int htree_dirblock_to_tree(struct file *dir_file, struct inode *dir, ext4_lblk_t block, struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, __u32 start_hash, __u32 start_minor_hash) { struct buffer_head *bh; struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, *top; int err = 0, count = 0; struct fscrypt_str fname_crypto_str = FSTR_INIT(NULL, 0), tmp_str; dxtrace(printk(KERN_INFO "In htree dirblock_to_tree: block %lu\n", (unsigned long)block)); bh = ext4_read_dirblock(dir, block, DIRENT_HTREE); if (IS_ERR(bh)) return PTR_ERR(bh); de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) bh->b_data; top = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) ((char *) de + dir->i_sb->s_blocksize - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(0)); /* Check if the directory is encrypted */ if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) { err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(dir); if (err < 0) { brelse(bh); return err; } err = fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(EXT4_NAME_LEN, &fname_crypto_str); if (err < 0) { brelse(bh); return err; } } for (; de < top; de = ext4_next_entry(de, dir->i_sb->s_blocksize)) { if (ext4_check_dir_entry(dir, NULL, de, bh, bh->b_data, bh->b_size, (block<<EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(dir->i_sb)) + ((char *)de - bh->b_data))) { /* silently ignore the rest of the block */ break; } ext4fs_dirhash(dir, de->name, de->name_len, hinfo); if ((hinfo->hash < start_hash) || ((hinfo->hash == start_hash) && (hinfo->minor_hash < start_minor_hash))) continue; if (de->inode == 0) continue; if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) { tmp_str.name = de->name; tmp_str.len = de->name_len; err = ext4_htree_store_dirent(dir_file, hinfo->hash, hinfo->minor_hash, de, &tmp_str); } else { int save_len = fname_crypto_str.len; struct fscrypt_str de_name = FSTR_INIT(de->name, de->name_len); /* Directory is encrypted */ err = fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(dir, hinfo->hash, hinfo->minor_hash, &de_name, &fname_crypto_str); if (err) { count = err; goto errout; } err = ext4_htree_store_dirent(dir_file, hinfo->hash, hinfo->minor_hash, de, &fname_crypto_str); fname_crypto_str.len = save_len; } if (err != 0) { count = err; goto errout; } count++; } errout: brelse(bh); fscrypt_fname_free_buffer(&fname_crypto_str); return count; } /* * This function fills a red-black tree with information from a * directory. We start scanning the directory in hash order, starting * at start_hash and start_minor_hash. * * This function returns the number of entries inserted into the tree, * or a negative error code. */ int ext4_htree_fill_tree(struct file *dir_file, __u32 start_hash, __u32 start_minor_hash, __u32 *next_hash) { struct dx_hash_info hinfo; struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de; struct dx_frame frames[EXT4_HTREE_LEVEL], *frame; struct inode *dir; ext4_lblk_t block; int count = 0; int ret, err; __u32 hashval; struct fscrypt_str tmp_str; dxtrace(printk(KERN_DEBUG "In htree_fill_tree, start hash: %x:%x\n", start_hash, start_minor_hash)); dir = file_inode(dir_file); if (!(ext4_test_inode_flag(dir, EXT4_INODE_INDEX))) { hinfo.hash_version = EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_def_hash_version; if (hinfo.hash_version <= DX_HASH_TEA) hinfo.hash_version += EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_hash_unsigned; hinfo.seed = EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_hash_seed; if (ext4_has_inline_data(dir)) { int has_inline_data = 1; count = ext4_inlinedir_to_tree(dir_file, dir, 0, &hinfo, start_hash, start_minor_hash, &has_inline_data); if (has_inline_data) { *next_hash = ~0; return count; } } count = htree_dirblock_to_tree(dir_file, dir, 0, &hinfo, start_hash, start_minor_hash); *next_hash = ~0; return count; } hinfo.hash = start_hash; hinfo.minor_hash = 0; frame = dx_probe(NULL, dir, &hinfo, frames); if (IS_ERR(frame)) return PTR_ERR(frame); /* Add '.' and '..' from the htree header */ if (!start_hash && !start_minor_hash) { de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) frames[0].bh->b_data; tmp_str.name = de->name; tmp_str.len = de->name_len; err = ext4_htree_store_dirent(dir_file, 0, 0, de, &tmp_str); if (err != 0) goto errout; count++; } if (start_hash < 2 || (start_hash ==2 && start_minor_hash==0)) { de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) frames[0].bh->b_data; de = ext4_next_entry(de, dir->i_sb->s_blocksize); tmp_str.name = de->name; tmp_str.len = de->name_len; err = ext4_htree_store_dirent(dir_file, 2, 0, de, &tmp_str); if (err != 0) goto errout; count++; } while (1) { if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) { err = -ERESTARTSYS; goto errout; } cond_resched(); block = dx_get_block(frame->at); ret = htree_dirblock_to_tree(dir_file, dir, block, &hinfo, start_hash, start_minor_hash); if (ret < 0) { err = ret; goto errout; } count += ret; hashval = ~0; ret = ext4_htree_next_block(dir, HASH_NB_ALWAYS, frame, frames, &hashval); *next_hash = hashval; if (ret < 0) { err = ret; goto errout; } /* * Stop if: (a) there are no more entries, or * (b) we have inserted at least one entry and the * next hash value is not a continuation */ if ((ret == 0) || (count && ((hashval & 1) == 0))) break; } dx_release(frames); dxtrace(printk(KERN_DEBUG "Fill tree: returned %d entries, " "next hash: %x\n", count, *next_hash)); return count; errout: dx_release(frames); return (err); } static inline int search_dirblock(struct buffer_head *bh, struct inode *dir, struct ext4_filename *fname, unsigned int offset, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **res_dir) { return ext4_search_dir(bh, bh->b_data, dir->i_sb->s_blocksize, dir, fname, offset, res_dir); } /* * Directory block splitting, compacting */ /* * Create map of hash values, offsets, and sizes, stored at end of block. * Returns number of entries mapped. */ static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, unsigned blocksize, struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, struct dx_map_entry *map_tail) { int count = 0; char *base = (char *) de; struct dx_hash_info h = *hinfo; while ((char *) de < base + blocksize) { if (de->name_len && de->inode) { ext4fs_dirhash(dir, de->name, de->name_len, &h); map_tail--; map_tail->hash = h.hash; map_tail->offs = ((char *) de - base)>>2; map_tail->size = le16_to_cpu(de->rec_len); count++; cond_resched(); } /* XXX: do we need to check rec_len == 0 case? -Chris */ de = ext4_next_entry(de, blocksize); } return count; } /* Sort map by hash value */ static void dx_sort_map (struct dx_map_entry *map, unsigned count) { struct dx_map_entry *p, *q, *top = map + count - 1; int more; /* Combsort until bubble sort doesn't suck */ while (count > 2) { count = count*10/13; if (count - 9 < 2) /* 9, 10 -> 11 */ count = 11; for (p = top, q = p - count; q >= map; p--, q--) if (p->hash < q->hash) swap(*p, *q); } /* Garden variety bubble sort */ do { more = 0; q = top; while (q-- > map) { if (q[1].hash >= q[0].hash) continue; swap(*(q+1), *q); more = 1; } } while(more); } static void dx_insert_block(struct dx_frame *frame, u32 hash, ext4_lblk_t block) { struct dx_entry *entries = frame->entries; struct dx_entry *old = frame->at, *new = old + 1; int count = dx_get_count(entries); assert(count < dx_get_limit(entries)); assert(old < entries + count); memmove(new + 1, new, (char *)(entries + count) - (char *)(new)); dx_set_hash(new, hash); dx_set_block(new, block); dx_set_count(entries, count + 1); } #ifdef CONFIG_UNICODE /* * Test whether a case-insensitive directory entry matches the filename * being searched for. If quick is set, assume the name being looked up * is already in the casefolded form. * * Returns: 0 if the directory entry matches, more than 0 if it * doesn't match or less than zero on error. */ int ext4_ci_compare(const struct inode *parent, const struct qstr *name, const struct qstr *entry, bool quick) { const struct super_block *sb = parent->i_sb; const struct unicode_map *um = sb->s_encoding; int ret; if (quick) ret = utf8_strncasecmp_folded(um, name, entry); else ret = utf8_strncasecmp(um, name, entry); if (ret < 0) { /* Handle invalid character sequence as either an error * or as an opaque byte sequence. */ if (sb_has_strict_encoding(sb)) return -EINVAL; if (name->len != entry->len) return 1; return !!memcmp(name->name, entry->name, name->len); } return ret; } void ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname, struct fscrypt_str *cf_name) { int len; if (!IS_CASEFOLDED(dir) || !dir->i_sb->s_encoding) { cf_name->name = NULL; return; } cf_name->name = kmalloc(EXT4_NAME_LEN, GFP_NOFS); if (!cf_name->name) return; len = utf8_casefold(dir->i_sb->s_encoding, iname, cf_name->name, EXT4_NAME_LEN); if (len <= 0) { kfree(cf_name->name); cf_name->name = NULL; return; } cf_name->len = (unsigned) len; } #endif /* * Test whether a directory entry matches the filename being searched for. * * Return: %true if the directory entry matches, otherwise %false. */ static inline bool ext4_match(const struct inode *parent, const struct ext4_filename *fname, const struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de) { struct fscrypt_name f; #ifdef CONFIG_UNICODE const struct qstr entry = {.name = de->name, .len = de->name_len}; #endif if (!de->inode) return false; f.usr_fname = fname->usr_fname; f.disk_name = fname->disk_name; #ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION f.crypto_buf = fname->crypto_buf; #endif #ifdef CONFIG_UNICODE if (parent->i_sb->s_encoding && IS_CASEFOLDED(parent)) { if (fname->cf_name.name) { struct qstr cf = {.name = fname->cf_name.name, .len = fname->cf_name.len}; return !ext4_ci_compare(parent, &cf, &entry, true); } return !ext4_ci_compare(parent, fname->usr_fname, &entry, false); } #endif return fscrypt_match_name(&f, de->name, de->name_len); } /* * Returns 0 if not found, -1 on failure, and 1 on success */ int ext4_search_dir(struct buffer_head *bh, char *search_buf, int buf_size, struct inode *dir, struct ext4_filename *fname, unsigned int offset, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **res_dir) { struct ext4_dir_entry_2 * de; char * dlimit; int de_len; de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *)search_buf; dlimit = search_buf + buf_size; while ((char *) de < dlimit) { /* this code is executed quadratically often */ /* do minimal checking `by hand' */ if ((char *) de + de->name_len <= dlimit && ext4_match(dir, fname, de)) { /* found a match - just to be sure, do * a full check */ if (ext4_check_dir_entry(dir, NULL, de, bh, search_buf, buf_size, offset)) return -1; *res_dir = de; return 1; } /* prevent looping on a bad block */ de_len = ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, dir->i_sb->s_blocksize); if (de_len <= 0) return -1; offset += de_len; de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) ((char *) de + de_len); } return 0; } static int is_dx_internal_node(struct inode *dir, ext4_lblk_t block, struct ext4_dir_entry *de) { struct super_block *sb = dir->i_sb; if (!is_dx(dir)) return 0; if (block == 0) return 1; if (de->inode == 0 && ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, sb->s_blocksize) == sb->s_blocksize) return 1; return 0; } /* * __ext4_find_entry() * * finds an entry in the specified directory with the wanted name. It * returns the cache buffer in which the entry was found, and the entry * itself (as a parameter - res_dir). It does NOT read the inode of the * entry - you'll have to do that yourself if you want to. * * The returned buffer_head has ->b_count elevated. The caller is expected * to brelse() it when appropriate. */ static struct buffer_head *__ext4_find_entry(struct inode *dir, struct ext4_filename *fname, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **res_dir, int *inlined) { struct super_block *sb; struct buffer_head *bh_use[NAMEI_RA_SIZE]; struct buffer_head *bh, *ret = NULL; ext4_lblk_t start, block; const u8 *name = fname->usr_fname->name; size_t ra_max = 0; /* Number of bh's in the readahead buffer, bh_use[] */ size_t ra_ptr = 0; /* Current index into readahead buffer */ ext4_lblk_t nblocks; int i, namelen, retval; *res_dir = NULL; sb = dir->i_sb; namelen = fname->usr_fname->len; if (namelen > EXT4_NAME_LEN) return NULL; if (ext4_has_inline_data(dir)) { int has_inline_data = 1; ret = ext4_find_inline_entry(dir, fname, res_dir, &has_inline_data); if (has_inline_data) { if (inlined) *inlined = 1; goto cleanup_and_exit; } } if ((namelen <= 2) && (name[0] == '.') && (name[1] == '.' || name[1] == '\0')) { /* * "." or ".." will only be in the first block * NFS may look up ".."; "." should be handled by the VFS */ block = start = 0; nblocks = 1; goto restart; } if (is_dx(dir)) { ret = ext4_dx_find_entry(dir, fname, res_dir); /* * On success, or if the error was file not found, * return. Otherwise, fall back to doing a search the * old fashioned way. */ if (!IS_ERR(ret) || PTR_ERR(ret) != ERR_BAD_DX_DIR) goto cleanup_and_exit; dxtrace(printk(KERN_DEBUG "ext4_find_entry: dx failed, " "falling back\n")); ret = NULL; } nblocks = dir->i_size >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb); if (!nblocks) { ret = NULL; goto cleanup_and_exit; } start = EXT4_I(dir)->i_dir_start_lookup; if (start >= nblocks) start = 0; block = start; restart: do { /* * We deal with the read-ahead logic here. */ cond_resched(); if (ra_ptr >= ra_max) { /* Refill the readahead buffer */ ra_ptr = 0; if (block < start) ra_max = start - block; else ra_max = nblocks - block; ra_max = min(ra_max, ARRAY_SIZE(bh_use)); retval = ext4_bread_batch(dir, block, ra_max, false /* wait */, bh_use); if (retval) { ret = ERR_PTR(retval); ra_max = 0; goto cleanup_and_exit; } } if ((bh = bh_use[ra_ptr++]) == NULL) goto next; wait_on_buffer(bh); if (!buffer_uptodate(bh)) { EXT4_ERROR_INODE_ERR(dir, EIO, "reading directory lblock %lu", (unsigned long) block); brelse(bh); ret = ERR_PTR(-EIO); goto cleanup_and_exit; } if (!buffer_verified(bh) && !is_dx_internal_node(dir, block, (struct ext4_dir_entry *)bh->b_data) && !ext4_dirblock_csum_verify(dir, bh)) { EXT4_ERROR_INODE_ERR(dir, EFSBADCRC, "checksumming directory " "block %lu", (unsigned long)block); brelse(bh); ret = ERR_PTR(-EFSBADCRC); goto cleanup_and_exit; } set_buffer_verified(bh); i = search_dirblock(bh, dir, fname, block << EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb), res_dir); if (i == 1) { EXT4_I(dir)->i_dir_start_lookup = block; ret = bh; goto cleanup_and_exit; } else { brelse(bh); if (i < 0) goto cleanup_and_exit; } next: if (++block >= nblocks) block = 0; } while (block != start); /* * If the directory has grown while we were searching, then * search the last part of the directory before giving up. */ block = nblocks; nblocks = dir->i_size >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb); if (block < nblocks) { start = 0; goto restart; } cleanup_and_exit: /* Clean up the read-ahead blocks */ for (; ra_ptr < ra_max; ra_ptr++) brelse(bh_use[ra_ptr]); return ret; } static struct buffer_head *ext4_find_entry(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *d_name, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **res_dir, int *inlined) { int err; struct ext4_filename fname; struct buffer_head *bh; err = ext4_fname_setup_filename(dir, d_name, 1, &fname); if (err == -ENOENT) return NULL; if (err) return ERR_PTR(err); bh = __ext4_find_entry(dir, &fname, res_dir, inlined); ext4_fname_free_filename(&fname); return bh; } static struct buffer_head *ext4_lookup_entry(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **res_dir) { int err; struct ext4_filename fname; struct buffer_head *bh; err = ext4_fname_prepare_lookup(dir, dentry, &fname); if (err == -ENOENT) return NULL; if (err) return ERR_PTR(err); bh = __ext4_find_entry(dir, &fname, res_dir, NULL); ext4_fname_free_filename(&fname); return bh; } static struct buffer_head * ext4_dx_find_entry(struct inode *dir, struct ext4_filename *fname, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **res_dir) { struct super_block * sb = dir->i_sb; struct dx_frame frames[EXT4_HTREE_LEVEL], *frame; struct buffer_head *bh; ext4_lblk_t block; int retval; #ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION *res_dir = NULL; #endif frame = dx_probe(fname, dir, NULL, frames); if (IS_ERR(frame)) return (struct buffer_head *) frame; do { block = dx_get_block(frame->at); bh = ext4_read_dirblock(dir, block, DIRENT_HTREE); if (IS_ERR(bh)) goto errout; retval = search_dirblock(bh, dir, fname, block << EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb), res_dir); if (retval == 1) goto success; brelse(bh); if (retval == -1) { bh = ERR_PTR(ERR_BAD_DX_DIR); goto errout; } /* Check to see if we should continue to search */ retval = ext4_htree_next_block(dir, fname->hinfo.hash, frame, frames, NULL); if (retval < 0) { ext4_warning_inode(dir, "error %d reading directory index block", retval); bh = ERR_PTR(retval); goto errout; } } while (retval == 1); bh = NULL; errout: dxtrace(printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s not found\n", fname->usr_fname->name)); success: dx_release(frames); return bh; } static struct dentry *ext4_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) { struct inode *inode; struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de; struct buffer_head *bh; if (dentry->d_name.len > EXT4_NAME_LEN) return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG); bh = ext4_lookup_entry(dir, dentry, &de); if (IS_ERR(bh)) return ERR_CAST(bh); inode = NULL; if (bh) { __u32 ino = le32_to_cpu(de->inode); brelse(bh); if (!ext4_valid_inum(dir->i_sb, ino)) { EXT4_ERROR_INODE(dir, "bad inode number: %u", ino); return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED); } if (unlikely(ino == dir->i_ino)) { EXT4_ERROR_INODE(dir, "'%pd' linked to parent dir", dentry); return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED); } inode = ext4_iget(dir->i_sb, ino, EXT4_IGET_NORMAL); if (inode == ERR_PTR(-ESTALE)) { EXT4_ERROR_INODE(dir, "deleted inode referenced: %u", ino); return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED); } if (!IS_ERR(inode) && IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) && (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) && !fscrypt_has_permitted_context(dir, inode)) { ext4_warning(inode->i_sb, "Inconsistent encryption contexts: %lu/%lu", dir->i_ino, inode->i_ino); iput(inode); return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); } } #ifdef CONFIG_UNICODE if (!inode && IS_CASEFOLDED(dir)) { /* Eventually we want to call d_add_ci(dentry, NULL) * for negative dentries in the encoding case as * well. For now, prevent the negative dentry * from being cached. */ return NULL; } #endif return d_splice_alias(inode, dentry); } struct dentry *ext4_get_parent(struct dentry *child) { __u32 ino; static const struct qstr dotdot = QSTR_INIT("..", 2); struct ext4_dir_entry_2 * de; struct buffer_head *bh; bh = ext4_find_entry(d_inode(child), &dotdot, &de, NULL); if (IS_ERR(bh)) return ERR_CAST(bh); if (!bh) return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); ino = le32_to_cpu(de->inode); brelse(bh); if (!ext4_valid_inum(child->d_sb, ino)) { EXT4_ERROR_INODE(d_inode(child), "bad parent inode number: %u", ino); return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED); } return d_obtain_alias(ext4_iget(child->d_sb, ino, EXT4_IGET_NORMAL)); } /* * Move count entries from end of map between two memory locations. * Returns pointer to last entry moved. */ static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 * dx_move_dirents(char *from, char *to, struct dx_map_entry *map, int count, unsigned blocksize) { unsigned rec_len = 0; while (count--) { struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) (from + (map->offs<<2)); rec_len = EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len); memcpy (to, de, rec_len); ((struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) to)->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(rec_len, blocksize); de->inode = 0; map++; to += rec_len; } return (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) (to - rec_len); } /* * Compact each dir entry in the range to the minimal rec_len. * Returns pointer to last entry in range. */ static struct ext4_dir_entry_2* dx_pack_dirents(char *base, unsigned blocksize) { struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *next, *to, *prev, *de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) base; unsigned rec_len = 0; prev = to = de; while ((char*)de < base + blocksize) { next = ext4_next_entry(de, blocksize); if (de->inode && de->name_len) { rec_len = EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len); if (de > to) memmove(to, de, rec_len); to->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(rec_len, blocksize); prev = to; to = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) (((char *) to) + rec_len); } de = next; } return prev; } /* * Split a full leaf block to make room for a new dir entry. * Allocate a new block, and move entries so that they are approx. equally full. * Returns pointer to de in block into which the new entry will be inserted. */ static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *do_split(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir, struct