1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * Hash algorithms. * * Copyright (c) 2008 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> */ #ifndef _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_HASH_H #define _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_HASH_H #include <crypto/algapi.h> #include <crypto/hash.h> struct ahash_request; struct scatterlist; struct crypto_hash_walk { char *data; unsigned int offset; unsigned int alignmask; struct page *pg; unsigned int entrylen; unsigned int total; struct scatterlist *sg; unsigned int flags; }; struct ahash_instance { void (*free)(struct ahash_instance *inst); union { struct { char head[offsetof(struct ahash_alg, halg.base)]; struct crypto_instance base; } s; struct ahash_alg alg; }; }; struct shash_instance { void (*free)(struct shash_instance *inst); union { struct { char head[offsetof(struct shash_alg, base)]; struct crypto_instance base; } s; struct shash_alg alg; }; }; struct crypto_ahash_spawn { struct crypto_spawn base; }; struct crypto_shash_spawn { struct crypto_spawn base; }; int crypto_hash_walk_done(struct crypto_hash_walk *walk, int err); int crypto_hash_walk_first(struct ahash_request *req, struct crypto_hash_walk *walk); static inline int crypto_hash_walk_last(struct crypto_hash_walk *walk) { return !(walk->entrylen | walk->total); } int crypto_register_ahash(struct ahash_alg *alg); void crypto_unregister_ahash(struct ahash_alg *alg); int crypto_register_ahashes(struct ahash_alg *algs, int count); void crypto_unregister_ahashes(struct ahash_alg *algs, int count); int ahash_register_instance(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct ahash_instance *inst); bool crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey(struct shash_alg *alg); static inline bool crypto_shash_alg_needs_key(struct shash_alg *alg) { return crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey(alg) && !(alg->base.cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY); } bool crypto_hash_alg_has_setkey(struct hash_alg_common *halg); int crypto_grab_ahash(struct crypto_ahash_spawn *spawn, struct crypto_instance *inst, const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask); static inline void crypto_drop_ahash(struct crypto_ahash_spawn *spawn) { crypto_drop_spawn(&spawn->base); } static inline struct hash_alg_common *crypto_spawn_ahash_alg( struct crypto_ahash_spawn *spawn) { return __crypto_hash_alg_common(spawn->base.alg); } int crypto_register_shash(struct shash_alg *alg); void crypto_unregister_shash(struct shash_alg *alg); int crypto_register_shashes(struct shash_alg *algs, int count); void crypto_unregister_shashes(struct shash_alg *algs, int count); int shash_register_instance(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct shash_instance *inst); void shash_free_singlespawn_instance(struct shash_instance *inst); int crypto_grab_shash(struct crypto_shash_spawn *spawn, struct crypto_instance *inst, const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask); static inline void crypto_drop_shash(struct crypto_shash_spawn *spawn) { crypto_drop_spawn(&spawn->base); } static inline struct shash_alg *crypto_spawn_shash_alg( struct crypto_shash_spawn *spawn) { return __crypto_shash_alg(spawn->base.alg); } int shash_ahash_update(struct ahash_request *req, struct shash_desc *desc); int shash_ahash_finup(struct ahash_request *req, struct shash_desc *desc); int shash_ahash_digest(struct ahash_request *req, struct shash_desc *desc); int crypto_init_shash_ops_async(struct crypto_tfm *tfm); static inline void *crypto_ahash_ctx(struct crypto_ahash *tfm) { return crypto_tfm_ctx(crypto_ahash_tfm(tfm)); } static inline struct ahash_alg *__crypto_ahash_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg) { return container_of(__crypto_hash_alg_common(alg), struct ahash_alg, halg); } static inline void crypto_ahash_set_reqsize(struct crypto_ahash *tfm, unsigned int reqsize) { tfm->reqsize = reqsize; } static inline struct crypto_instance *ahash_crypto_instance( struct ahash_instance *inst) { return &inst->s.base; } static inline struct ahash_instance *ahash_instance( struct crypto_instance *inst) { return container_of(inst, struct ahash_instance, s.base); } static inline struct ahash_instance *ahash_alg_instance( struct crypto_ahash *ahash) { return ahash_instance(crypto_tfm_alg_instance(&ahash->base)); } static inline void *ahash_instance_ctx(struct ahash_instance *inst) { return crypto_instance_ctx(ahash_crypto_instance(inst)); } static inline void ahash_request_complete(struct ahash_request *req, int err) { req->base.complete(&req->base, err); } static inline u32 ahash_request_flags(struct ahash_request *req) { return req->base.flags; } static inline struct crypto_ahash *crypto_spawn_ahash( struct crypto_ahash_spawn *spawn) { return crypto_spawn_tfm2(&spawn->base); } static inline int ahash_enqueue_request(struct crypto_queue *queue, struct ahash_request *request) { return crypto_enqueue_request(queue, &request->base); } static inline struct ahash_request *ahash_dequeue_request( struct crypto_queue *queue) { return ahash_request_cast(crypto_dequeue_request(queue)); } static inline void *crypto_shash_ctx(struct crypto_shash *tfm) { return crypto_tfm_ctx(&tfm->base); } static inline struct crypto_instance *shash_crypto_instance( struct shash_instance *inst) { return &inst->s.base; } static inline struct shash_instance *shash_instance( struct crypto_instance *inst) { return container_of(inst, struct shash_instance, s.base); } static inline struct shash_instance *shash_alg_instance( struct crypto_shash *shash) { return shash_instance(crypto_tfm_alg_instance(&shash->base)); } static inline void *shash_instance_ctx(struct shash_instance *inst) { return crypto_instance_ctx(shash_crypto_instance(inst)); } static inline struct crypto_shash *crypto_spawn_shash( struct crypto_shash_spawn *spawn) { return crypto_spawn_tfm2(&spawn->base); } static inline void *crypto_shash_ctx_aligned(struct crypto_shash *tfm) { return crypto_tfm_ctx_aligned(&tfm->base); } static inline struct crypto_shash *__crypto_shash_cast(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) { return container_of(tfm, struct crypto_shash, base); } #endif /* _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_HASH_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * Cryptographic API for algorithms (i.e., low-level API). * * Copyright (c) 2006 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> */ #ifndef _CRYPTO_ALGAPI_H #define _CRYPTO_ALGAPI_H #include <linux/crypto.h> #include <linux/list.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> /* * Maximum values for blocksize and alignmask, used to allocate * static buffers that are big enough for any combination of * algs and architectures. Ciphers have a lower maximum size. */ #define MAX_ALGAPI_BLOCKSIZE 160 #define MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK 63 #define MAX_CIPHER_BLOCKSIZE 16 #define MAX_CIPHER_ALIGNMASK 15 struct crypto_aead; struct crypto_instance; struct module; struct rtattr; struct seq_file; struct sk_buff; struct crypto_type { unsigned int (*ctxsize)(struct crypto_alg *alg, u32 type, u32 mask); unsigned int (*extsize)(struct crypto_alg *alg); int (*init)(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u32 type, u32 mask); int (*init_tfm)(struct crypto_tfm *tfm); void (*show)(struct seq_file *m, struct crypto_alg *alg); int (*report)(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg); void (*free)(struct crypto_instance *inst); unsigned int type; unsigned int maskclear; unsigned int maskset; unsigned int tfmsize; }; struct crypto_instance { struct crypto_alg alg; struct crypto_template *tmpl; union { /* Node in list of instances after registration. */ struct hlist_node list; /* List of attached spawns before registration. */ struct crypto_spawn *spawns; }; void *__ctx[] CRYPTO_MINALIGN_ATTR; }; struct crypto_template { struct list_head list; struct hlist_head instances; struct module *module; int (*create)(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb); char name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; }; struct crypto_spawn { struct list_head list; struct crypto_alg *alg; union { /* Back pointer to instance after registration.*/ struct crypto_instance *inst; /* Spawn list pointer prior to registration. */ struct crypto_spawn *next; }; const struct crypto_type *frontend; u32 mask; bool dead; bool registered; }; struct crypto_queue { struct list_head list; struct list_head *backlog; unsigned int qlen; unsigned int max_qlen; }; struct scatter_walk { struct scatterlist *sg; unsigned int offset; }; void crypto_mod_put(struct crypto_alg *alg); int crypto_register_template(struct crypto_template *tmpl); int crypto_register_templates(struct crypto_template *tmpls, int count); void crypto_unregister_template(struct crypto_template *tmpl); void crypto_unregister_templates(struct crypto_template *tmpls, int count); struct crypto_template *crypto_lookup_template(const char *name); int crypto_register_instance(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct crypto_instance *inst); void crypto_unregister_instance(struct crypto_instance *inst); int crypto_grab_spawn(struct crypto_spawn *spawn, struct crypto_instance *inst, const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask); void crypto_drop_spawn(struct crypto_spawn *spawn); struct crypto_tfm *crypto_spawn_tfm(struct crypto_spawn *spawn, u32 type, u32 mask); void *crypto_spawn_tfm2(struct crypto_spawn *spawn); struct crypto_attr_type *crypto_get_attr_type(struct rtattr **tb); int crypto_check_attr_type(struct rtattr **tb, u32 type, u32 *mask_ret); const char *crypto_attr_alg_name(struct rtattr *rta); int crypto_attr_u32(struct rtattr *rta, u32 *num); int crypto_inst_setname(struct crypto_instance *inst, const char *name, struct crypto_alg *alg); void crypto_init_queue(struct crypto_queue *queue, unsigned int max_qlen); int crypto_enqueue_request(struct crypto_queue *queue, struct crypto_async_request *request); void crypto_enqueue_request_head(struct crypto_queue *queue, struct crypto_async_request *request); struct crypto_async_request *crypto_dequeue_request(struct crypto_queue *queue); static inline unsigned int crypto_queue_len(struct crypto_queue *queue) { return queue->qlen; } void crypto_inc(u8 *a, unsigned int size); void __crypto_xor(u8 *dst, const u8 *src1, const u8 *src2, unsigned int size); static inline void crypto_xor(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, unsigned int size) { if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) && __builtin_constant_p(size) && (size % sizeof(unsigned long)) == 0) { unsigned long *d = (unsigned long *)dst; unsigned long *s = (unsigned long *)src; while (size > 0) { *d++ ^= *s++; size -= sizeof(unsigned long); } } else { __crypto_xor(dst, dst, src, size); } } static inline void crypto_xor_cpy(u8 *dst, const u8 *src1, const u8 *src2, unsigned int size) { if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) && __builtin_constant_p(size) && (size % sizeof(unsigned long)) == 0) { unsigned long *d = (unsigned long *)dst; unsigned long *s1 = (unsigned long *)src1; unsigned long *s2 = (unsigned long *)src2; while (size > 0) { *d++ = *s1++ ^ *s2++; size -= sizeof(unsigned long); } } else { __crypto_xor(dst, src1, src2, size); } } static inline void *crypto_tfm_ctx_aligned(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) { return PTR_ALIGN(crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm), crypto_tfm_alg_alignmask(tfm) + 1); } static inline struct crypto_instance *crypto_tfm_alg_instance( struct crypto_tfm *tfm) { return