buffer_head **bh,struct dx_frame *frame, struct dx_hash_info *hinfo) { unsigned blocksize = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize; unsigned count, continued; struct buffer_head *bh2; ext4_lblk_t newblock; u32 hash2; struct dx_map_entry *map; char *data1 = (*bh)->b_data, *data2; unsigned split, move, size; struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de = NULL, *de2; int csum_size = 0; int err = 0, i; if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(dir->i_sb)) csum_size = sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail); bh2 = ext4_append(handle, dir, &newblock); if (IS_ERR(bh2)) { brelse(*bh); *bh = NULL; return (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) bh2; } BUFFER_TRACE(*bh, "get_write_access"); err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, *bh); if (err) goto journal_error; BUFFER_TRACE(frame->bh, "get_write_access"); err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, frame->bh); if (err) goto journal_error; data2 = bh2->b_data; /* create map in the end of data2 block */ map = (struct dx_map_entry *) (data2 + blocksize); count = dx_make_map(dir, (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) data1, blocksize, hinfo, map); map -= count; dx_sort_map(map, count); /* Ensure that neither split block is over half full */ size = 0; move = 0; for (i = count-1; i >= 0; i--) { /* is more than half of this entry in 2nd half of the block? */ if (size + map[i].size/2 > blocksize/2) break; size += map[i].size; move++; } /* * map index at which we will split * * If the sum of active entries didn't exceed half the block size, just * split it in half by count; each resulting block will have at least * half the space free. */ if (i > 0) split = count - move; else split = count/2; hash2 = map[split].hash; continued = hash2 == map[split - 1].hash; dxtrace(printk(KERN_INFO "Split block %lu at %x, %i/%i\n", (unsigned long)dx_get_block(frame->at), hash2, split, count-split)); /* Fancy dance to stay within two buffers */ de2 = dx_move_dirents(data1, data2, map + split, count - split, blocksize); de = dx_pack_dirents(data1, blocksize); de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(data1 + (blocksize - csum_size) - (char *) de, blocksize); de2->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(data2 + (blocksize - csum_size) - (char *) de2, blocksize); if (csum_size) { ext4_initialize_dirent_tail(*bh, blocksize); ext4_initialize_dirent_tail(bh2, blocksize); } dxtrace(dx_show_leaf(dir, hinfo, (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) data1, blocksize, 1)); dxtrace(dx_show_leaf(dir, hinfo, (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) data2, blocksize, 1)); /* Which block gets the new entry? */ if (hinfo->hash >= hash2) { swap(*bh, bh2); de = de2; } dx_insert_block(frame, hash2 + continued, newblock); err = ext4_handle_dirty_dirblock(handle, dir, bh2); if (err) goto journal_error; err = ext4_handle_dirty_dx_node(handle, dir, frame->bh); if (err) goto journal_error; brelse(bh2); dxtrace(dx_show_index("frame", frame->entries)); return de; journal_error: brelse(*bh); brelse(bh2); *bh = NULL; ext4_std_error(dir->i_sb, err); return ERR_PTR(err); } int ext4_find_dest_de(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head *bh, void *buf, int buf_size, struct ext4_filename *fname, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **dest_de) { struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de; unsigned short reclen = EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(fname_len(fname)); int nlen, rlen; unsigned int offset = 0; char *top; de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *)buf; top = buf + buf_size - reclen; while ((char *) de <= top) { if (ext4_check_dir_entry(dir, NULL, de, bh, buf, buf_size, offset)) return -EFSCORRUPTED; if (ext4_match(dir, fname, de)) return -EEXIST; nlen = EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len); rlen = ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, buf_size); if ((de->inode ? rlen - nlen : rlen) >= reclen) break; de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *)((char *)de + rlen); offset += rlen; } if ((char *) de > top) return -ENOSPC; *dest_de = de; return 0; } void ext4_insert_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, int buf_size, struct ext4_filename *fname) { int nlen, rlen; nlen = EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len); rlen = ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, buf_size); if (de->inode) { struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de1 = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *)((char *)de + nlen); de1->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(rlen - nlen, buf_size); de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(nlen, buf_size); de = de1; } de->file_type = EXT4_FT_UNKNOWN; de->inode = cpu_to_le32(inode->i_ino); ext4_set_de_type(inode->i_sb, de, inode->i_mode); de->name_len = fname_len(fname); memcpy(de->name, fname_name(fname), fname_len(fname)); } /* * Add a new entry into a directory (leaf) block. If de is non-NULL, * it points to a directory entry which is guaranteed to be large * enough for new directory entry. If de is NULL, then * add_dirent_to_buf will attempt search the directory block for * space. It will return -ENOSPC if no space is available, and -EIO * and -EEXIST if directory entry already exists. */ static int add_dirent_to_buf(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_filename *fname, struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, struct buffer_head *bh) { unsigned int blocksize = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize; int csum_size = 0; int err, err2; if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(inode->i_sb)) csum_size = sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail); if (!de) { err = ext4_find_dest_de(dir, inode, bh, bh->b_data, blocksize - csum_size, fname, &de); if (err) return err; } BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "get_write_access"); err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, bh); if (err) { ext4_std_error(dir->i_sb, err); return err; } /* By now the buffer is marked for journaling */ ext4_insert_dentry(inode, de, blocksize, fname); /* * XXX shouldn't update any times until successful * completion of syscall, but too many callers depend * on this. * * XXX similarly, too many callers depend on * ext4_new_inode() setting the times, but error * recovery deletes the inode, so the worst that can * happen is that the times are slightly out of date * and/or different from the directory change time. */ dir->i_mtime = dir->i_ctime = current_time(dir); ext4_update_dx_flag(dir); inode_inc_iversion(dir); err2 = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, dir); BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "call ext4_handle_dirty_metadata"); err = ext4_handle_dirty_dirblock(handle, dir, bh); if (err) ext4_std_error(dir->i_sb, err); return err ? err : err2; } /* * This converts a one block unindexed directory to a 3 block indexed * directory, and adds the dentry to the indexed directory. */ static int make_indexed_dir(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_filename *fname, struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head *bh) { struct buffer_head *bh2; struct dx_root *root; struct dx_frame frames[EXT4_HTREE_LEVEL], *frame; struct dx_entry *entries; struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, *de2; char *data2, *top; unsigned len; int retval; unsigned blocksize; ext4_lblk_t block; struct fake_dirent *fde; int csum_size = 0; if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(inode->i_sb)) csum_size = sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail); blocksize = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize; dxtrace(printk(KERN_DEBUG "Creating index: inode %lu\n", dir->i_ino)); BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "get_write_access"); retval = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, bh); if (retval) { ext4_std_error(dir->i_sb, retval); brelse(bh); return retval; } root = (struct dx_root *) bh->b_data; /* The 0th block becomes the root, move the dirents out */ fde = &root->dotdot; de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *)((char *)fde + ext4_rec_len_from_disk(fde->rec_len, blocksize)); if ((char *) de >= (((char *) root) + blocksize)) { EXT4_ERROR_INODE(dir, "invalid rec_len for '..'"); brelse(bh); return -EFSCORRUPTED; } len = ((char *) root) + (blocksize - csum_size) - (char *) de; /* Allocate new block for the 0th block's dirents */ bh2 = ext4_append(handle, dir, &block); if (IS_ERR(bh2)) { brelse(bh); return PTR_ERR(bh2); } ext4_set_inode_flag(dir, EXT4_INODE_INDEX); data2 = bh2->b_data; memcpy(data2, de, len); de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) data2; top = data2 + len; while ((char *)(de2 = ext4_next_entry(de, blocksize)) < top) de = de2; de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(data2 + (blocksize - csum_size) - (char *) de, blocksize); if (csum_size) ext4_initialize_dirent_tail(bh2, blocksize); /* Initialize the root; the dot dirents already exist */ de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) (&root->dotdot); de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(blocksize - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(2), blocksize); memset (&root->info, 0, sizeof(root->info)); root->info.info_length = sizeof(root->info); root->info.hash_version = EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_def_hash_version; entries = root->entries; dx_set_block(entries, 1); dx_set_count(entries, 1); dx_set_limit(entries, dx_root_limit(dir, sizeof(root->info))); /* Initialize as for dx_probe */ fname->hinfo.hash_version = root->info.hash_version; if (fname->hinfo.hash_version <= DX_HASH_TEA) fname->hinfo.hash_version += EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_hash_unsigned; fname->hinfo.seed = EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_hash_seed; ext4fs_dirhash(dir, fname_name(fname), fname_len(fname), &fname->hinfo); memset(frames, 0, sizeof(frames)); frame = frames; frame->entries = entries; frame->at = entries; frame->bh = bh; retval = ext4_handle_dirty_dx_node(handle, dir, frame->bh); if (retval) goto out_frames; retval = ext4_handle_dirty_dirblock(handle, dir, bh2); if (retval) goto out_frames; de = do_split(handle,dir, &bh2, frame, &fname->hinfo); if (IS_ERR(de)) { retval = PTR_ERR(de); goto out_frames; } retval = add_dirent_to_buf(handle, fname, dir, inode, de, bh2); out_frames: /* * Even if the block split failed, we have to properly write * out all the changes we did so far. Otherwise we can end up * with corrupted filesystem. */ if (retval) ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, dir); dx_release(frames); brelse(bh2); return retval; } /* * ext4_add_entry() * * adds a file entry to the specified directory, using the same * semantics as ext4_find_entry(). It returns NULL if it failed. * * NOTE!! The inode part of 'de' is left at 0 - which means you * may not sleep between calling this and putting something into * the entry, as someone else might have used it while you slept. */ static int ext4_add_entry(handle_t *handle, struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) { struct inode *dir = d_inode(dentry->d_parent); struct buffer_head *bh = NULL; struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de; struct super_block *sb; struct ext4_filename fname; int retval; int dx_fallback=0; unsigned blocksize; ext4_lblk_t block, blocks; int csum_size = 0; if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(inode->i_sb)) csum_size = sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail); sb = dir->i_sb; blocksize = sb->s_blocksize; if (!dentry->d_name.len) return -EINVAL; if (fscrypt_is_nokey_name(dentry)) return -ENOKEY; #ifdef CONFIG_UNICODE if (sb_has_strict_encoding(sb) && IS_CASEFOLDED(dir) && sb->s_encoding && utf8_validate(sb->s_encoding, &dentry->d_name)) return -EINVAL; #endif retval = ext4_fname_setup_filename(dir, &dentry->d_name, 0, &fname); if (retval) return retval; if (ext4_has_inline_data(dir)) { retval = ext4_try_add_inline_entry(handle, &fname, dir, inode); if (retval < 0) goto out; if (retval == 1) { retval = 0; goto out; } } if (is_dx(dir)) { retval = ext4_dx_add_entry(handle, &fname, dir, inode); if (!retval || (retval != ERR_BAD_DX_DIR)) goto out; /* Can we just ignore htree data? */ if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(sb)) { EXT4_ERROR_INODE(dir, "Directory has corrupted htree index."); retval = -EFSCORRUPTED; goto out; } ext4_clear_inode_flag(dir, EXT4_INODE_INDEX); dx_fallback++; retval = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, dir); if (unlikely(retval)) goto out; } blocks = dir->i_size >> sb->s_blocksize_bits; for (block = 0; block < blocks; block++) { bh = ext4_read_dirblock(dir, block, DIRENT); if (bh == NULL) { bh = ext4_bread(handle, dir, block, EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE); goto add_to_new_block; } if (IS_ERR(bh)) { retval = PTR_ERR(bh); bh = NULL; goto out; } retval = add_dirent_to_buf(handle, &fname, dir, inode, NULL, bh); if (retval != -ENOSPC) goto out; if (blocks == 1 && !dx_fallback && ext4_has_feature_dir_index(sb)) { retval = make_indexed_dir(handle, &fname, dir, inode, bh); bh = NULL; /* make_indexed_dir releases bh */ goto out; } brelse(bh); } bh = ext4_append(handle, dir, &block); add_to_new_block: if (IS_ERR(bh)) { retval = PTR_ERR(bh); bh = NULL; goto out; } de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) bh->b_data; de->inode = 0; de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(blocksize - csum_size, blocksize); if (csum_size) ext4_initialize_dirent_tail(bh, blocksize); retval = add_dirent_to_buf(handle, &fname, dir, inode, de, bh); out: ext4_fname_free_filename(&fname); brelse(bh); if (retval == 0) ext4_set_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_NEWENTRY); return retval; } /* * Returns 0 for success, or a negative error value */ static int ext4_dx_add_entry(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_filename *fname, struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode) { struct dx_frame frames[EXT4_HTREE_LEVEL], *frame; struct dx_entry *entries, *at; struct buffer_head *bh; struct super_block *sb = dir->i_sb; struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de; int restart; int err; again: restart = 0; frame = dx_probe(fname, dir, NULL, frames); if (IS_ERR(frame)) return PTR_ERR(frame); entries = frame->entries; at = frame->at; bh = ext4_read_dirblock(dir, dx_get_block(frame->at), DIRENT_HTREE); if (IS_ERR(bh)) { err = PTR_ERR(bh); bh = NULL; goto cleanup; } BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "get_write_access"); err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, bh); if (err) goto journal_error; err = add_dirent_to_buf(handle, fname, dir, inode, NULL, bh); if (err != -ENOSPC) goto cleanup; err = 0; /* Block full, should compress but for now just split */ dxtrace(printk(KERN_DEBUG "using %u of %u node entries\n", dx_get_count(entries), dx_get_limit(entries))); /* Need to split index? */ if (dx_get_count(entries) == dx_get_limit(entries)) { ext4_lblk_t newblock; int levels = frame - frames + 1; unsigned int icount; int add_level = 1; struct dx_entry *entries2; struct dx_node *node2; struct buffer_head *bh2; while (frame > frames) { if (dx_get_count((frame - 1)->entries) < dx_get_limit((frame - 1)->entries)) { add_level = 0; break; } frame--; /* split higher index block */ at = frame->at; entries = frame->entries; restart = 1; } if (add_level && levels == ext4_dir_htree_level(sb)) { ext4_warning(sb, "Directory (ino: %lu) index full, " "reach max htree level :%d", dir->i_ino, levels); if (ext4_dir_htree_level(sb) < EXT4_HTREE_LEVEL) { ext4_warning(sb, "Large directory feature is " "not enabled on this " "filesystem"); } err = -ENOSPC; goto cleanup; } icount = dx_get_count(entries); bh2 = ext4_append(handle, dir, &newblock); if (IS_ERR(bh2)) { err = PTR_ERR(bh2); goto cleanup; } node2 = (struct dx_node *)(bh2->b_data); entries2 = node2->entries; memset(&node2->fake, 0, sizeof(struct fake_dirent)); node2->fake.rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(sb->s_blocksize, sb->s_blocksize); BUFFER_TRACE(frame->bh, "get_write_access"); err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, frame->bh); if (err) goto journal_error; if (!add_level) { unsigned icount1 = icount/2, icount2 = icount - icount1; unsigned hash2 = dx_get_hash(entries + icount1); dxtrace(printk(KERN_DEBUG "Split index %i/%i\n", icount1, icount2)); BUFFER_TRACE(frame->bh, "get_write_access"); /* index root */ err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, (frame - 1)->bh); if (err) goto journal_error; memcpy((char *) entries2, (char *) (entries + icount1), icount2 * sizeof(struct dx_entry)); dx_set_count(entries, icount1); dx_set_count(entries2, icount2); dx_set_limit(entries2, dx_node_limit(dir)); /* Which index block gets the new entry? */ if (at - entries >= icount1) { frame->at = at = at - entries - icount1 + entries2; frame->entries = entries = entries2; swap(frame->bh, bh2); } dx_insert_block((frame - 1), hash2, newblock); dxtrace(dx_show_index("node", frame->entries)); dxtrace(dx_show_index("node", ((struct dx_node *) bh2->b_data)->entries)); err = ext4_handle_dirty_dx_node(handle, dir, bh2); if (err) goto journal_error; brelse (bh2); err = ext4_handle_dirty_dx_node(handle, dir, (frame - 1)->bh); if (err) goto journal_error; err = ext4_handle_dirty_dx_node(handle, dir, frame->bh); if (restart || err) goto journal_error; } else { struct dx_root *dxroot; memcpy((char *) entries2, (char *) entries, icount * sizeof(struct dx_entry)); dx_set_limit(entries2, dx_node_limit(dir)); /* Set up root */ dx_set_count(entries, 1); dx_set_block(entries + 0, newblock); dxroot = (struct dx_root *)frames[0].bh->b_data; dxroot->info.indirect_levels += 1; dxtrace(printk(KERN_DEBUG "Creating %d level index...\n", dxroot->info.indirect_levels)); err = ext4_handle_dirty_dx_node(handle, dir, frame->bh); if (err) goto journal_error; err = ext4_handle_dirty_dx_node(handle, dir, bh2); brelse(bh2); restart = 1; goto journal_error; } } de = do_split(handle, dir, &bh, frame, &fname->hinfo); if (IS_ERR(de)) { err = PTR_ERR(de); goto cleanup; } err = add_dirent_to_buf(handle, fname, dir, inode, de, bh); goto cleanup; journal_error: ext4_std_error(dir->i_sb, err); /* this is a no-op if err == 0 */ cleanup: brelse(bh); dx_release(frames); /* @restart is true means htree-path has been changed, we need to * repeat dx_probe() to find out valid htree-path */ if (restart && err == 0) goto again; return err; } /* * ext4_generic_delete_entry deletes a directory entry by merging it * with the previous entry */ int ext4_generic_delete_entry(struct inode *dir, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de_del, struct buffer_head *bh, void *entry_buf, int buf_size, int csum_size) { struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, *pde; unsigned int blocksize = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize; int i; i = 0; pde = NULL; de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *)entry_buf; while (i < buf_size - csum_size) { if (ext4_check_dir_entry(dir, NULL, de, bh, entry_buf, buf_size, i)) return -EFSCORRUPTED; if (de == de_del) { if (pde) pde->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk( ext4_rec_len_from_disk(pde->rec_len, blocksize) + ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, blocksize), blocksize); else de->inode = 0; inode_inc_iversion(dir); return 0; } i += ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, blocksize); pde = de; de = ext4_next_entry(de, blocksize); } return -ENOENT; } static int ext4_delete_entry(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de_del, struct buffer_head *bh) { int err, csum_size = 0; if (ext4_has_inline_data(dir)) { int has_inline_data = 1; err = ext4_delete_inline_entry(handle, dir, de_del, bh, &has_inline_data); if (has_inline_data) return err; } if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(dir->i_sb)) csum_size = sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail); BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "get_write_access"); err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, bh); if (unlikely(err)) goto out; err = ext4_generic_delete_entry(dir, de_del, bh, bh->b_data, dir->i_sb->s_blocksize, csum_size); if (err) goto out; BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "call ext4_handle_dirty_metadata"); err = ext4_handle_dirty_dirblock(handle, dir, bh); if (unlikely(err)) goto out; return 0; out: if (err != -ENOENT) ext4_std_error(dir->i_sb, err); return err; } /* * Set directory link count to 1 if nlinks > EXT4_LINK_MAX, or if nlinks == 2 * since this indicates that nlinks count was previously 1 to avoid overflowing * the 16-bit i_links_count field on disk. Directories with i_nlink == 1 mean * that subdirectory link counts are not being maintained accurately. * * The caller has already checked for i_nlink overflow in case the DIR_LINK * feature is not enabled and returned -EMLINK. The is_dx() check is a proxy * for checking