container_of(tfm->__crt_alg, struct crypto_instance, alg); } static inline void *crypto_instance_ctx(struct crypto_instance *inst) { return inst->__ctx; } struct crypto_cipher_spawn { struct crypto_spawn base; }; static inline int crypto_grab_cipher(struct crypto_cipher_spawn *spawn, struct crypto_instance *inst, const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask) { type &= ~CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK; type |= CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER; mask |= CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK; return crypto_grab_spawn(&spawn->base, inst, name, type, mask); } static inline void crypto_drop_cipher(struct crypto_cipher_spawn *spawn) { crypto_drop_spawn(&spawn->base); } static inline struct crypto_alg *crypto_spawn_cipher_alg( struct crypto_cipher_spawn *spawn) { return spawn->base.alg; } static inline struct crypto_cipher *crypto_spawn_cipher( struct crypto_cipher_spawn *spawn) { u32 type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER; u32 mask = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK; return __crypto_cipher_cast(crypto_spawn_tfm(&spawn->base, type, mask)); } static inline struct cipher_alg *crypto_cipher_alg(struct crypto_cipher *tfm) { return &crypto_cipher_tfm(tfm)->__crt_alg->cra_cipher; } static inline struct crypto_async_request *crypto_get_backlog( struct crypto_queue *queue) { return queue->backlog == &queue->list ? NULL : container_of(queue->backlog, struct crypto_async_request, list); } static inline u32 crypto_requires_off(struct crypto_attr_type *algt, u32 off) { return (algt->type ^ off) & algt->mask & off; } /* * When an algorithm uses another algorithm (e.g., if it's an instance of a * template), these are the flags that should always be set on the "outer" * algorithm if any "inner" algorithm has them set. */ #define CRYPTO_ALG_INHERITED_FLAGS \ (CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK | \ CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY) /* * Given the type and mask that specify the flags restrictions on a template * instance being created, return the mask that should be passed to * crypto_grab_*() (along with type=0) to honor any request the user made to * have any of the CRYPTO_ALG_INHERITED_FLAGS clear. */ static inline u32 crypto_algt_inherited_mask(struct crypto_attr_type *algt) { return crypto_requires_off(algt, CRYPTO_ALG_INHERITED_FLAGS); } noinline unsigned long __crypto_memneq(const void *a, const void *b, size_t size); /** * crypto_memneq - Compare two areas of memory without leaking * timing information. * * @a: One area of memory * @b: Another area of memory * @size: The size of the area. * * Returns 0 when data is equal, 1 otherwise. */ static inline int crypto_memneq(const void *a, const void *b, size_t size) { return __crypto_memneq(a, b, size) != 0UL ? 1 : 0; } int crypto_register_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb); int crypto_unregister_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb); /* Crypto notification events. */ enum { CRYPTO_MSG_ALG_REQUEST, CRYPTO_MSG_ALG_REGISTER, CRYPTO_MSG_ALG_LOADED, }; #endif /* _CRYPTO_ALGAPI_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef _LINUX_TIMENS_H #define _LINUX_TIMENS_H #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/kref.h> #include <linux/nsproxy.h> #include <linux/ns_common.h> #include <linux/err.h> struct user_namespace; extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns; struct timens_offsets { struct timespec64 monotonic; struct timespec64 boottime; }; struct time_namespace { struct kref kref; struct user_namespace *user_ns; struct ucounts *ucounts; struct ns_common ns; struct timens_offsets offsets; struct page *vvar_page; /* If set prevents changing offsets after any task joined namespace. */ bool frozen_offsets; } __randomize_layout; extern struct time_namespace init_time_ns; #ifdef CONFIG_TIME_NS extern int vdso_join_timens(struct task_struct *task, struct time_namespace *ns); extern void timens_commit(struct task_struct *tsk, struct time_namespace *ns); static inline struct time_namespace *get_time_ns(struct time_namespace *ns) { kref_get(&ns->kref); return ns; } struct time_namespace *copy_time_ns(unsigned long flags, struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct time_namespace *old_ns); void free_time_ns(struct kref *kref); int timens_on_fork(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, struct task_struct *tsk); struct vdso_data *arch_get_vdso_data(void *vvar_page); static inline void put_time_ns(struct time_namespace *ns) { kref_put(&ns->kref, free_time_ns); } void proc_timens_show_offsets(struct task_struct *p, struct seq_file *m); struct proc_timens_offset { int clockid; struct timespec64 val; }; int proc_timens_set_offset(struct file *file, struct task_struct *p, struct proc_timens_offset *offsets, int n); static inline void timens_add_monotonic(struct timespec64 *ts) { struct timens_offsets *ns_offsets = &current->nsproxy->time_ns->offsets; *ts = timespec64_add(*ts, ns_offsets->monotonic); } static inline void timens_add_boottime(struct timespec64 *ts) { struct timens_offsets *ns_offsets = &current->nsproxy->time_ns->offsets; *ts = timespec64_add(*ts, ns_offsets->boottime); } ktime_t do_timens_ktime_to_host(clockid_t clockid, ktime_t tim, struct timens_offsets *offsets); static inline ktime_t timens_ktime_to_host(clockid_t clockid, ktime_t tim) { struct time_namespace *ns = current->nsproxy->time_ns; if (likely(ns == &init_time_ns)) return tim; return do_timens_ktime_to_host(clockid, tim, &ns->offsets); } #else static inline int vdso_join_timens(struct task_struct *task, struct time_namespace *ns) { return 0; } static inline void timens_commit(struct task_struct *tsk, struct time_namespace *ns) { } static inline struct time_namespace *get_time_ns(struct time_namespace *ns) { return NULL; } static inline void put_time_ns(struct time_namespace *ns) { } static inline struct time_namespace *copy_time_ns(unsigned long flags, struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct time_namespace *old_ns) { if (flags & CLONE_NEWTIME) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); return old_ns; } static inline int timens_on_fork(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, struct task_struct *tsk) { return 0; } static inline void timens_add_monotonic(struct timespec64 *ts) { } static inline void timens_add_boottime(struct timespec64 *ts) { } static inline ktime_t timens_ktime_to_host(clockid_t clockid, ktime_t tim) { return tim; } #endif #endif /* _LINUX_TIMENS_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef _LINUX_SCHED_CLOCK_H #define _LINUX_SCHED_CLOCK_H #include <linux/smp.h> /* * Do not use outside of architecture code which knows its limitations. * * sched_clock() has no promise of monotonicity or bounded drift between * CPUs, use (which you should not) requires disabling IRQs. * * Please use one of the three interfaces below. */ extern unsigned long long notrace sched_clock(void); /* * See the comment in kernel/sched/clock.c */ extern u64 running_clock(void); extern u64 sched_clock_cpu(int cpu); extern void sched_clock_init(void); #ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_UNSTABLE_SCHED_CLOCK static inline void sched_clock_tick(void) { } static inline void clear_sched_clock_stable(void) { } static inline void sched_clock_idle_sleep_event(void) { } static inline void sched_clock_idle_wakeup_event(void) { } static inline u64 cpu_clock(int cpu) { return sched_clock(); } static inline u64 local_clock(void) { return sched_clock(); } #else extern int sched_clock_stable(void); extern void clear_sched_clock_stable(void); /* * When sched_clock_stable(), __sched_clock_offset provides the offset * between local_clock() and sched_clock(). */ extern u64 __sched_clock_offset; extern void sched_clock_tick(void); extern void sched_clock_tick_stable(void); extern void sched_clock_idle_sleep_event(void); extern void sched_clock_idle_wakeup_event(void); /* * As outlined in clock.c, provides a fast, high resolution, nanosecond * time source that is monotonic per cpu argument and has bounded drift * between cpus. * * ######################### BIG FAT WARNING ########################## * # when comparing cpu_clock(i) to cpu_clock(j) for i != j, time can # * # go backwards !! # * #################################################################### */ static inline u64 cpu_clock(int cpu) { return sched_clock_cpu(cpu); } static inline u64 local_clock(void) { return sched_clock_cpu(raw_smp_processor_id()); } #endif #ifdef CONFIG_IRQ_TIME_ACCOUNTING /* * An i/f to runtime opt-in for irq time accounting based off of sched_clock. * The reason for this explicit opt-in is not to have perf penalty with * slow sched_clocks. */ extern void enable_sched_clock_irqtime(void); extern void disable_sched_clock_irqtime(void); #else static inline void enable_sched_clock_irqtime(void) {} static inline void disable_sched_clock_irqtime(void) {} #endif #endif /* _LINUX_SCHED_CLOCK_H */
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If these fields are 0, then either the mapping is shared, or * cgroup accounting is disabled for this resv_map. */ struct page_counter *reservation_counter; unsigned long pages_per_hpage; struct cgroup_subsys_state *css; #endif }; /* * Region tracking -- allows tracking of reservations and instantiated pages * across the pages in a mapping. * * The region data structures are embedded into a resv_map and protected * by a resv_map's lock. The set of regions within the resv_map represent * reservations for huge pages, or huge pages that have already been * instantiated within the map. The from and to elements are huge page * indicies into the associated mapping. from indicates the starting index * of the region. to represents the first index past the end of the region. * * For example, a file region structure with from == 0 and to == 4 represents * four huge pages in a mapping. It is important to note that the to element * represents the first element past the end of the region. This is used in * arithmetic as 4(to) - 0(from) = 4 huge pages in the region. * * Interval notation of the form [from, to) will be used to indicate that * the endpoint from is inclusive and to is exclusive. */ struct file_region { struct list_head link; long from; long to; #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_HUGETLB /* * On shared mappings, each reserved region appears as a struct * file_region in resv_map. These fields hold the info needed to * uncharge each reservation. */ struct page_counter *reservation_counter; struct cgroup_subsys_state *css; #endif }; extern struct resv_map *resv_map_alloc(void); void resv_map_release(struct kref *ref); extern spinlock_t hugetlb_lock; extern int hugetlb_max_hstate __read_mostly; #define for_each_hstate(h) \ for ((h) = hstates; (h) < &hstates[hugetlb_max_hstate]; (h)++) struct hugepage_subpool *hugepage_new_subpool(struct hstate *h, long max_hpages, long min_hpages); void hugepage_put_subpool(struct hugepage_subpool *spool); void reset_vma_resv_huge_pages(struct vm_area_struct *vma); int hugetlb_sysctl_handler(struct ctl_table *, int, void *, size_t *, loff_t *); int hugetlb_overcommit_handler(struct ctl_table *, int, void *, size_t *, loff_t *); int hugetlb_treat_movable_handler(struct ctl_table *, int, void *, size_t *, loff_t *); int hugetlb_mempolicy_sysctl_handler(struct ctl_table *, int, void *, size_t *, loff_t *); int copy_hugetlb_page_range(struct mm_struct *, struct mm_struct *, struct vm_area_struct *); long follow_hugetlb_page(struct mm_struct *, struct vm_area_struct *, struct page **, struct vm_area_struct **, unsigned long *, unsigned long *, long, unsigned int, int *); void unmap_hugepage_range(struct vm_area_struct *, unsigned long, unsigned long, struct page *); void __unmap_hugepage_range_final(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, struct page *ref_page); void __unmap_hugepage_range(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, struct page *ref_page); void hugetlb_report_meminfo(struct seq_file *); int hugetlb_report_node_meminfo(char *buf, int len, int nid); void hugetlb_show_meminfo(void); unsigned long hugetlb_total_pages(void); vm_fault_t hugetlb_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, unsigned int flags); int hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, pte_t *dst_pte, struct vm_area_struct *dst_vma, unsigned long dst_addr, unsigned long src_addr, struct page **pagep); int hugetlb_reserve_pages(struct inode *inode, long from, long to, struct vm_area_struct *vma, vm_flags_t vm_flags); long hugetlb_unreserve_pages(struct inode *inode, long start, long end, long freed); bool isolate_huge_page(struct page *page, struct list_head *list); void putback_active_hugepage(struct page *page); void move_hugetlb_state(struct page *oldpage, struct page *newpage, int reason); void free_huge_page(struct page *page); void hugetlb_fix_reserve_counts(struct inode *inode); extern struct mutex *hugetlb_fault_mutex_table; u32 hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t idx); pte_t *huge_pmd_share(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, pud_t *pud); struct address_space *hugetlb_page_mapping_lock_write(struct page *hpage); extern int sysctl_hugetlb_shm_group; extern struct list_head huge_boot_pages; /* arch callbacks */ pte_t *huge_pte_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, unsigned long sz); pte_t *huge_pte_offset(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, unsigned long sz); int huge_pmd_unshare(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long *addr, pte_t *ptep); void adjust_range_if_pmd_sharing_possible(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long *start, unsigned long *end); struct page *follow_huge_addr(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address, int write); struct page *follow_huge_pd(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, hugepd_t hpd, int flags, int pdshift); struct page *follow_huge_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmd, int flags); struct page *follow_huge_pud(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address, pud_t *pud, int flags); struct page *follow_huge_pgd(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address, pgd_t *pgd, int flags); int pmd_huge(pmd_t pmd); int pud_huge(pud_t pud); unsigned long hugetlb_change_protection(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, unsigned long end, pgprot_t newprot); bool is_hugetlb_entry_migration(pte_t pte); #else /* !CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE */ static inline void reset_vma_resv_huge_pages(struct vm_area_struct *vma) { } static inline unsigned long hugetlb_total_pages(void) { return 0; } static inline struct address_space *hugetlb_page_mapping_lock_write( struct page *hpage) { return NULL; } static inline int huge_pmd_unshare(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long *addr, pte_t *ptep) { return 0; } static inline void adjust_range_if_pmd_sharing_possible( struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long *start, unsigned long *end) { } static inline long follow_hugetlb_page(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct page **pages, struct vm_area_struct **vmas, unsigned long *position, unsigned long *nr_pages, long i, unsigned int flags, int *nonblocking) { BUG(); return 0; } static inline struct page *follow_huge_addr(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address, int write) { return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } static inline int copy_hugetlb_page_range(struct mm_struct *dst, struct mm_struct *src, struct vm_area_struct *vma) { BUG(); return 0; } static inline void hugetlb_report_meminfo(struct seq_file *m) { } static inline int hugetlb_report_node_meminfo(char *buf, int len, int nid) { return 0; } static inline void hugetlb_show_meminfo(void) { } static inline struct page *follow_huge_pd(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, hugepd_t hpd, int flags, int pdshift) { return NULL; } static inline struct page *follow_huge_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmd, int flags) { return NULL; } static inline struct page *follow_huge_pud(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address, pud_t *pud, int flags) { return NULL; } static inline struct page *follow_huge_pgd(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address, pgd_t *pgd, int flags) { return NULL; } static inline int prepare_hugepage_range(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, unsigned long len) { return -EINVAL; } static inline int pmd_huge(pmd_t pmd) { return 0; } static inline int pud_huge(pud_t pud) { return 0; } static inline int is_hugepage_only_range(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, unsigned long len) { return 0; } static inline void hugetlb_free_pgd_range(struct mmu_gather *tlb, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end, unsigned long floor, unsigned long ceiling) { BUG(); } static inline int hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, pte_t *dst_pte, struct vm_area_struct *dst_vma, unsigned long dst_addr, unsigned long src_addr, struct page **pagep) { BUG(); return 0; } static inline pte_t *huge_pte_offset(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, unsigned long sz) { return NULL; } static inline bool isolate_huge_page(struct page *page, struct list_head *list) { return false; } static inline void putback_active_hugepage(struct page *page) { } static inline void move_hugetlb_state(struct page *oldpage, struct page *newpage, int reason) { } static inline unsigned long hugetlb_change_protection( struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, unsigned long end, pgprot_t newprot) { return 0; } static inline void __unmap_hugepage_range_final(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, struct page *ref_page) { BUG(); } static inline void __unmap_hugepage_range(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, struct page *ref_page) { BUG(); } static inline vm_fault_t hugetlb_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, unsigned int flags) { BUG(); return 0; } #endif /* !CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE */ /* * hugepages at page global directory. If arch support * hugepages at pgd level, they need to define this. */ #ifndef pgd_huge #define pgd_huge(x) 0 #endif #ifndef p4d_huge #define p4d_huge(x) 0 #endif #ifndef pgd_write static inline int pgd_write(pgd_t pgd) { BUG(); return 0; } #endif #define HUGETLB_ANON_FILE "anon_hugepage" enum { /* * The file will be used as an shm file so shmfs accounting rules * apply */ HUGETLB_SHMFS_INODE = 1, /* * The file is being created on the internal vfs mount and shmfs * accounting rules do not apply */ HUGETLB_ANONHUGE_INODE = 2, }; #ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLBFS struct hugetlbfs_sb_info { long max_inodes; /* inodes allowed */ long free_inodes; /* inodes free */ spinlock_t stat_lock; struct hstate *hstate; struct hugepage_subpool *spool; kuid_t uid; kgid_t gid; umode_t mode; }; static inline struct hugetlbfs_sb_info *HUGETLBFS_SB(struct super_block *sb) { return sb->s_fs_info; } struct hugetlbfs_inode_info { struct shared_policy policy; struct inode vfs_inode; unsigned int seals; }; static inline struct hugetlbfs_inode_info *HUGETLBFS_I(struct inode *inode) { return container_of(inode, struct hugetlbfs_inode_info, vfs_inode); } extern const struct file_operations hugetlbfs_file_operations; extern const struct vm_operations_struct hugetlb_vm_ops; struct file *hugetlb_file_setup(const char *name, size_t size, vm_flags_t acct, struct user_struct **user, int creat_flags, int page_size_log); static inline bool is_file_hugepages(struct file *file) { if (file->f_op == &hugetlbfs_file_operations) return true; return is_file_shm_hugepages(file); } static inline struct hstate *hstate_inode(struct inode *i) { return HUGETLBFS_SB(i->i_sb)->hstate; } #else /* !CONFIG_HUGETLBFS */ #define is_file_hugepages(file) false static inline struct file * hugetlb_file_setup(const char *name, size_t size, vm_flags_t acctflag, struct user_struct **user, int creat_flags, int page_size_log) { return ERR_PTR(-ENOSYS); } static inline struct hstate *hstate_inode(struct inode *i) { return NULL; } #endif /* !CONFIG_HUGETLBFS */ #ifdef HAVE_ARCH_HUGETLB_UNMAPPED_AREA unsigned long hugetlb_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, unsigned long len, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags); #endif /* HAVE_ARCH_HUGETLB_UNMAPPED_AREA */ #ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE #define HSTATE_NAME_LEN 32 /* Defines one hugetlb page size */ struct hstate { int next_nid_to_alloc; int next_nid_to_free; unsigned int order; unsigned long mask; unsigned long max_huge_pages; unsigned long nr_huge_pages; unsigned long free_huge_pages; unsigned long resv_huge_pages; unsigned long surplus_huge_pages; unsigned long nr_overcommit_huge_pages; struct list_head hugepage_activelist; struct list_head hugepage_freelists[MAX_NUMNODES]; unsigned int nr_huge_pages_node[MAX_NUMNODES]; unsigned int free_huge_pages_node[MAX_NUMNODES]; unsigned int surplus_huge_pages_node[MAX_NUMNODES]; #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_HUGETLB /* cgroup control files */ struct cftype cgroup_files_dfl[7]; struct cftype cgroup_files_legacy[9]; #endif char name[HSTATE_NAME_LEN]; }; struct huge_bootmem_page { struct list_head list; struct hstate *hstate; }; struct page *alloc_huge_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, int avoid_reserve); struct page *alloc_huge_page_nodemask(struct hstate *h, int preferred_nid, nodemask_t *nmask, gfp_t gfp_mask); struct page *alloc_huge_page_vma(struct hstate *h, struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address); int huge_add_to_page_cache(struct page *page, struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t idx); /* arch callback */ int __init __alloc_bootmem_huge_page(struct hstate *h); int __init alloc_bootmem_huge_page(struct hstate *h); void __init hugetlb_add_hstate(unsigned order); bool __init arch_hugetlb_valid_size(unsigned long size); struct hstate *size_to_hstate(unsigned long size); #ifndef HUGE_MAX_HSTATE #define HUGE_MAX_HSTATE 1 #endif extern struct hstate hstates[HUGE_MAX_HSTATE]; extern unsigned int default_hstate_idx; #define default_hstate (hstates[default_hstate_idx]) static inline struct hstate *hstate_file(struct file *f) { return hstate_inode(file_inode(f)); } static inline struct hstate *hstate_sizelog(int page_size_log) { if (!page_size_log) return &default_hstate; return size_to_hstate(1UL << page_size_log); } static inline struct hstate *hstate_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma) { return hstate_file(vma->vm_file); } static inline unsigned long huge_page_size(struct hstate *h) { return (unsigned long)PAGE_SIZE << h->order; } extern unsigned long vma_kernel_pagesize(struct vm_area_struct *vma); extern unsigned long vma_mmu_pagesize(struct vm_area_struct *vma); static inline unsigned long huge_page_mask(struct hstate *h) { return h->mask; } static inline unsigned int huge_page_order(struct hstate *h) { return h->order; } static inline unsigned huge_page_shift(struct hstate *h) { return h->order + PAGE_SHIFT; } static inline bool hstate_is_gigantic(struct hstate *h) { return huge_page_order(h) >= MAX_ORDER; } static inline unsigned int pages_per_huge_page(struct hstate *h) { return 1 << h->order; } static inline unsigned int blocks_per_huge_page(struct hstate *h) { return huge_page_size(h) / 512; } #include <asm/hugetlb.h> #ifndef is_hugepage_only_range static inline int is_hugepage_only_range(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, unsigned long len) { return 0; } #define is_hugepage_only_range is_hugepage_only_range #endif #ifndef arch_clear_hugepage_flags static inline void arch_clear_hugepage_flags(struct page *page) { } #define arch_clear_hugepage_flags arch_clear_hugepage_flags #endif #ifndef arch_make_huge_pte static inline pte_t arch_make_huge_pte(pte_t entry, struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct page *page, int writable) { return entry; } #endif static inline struct hstate *page_hstate(struct page *page) { VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageHuge(page), page); return size_to_hstate(page_size(page)); } static inline unsigned hstate_index_to_shift(unsigned index) { return hstates[index].order + PAGE_SHIFT; } static inline int hstate_index(struct hstate *h) { return h - hstates; } extern int dissolve_free_huge_page(struct page *page); extern int dissolve_free_huge_pages(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long end_pfn); #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_HUGEPAGE_MIGRATION #ifndef arch_hugetlb_migration_supported static inline bool arch_hugetlb_migration_supported(struct hstate *h) { if ((huge_page_shift(h) == PMD_SHIFT) || (huge_page_shift(h) == PUD_SHIFT) || (huge_page_shift(h) == PGDIR_SHIFT)) return true; else return false; } #endif #else static inline bool arch_hugetlb_migration_supported(struct hstate *h) { return false; } #endif static inline bool hugepage_migration_supported(struct hstate *h) { return arch_hugetlb_migration_supported(h); } /* * Movability check is different as compared to migration check. * It determines whether or not a huge page should be placed on * movable zone or not. Movability of any huge page should be * required only if huge page size is supported for migration. * There wont be any reason for the huge page to be movable if * it is not migratable to start with. Also the size of the huge * page should be large enough to be placed under a movable zone * and still feasible enough to be migratable. Just the presence * in movable zone does not make the migration feasible. * * So even though large huge page sizes like the gigantic ones * are migratable they should not be movable because its not * feasible to migrate them from movable zone. */ static inline bool hugepage_movable_supported(struct hstate *h) { if (!hugepage_migration_supported(h)) return false; if (hstate_is_gigantic(h)) return false; return true; } /* Movability of hugepages depends on migration support. */ static inline gfp_t htlb_alloc_mask(struct hstate *h) { if (hugepage_movable_supported(h)) return GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE; else return GFP_HIGHUSER; } static inline gfp_t htlb_modify_alloc_mask(struct hstate *h, gfp_t gfp_mask) { gfp_t modified_mask = htlb_alloc_mask(h); /* Some callers might want to enforce node */ modified_mask |= (gfp_mask & __GFP_THISNODE); modified_mask |= (gfp_mask & __GFP_NOWARN); return modified_mask; } static inline spinlock_t *huge_pte_lockptr(struct hstate *h, struct mm_struct *mm, pte_t *pte) { if (huge_page_size(h) == PMD_SIZE) return pmd_lockptr(mm, (pmd_t *) pte); VM_BUG_ON(huge_page_size(h) == PAGE_SIZE); return &mm->page_table_lock; } #ifndef hugepages_supported /* * Some platform decide whether they support huge pages at boot * time. Some of them, such as powerpc, set HPAGE_SHIFT to 0 * when there is no such support */ #define hugepages_supported() (HPAGE_SHIFT != 0) #endif void hugetlb_report_usage(struct seq_file *m, struct mm_struct *mm); static inline void hugetlb_count_init(struct mm_struct *mm) { atomic_long_set(&mm->hugetlb_usage, 0); } static inline void hugetlb_count_add(long l, struct mm_struct *mm) { atomic_long_add(l, &mm->hugetlb_usage); } static inline void hugetlb_count_sub(long l, struct mm_struct *mm) { atomic_long_sub(l, &mm->hugetlb_usage); } #ifndef set_huge_swap_pte_at static inline void set_huge_swap_pte_at(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte, unsigned long sz) { set_huge_pte_at(mm, addr, ptep, pte); } #endif #ifndef huge_ptep_modify_prot_start #define huge_ptep_modify_prot_start huge_ptep_modify_prot_start static inline pte_t huge_ptep_modify_prot_start(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep) { return huge_ptep_get_and_clear(vma->vm_mm, addr, ptep); } #endif #ifndef huge_ptep_modify_prot_commit #define huge_ptep_modify_prot_commit huge_ptep_modify_prot_commit static inline void huge_ptep_modify_prot_commit(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep, pte_t old_pte, pte_t pte) { set_huge_pte_at(vma->vm_mm, addr, ptep, pte); } #endif void set_page_huge_active(struct page *page); #else /* CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE */ struct hstate {}; static inline struct page *alloc_huge_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, int avoid_reserve) { return NULL; } static inline struct page * alloc_huge_page_nodemask(struct hstate *h, int preferred_nid, nodemask_t *nmask, gfp_t gfp_mask) { return NULL; } static inline struct page *alloc_huge_page_vma(struct hstate *h, struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address) { return NULL; } static inline int __alloc_bootmem_huge_page(struct hstate *h) { return 0; } static inline struct hstate *hstate_file(struct file *f) { return NULL; } static inline struct hstate *hstate_sizelog(int page_size_log) { return NULL; } static inline struct hstate *hstate_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma) { return NULL; } static inline struct hstate *page_hstate(struct page *page) { return NULL; } static inline unsigned long huge_page_size(struct hstate *h) { return PAGE_SIZE; } static inline unsigned long huge_page_mask(struct hstate *h) { return PAGE_MASK; } static inline unsigned long vma_kernel_pagesize(struct vm_area_struct *vma) { return PAGE_SIZE; } static inline unsigned long vma_mmu_pagesize(struct vm_area_struct *vma) { return PAGE_SIZE; } static inline unsigned int huge_page_order(struct hstate *h) { return 0; } static inline unsigned int huge_page_shift(struct hstate *h) { return PAGE_SHIFT; } static inline bool hstate_is_gigantic(struct hstate *h) { return false; } static inline unsigned int pages_per_huge_page(struct hstate *h) { return 1; } static inline unsigned hstate_index_to_shift(unsigned index) { return 0; } static inline int hstate_index(struct hstate *h) { return 0; } static inline int dissolve_free_huge_page(struct page *page) { return 0; } static inline int dissolve_free_huge_pages(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long end_pfn) { return 0; } static inline bool hugepage_migration_supported(struct hstate *h) { return false; } static inline bool hugepage_movable_supported(struct hstate *h) { return false; } static inline gfp_t htlb_alloc_mask(struct hstate *h) { return 0; } static inline gfp_t htlb_modify_alloc_mask(struct hstate *h, gfp_t gfp_mask) { return 0; } static inline spinlock_t *huge_pte_lockptr(struct hstate *h, struct mm_struct *mm, pte_t *pte) { return &mm->page_table_lock; } static inline void hugetlb_count_init(struct mm_struct *mm) { } static inline void hugetlb_report_usage(struct seq_file *f, struct mm_struct *m) { } static inline void hugetlb_count_sub(long l, struct mm_struct *mm) { } static inline void set_huge_swap_pte_at(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte, unsigned long sz) { } #endif /* CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE */ static inline spinlock_t *huge_pte_lock(struct hstate *h, struct mm_struct *mm, pte_t *pte) { spinlock_t *ptl; ptl = huge_pte_lockptr(h, mm, pte); spin_lock(ptl); return ptl; } #if defined(CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE) && defined(CONFIG_CMA) extern void __init hugetlb_cma_reserve(int order); extern void __init hugetlb_cma_check(void); #else static inline __init void hugetlb_cma_reserve(int order) { } static inline __init void hugetlb_cma_check(void) { } #endif #endif /* _LINUX_HUGETLB_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef __LINUX_NODEMASK_H #define __LINUX_NODEMASK_H /* * Nodemasks provide a bitmap suitable for representing the * set of Node's in a system, one bit position per Node number. * * See detailed comments in the file linux/bitmap.h describing the * data type on which these nodemasks are based. * * For details of nodemask_parse_user(), see bitmap_parse_user() in * lib/bitmap.c. For details of nodelist_parse(), see bitmap_parselist(), * also in bitmap.c. For details of node_remap(), see bitmap_bitremap in * lib/bitmap.c. For details of nodes_remap(), see bitmap_remap in * lib/bitmap.c. For details of nodes_onto(), see bitmap_onto in * lib/bitmap.c. For details of nodes_fold(), see bitmap_fold in * lib/bitmap.c. * * The available nodemask operations are: * * void node_set(node, mask) turn on bit 'node' in mask * void node_clear(node, mask) turn off bit 'node' in mask * void nodes_setall(mask) set all bits * void nodes_clear(mask) clear all bits * int node_isset(node, mask) true iff bit 'node' set in mask * int node_test_and_set(node, mask) test and set bit 'node' in mask * * void nodes_and(dst, src1, src2) dst = src1 & src2 [intersection] * void nodes_or(dst, src1, src2) dst = src1 | src2 [union] * void nodes_xor(dst, src1, src2) dst = src1 ^ src2 * void nodes_andnot(dst, src1, src2) dst = src1 & ~src2 * void nodes_complement(dst, src) dst = ~src * * int nodes_equal(mask1, mask2) Does mask1 == mask2? * int nodes_intersects(mask1, mask2) Do mask1 and mask2 intersect? * int nodes_subset(mask1, mask2) Is mask1 a subset of mask2? * int nodes_empty(mask) Is mask empty (no bits sets)? * int nodes_full(mask) Is mask full (all bits sets)? * int nodes_weight(mask) Hamming weight - number of set bits * * void nodes_shift_right(dst, src, n) Shift right * void nodes_shift_left(dst, src, n) Shift left * * int first_node(mask) Number lowest set bit, or MAX_NUMNODES * int next_node(node, mask) Next node past 'node', or MAX_NUMNODES * int next_node_in(node, mask) Next node past 'node', or wrap to first, * or MAX_NUMNODES * int first_unset_node(mask) First node not set in mask, or * MAX_NUMNODES * * nodemask_t nodemask_of_node(node) Return nodemask with bit 'node' set * NODE_MASK_ALL Initializer - all bits set * NODE_MASK_NONE Initializer - no bits set * unsigned long *nodes_addr(mask) Array of unsigned long's in mask * * int nodemask_parse_user(ubuf, ulen, mask) Parse ascii string as nodemask * int nodelist_parse(buf, map) Parse ascii string as nodelist * int node_remap(oldbit, old, new) newbit = map(old, new)(oldbit) * void nodes_remap(dst, src, old, new) *dst = map(old, new)(src) * void nodes_onto(dst, orig, relmap) *dst = orig relative to relmap * void nodes_fold(dst, orig, sz) dst bits = orig bits mod sz * * for_each_node_mask(node, mask) for-loop node over mask * * int num_online_nodes() Number of online Nodes * int num_possible_nodes() Number of all possible Nodes * * int node_random(mask) Random node with set bit in mask * * int node_online(node) Is some node online? * int node_possible(node) Is some node possible? * * node_set_online(node) set bit 'node' in node_online_map * node_set_offline(node) clear bit 'node' in node_online_map * * for_each_node(node) for-loop