S_ISDIR(inode) (since the INODE_INDEX feature will not be set * on regular files) and to avoid creating huge/slow non-HTREE directories. */ static void ext4_inc_count(struct inode *inode) { inc_nlink(inode); if (is_dx(inode) && (inode->i_nlink > EXT4_LINK_MAX || inode->i_nlink == 2)) set_nlink(inode, 1); } /* * If a directory had nlink == 1, then we should let it be 1. This indicates * directory has >EXT4_LINK_MAX subdirs. */ static void ext4_dec_count(struct inode *inode) { if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) || inode->i_nlink > 2) drop_nlink(inode); } /* * Add non-directory inode to a directory. On success, the inode reference is * consumed by dentry is instantiation. This is also indicated by clearing of * *inodep pointer. On failure, the caller is responsible for dropping the * inode reference in the safe context. */ static int ext4_add_nondir(handle_t *handle, struct dentry *dentry, struct inode **inodep) { struct inode *dir = d_inode(dentry->d_parent); struct inode *inode = *inodep; int err = ext4_add_entry(handle, dentry, inode); if (!err) { err = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode); if (IS_DIRSYNC(dir)) ext4_handle_sync(handle); d_instantiate_new(dentry, inode); *inodep = NULL; return err; } drop_nlink(inode); ext4_orphan_add(handle, inode); unlock_new_inode(inode); return err; } /* * By the time this is called, we already have created * the directory cache entry for the new file, but it * is so far negative - it has no inode. * * If the create succeeds, we fill in the inode information * with d_instantiate(). */ static int ext4_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, bool excl) { handle_t *handle; struct inode *inode; int err, credits, retries = 0; err = dquot_initialize(dir); if (err) return err; credits = (EXT4_DATA_TRANS_BLOCKS(dir->i_sb) + EXT4_INDEX_EXTRA_TRANS_BLOCKS + 3); retry: inode = ext4_new_inode_start_handle(dir, mode, &dentry->d_name, 0, NULL, EXT4_HT_DIR, credits); handle = ext4_journal_current_handle(); err = PTR_ERR(inode); if (!IS_ERR(inode)) { inode->i_op = &ext4_file_inode_operations; inode->i_fop = &ext4_file_operations; ext4_set_aops(inode); err = ext4_add_nondir(handle, dentry, &inode); if (!err) ext4_fc_track_create(handle, dentry); } if (handle) ext4_journal_stop(handle); if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(inode)) iput(inode); if (err == -ENOSPC && ext4_should_retry_alloc(dir->i_sb, &retries)) goto retry; return err; } static int ext4_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t rdev) { handle_t *handle; struct inode *inode; int err, credits, retries = 0; err = dquot_initialize(dir); if (err) return err; credits = (EXT4_DATA_TRANS_BLOCKS(dir->i_sb) + EXT4_INDEX_EXTRA_TRANS_BLOCKS + 3); retry: inode = ext4_new_inode_start_handle(dir, mode, &dentry->d_name, 0, NULL, EXT4_HT_DIR, credits); handle = ext4_journal_current_handle(); err = PTR_ERR(inode); if (!IS_ERR(inode)) { init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode, rdev); inode->i_op = &ext4_special_inode_operations; err = ext4_add_nondir(handle, dentry, &inode); if (!err) ext4_fc_track_create(handle, dentry); } if (handle) ext4_journal_stop(handle); if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(inode)) iput(inode); if (err == -ENOSPC && ext4_should_retry_alloc(dir->i_sb, &retries)) goto retry; return err; } static int ext4_tmpfile(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) { handle_t *handle; struct inode *inode; int err, retries = 0; err = dquot_initialize(dir); if (err) return err; retry: inode = ext4_new_inode_start_handle(dir, mode, NULL, 0, NULL, EXT4_HT_DIR, EXT4_MAXQUOTAS_INIT_BLOCKS(dir->i_sb) + 4 + EXT4_XATTR_TRANS_BLOCKS); handle = ext4_journal_current_handle(); err = PTR_ERR(inode); if (!IS_ERR(inode)) { inode->i_op = &ext4_file_inode_operations; inode->i_fop = &ext4_file_operations; ext4_set_aops(inode); d_tmpfile(dentry, inode); err = ext4_orphan_add(handle, inode); if (err) goto err_unlock_inode; mark_inode_dirty(inode); unlock_new_inode(inode); } if (handle) ext4_journal_stop(handle); if (err == -ENOSPC && ext4_should_retry_alloc(dir->i_sb, &retries)) goto retry; return err; err_unlock_inode: ext4_journal_stop(handle); unlock_new_inode(inode); return err; } struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *ext4_init_dot_dotdot(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, int blocksize, int csum_size, unsigned int parent_ino, int dotdot_real_len) { de->inode = cpu_to_le32(inode->i_ino); de->name_len = 1; de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len), blocksize); strcpy(de->name, "."); ext4_set_de_type(inode->i_sb, de, S_IFDIR); de = ext4_next_entry(de, blocksize); de->inode = cpu_to_le32(parent_ino); de->name_len = 2; if (!dotdot_real_len) de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(blocksize - (csum_size + EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1)), blocksize); else de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk( EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len), blocksize); strcpy(de->name, ".."); ext4_set_de_type(inode->i_sb, de, S_IFDIR); return ext4_next_entry(de, blocksize); } int ext4_init_new_dir(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode) { struct buffer_head *dir_block = NULL; struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de; ext4_lblk_t block = 0; unsigned int blocksize = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize; int csum_size = 0; int err; if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(dir->i_sb)) csum_size = sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail); if (ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA)) { err = ext4_try_create_inline_dir(handle, dir, inode); if (err < 0 && err != -ENOSPC) goto out; if (!err) goto out; } inode->i_size = 0; dir_block = ext4_append(handle, inode, &block); if (IS_ERR(dir_block)) return PTR_ERR(dir_block); de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *)dir_block->b_data; ext4_init_dot_dotdot(inode, de, blocksize, csum_size, dir->i_ino, 0); set_nlink(inode, 2); if (csum_size) ext4_initialize_dirent_tail(dir_block, blocksize); BUFFER_TRACE(dir_block, "call ext4_handle_dirty_metadata"); err = ext4_handle_dirty_dirblock(handle, inode, dir_block); if (err) goto out; set_buffer_verified(dir_block); out: brelse(dir_block); return err; } static int ext4_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) { handle_t *handle; struct inode *inode; int err, err2 = 0, credits, retries = 0; if (EXT4_DIR_LINK_MAX(dir)) return -EMLINK; err = dquot_initialize(dir); if (err) return err; credits = (EXT4_DATA_TRANS_BLOCKS(dir->i_sb) + EXT4_INDEX_EXTRA_TRANS_BLOCKS + 3); retry: inode = ext4_new_inode_start_handle(dir, S_IFDIR | mode, &dentry->d_name, 0, NULL, EXT4_HT_DIR, credits); handle = ext4_journal_current_handle(); err = PTR_ERR(inode); if (IS_ERR(inode)) goto out_stop; inode->i_op = &ext4_dir_inode_operations; inode->i_fop = &ext4_dir_operations; err = ext4_init_new_dir(handle, dir, inode); if (err) goto out_clear_inode; err = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode); if (!err) err = ext4_add_entry(handle, dentry, inode); if (err) { out_clear_inode: clear_nlink(inode); ext4_orphan_add(handle, inode); unlock_new_inode(inode); err2 = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode); if (unlikely(err2)) err = err2; ext4_journal_stop(handle); iput(inode); goto out_retry; } ext4_inc_count(dir); ext4_update_dx_flag(dir); err = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, dir); if (err) goto out_clear_inode; d_instantiate_new(dentry, inode); ext4_fc_track_create(handle, dentry); if (IS_DIRSYNC(dir)) ext4_handle_sync(handle); out_stop: if (handle) ext4_journal_stop(handle); out_retry: if (err == -ENOSPC && ext4_should_retry_alloc(dir->i_sb, &retries)) goto retry; return err; } /* * routine to check that the specified directory is empty (for rmdir) */ bool ext4_empty_dir(struct inode *inode) { unsigned int offset; struct buffer_head *bh; struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de; struct super_block *sb; if (ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) { int has_inline_data = 1; int ret; ret = empty_inline_dir(inode, &has_inline_data); if (has_inline_data) return ret; } sb = inode->i_sb; if (inode->i_size < EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1) + EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(2)) { EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "invalid size"); return true; } /* The first directory block must not be a hole, * so treat it as DIRENT_HTREE */ bh = ext4_read_dirblock(inode, 0, DIRENT_HTREE); if (IS_ERR(bh)) return true; de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) bh->b_data; if (ext4_check_dir_entry(inode, NULL, de, bh, bh->b_data, bh->b_size, 0) || le32_to_cpu(de->inode) != inode->i_ino || strcmp(".", de->name)) { ext4_warning_inode(inode, "directory missing '.'"); brelse(bh); return true; } offset = ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, sb->s_blocksize); de = ext4_next_entry(de, sb->s_blocksize); if (ext4_check_dir_entry(inode, NULL, de, bh, bh->b_data, bh->b_size, offset) || le32_to_cpu(de->inode) == 0 || strcmp("..", de->name)) { ext4_warning_inode(inode, "directory missing '..'"); brelse(bh); return true; } offset += ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, sb->s_blocksize); while (offset < inode->i_size) { if (!(offset & (sb->s_blocksize - 1))) { unsigned int lblock; brelse(bh); lblock = offset >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb); bh = ext4_read_dirblock(inode, lblock, EITHER); if (bh == NULL) { offset += sb->s_blocksize; continue; } if (IS_ERR(bh)) return true; } de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) (bh->b_data + (offset & (sb->s_blocksize - 1))); if (ext4_check_dir_entry(inode, NULL, de, bh, bh->b_data, bh->b_size, offset)) { offset = (offset | (sb->s_blocksize - 1)) + 1; continue; } if (le32_to_cpu(de->inode)) { brelse(bh); return false; } offset += ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, sb->s_blocksize); } brelse(bh); return true; } /* * ext4_orphan_add() links an unlinked or truncated inode into a list of * such inodes, starting at the superblock, in case we crash before the * file is closed/deleted, or in case the inode truncate spans multiple * transactions and the last transaction is not recovered after a crash. * * At filesystem recovery time, we walk this list deleting unlinked * inodes and truncating linked inodes in ext4_orphan_cleanup(). * * Orphan list manipulation functions must be called under i_mutex unless * we are just creating the inode or deleting it. */ int ext4_orphan_add(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode) { struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb; struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb); struct ext4_iloc iloc; int err = 0, rc; bool dirty = false; if (!sbi->s_journal || is_bad_inode(inode)) return 0; WARN_ON_ONCE(!(inode->i_state & (I_NEW | I_FREEING)) && !inode_is_locked(inode)); /* * Exit early if inode already is on orphan list. This is a big speedup * since we don't have to contend on the global s_orphan_lock. */ if (!list_empty(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_orphan)) return 0; /* * Orphan handling is only valid for files with data blocks * being truncated, or files being unlinked. Note that we either * hold i_mutex, or the inode can not be referenced from outside, * so i_nlink should not be bumped due to race */ J_ASSERT((S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) || inode->i_nlink == 0); BUFFER_TRACE(sbi->s_sbh, "get_write_access"); err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, sbi->s_sbh); if (err) goto out; err = ext4_reserve_inode_write(handle, inode, &iloc); if (err) goto out; mutex_lock(&sbi->s_orphan_lock); /* * Due to previous errors inode may be already a part of on-disk * orphan list. If so skip on-disk list modification. */ if (!NEXT_ORPHAN(inode) || NEXT_ORPHAN(inode) > (le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_inodes_count))) { /* Insert this inode at the head of the on-disk orphan list */ NEXT_ORPHAN(inode) = le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_last_orphan); sbi->s_es->s_last_orphan = cpu_to_le32(inode->i_ino); dirty = true; } list_add(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_orphan, &sbi->s_orphan); mutex_unlock(&sbi->s_orphan_lock); if (dirty) { err = ext4_handle_dirty_super(handle, sb); rc = ext4_mark_iloc_dirty(handle, inode, &iloc); if (!err) err = rc; if (err) { /* * We have to remove inode from in-memory list if * addition to on disk orphan list failed. Stray orphan * list entries can cause panics at unmount time. */ mutex_lock(&sbi->s_orphan_lock); list_del_init(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_orphan); mutex_unlock(&sbi->s_orphan_lock); } } else brelse(iloc.bh); jbd_debug(4, "superblock will point to %lu\n", inode->i_ino); jbd_debug(4, "orphan inode %lu will point to %d\n", inode->i_ino, NEXT_ORPHAN(inode)); out: ext4_std_error(sb, err); return err; } /* * ext4_orphan_del() removes an unlinked or truncated inode from the list * of such inodes stored on disk, because it is finally being cleaned up. */ int ext4_orphan_del(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode) { struct list_head *prev; struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode); struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb); __u32 ino_next; struct ext4_iloc iloc; int err = 0; if (!sbi->s_journal && !(sbi->s_mount_state & EXT4_ORPHAN_FS)) return 0; WARN_ON_ONCE(!(inode->i_state & (I_NEW | I_FREEING)) && !inode_is_locked(inode)); /* Do this quick check before taking global s_orphan_lock. */ if (list_empty(&ei->i_orphan)) return 0; if (handle) { /* Grab inode buffer early before taking global s_orphan_lock */ err = ext4_reserve_inode_write(handle, inode, &iloc); } mutex_lock(&sbi->s_orphan_lock); jbd_debug(4, "remove inode %lu from orphan list\n", inode->i_ino); prev = ei->i_orphan.prev; list_del_init(&ei->i_orphan); /* If we're on an error path, we may not have a valid * transaction handle with which to update the orphan list on * disk, but we still need to remove the inode from the linked * list in memory. */ if (!handle || err) { mutex_unlock(&sbi->s_orphan_lock); goto out_err; } ino_next = NEXT_ORPHAN(inode); if (prev == &sbi->s_orphan) { jbd_debug(4, "superblock will point to %u\n", ino_next); BUFFER_TRACE(sbi->s_sbh, "get_write_access"); err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, sbi->s_sbh); if (err) { mutex_unlock(&sbi->s_orphan_lock); goto out_brelse; } sbi->s_es->s_last_orphan = cpu_to_le32(ino_next); mutex_unlock(&sbi->s_orphan_lock); err = ext4_handle_dirty_super(handle, inode->i_sb); } else { struct ext4_iloc iloc2; struct inode *i_prev = &list_entry(prev, struct ext4_inode_info, i_orphan)->vfs_inode; jbd_debug(4, "orphan inode %lu will point to %u\n", i_prev->i_ino, ino_next); err = ext4_reserve_inode_write(handle, i_prev, &iloc2); if (err) { mutex_unlock(&sbi->s_orphan_lock); goto out_brelse; } NEXT_ORPHAN(i_prev) = ino_next; err = ext4_mark_iloc_dirty(handle, i_prev, &iloc2); mutex_unlock(&sbi->s_orphan_lock); } if (err) goto out_brelse; NEXT_ORPHAN(inode) = 0; err = ext4_mark_iloc_dirty(handle, inode, &iloc); out_err: ext4_std_error(inode->i_sb, err); return err; out_brelse: brelse(iloc.bh); goto out_err; } static int ext4_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) { int retval; struct inode *inode; struct buffer_head *bh; struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de; handle_t *handle = NULL; if (unlikely(ext4_forced_shutdown(EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)))) return -EIO; /* Initialize quotas before so that eventual writes go in * separate transaction */ retval = dquot_initialize(dir); if (retval) return retval; retval = dquot_initialize(d_inode(dentry)); if (retval) return retval; retval = -ENOENT; bh = ext4_find_entry(dir, &dentry->d_name, &de, NULL); if (IS_ERR(bh)) return PTR_ERR(bh); if (!bh) goto end_rmdir; inode = d_inode(dentry); retval = -EFSCORRUPTED; if (le32_to_cpu(de->inode) != inode->i_ino) goto end_rmdir; retval = -ENOTEMPTY; if (!ext4_empty_dir(inode)) goto end_rmdir; handle = ext4_journal_start(dir, EXT4_HT_DIR, EXT4_DATA_TRANS_BLOCKS(dir->i_sb)); if (IS_ERR(handle)) { retval = PTR_ERR(handle); handle = NULL; goto end_rmdir; } if (IS_DIRSYNC(dir)) ext4_handle_sync(handle); retval = ext4_delete_entry(handle, dir, de, bh); if (retval) goto end_rmdir; if (!EXT4_DIR_LINK_EMPTY(inode)) ext4_warning_inode(inode, "empty directory '%.*s' has too many links (%u)", dentry->d_name.len, dentry->d_name.name, inode->i_nlink); inode_inc_iversion(inode); clear_nlink(inode); /* There's no need to set i_disksize: the fact that i_nlink is * zero will ensure that the right thing happens during any * recovery. */ inode->i_size = 0; ext4_orphan_add(handle, inode); inode->i_ctime = dir->i_ctime = dir->i_mtime = current_time(inode); retval = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode); if (retval) goto end_rmdir; ext4_dec_count(dir); ext4_update_dx_flag(dir); ext4_fc_track_unlink(handle, dentry); retval = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, dir); #ifdef CONFIG_UNICODE /* VFS negative dentries are incompatible with Encoding and * Case-insensitiveness. Eventually we'll want avoid * invalidating the dentries here, alongside with returning the * negative dentries at ext4_lookup(), when it is better * supported by the VFS for the CI case. */ if (IS_CASEFOLDED(dir)) d_invalidate(dentry); #endif end_rmdir: brelse(bh); if (handle) ext4_journal_stop(handle); return retval; } int __ext4_unlink(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *d_name, struct inode *inode) { int retval = -ENOENT; struct buffer_head *bh; struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de; int skip_remove_dentry = 0; bh = ext4_find_entry(dir, d_name, &de, NULL); if (IS_ERR(bh)) return PTR_ERR(bh); if (!bh) return -ENOENT; if (le32_to_cpu(de->inode) != inode->i_ino) { /* * It's okay if we find dont find dentry which matches * the inode. That's because it might have gotten * renamed to a different inode number */ if (EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_mount_state & EXT4_FC_REPLAY) skip_remove_dentry = 1; else goto out; } if (IS_DIRSYNC(dir)) ext4_handle_sync(handle); if (!skip_remove_dentry) { retval = ext4_delete_entry(handle, dir, de, bh); if (retval) goto out; dir->i_ctime = dir->i_mtime = current_time(dir); ext4_update_dx_flag(dir); retval = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, dir); if (retval) goto out; } else { retval = 0; } if (inode->i_nlink == 0) ext4_warning_inode(inode, "Deleting file '%.*s' with no links", d_name->len, d_name->name); else drop_nlink(inode); if (!inode->i_nlink) ext4_orphan_add(handle, inode); inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode); retval = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode); out: brelse(bh); return retval; } static int ext4_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) { handle_t *handle; int retval; if (unlikely(ext4_forced_shutdown(EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)))) return -EIO; trace_ext4_unlink_enter(dir, dentry); /* * Initialize quotas before so that eventual writes go * in separate transaction */ retval = dquot_initialize(dir); if (retval) goto out_trace; retval = dquot_initialize(d_inode(dentry)); if (retval) goto out_trace; handle = ext4_journal_start(dir, EXT4_HT_DIR, EXT4_DATA_TRANS_BLOCKS(dir->i_sb)); if (IS_ERR(handle)) { retval = PTR_ERR(handle); goto out_trace; } retval = __ext4_unlink(handle, dir, &dentry->d_name, d_inode(dentry)); if (!retval) ext4_fc_track_unlink(handle, dentry); #ifdef CONFIG_UNICODE /* VFS negative dentries are incompatible with Encoding and * Case-insensitiveness. Eventually we'll want avoid * invalidating the dentries here, alongside with returning the * negative dentries at ext4_lookup(), when it is better * supported by the VFS for the CI case. */ if (IS_CASEFOLDED(dir)) d_invalidate(dentry); #endif if (handle) ext4_journal_stop(handle); out_trace: trace_ext4_unlink_exit(dentry, retval); return retval; } static int ext4_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *symname) { handle_t *handle; struct inode *inode; int err, len = strlen(symname); int credits; struct fscrypt_str disk_link; if (unlikely(ext4_forced_shutdown(EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)))) return -EIO; err = fscrypt_prepare_symlink(dir, symname, len, dir->i_sb->s_blocksize, &disk_link); if (err) return err; err = dquot_initialize(dir); if (err) return err; if ((disk_link.len > EXT4_N_BLOCKS * 4)) { /* * For non-fast symlinks, we just allocate inode and put it on * orphan list in the first transaction => we need bitmap, * group descriptor, sb, inode block, quota blocks, and * possibly selinux xattr blocks. */ credits = 4 + EXT4_MAXQUOTAS_INIT_BLOCKS(dir->i_sb) + EXT4_XATTR_TRANS_BLOCKS; } else { /* * Fast symlink. We have to add entry to directory * (EXT4_DATA_TRANS_BLOCKS + EXT4_INDEX_EXTRA_TRANS_BLOCKS), * allocate new inode (bitmap, group descriptor, inode block, * quota blocks, sb is already counted