node over node_possible_map * for_each_online_node(node) for-loop node over node_online_map * * Subtlety: * 1) The 'type-checked' form of node_isset() causes gcc (3.3.2, anyway) * to generate slightly worse code. So use a simple one-line #define * for node_isset(), instead of wrapping an inline inside a macro, the * way we do the other calls. * * NODEMASK_SCRATCH * When doing above logical AND, OR, XOR, Remap operations the callers tend to * need temporary nodemask_t's on the stack. But if NODES_SHIFT is large, * nodemask_t's consume too much stack space. NODEMASK_SCRATCH is a helper * for such situations. See below and CPUMASK_ALLOC also. */ #include <linux/threads.h> #include <linux/bitmap.h> #include <linux/minmax.h> #include <linux/numa.h> typedef struct { DECLARE_BITMAP(bits, MAX_NUMNODES); } nodemask_t; extern nodemask_t _unused_nodemask_arg_; /** * nodemask_pr_args - printf args to output a nodemask * @maskp: nodemask to be printed * * Can be used to provide arguments for '%*pb[l]' when printing a nodemask. */ #define nodemask_pr_args(maskp) __nodemask_pr_numnodes(maskp), \ __nodemask_pr_bits(maskp) static inline unsigned int __nodemask_pr_numnodes(const nodemask_t *m) { return m ? MAX_NUMNODES : 0; } static inline const unsigned long *__nodemask_pr_bits(const nodemask_t *m) { return m ? m->bits : NULL; } /* * The inline keyword gives the compiler room to decide to inline, or * not inline a function as it sees best. However, as these functions * are called in both __init and non-__init functions, if they are not * inlined we will end up with a section mis-match error (of the type of * freeable items not being freed). So we must use __always_inline here * to fix the problem. If other functions in the future also end up in * this situation they will also need to be annotated as __always_inline */ #define node_set(node, dst) __node_set((node), &(dst)) static __always_inline void __node_set(int node, volatile nodemask_t *dstp) { set_bit(node, dstp->bits); } #define node_clear(node, dst) __node_clear((node), &(dst)) static inline void __node_clear(int node, volatile nodemask_t *dstp) { clear_bit(node, dstp->bits); } #define nodes_setall(dst) __nodes_setall(&(dst), MAX_NUMNODES) static inline void __nodes_setall(nodemask_t *dstp, unsigned int nbits) { bitmap_fill(dstp->bits, nbits); } #define nodes_clear(dst) __nodes_clear(&(dst), MAX_NUMNODES) static inline void __nodes_clear(nodemask_t *dstp, unsigned int nbits) { bitmap_zero(dstp->bits, nbits); } /* No static inline type checking - see Subtlety (1) above. */ #define node_isset(node, nodemask) test_bit((node), (nodemask).bits) #define node_test_and_set(node, nodemask) \ __node_test_and_set((node), &(nodemask)) static inline int __node_test_and_set(int node, nodemask_t *addr) { return test_and_set_bit(node, addr->bits); } #define nodes_and(dst, src1, src2) \ __nodes_and(&(dst), &(src1), &(src2), MAX_NUMNODES) static inline void __nodes_and(nodemask_t *dstp, const nodemask_t *src1p, const nodemask_t *src2p, unsigned int nbits) { bitmap_and(dstp->bits, src1p->bits, src2p->bits, nbits); } #define nodes_or(dst, src1, src2) \ __nodes_or(&(dst), &(src1), &(src2), MAX_NUMNODES) static inline void __nodes_or(nodemask_t *dstp, const nodemask_t *src1p, const nodemask_t *src2p, unsigned int nbits) { bitmap_or(dstp->bits, src1p->bits, src2p->bits, nbits); } #define nodes_xor(dst, src1, src2) \ __nodes_xor(&(dst), &(src1), &(src2), MAX_NUMNODES) static inline void __nodes_xor(nodemask_t *dstp, const nodemask_t *src1p, const nodemask_t *src2p, unsigned int nbits) { bitmap_xor(dstp->bits, src1p->bits, src2p->bits, nbits); } #define nodes_andnot(dst, src1, src2) \ __nodes_andnot(&(dst), &(src1), &(src2), MAX_NUMNODES) static inline void __nodes_andnot(nodemask_t *dstp, const nodemask_t *src1p, const nodemask_t *src2p, unsigned int nbits) { bitmap_andnot(dstp->bits, src1p->bits, src2p->bits, nbits); } #define nodes_complement(dst, src) \ __nodes_complement(&(dst), &(src), MAX_NUMNODES) static inline void __nodes_complement(nodemask_t *dstp, const nodemask_t *srcp, unsigned int nbits) { bitmap_complement(dstp->bits, srcp->bits, nbits); } #define nodes_equal(src1, src2) \ __nodes_equal(&(src1), &(src2), MAX_NUMNODES) static inline int __nodes_equal(const nodemask_t *src1p, const nodemask_t *src2p, unsigned int nbits) { return bitmap_equal(src1p->bits, src2p->bits, nbits); } #define nodes_intersects(src1, src2) \ __nodes_intersects(&(src1), &(src2), MAX_NUMNODES) static inline int __nodes_intersects(const nodemask_t *src1p, const nodemask_t *src2p, unsigned int nbits) { return bitmap_intersects(src1p->bits, src2p->bits, nbits); } #define nodes_subset(src1, src2) \ __nodes_subset(&(src1), &(src2), MAX_NUMNODES) static inline int __nodes_subset(const nodemask_t *src1p, const nodemask_t *src2p, unsigned int nbits) { return bitmap_subset(src1p->bits, src2p->bits, nbits); } #define nodes_empty(src) __nodes_empty(&(src), MAX_NUMNODES) static inline int __nodes_empty(const nodemask_t *srcp, unsigned int nbits) { return bitmap_empty(srcp->bits, nbits); } #define nodes_full(nodemask) __nodes_full(&(nodemask), MAX_NUMNODES) static inline int __nodes_full(const nodemask_t *srcp, unsigned int nbits) { return bitmap_full(srcp->bits, nbits); } #define nodes_weight(nodemask) __nodes_weight(&(nodemask), MAX_NUMNODES) static inline int __nodes_weight(const nodemask_t *srcp, unsigned int nbits) { return bitmap_weight(srcp->bits, nbits); } #define nodes_shift_right(dst, src, n) \ __nodes_shift_right(&(dst), &(src), (n), MAX_NUMNODES) static inline void __nodes_shift_right(nodemask_t *dstp, const nodemask_t *srcp, int n, int nbits) { bitmap_shift_right(dstp->bits, srcp->bits, n, nbits); } #define nodes_shift_left(dst, src, n) \ __nodes_shift_left(&(dst), &(src), (n), MAX_NUMNODES) static inline void __nodes_shift_left(nodemask_t *dstp, const nodemask_t *srcp, int n, int nbits) { bitmap_shift_left(dstp->bits, srcp->bits, n, nbits); } /* FIXME: better would be to fix all architectures to never return > MAX_NUMNODES, then the silly min_ts could be dropped. */ #define first_node(src) __first_node(&(src)) static inline int __first_node(const nodemask_t *srcp) { return min_t(int, MAX_NUMNODES, find_first_bit(srcp->bits, MAX_NUMNODES)); } #define next_node(n, src) __next_node((n), &(src)) static inline int __next_node(int n, const nodemask_t *srcp) { return min_t(int,MAX_NUMNODES,find_next_bit(srcp->bits, MAX_NUMNODES, n+1)); } /* * Find the next present node in src, starting after node n, wrapping around to * the first node in src if needed. Returns MAX_NUMNODES if src is empty. */ #define next_node_in(n, src) __next_node_in((n), &(src)) int __next_node_in(int node, const nodemask_t *srcp); static inline void init_nodemask_of_node(nodemask_t *mask, int node) { nodes_clear(*mask); node_set(node, *mask); } #define nodemask_of_node(node) \ ({ \ typeof(_unused_nodemask_arg_) m; \ if (sizeof(m) == sizeof(unsigned long)) { \ m.bits[0] = 1UL << (node); \ } else { \ init_nodemask_of_node(&m, (node)); \ } \ m; \ }) #define first_unset_node(mask) __first_unset_node(&(mask)) static inline int __first_unset_node(const nodemask_t *maskp) { return min_t(int,MAX_NUMNODES, find_first_zero_bit(maskp->bits, MAX_NUMNODES)); } #define NODE_MASK_LAST_WORD BITMAP_LAST_WORD_MASK(MAX_NUMNODES) #if MAX_NUMNODES <= BITS_PER_LONG #define NODE_MASK_ALL \ ((nodemask_t) { { \ [BITS_TO_LONGS(MAX_NUMNODES)-1] = NODE_MASK_LAST_WORD \ } }) #else #define NODE_MASK_ALL \ ((nodemask_t) { { \ [0 ... BITS_TO_LONGS(MAX_NUMNODES)-2] = ~0UL, \ [BITS_TO_LONGS(MAX_NUMNODES)-1] = NODE_MASK_LAST_WORD \ } }) #endif #define NODE_MASK_NONE \ ((nodemask_t) { { \ [0 ... BITS_TO_LONGS(MAX_NUMNODES)-1] = 0UL \ } }) #define nodes_addr(src) ((src).bits) #define nodemask_parse_user(ubuf, ulen, dst) \ __nodemask_parse_user((ubuf), (ulen), &(dst), MAX_NUMNODES) static inline int __nodemask_parse_user(const char __user *buf, int len, nodemask_t *dstp, int nbits) { return bitmap_parse_user(buf, len, dstp->bits, nbits); } #define nodelist_parse(buf, dst) __nodelist_parse((buf), &(dst), MAX_NUMNODES) static inline int __nodelist_parse(const char *buf, nodemask_t *dstp, int nbits) { return bitmap_parselist(buf, dstp->bits, nbits); } #define node_remap(oldbit, old, new) \ __node_remap((oldbit), &(old), &(new), MAX_NUMNODES) static inline int __node_remap(int oldbit, const nodemask_t *oldp, const nodemask_t *newp, int nbits) { return bitmap_bitremap(oldbit, oldp->bits, newp->bits, nbits); } #define nodes_remap(dst, src, old, new) \ __nodes_remap(&(dst), &(src), &(old), &(new), MAX_NUMNODES) static inline void __nodes_remap(nodemask_t *dstp, const nodemask_t *srcp, const nodemask_t *oldp, const nodemask_t *newp, int nbits) { bitmap_remap(dstp->bits, srcp->bits, oldp->bits, newp->bits, nbits); } #define nodes_onto(dst, orig, relmap) \ __nodes_onto(&(dst), &(orig), &(relmap), MAX_NUMNODES) static inline void __nodes_onto(nodemask_t *dstp, const nodemask_t *origp, const nodemask_t *relmapp, int nbits) { bitmap_onto(dstp->bits, origp->bits, relmapp->bits, nbits); } #define nodes_fold(dst, orig, sz) \ __nodes_fold(&(dst), &(orig), sz, MAX_NUMNODES) static inline void __nodes_fold(nodemask_t *dstp, const nodemask_t *origp, int sz, int nbits) { bitmap_fold(dstp->bits, origp->bits, sz, nbits); } #if MAX_NUMNODES > 1 #define for_each_node_mask(node, mask) \ for ((node) = first_node(mask); \ (node) < MAX_NUMNODES; \ (node) = next_node((node), (mask))) #else /* MAX_NUMNODES == 1 */ #define for_each_node_mask(node, mask) \ if (!nodes_empty(mask)) \ for ((node) = 0; (node) < 1; (node)++) #endif /* MAX_NUMNODES */ /* * Bitmasks that are kept for all the nodes. */ enum node_states { N_POSSIBLE, /* The node could become online at some point */ N_ONLINE, /* The node is online */ N_NORMAL_MEMORY, /* The node has regular memory */ #ifdef CONFIG_HIGHMEM N_HIGH_MEMORY, /* The node has regular or high memory */ #else N_HIGH_MEMORY = N_NORMAL_MEMORY, #endif N_MEMORY, /* The node has memory(regular, high, movable) */ N_CPU, /* The node has one or more cpus */ N_GENERIC_INITIATOR, /* The node has one or more Generic Initiators */ NR_NODE_STATES }; /* * The following particular system nodemasks and operations * on them manage all possible and online nodes. */ extern nodemask_t node_states[NR_NODE_STATES]; #if MAX_NUMNODES > 1 static inline int node_state(int node, enum node_states state) { return node_isset(node, node_states[state]); } static inline void node_set_state(int node, enum node_states state) { __node_set(node, &node_states[state]); } static inline void node_clear_state(int node, enum node_states state) { __node_clear(node, &node_states[state]); } static inline int num_node_state(enum node_states state) { return nodes_weight(node_states[state]); } #define for_each_node_state(__node, __state) \ for_each_node_mask((__node), node_states[__state]) #define first_online_node first_node(node_states[N_ONLINE]) #define first_memory_node first_node(node_states[N_MEMORY]) static inline int next_online_node(int nid) { return next_node(nid, node_states[N_ONLINE]); } static inline int next_memory_node(int nid) { return next_node(nid, node_states[N_MEMORY]); } extern unsigned int nr_node_ids; extern unsigned int nr_online_nodes; static inline void node_set_online(int nid) { node_set_state(nid, N_ONLINE); nr_online_nodes = num_node_state(N_ONLINE); } static inline void node_set_offline(int nid) { node_clear_state(nid, N_ONLINE); nr_online_nodes = num_node_state(N_ONLINE); } #else static inline int node_state(int node, enum node_states state) { return node == 0; } static inline void node_set_state(int node, enum node_states state) { } static