in previous macros). */ credits = EXT4_DATA_TRANS_BLOCKS(dir->i_sb) + EXT4_INDEX_EXTRA_TRANS_BLOCKS + 3; } inode = ext4_new_inode_start_handle(dir, S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO, &dentry->d_name, 0, NULL, EXT4_HT_DIR, credits); handle = ext4_journal_current_handle(); if (IS_ERR(inode)) { if (handle) ext4_journal_stop(handle); return PTR_ERR(inode); } if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) { err = fscrypt_encrypt_symlink(inode, symname, len, &disk_link); if (err) goto err_drop_inode; inode->i_op = &ext4_encrypted_symlink_inode_operations; } if ((disk_link.len > EXT4_N_BLOCKS * 4)) { if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) inode->i_op = &ext4_symlink_inode_operations; inode_nohighmem(inode); ext4_set_aops(inode); /* * We cannot call page_symlink() with transaction started * because it calls into ext4_write_begin() which can wait * for transaction commit if we are running out of space * and thus we deadlock. So we have to stop transaction now * and restart it when symlink contents is written. * * To keep fs consistent in case of crash, we have to put inode * to orphan list in the mean time. */ drop_nlink(inode); err = ext4_orphan_add(handle, inode); if (handle) ext4_journal_stop(handle); handle = NULL; if (err) goto err_drop_inode; err = __page_symlink(inode, disk_link.name, disk_link.len, 1); if (err) goto err_drop_inode; /* * Now inode is being linked into dir (EXT4_DATA_TRANS_BLOCKS * + EXT4_INDEX_EXTRA_TRANS_BLOCKS), inode is also modified */ handle = ext4_journal_start(dir, EXT4_HT_DIR, EXT4_DATA_TRANS_BLOCKS(dir->i_sb) + EXT4_INDEX_EXTRA_TRANS_BLOCKS + 1); if (IS_ERR(handle)) { err = PTR_ERR(handle); handle = NULL; goto err_drop_inode; } set_nlink(inode, 1); err = ext4_orphan_del(handle, inode); if (err) goto err_drop_inode; } else { /* clear the extent format for fast symlink */ ext4_clear_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS); if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) { inode->i_op = &ext4_fast_symlink_inode_operations; inode->i_link = (char *)&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data; } memcpy((char *)&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data, disk_link.name, disk_link.len); inode->i_size = disk_link.len - 1; } EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize = inode->i_size; err = ext4_add_nondir(handle, dentry, &inode); if (handle) ext4_journal_stop(handle); if (inode) iput(inode); goto out_free_encrypted_link; err_drop_inode: if (handle) ext4_journal_stop(handle); clear_nlink(inode); unlock_new_inode(inode); iput(inode); out_free_encrypted_link: if (disk_link.name != (unsigned char *)symname) kfree(disk_link.name); return err; } int __ext4_link(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry) { handle_t *handle; int err, retries = 0; retry: handle = ext4_journal_start(dir, EXT4_HT_DIR, (EXT4_DATA_TRANS_BLOCKS(dir->i_sb) + EXT4_INDEX_EXTRA_TRANS_BLOCKS) + 1); if (IS_ERR(handle)) return PTR_ERR(handle); if (IS_DIRSYNC(dir)) ext4_handle_sync(handle); inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode); ext4_inc_count(inode); ihold(inode); err = ext4_add_entry(handle, dentry, inode); if (!err) { err = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode); /* this can happen only for tmpfile being * linked the first time */ if (inode->i_nlink == 1) ext4_orphan_del(handle, inode); d_instantiate(dentry, inode); ext4_fc_track_link(handle, dentry); } else { drop_nlink(inode); iput(inode); } ext4_journal_stop(handle); if (err == -ENOSPC && ext4_should_retry_alloc(dir->i_sb, &retries)) goto retry; return err; } static int ext4_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = d_inode(old_dentry); int err; if (inode->i_nlink >= EXT4_LINK_MAX) return -EMLINK; err = fscrypt_prepare_link(old_dentry, dir, dentry); if (err) return err; if ((ext4_test_inode_flag(dir, EXT4_INODE_PROJINHERIT)) && (!projid_eq(EXT4_I(dir)->i_projid, EXT4_I(old_dentry->d_inode)->i_projid))) return -EXDEV; err = dquot_initialize(dir); if (err) return err; return __ext4_link(dir, inode, dentry); } /* * Try to find buffer head where contains the parent block. * It should be the inode block if it is inlined or the 1st block * if it is a normal dir. */ static struct buffer_head *ext4_get_first_dir_block(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, int *retval, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **parent_de, int *inlined) { struct buffer_head *bh; if (!ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) { /* The first directory block must not be a hole, so * treat it as DIRENT_HTREE */ bh = ext4_read_dirblock(inode, 0, DIRENT_HTREE); if (IS_ERR(bh)) { *retval = PTR_ERR(bh); return NULL; } *parent_de = ext4_next_entry( (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *)bh->b_data, inode->i_sb->s_blocksize); return bh; } *inlined = 1; return ext4_get_first_inline_block(inode, parent_de, retval); } struct ext4_renament { struct inode *dir; struct dentry *dentry; struct inode *inode; bool is_dir; int dir_nlink_delta; /* entry for "dentry" */ struct buffer_head *bh; struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de; int inlined; /* entry for ".." in inode if it's a directory */ struct buffer_head *dir_bh; struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *parent_de; int dir_inlined; }; static int ext4_rename_dir_prepare(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_renament *ent) { int retval; ent->dir_bh = ext4_get_first_dir_block(handle, ent->inode, &retval, &ent->parent_de, &ent->dir_inlined); if (!ent->dir_bh) return retval; if (le32_to_cpu(ent->parent_de->inode) != ent->dir->i_ino) return -EFSCORRUPTED; BUFFER_TRACE(ent->dir_bh, "get_write_access"); return ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, ent->dir_bh); } static int ext4_rename_dir_finish(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_renament *ent, unsigned dir_ino) { int retval; ent->parent_de->inode = cpu_to_le32(dir_ino); BUFFER_TRACE(ent->dir_bh, "call ext4_handle_dirty_metadata"); if (!ent->dir_inlined) { if (is_dx(ent->inode)) { retval = ext4_handle_dirty_dx_node(handle, ent->inode, ent->dir_bh); } else { retval = ext4_handle_dirty_dirblock(handle, ent->inode, ent->dir_bh); } } else { retval = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, ent->inode); } if (retval) { ext4_std_error(ent->dir->i_sb, retval); return retval; } return 0; } static int ext4_setent(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_renament *ent, unsigned ino, unsigned file_type) { int retval, retval2; BUFFER_TRACE(ent->bh, "get write access"); retval = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, ent->bh); if (retval) return retval; ent->de->inode = cpu_to_le32(ino); if (ext4_has_feature_filetype(ent->dir->i_sb)) ent->de->file_type = file_type; inode_inc_iversion(ent->dir); ent->dir->i_ctime = ent->dir->i_mtime = current_time(ent->dir); retval = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, ent->dir); BUFFER_TRACE(ent->bh, "call ext4_handle_dirty_metadata"); if (!ent->inlined) { retval2 = ext4_handle_dirty_dirblock(handle, ent->dir, ent->bh); if (unlikely(retval2)) { ext4_std_error(ent->dir->i_sb, retval2); return retval2; } } return retval; } static void ext4_resetent(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_renament *ent, unsigned ino, unsigned file_type) { struct ext4_renament old = *ent; int retval = 0; /* * old->de could have moved from under us during make indexed dir, * so the old->de may no longer valid and need to find it again * before reset old inode info. */ old.bh = ext4_find_entry(old.dir, &old.dentry->d_name, &old.de, NULL); if (IS_ERR(old.bh)) retval = PTR_ERR(old.bh); if (!old.bh) retval = -ENOENT; if (retval) { ext4_std_error(old.dir->i_sb, retval); return; } ext4_setent(handle, &old, ino, file_type); brelse(old.bh); } static int ext4_find_delete_entry(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *d_name) { int retval = -ENOENT; struct buffer_head *bh; struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de; bh = ext4_find_entry(dir, d_name, &de, NULL); if (IS_ERR(bh)) return PTR_ERR(bh); if (bh) { retval = ext4_delete_entry(handle, dir, de, bh); brelse(bh); } return retval; } static void ext4_rename_delete(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_renament *ent, int force_reread) { int retval; /* * ent->de could have moved from under us during htree split, so make * sure that we are deleting the right entry. We might also be pointing * to a stale entry in the unused part of ent->bh so just checking inum * and the name isn't enough. */ if (le32_to_cpu(ent->de->inode) != ent->inode->i_ino || ent->de->name_len != ent->dentry->d_name.len || strncmp(ent->de->name, ent->dentry->d_name.name, ent->de->name_len) || force_reread) { retval = ext4_find_delete_entry(handle, ent->dir, &ent->dentry->d_name); } else { retval = ext4_delete_entry(handle, ent->dir, ent->de, ent->bh); if (retval == -ENOENT) { retval = ext4_find_delete_entry(handle, ent->dir, &ent->dentry->d_name); } } if (retval) { ext4_warning_inode(ent->dir, "Deleting old file: nlink %d, error=%d", ent->dir->i_nlink, retval); } } static void ext4_update_dir_count(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_renament *ent) { if (ent->dir_nlink_delta) { if (ent->dir_nlink_delta == -1) ext4_dec_count(ent->dir); else ext4_inc_count(ent->dir); ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, ent->dir); } } static struct inode *ext4_whiteout_for_rename(struct ext4_renament *ent, int credits, handle_t **h) { struct inode *wh; handle_t *handle; int retries = 0; /* * for inode block, sb block, group summaries, * and inode bitmap */ credits += (EXT4_MAXQUOTAS_TRANS_BLOCKS(ent->dir->i_sb) + EXT4_XATTR_TRANS_BLOCKS + 4); retry: wh = ext4_new_inode_start_handle(ent->dir, S_IFCHR | WHITEOUT_MODE, &ent->dentry->d_name, 0, NULL, EXT4_HT_DIR, credits); handle = ext4_journal_current_handle(); if (IS_ERR(wh)) { if (handle) ext4_journal_stop(handle); if (PTR_ERR(wh) == -ENOSPC && ext4_should_retry_alloc(ent->dir->i_sb, &retries)) goto retry; } else { *h = handle; init_special_inode(wh, wh->i_mode, WHITEOUT_DEV); wh->i_op = &ext4_special_inode_operations; } return wh; } /* * Anybody can rename anything with this: the permission checks are left to the * higher-level routines. * * n.b. old_{dentry,inode) refers to the source dentry/inode * while new_{dentry,inode) refers to the destination dentry/inode * This comes from rename(const char *oldpath, const char *newpath) */ static int ext4_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, unsigned int flags) { handle_t *handle = NULL; struct