inline void node_clear_state(int node, enum node_states state) { } static inline int num_node_state(enum node_states state) { return 1; } #define for_each_node_state(node, __state) \ for ( (node) = 0; (node) == 0; (node) = 1) #define first_online_node 0 #define first_memory_node 0 #define next_online_node(nid) (MAX_NUMNODES) #define nr_node_ids 1U #define nr_online_nodes 1U #define node_set_online(node) node_set_state((node), N_ONLINE) #define node_set_offline(node) node_clear_state((node), N_ONLINE) #endif #if defined(CONFIG_NUMA) && (MAX_NUMNODES > 1) extern int node_random(const nodemask_t *maskp); #else static inline int node_random(const nodemask_t *mask) { return 0; } #endif #define node_online_map node_states[N_ONLINE] #define node_possible_map node_states[N_POSSIBLE] #define num_online_nodes() num_node_state(N_ONLINE) #define num_possible_nodes() num_node_state(N_POSSIBLE) #define node_online(node) node_state((node), N_ONLINE) #define node_possible(node) node_state((node), N_POSSIBLE) #define for_each_node(node) for_each_node_state(node, N_POSSIBLE) #define for_each_online_node(node) for_each_node_state(node, N_ONLINE) /* * For nodemask scrach area. * NODEMASK_ALLOC(type, name) allocates an object with a specified type and * name. */ #if NODES_SHIFT > 8 /* nodemask_t > 32 bytes */ #define NODEMASK_ALLOC(type, name, gfp_flags) \ type *name = kmalloc(sizeof(*name), gfp_flags) #define NODEMASK_FREE(m) kfree(m) #else #define NODEMASK_ALLOC(type, name, gfp_flags) type _##name, *name = &_##name #define NODEMASK_FREE(m) do {} while (0) #endif /* A example struture for using NODEMASK_ALLOC, used in mempolicy. */ struct nodemask_scratch { nodemask_t mask1; nodemask_t mask2; }; #define NODEMASK_SCRATCH(x) \ NODEMASK_ALLOC(struct nodemask_scratch, x, \ GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NORETRY) #define NODEMASK_SCRATCH_FREE(x) NODEMASK_FREE(x) #endif /* __LINUX_NODEMASK_H */
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1622 1623 1624 1625 1626 1627 1628 1629 1630 1631 1632 1633 1634 1635 1636 1637 1638 1639 1640 1641 1642 1643 1644 1645 1646 1647 1648 1649 1650 1651 1652 1653 1654 1655 1656 1657 1658 1659 1660 1661 1662 1663 1664 1665 1666 1667 1668 1669 1670 1671 1672 1673 1674 1675 1676 1677 1678 1679 1680 1681 1682 1683 1684 1685 1686 1687 1688 1689 1690 1691 1692 1693 1694 1695 1696 1697 1698 1699 1700 1701 1702 1703 1704 1705 1706 1707 1708 1709 1710 1711 1712 1713 1714 1715 1716 1717 1718 1719 1720 1721 1722 1723 1724 1725 1726 1727 1728 1729 1730 1731 1732 1733 1734 1735 1736 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 1749 1750 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 1767 1768 1769 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 /* BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux Copyright (c) 2000-2001, 2010, Code Aurora Forum. All rights reserved. Written 2000,2001 by Maxim Krasnyansky <maxk@qualcomm.com> This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as published by the Free Software Foundation; THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED. */ #ifndef __HCI_CORE_H #define __HCI_CORE_H #include <linux/idr.h> #include <linux/leds.h> #include <linux/rculist.h> #include <net/bluetooth/hci.h> #include <net/bluetooth/hci_sock.h> /* HCI priority */ #define HCI_PRIO_MAX 7 /* HCI Core structures */ struct inquiry_data { bdaddr_t bdaddr; __u8 pscan_rep_mode; __u8 pscan_period_mode; __u8 pscan_mode; __u8 dev_class[3]; __le16 clock_offset; __s8 rssi; __u8 ssp_mode; }; struct inquiry_entry { struct list_head all; /* inq_cache.all */ struct list_head list; /* unknown or resolve */ enum { NAME_NOT_KNOWN, NAME_NEEDED, NAME_PENDING, NAME_KNOWN, } name_state; __u32 timestamp; struct inquiry_data data; }; struct discovery_state { int type; enum { DISCOVERY_STOPPED, DISCOVERY_STARTING, DISCOVERY_FINDING, DISCOVERY_RESOLVING, DISCOVERY_STOPPING, } state; struct list_head all; /* All devices found during inquiry */ struct list_head unknown; /* Name state not known */ struct list_head resolve; /* Name needs to be resolved */ __u32 timestamp; bdaddr_t last_adv_addr; u8 last_adv_addr_type; s8 last_adv_rssi; u32 last_adv_flags; u8 last_adv_data[HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH]; u8 last_adv_data_len; bool report_invalid_rssi; bool result_filtering; bool limited; s8 rssi; u16 uuid_count; u8 (*uuids)[16]; unsigned long scan_start; unsigned long scan_duration; }; #define SUSPEND_NOTIFIER_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(2000) /* 2 seconds */ enum suspend_tasks { SUSPEND_PAUSE_DISCOVERY, SUSPEND_UNPAUSE_DISCOVERY, SUSPEND_PAUSE_ADVERTISING, SUSPEND_UNPAUSE_ADVERTISING, SUSPEND_SCAN_DISABLE, SUSPEND_SCAN_ENABLE, SUSPEND_DISCONNECTING, SUSPEND_POWERING_DOWN, SUSPEND_PREPARE_NOTIFIER, __SUSPEND_NUM_TASKS }; enum suspended_state { BT_RUNNING = 0, BT_SUSPEND_DISCONNECT, BT_SUSPEND_CONFIGURE_WAKE, }; struct hci_conn_hash { struct list_head list; unsigned int acl_num; unsigned int amp_num; unsigned int sco_num; unsigned int le_num; unsigned int le_num_slave; }; struct bdaddr_list { struct list_head list; bdaddr_t bdaddr; u8 bdaddr_type; }; struct bdaddr_list_with_irk { struct list_head list; bdaddr_t bdaddr; u8 bdaddr_type; u8 peer_irk[16]; u8 local_irk[16]; }; struct bdaddr_list_with_flags { struct list_head list; bdaddr_t bdaddr; u8 bdaddr_type; u32 current_flags; }; enum hci_conn_flags { HCI_CONN_FLAG_REMOTE_WAKEUP, HCI_CONN_FLAG_MAX }; #define hci_conn_test_flag(nr, flags) ((flags) & (1U << nr)) /* Make sure number of flags doesn't exceed sizeof(current_flags) */ static_assert(HCI_CONN_FLAG_MAX < 32); struct bt_uuid { struct list_head list; u8 uuid[16]; u8 size; u8 svc_hint; }; struct blocked_key { struct list_head list; struct rcu_head rcu; u8 type; u8 val[16]; }; struct smp_csrk { bdaddr_t bdaddr; u8 bdaddr_type; u8 type; u8 val[16]; }; struct smp_ltk { struct list_head list; struct rcu_head rcu; bdaddr_t bdaddr; u8 bdaddr_type; u8 authenticated; u8 type; u8 enc_size; __le16 ediv; __le64 rand; u8 val[16]; }; struct smp_irk { struct list_head list; struct rcu_head rcu; bdaddr_t rpa; bdaddr_t bdaddr; u8 addr_type; u8 val[16]; }; struct link_key { struct list_head list; struct rcu_head rcu; bdaddr_t bdaddr; u8 type; u8 val[HCI_LINK_KEY_SIZE]; u8 pin_len; }; struct oob_data { struct list_head list; bdaddr_t bdaddr; u8 bdaddr_type; u8 present; u8 hash192[16]; u8 rand192[16]; u8 hash256[16]; u8 rand256[16]; }; struct adv_info { struct list_head list; bool pending; __u8 instance; __u32 flags; __u16 timeout; __u16 remaining_time; __u16 duration; __u16 adv_data_len; __u8 adv_data[HCI_MAX_EXT_AD_LENGTH]; __u16 scan_rsp_len; __u8 scan_rsp_data[HCI_MAX_EXT_AD_LENGTH]; __s8 tx_power; bdaddr_t random_addr; bool rpa_expired; struct delayed_work rpa_expired_cb; }; #define HCI_MAX_ADV_INSTANCES 5 #define HCI_DEFAULT_ADV_DURATION 2 struct adv_pattern { struct list_head list; __u8 ad_type; __u8 offset; __u8 length; __u8 value[HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH]; }; struct adv_monitor { struct list_head patterns; bool active; __u16 handle; }; #define HCI_MIN_ADV_MONITOR_HANDLE 1 #define HCI_MAX_ADV_MONITOR_NUM_HANDLES 32 #define HCI_MAX_ADV_MONITOR_NUM_PATTERNS 16 #define HCI_MAX_SHORT_NAME_LENGTH 10 /* Min encryption key size to match with SMP */ #define HCI_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE 7 /* Default LE RPA expiry time, 15 minutes */ #define HCI_DEFAULT_RPA_TIMEOUT (15 * 60) /* Default min/max age of connection information (1s/3s) */ #define DEFAULT_CONN_INFO_MIN_AGE 1000 #define DEFAULT_CONN_INFO_MAX_AGE 3000 /* Default authenticated payload timeout 30s */ #define DEFAULT_AUTH_PAYLOAD_TIMEOUT 0x0bb8 struct amp_assoc { __u16 len; __u16 offset; __u16 rem_len; __u16 len_so_far; __u8 data[HCI_MAX_AMP_ASSOC_SIZE]; }; #define HCI_MAX_PAGES 3 struct hci_dev { struct list_head list; struct mutex lock; char name[8]; unsigned long flags; __u16 id; __u8 bus; __u8 dev_type; bdaddr_t bdaddr; bdaddr_t setup_addr; bdaddr_t public_addr; bdaddr_t random_addr; bdaddr_t static_addr; __u8 adv_addr_type; __u8 dev_name[HCI_MAX_NAME_LENGTH]; __u8 short_name[HCI_MAX_SHORT_NAME_LENGTH]; __u8 eir[HCI_MAX_EIR_LENGTH]; __u16 appearance; __u8 dev_class[3]; __u8 major_class; __u8 minor_class; __u8 max_page; __u8 features[HCI_MAX_PAGES][8]; __u8 le_features[8]; __u8 le_white_list_size; __u8 le_resolv_list_size; __u8 le_num_of_adv_sets; __u8 le_states[8]; __u8 commands[64]; __u8 hci_ver; __u16 hci_rev; __u8 lmp_ver; __u16 manufacturer; __u16 lmp_subver; __u16 voice_setting; __u8 num_iac; __u8 stored_max_keys; __u8 stored_num_keys; __u8 io_capability; __s8 inq_tx_power; __u8 err_data_reporting; __u16 page_scan_interval; __u16 page_scan_window; __u8 page_scan_type; __u8 le_adv_channel_map; __u16 le_adv_min_interval; __u16 le_adv_max_interval; __u8 le_scan_type; __u16 le_scan_interval; __u16 le_scan_window; __u16 le_scan_int_suspend; __u16 le_scan_window_suspend; __u16 le_scan_int_discovery; __u16 le_scan_window_discovery; __u16 le_scan_int_adv_monitor; __u16 le_scan_window_adv_monitor; __u16 le_scan_int_connect; __u16 le_scan_window_connect; __u16 le_conn_min_interval; __u16 le_conn_max_interval; __u16 le_conn_latency; __u16 le_supv_timeout; __u16 le_def_tx_len; __u16 le_def_tx_time; __u16 le_max_tx_len; __u16 le_max_tx_time; __u16 le_max_rx_len; __u16 le_max_rx_time; __u8 le_max_key_size; __u8 le_min_key_size; __u16 discov_interleaved_timeout; __u16 conn_info_min_age; __u16 conn_info_max_age; __u16 auth_payload_timeout; __u8 min_enc_key_size; __u8 max_enc_key_size; __u8 pairing_opts; __u8 ssp_debug_mode; __u8 hw_error_code; __u32 clock; __u16 devid_source; __u16 devid_vendor; __u16 devid_product; __u16 devid_version; __u8 def_page_scan_type; __u16 def_page_scan_int; __u16 def_page_scan_window; __u8 def_inq_scan_type; __u16 def_inq_scan_int; __u16 def_inq_scan_window; __u16 def_br_lsto; __u16 def_page_timeout; __u16 def_multi_adv_rotation_duration; __u16 def_le_autoconnect_timeout; __u16 pkt_type; __u16 esco_type; __u16 link_policy; __u16 link_mode; __u32 idle_timeout; __u16 sniff_min_interval; __u16 sniff_max_interval; __u8 amp_status; __u32 amp_total_bw; __u32 amp_max_bw; __u32 amp_min_latency; __u32 amp_max_pdu; __u8 amp_type; __u16 amp_pal_cap; __u16 amp_assoc_size; __u32 amp_max_flush_to; __u32 amp_be_flush_to; struct amp_assoc loc_assoc; __u8 flow_ctl_mode; unsigned int auto_accept_delay; unsigned long quirks; atomic_t cmd_cnt; unsigned int acl_cnt; unsigned int sco_cnt; unsigned int le_cnt; unsigned int acl_mtu; unsigned int sco_mtu; unsigned int le_mtu; unsigned int acl_pkts; unsigned int sco_pkts; unsigned int le_pkts; __u16 block_len; __u16 block_mtu; __u16 num_blocks; __u16 block_cnt; unsigned long acl_last_tx; unsigned long sco_last_tx; unsigned long le_last_tx; __u8 le_tx_def_phys; __u8 le_rx_def_phys; struct workqueue_struct *workqueue; struct workqueue_struct *req_workqueue; struct work_struct power_on; struct delayed_work power_off; struct work_struct error_reset; __u16 discov_timeout; struct delayed_work discov_off; struct delayed_work service_cache; struct delayed_work cmd_timer; struct work_struct rx_work; struct work_struct cmd_work; struct work_struct tx_work; struct work_struct discov_update; struct work_struct bg_scan_update; struct work_struct scan_update; struct work_struct connectable_update; struct work_struct discoverable_update; struct delayed_work le_scan_disable; struct delayed_work le_scan_restart; struct sk_buff_head rx_q; struct sk_buff_head raw_q; struct sk_buff_head cmd_q; struct sk_buff *sent_cmd; struct mutex req_lock; wait_queue_head_t req_wait_q; __u32 req_status; __u32 req_result; struct sk_buff *req_skb; void *smp_data; void *smp_bredr_data; struct discovery_state discovery; int discovery_old_state; bool discovery_paused; int advertising_old_state; bool advertising_paused; struct notifier_block suspend_notifier; struct work_struct suspend_prepare; enum suspended_state suspend_state_next; enum suspended_state suspend_state; bool scanning_paused; bool suspended; u8 wake_reason; bdaddr_t wake_addr; u8 wake_addr_type; wait_queue_head_t suspend_wait_q; DECLARE_BITMAP(suspend_tasks, __SUSPEND_NUM_TASKS); struct hci_conn_hash conn_hash; struct list_head mgmt_pending; struct list_head blacklist; struct list_head whitelist; struct list_head uuids; struct list_head link_keys; struct list_head long_term_keys; struct list_head identity_resolving_keys; struct list_head remote_oob_data; struct list_head le_white_list; struct list_head le_resolv_list; struct list_head le_conn_params; struct list_head pend_le_conns; struct list_head pend_le_reports; struct list_head blocked_keys; struct hci_dev_stats stat; atomic_t promisc; const char *hw_info; const char *fw_info; struct dentry *debugfs; struct device dev; struct rfkill *rfkill; DECLARE_BITMAP(dev_flags, __HCI_NUM_FLAGS); __s8 adv_tx_power; __u8 adv_data[HCI_MAX_EXT_AD_LENGTH]; __u8 adv_data_len; __u8 scan_rsp_data[HCI_MAX_EXT_AD_LENGTH]; __u8 scan_rsp_data_len; struct list_head adv_instances; unsigned int adv_instance_cnt; __u8 cur_adv_instance; __u16 adv_instance_timeout; struct delayed_work adv_instance_expire; struct idr adv_monitors_idr; unsigned int adv_monitors_cnt; __u8 irk[16]; __u32 rpa_timeout; struct delayed_work rpa_expired; bdaddr_t rpa; #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_LEDS) struct led_trigger *power_led; #endif #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_MSFTEXT) __u16 msft_opcode; void *msft_data; #endif int (*open)(struct hci_dev *hdev); int (*close)(struct hci_dev *hdev); int (*flush)(struct hci_dev *hdev); int (*setup)(struct hci_dev *hdev); int (*shutdown)(struct hci_dev *hdev); int (*send)(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb); void (*notify)(struct hci_dev *hdev, unsigned int evt); void (*hw_error)(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 code); int (*post_init)(struct hci_dev *hdev); int (*set_diag)(struct hci_dev *hdev, bool enable); int (*set_bdaddr)(struct hci_dev *hdev, const bdaddr_t *bdaddr); void (*cmd_timeout)(struct hci_dev *hdev); bool (*prevent_wake)(struct hci_dev *hdev); }; #define HCI_PHY_HANDLE(handle) (handle & 0xff) enum conn_reasons { CONN_REASON_PAIR_DEVICE, CONN_REASON_L2CAP_CHAN, CONN_REASON_SCO_CONNECT, }; struct hci_conn { struct list_head list; atomic_t refcnt; bdaddr_t dst; __u8 dst_type; bdaddr_t src; __u8 src_type; bdaddr_t init_addr; __u8 init_addr_type; bdaddr_t resp_addr; __u8 resp_addr_type; __u16 handle; __u16 state; __u8 mode; __u8 type; __u8 role; bool out; __u8 attempt; __u8 dev_class[3]; __u8 features[HCI_MAX_PAGES][8]; __u16 pkt_type; __u16 link_policy; __u8 key_type; __u8 auth_type; __u8 sec_level; __u8 pending_sec_level; __u8 pin_length; __u8 enc_key_size; __u8 io_capability; __u32 passkey_notify; __u8 passkey_entered; __u16 disc_timeout; __u16 conn_timeout; __u16 setting; __u16 auth_payload_timeout; __u16 le_conn_min_interval; __u16 le_conn_max_interval; __u16 le_conn_interval; __u16 le_conn_latency; __u16 le_supv_timeout; __u8 le_adv_data[HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH]; __u8 le_adv_data_len; __u8 le_tx_phy; __u8 le_rx_phy; __s8 rssi; __s8 tx_power; __s8 max_tx_power; unsigned long flags; enum conn_reasons conn_reason; __u32 clock; __u16 clock_accuracy; unsigned long conn_info_timestamp; __u8 remote_cap; __u8 remote_auth; __u8 remote_id; unsigned int sent; struct sk_buff_head data_q; struct list_head chan_list; struct delayed_work disc_work; struct delayed_work auto_accept_work; struct delayed_work idle_work; struct delayed_work le_conn_timeout; struct work_struct le_scan_cleanup; struct device dev; struct dentry *debugfs; struct hci_dev *hdev; void *l2cap_data; void *sco_data; struct amp_mgr *amp_mgr; struct hci_conn *link; void (*connect_cfm_cb) (struct hci_conn *conn, u8 status); void (*security_cfm_cb) (struct hci_conn *conn, u8 status); void (*disconn_cfm_cb) (struct hci_conn *conn, u8 reason); }; struct hci_chan { struct list_head list; __u16 handle; struct hci_conn *conn; struct sk_buff_head data_q; unsigned int sent; __u8 state; bool amp; }; struct hci_conn_params { struct list_head list; struct list_head action; bdaddr_t addr; u8 addr_type; u16 conn_min_interval; u16 conn_max_interval; u16 conn_latency; u16 supervision_timeout; enum { HCI_AUTO_CONN_DISABLED, HCI_AUTO_CONN_REPORT, HCI_AUTO_CONN_DIRECT, HCI_AUTO_CONN_ALWAYS, HCI_AUTO_CONN_LINK_LOSS, HCI_AUTO_CONN_EXPLICIT, } auto_connect; struct hci_conn *conn; bool explicit_connect; u32 current_flags; }; extern struct list_head hci_dev_list; extern struct list_head hci_cb_list; extern rwlock_t hci_dev_list_lock; extern struct mutex hci_cb_list_lock; #define hci_dev_set_flag(hdev, nr) set_bit((nr), (hdev)->dev_flags) #define hci_dev_clear_flag(hdev, nr) clear_bit((nr), (hdev)->dev_flags) #define hci_dev_change_flag(hdev, nr) change_bit((nr), (hdev)->dev_flags) #define hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, nr) test_bit((nr), (hdev)->dev_flags) #define hci_dev_test_and_set_flag(hdev, nr) test_and_set_bit((nr), (hdev)->dev_flags) #define hci_dev_test_and_clear_flag(hdev, nr) test_and_clear_bit((nr), (hdev)->dev_flags) #define hci_dev_test_and_change_flag(hdev, nr) test_and_change_bit((nr), (hdev)->dev_flags) #define hci_dev_clear_volatile_flags(hdev) \ do { \ hci_dev_clear_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_SCAN); \ hci_dev_clear_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_ADV); \ hci_dev_clear_flag(hdev, HCI_LL_RPA_RESOLUTION);\ hci_dev_clear_flag(hdev, HCI_PERIODIC_INQ); \ } while (0) /* ----- HCI interface to upper protocols ----- */ int l2cap_connect_ind(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr); int l2cap_disconn_ind(struct hci_conn *hcon); void l2cap_recv_acldata(struct hci_conn *hcon, struct sk_buff *skb, u16 flags); #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_BREDR) int sco_connect_ind(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, __u8 *flags); void sco_recv_scodata(struct hci_conn *hcon, struct sk_buff *skb); #else static inline int sco_connect_ind(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, __u8 *flags) { return 0; } static inline void sco_recv_scodata(struct hci_conn *hcon, struct sk_buff *skb) { } #endif /* ----- Inquiry cache ----- */ #define INQUIRY_CACHE_AGE_MAX (HZ*30) /* 30 seconds */ #define INQUIRY_ENTRY_AGE_MAX (HZ*60) /* 60 seconds */ static inline void discovery_init(struct hci_dev *hdev) { hdev->discovery.state = DISCOVERY_STOPPED; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&hdev->discovery.all); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&hdev->discovery.unknown); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&hdev->discovery.resolve); hdev->discovery.report_invalid_rssi = true; hdev->discovery.rssi = HCI_RSSI_INVALID; } static inline void hci_discovery_filter_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev) { hdev->discovery.result_filtering = false; hdev->discovery.report_invalid_rssi = true; hdev->discovery.rssi = HCI_RSSI_INVALID; hdev->discovery.uuid_count = 0; kfree(hdev->discovery.uuids); hdev->discovery.uuids = NULL; hdev->discovery.scan_start = 0; hdev->discovery.scan_duration = 0; } bool hci_discovery_active(struct hci_dev *hdev); void hci_discovery_set_state(struct hci_dev *hdev, int state); static inline int inquiry_cache_empty(struct hci_dev *hdev) { return list_empty(&hdev->discovery.all); } static inline long inquiry_cache_age(struct hci_dev *hdev) { struct discovery_state *c = &hdev->discovery; return jiffies - c->timestamp; } static inline long inquiry_entry_age(struct inquiry_entry *e) { return jiffies - e->timestamp; } struct inquiry_entry *hci_inquiry_cache_lookup(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr); struct inquiry_entry *hci_inquiry_cache_lookup_unknown(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr); struct inquiry_entry *hci_inquiry_cache_lookup_resolve(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, int state); void hci_inquiry_cache_update_resolve(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct inquiry_entry *ie); u32 hci_inquiry_cache_update(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct inquiry_data *data, bool name_known); void hci_inquiry_cache_flush(struct hci_dev *hdev); /* ----- HCI Connections ----- */ enum { HCI_CONN_AUTH_PEND, HCI_CONN_REAUTH_PEND, HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, HCI_CONN_RSWITCH_PEND, HCI_CONN_MODE_CHANGE_PEND, HCI_CONN_SCO_SETUP_PEND, HCI_CONN_MGMT_CONNECTED, HCI_CONN_SSP_ENABLED, HCI_CONN_SC_ENABLED, HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, HCI_CONN_POWER_SAVE, HCI_CONN_FLUSH_KEY, HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, HCI_CONN_AUTH, HCI_CONN_SECURE, HCI_CONN_FIPS, HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, HCI_CONN_AUTH_INITIATOR, HCI_CONN_DROP, HCI_CONN_PARAM_REMOVAL_PEND, HCI_CONN_NEW_LINK_KEY, HCI_CONN_SCANNING, HCI_CONN_AUTH_FAILURE, }; static inline bool hci_conn_ssp_enabled(struct hci_conn *conn) { struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev; return hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED) && test_bit(HCI_CONN_SSP_ENABLED, &conn->flags); } static inline bool hci_conn_sc_enabled(struct hci_conn *conn) { struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev; return hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) && test_bit(HCI_CONN_SC_ENABLED, &conn->flags); } static inline void hci_conn_hash_add(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *c) { struct hci_conn_hash *h = &hdev->conn_hash; list_add_rcu(&c->list, &h->list); switch (c->type) { case ACL_LINK: h->acl_num++; break; case AMP_LINK: h->amp_num++; break; case LE_LINK: h->le_num++; if (c->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) h->le_num_slave++; break; case SCO_LINK: case ESCO_LINK: h->sco_num++; break; } } static inline void hci_conn_hash_del(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *c) { struct hci_conn_hash *h = &hdev->conn_hash; list_del_rcu(&c->list); synchronize_rcu(); switch (c->type) { case ACL_LINK: h->acl_num--; break; case AMP_LINK: h->amp_num--; break; case LE_LINK: h->le_num--; if (c->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE) h->le_num_slave--; break; case SCO_LINK: case ESCO_LINK: h->sco_num--; break; } } static inline unsigned int hci_conn_num(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u8 type) { struct hci_conn_hash *h = &hdev->conn_hash; switch (type) { case ACL_LINK: return h->acl_num; case AMP_LINK: return h->amp_num; case LE_LINK: return h->le_num; case SCO_LINK: case ESCO_LINK: return h->sco_num; default: return 0; } } static inline unsigned int hci_conn_count(struct hci_dev *hdev) { struct hci_conn_hash *c = &hdev->conn_hash; return c->acl_num + c->amp_num + c->sco_num + c->le_num; } static inline __u8 hci_conn_lookup_type(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u16 handle) { struct hci_conn_hash *h = &hdev->conn_hash; struct hci_conn *c; __u8 type = INVALID_LINK; rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(c, &h->list, list) { if (c->handle == handle) { type = c->type; break; } } rcu_read_unlock(); return type; } static inline struct hci_conn *hci_conn_hash_lookup_handle(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u16 handle) { struct hci_conn_hash *h = &hdev->conn_hash; struct