ext4_renament old = { .dir = old_dir, .dentry = old_dentry, .inode = d_inode(old_dentry), }; struct ext4_renament new = { .dir = new_dir, .dentry = new_dentry, .inode = d_inode(new_dentry), }; int force_reread; int retval; struct inode *whiteout = NULL; int credits; u8 old_file_type; if (new.inode && new.inode->i_nlink == 0) { EXT4_ERROR_INODE(new.inode, "target of rename is already freed"); return -EFSCORRUPTED; } if ((ext4_test_inode_flag(new_dir, EXT4_INODE_PROJINHERIT)) && (!projid_eq(EXT4_I(new_dir)->i_projid, EXT4_I(old_dentry->d_inode)->i_projid))) return -EXDEV; retval = dquot_initialize(old.dir); if (retval) return retval; retval = dquot_initialize(new.dir); if (retval) return retval; /* Initialize quotas before so that eventual writes go * in separate transaction */ if (new.inode) { retval = dquot_initialize(new.inode); if (retval) return retval; } old.bh = ext4_find_entry(old.dir, &old.dentry->d_name, &old.de, NULL); if (IS_ERR(old.bh)) return PTR_ERR(old.bh); /* * Check for inode number is _not_ due to possible IO errors. * We might rmdir the source, keep it as pwd of some process * and merrily kill the link to whatever was created under the * same name. Goodbye sticky bit ;-< */ retval = -ENOENT; if (!old.bh || le32_to_cpu(old.de->inode) != old.inode->i_ino) goto release_bh; new.bh = ext4_find_entry(new.dir, &new.dentry->d_name, &new.de, &new.inlined); if (IS_ERR(new.bh)) { retval = PTR_ERR(new.bh); new.bh = NULL; goto release_bh; } if (new.bh) { if (!new.inode) { brelse(new.bh); new.bh = NULL; } } if (new.inode && !test_opt(new.dir->i_sb, NO_AUTO_DA_ALLOC)) ext4_alloc_da_blocks(old.inode); credits = (2 * EXT4_DATA_TRANS_BLOCKS(old.dir->i_sb) + EXT4_INDEX_EXTRA_TRANS_BLOCKS + 2); if (!(flags & RENAME_WHITEOUT)) { handle = ext4_journal_start(old.dir, EXT4_HT_DIR, credits); if (IS_ERR(handle)) { retval = PTR_ERR(handle); goto release_bh; } } else { whiteout = ext4_whiteout_for_rename(&old, credits, &handle); if (IS_ERR(whiteout)) { retval = PTR_ERR(whiteout); goto release_bh; } } old_file_type = old.de->file_type; if (IS_DIRSYNC(old.dir) || IS_DIRSYNC(new.dir)) ext4_handle_sync(handle); if (S_ISDIR(old.inode->i_mode)) { if (new.inode) { retval = -ENOTEMPTY; if (!ext4_empty_dir(new.inode)) goto end_rename; } else { retval = -EMLINK; if (new.dir != old.dir && EXT4_DIR_LINK_MAX(new.dir)) goto end_rename; } retval = ext4_rename_dir_prepare(handle, &old); if (retval) goto end_rename; } /* * If we're renaming a file within an inline_data dir and adding or * setting the new dirent causes a conversion from inline_data to * extents/blockmap, we need to force the dirent delete code to * re-read the directory, or else we end up trying to delete a dirent * from what is now the extent tree root (or a block map). */ force_reread = (new.dir->i_ino == old.dir->i_ino && ext4_test_inode_flag(new.dir, EXT4_INODE_INLINE_DATA)); if (whiteout) { /* * Do this before adding a new entry, so the old entry is sure * to be still pointing to the valid old entry. */ retval = ext4_setent(handle, &old, whiteout->i_ino, EXT4_FT_CHRDEV); if (retval) goto end_rename; retval = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, whiteout); if (unlikely(retval)) goto end_rename; } if (!new.bh) { retval = ext4_add_entry(handle, new.dentry, old.inode); if (retval) goto end_rename; } else { retval = ext4_setent(handle, &new, old.inode->i_ino, old_file_type); if (retval) goto end_rename; } if (force_reread) force_reread = !ext4_test_inode_flag(new.dir, EXT4_INODE_INLINE_DATA); /* * Like most other Unix systems, set the ctime for inodes on a * rename. */ old.inode->i_ctime = current_time(old.inode); retval = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, old.inode); if (unlikely(retval)) goto end_rename; if (!whiteout) { /* * ok, that's it */ ext4_rename_delete(handle, &old, force_reread); } if (new.inode) { ext4_dec_count(new.inode); new.inode->i_ctime = current_time(new.inode); } old.dir->i_ctime = old.dir->i_mtime = current_time(old.dir); ext4_update_dx_flag(old.dir); if (old.dir_bh) { retval = ext4_rename_dir_finish(handle, &old, new.dir->i_ino); if (retval) goto end_rename; ext4_dec_count(old.dir); if (new.inode) { /* checked ext4_empty_dir above, can't have another * parent, ext4_dec_count() won't work for many-linked * dirs */ clear_nlink(new.inode); } else { ext4_inc_count(new.dir); ext4_update_dx_flag(new.dir); retval = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, new.dir); if (unlikely(retval)) goto end_rename; } } retval = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, old.dir); if (unlikely(retval)) goto end_rename; if (S_ISDIR(old.inode->i_mode)) { /* * We disable fast commits here that's because the * replay code is not yet capable of changing dot dot * dirents in directories. */ ext4_fc_mark_ineligible(old.inode->i_sb, EXT4_FC_REASON_RENAME_DIR); } else { if (new.inode) ext4_fc_track_unlink(handle, new.dentry); __ext4_fc_track_link(handle, old.inode, new.dentry); __ext4_fc_track_unlink(handle, old.inode, old.dentry); if (whiteout) __ext4_fc_track_create(handle, whiteout, old.dentry); } if (new.inode) { retval = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, new.inode); if (unlikely(retval)) goto end_rename; if (!new.inode->i_nlink) ext4_orphan_add(handle, new.inode); } retval = 0; end_rename: if (whiteout) { if (retval) { ext4_resetent(handle, &old, old.inode->i_ino, old_file_type); drop_nlink(whiteout); ext4_orphan_add(handle, whiteout); } unlock_new_inode(whiteout); ext4_journal_stop(handle); iput(whiteout); } else { ext4_journal_stop(handle); } release_bh: brelse(old.dir_bh); brelse(old.bh); brelse(new.bh); return retval; } static int ext4_cross_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) { handle_t *handle = NULL; struct ext4_renament old = { .dir = old_dir, .dentry = old_dentry, .inode = d_inode(old_dentry), }; struct ext4_renament new = { .dir = new_dir, .dentry = new_dentry, .inode = d_inode(new_dentry), }; u8 new_file_type; int retval; struct timespec64 ctime; if ((ext4_test_inode_flag(new_dir, EXT4_INODE_PROJINHERIT) && !projid_eq(EXT4_I(new_dir)->i_projid, EXT4_I(old_dentry->d_inode)->i_projid)) || (ext4_test_inode_flag(old_dir, EXT4_INODE_PROJINHERIT) && !projid_eq(EXT4_I(old_dir)->i_projid, EXT4_I(new_dentry->d_inode)->i_projid))) return -EXDEV; retval = dquot_initialize(old.dir); if (retval) return retval; retval = dquot_initialize(new.dir); if (retval) return retval; old.bh = ext4_find_entry(old.dir, &old.dentry->d_name, &old.de, &old.inlined); if (IS_ERR(old.bh)) return PTR_ERR(old.bh); /* * Check for inode number is _not_ due to possible IO errors. * We might rmdir the source, keep it as pwd of some process * and merrily kill the link to whatever was created under the * same name. Goodbye sticky bit ;-< */ retval = -ENOENT; if (!old.bh || le32_to_cpu(old.de->inode) != old.inode->i_ino) goto end_rename; new.bh = ext4_find_entry(new.dir, &new.dentry->d_name, &new.de, &new.inlined); if (IS_ERR(new.bh)) { retval = PTR_ERR(new.bh); new.bh = NULL; goto end_rename; } /* RENAME_EXCHANGE case: old *and* new must both exist */ if (!new.bh || le32_to_cpu(new.de->inode) != new.inode->i_ino) goto end_rename; handle = ext4_journal_start(old.dir, EXT4_HT_DIR, (2 * EXT4_DATA_TRANS_BLOCKS(old.dir->i_sb) + 2 * EXT4_INDEX_EXTRA_TRANS_BLOCKS + 2)); if (IS_ERR(handle)) { retval = PTR_ERR(handle); handle = NULL; goto end_rename; } if (IS_DIRSYNC(old.dir) || IS_DIRSYNC(new.dir)) ext4_handle_sync(handle); if (S_ISDIR(old.inode->i_mode)) { old.is_dir = true; retval = ext4_rename_dir_prepare(handle, &old); if (retval) goto end_rename; } if (S_ISDIR(new.inode->i_mode)) { new.is_dir = true; retval = ext4_rename_dir_prepare(handle, &new); if (retval) goto end_rename; } /* * Other than the special case of overwriting a directory, parents' * nlink only needs to be modified if this is a cross directory rename. */ if (old.dir != new.dir && old.is_dir != new.is_dir) { old.dir_nlink_delta = old.is_dir ? -1 : 1; new.dir_nlink_delta = -old.dir_nlink_delta; retval = -EMLINK; if ((old.dir_nlink_delta > 0 && EXT4_DIR_LINK_MAX(old.dir)) || (new.dir_nlink_delta > 0 && EXT4_DIR_LINK_MAX(new.dir))) goto end_rename; } new_file_type = new.de->file_type; retval = ext4_setent(handle, &new, old.inode->i_ino, old.de->file_type); if (retval) goto end_rename; retval = ext4_setent(handle, &old, new.inode->i_ino, new_file_type); if (retval) goto end_rename; /* * Like most other Unix systems, set the ctime for inodes on a * rename. */ ctime = current_time(old.inode); old.inode->i_ctime = ctime; new.inode->i_ctime = ctime; retval = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, old.inode); if (unlikely(retval)) goto end_rename; retval = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, new.inode); if (unlikely(retval)) goto end_rename; ext4_fc_mark_ineligible(new.inode->i_sb, EXT4_FC_REASON_CROSS_RENAME); if (old.dir_bh) { retval = ext4_rename_dir_finish(handle, &old, new.dir->i_ino); if (retval) goto end_rename; } if (new.dir_bh) { retval = ext4_rename_dir_finish(handle, &new, old.dir->i_ino); if (retval) goto end_rename; } ext4_update_dir_count(handle, &old); ext4_update_dir_count(handle, &new); retval = 0; end_rename: brelse(old.dir_bh); brelse(new.dir_bh); brelse(old.bh); brelse(new.bh); if (handle) ext4_journal_stop(handle); return retval; } static int ext4_rename2(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, unsigned int flags) { int err; if (unlikely(ext4_forced_shutdown(EXT4_SB(old_dir->i_sb)))) return -EIO; if (flags & ~(RENAME_NOREPLACE | RENAME_EXCHANGE | RENAME_WHITEOUT)) return -EINVAL; err = fscrypt_prepare_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry, flags); if (err) return err; if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) { return ext4_cross_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); } return ext4_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry, flags); } /* * directories can handle most operations... */ const struct inode_operations ext4_dir_inode_operations = { .create = ext4_create, .lookup = ext4_lookup, .link = ext4_link, .unlink = ext4_unlink, .symlink = ext4_symlink, .mkdir = ext4_mkdir, .rmdir = ext4_rmdir, .mknod = ext4_mknod, .tmpfile = ext4_tmpfile, .rename = ext4_rename2, .setattr = ext4_setattr, .getattr = ext4_getattr, .listxattr = ext4_listxattr, .get_acl = ext4_get_acl, .set_acl = ext4_set_acl, .fiemap = ext4_fiemap, }; const struct inode_operations ext4_special_inode_operations = { .setattr = ext4_setattr, .getattr = ext4_getattr, .listxattr = ext4_listxattr, .get_acl = ext4_get_acl, .set_acl = ext4_set_acl, };
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