hci_conn *c; rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(c, &h->list, list) { if (c->handle == handle) { rcu_read_unlock(); return c; } } rcu_read_unlock(); return NULL; } static inline struct hci_conn *hci_conn_hash_lookup_ba(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u8 type, bdaddr_t *ba) { struct hci_conn_hash *h = &hdev->conn_hash; struct hci_conn *c; rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(c, &h->list, list) { if (c->type == type && !bacmp(&c->dst, ba)) { rcu_read_unlock(); return c; } } rcu_read_unlock(); return NULL; } static inline struct hci_conn *hci_conn_hash_lookup_le(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *ba, __u8 ba_type) { struct hci_conn_hash *h = &hdev->conn_hash; struct hci_conn *c; rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(c, &h->list, list) { if (c->type != LE_LINK) continue; if (ba_type == c->dst_type && !bacmp(&c->dst, ba)) { rcu_read_unlock(); return c; } } rcu_read_unlock(); return NULL; } static inline struct hci_conn *hci_conn_hash_lookup_state(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u8 type, __u16 state) { struct hci_conn_hash *h = &hdev->conn_hash; struct hci_conn *c; rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(c, &h->list, list) { if (c->type == type && c->state == state) { rcu_read_unlock(); return c; } } rcu_read_unlock(); return NULL; } static inline struct hci_conn *hci_lookup_le_connect(struct hci_dev *hdev) { struct hci_conn_hash *h = &hdev->conn_hash; struct hci_conn *c; rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(c, &h->list, list) { if (c->type == LE_LINK && c->state == BT_CONNECT && !test_bit(HCI_CONN_SCANNING, &c->flags)) { rcu_read_unlock(); return c; } } rcu_read_unlock(); return NULL; } int hci_disconnect(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 reason); bool hci_setup_sync(struct hci_conn *conn, __u16 handle); void hci_sco_setup(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status); struct hci_conn *hci_conn_add(struct hci_dev *hdev, int type, bdaddr_t *dst, u8 role); int hci_conn_del(struct hci_conn *conn); void hci_conn_hash_flush(struct hci_dev *hdev); void hci_conn_check_pending(struct hci_dev *hdev); struct hci_chan *hci_chan_create(struct hci_conn *conn); void hci_chan_del(struct hci_chan *chan); void hci_chan_list_flush(struct hci_conn *conn); struct hci_chan *hci_chan_lookup_handle(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u16 handle); struct hci_conn *hci_connect_le_scan(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *dst, u8 dst_type, u8 sec_level, u16 conn_timeout, enum conn_reasons conn_reason); struct hci_conn *hci_connect_le(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *dst, u8 dst_type, u8 sec_level, u16 conn_timeout, u8 role, bdaddr_t *direct_rpa); struct hci_conn *hci_connect_acl(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *dst, u8 sec_level, u8 auth_type, enum conn_reasons conn_reason); struct hci_conn *hci_connect_sco(struct hci_dev *hdev, int type, bdaddr_t *dst, __u16 setting); int hci_conn_check_link_mode(struct hci_conn *conn); int hci_conn_check_secure(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level); int hci_conn_security(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level, __u8 auth_type, bool initiator); int hci_conn_switch_role(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 role); void hci_conn_enter_active_mode(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 force_active); void hci_le_conn_failed(struct hci_conn *conn, u8 status); /* * hci_conn_get() and hci_conn_put() are used to control the life-time of an * "hci_conn" object. They do not guarantee that the hci_conn object is running, * working or anything else. They just guarantee that the object is available * and can be dereferenced. So you can use its locks, local variables and any * other constant data. * Before accessing runtime data, you _must_ lock the object and then check that * it is still running. As soon as you release the locks, the connection might * get dropped, though. * * On the other hand, hci_conn_hold() and hci_conn_drop() are used to control * how long the underlying connection is held. So every channel that runs on the * hci_conn object calls this to prevent the connection from disappearing. As * long as you hold a device, you must also guarantee that you have a valid * reference to the device via hci_conn_get() (or the initial reference from * hci_conn_add()). * The hold()/drop() ref-count is known to drop below 0 sometimes, which doesn't * break because nobody cares for that. But this means, we cannot use * _get()/_drop() in it, but require the caller to have a valid ref (FIXME). */ static inline struct hci_conn *hci_conn_get(struct hci_conn *conn) { get_device(&conn->dev); return conn; } static inline void hci_conn_put(struct hci_conn *conn) { put_device(&conn->dev); } static inline void hci_conn_hold(struct hci_conn *conn) { BT_DBG("hcon %p orig refcnt %d", conn, atomic_read(&conn->refcnt)); atomic_inc(&conn->refcnt); cancel_delayed_work(&conn->disc_work); } static inline void hci_conn_drop(struct hci_conn *conn) { BT_DBG("hcon %p orig refcnt %d", conn, atomic_read(&conn->refcnt)); if (atomic_dec_and_test(&conn->refcnt)) { unsigned long timeo; switch (conn->type) { case ACL_LINK: case LE_LINK: cancel_delayed_work(&conn->idle_work); if (conn->state == BT_CONNECTED) { timeo = conn->disc_timeout; if (!conn->out) timeo *= 2; } else { timeo = 0; } break; case AMP_LINK: timeo = conn->disc_timeout; break; default: timeo = 0; break; } cancel_delayed_work(&conn->disc_work); queue_delayed_work(conn->hdev->workqueue, &conn->disc_work, timeo); } } /* ----- HCI Devices ----- */ static inline void hci_dev_put(struct hci_dev *d) { BT_DBG("%s orig refcnt %d", d->name, kref_read(&d->dev.kobj.kref)); put_device(&d->dev); } static inline struct hci_dev *hci_dev_hold(struct hci_dev *d) { BT_DBG("%s orig refcnt %d", d->name, kref_read(&d->dev.kobj.kref)); get_device(&d->dev); return d; } #define hci_dev_lock(d) mutex_lock(&d->lock) #define hci_dev_unlock(d) mutex_unlock(&d->lock) #define to_hci_dev(d) container_of(d, struct hci_dev, dev) #define to_hci_conn(c) container_of(c, struct hci_conn, dev) static inline void *hci_get_drvdata(struct hci_dev *hdev) { return dev_get_drvdata(&hdev->dev); } static inline void hci_set_drvdata(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data) { dev_set_drvdata(&hdev->dev, data); } struct hci_dev *hci_dev_get(int index); struct hci_dev *hci_get_route(bdaddr_t *dst, bdaddr_t *src, u8 src_type); struct hci_dev *hci_alloc_dev(void); void hci_free_dev(struct hci_dev *hdev); int hci_register_dev(struct hci_dev *hdev); void hci_unregister_dev(struct hci_dev *hdev); void hci_cleanup_dev(struct hci_dev *hdev); int hci_suspend_dev(struct hci_dev *hdev); int hci_resume_dev(struct hci_dev *hdev); int hci_reset_dev(struct hci_dev *hdev); int hci_recv_frame(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb); int hci_recv_diag(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb); __printf(2, 3) void hci_set_hw_info(struct hci_dev *hdev, const char *fmt, ...); __printf(2, 3) void hci_set_fw_info(struct hci_dev *hdev, const char *fmt, ...); static inline void hci_set_msft_opcode(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u16 opcode) { #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_MSFTEXT) hdev->msft_opcode = opcode; #endif } int hci_dev_open(__u16 dev); int hci_dev_close(__u16 dev); int hci_dev_do_close(struct hci_dev *hdev); int hci_dev_reset(__u16 dev); int hci_dev_reset_stat(__u16 dev); int hci_dev_cmd(unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg); int hci_get_dev_list(void __user *arg); int hci_get_dev_info(void __user *arg); int hci_get_conn_list(void __user *arg); int hci_get_conn_info(struct hci_dev *hdev, void __user *arg); int hci_get_auth_info(struct hci_dev *hdev, void __user *arg); int hci_inquiry(void __user *arg); struct bdaddr_list *hci_bdaddr_list_lookup(struct list_head *list, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 type); struct bdaddr_list_with_irk *hci_bdaddr_list_lookup_with_irk( struct list_head *list, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 type); struct bdaddr_list_with_flags * hci_bdaddr_list_lookup_with_flags(struct list_head *list, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 type); int hci_bdaddr_list_add(struct list_head *list, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 type); int hci_bdaddr_list_add_with_irk(struct list_head *list, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 type, u8 *peer_irk, u8 *local_irk); int hci_bdaddr_list_add_with_flags(struct list_head *list, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 type, u32 flags); int hci_bdaddr_list_del(struct list_head *list, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 type); int hci_bdaddr_list_del_with_irk(struct list_head *list, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 type); int hci_bdaddr_list_del_with_flags(struct list_head *list, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 type); void hci_bdaddr_list_clear(struct list_head *list); struct hci_conn_params *hci_conn_params_lookup(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *addr, u8 addr_type); struct hci_conn_params *hci_conn_params_add(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *addr, u8 addr_type); void hci_conn_params_del(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *addr, u8 addr_type); void hci_conn_params_clear_disabled(struct hci_dev *hdev); struct hci_conn_params *hci_pend_le_action_lookup(struct list_head *list, bdaddr_t *addr, u8 addr_type); void hci_uuids_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev); void hci_link_keys_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev); struct link_key *hci_find_link_key(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr); struct link_key *hci_add_link_key(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *conn, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 *val, u8 type, u8 pin_len, bool *persistent); struct smp_ltk *hci_add_ltk(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 addr_type, u8 type, u8 authenticated, u8 tk[16], u8 enc_size, __le16 ediv, __le64 rand); struct smp_ltk *hci_find_ltk(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 addr_type, u8 role); int hci_remove_ltk(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 bdaddr_type); void hci_smp_ltks_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev); int hci_remove_link_key(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr); struct smp_irk *hci_find_irk_by_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *rpa); struct smp_irk *hci_find_irk_by_addr(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 addr_type); struct smp_irk *hci_add_irk(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 addr_type, u8 val[16], bdaddr_t *rpa); void hci_remove_irk(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 addr_type); bool hci_is_blocked_key(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 type, u8 val[16]); void hci_blocked_keys_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev); void hci_smp_irks_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev); bool hci_bdaddr_is_paired(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 type); void hci_remote_oob_data_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev); struct oob_data *hci_find_remote_oob_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 bdaddr_type); int hci_add_remote_oob_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 bdaddr_type, u8 *hash192, u8 *rand192, u8 *hash256, u8 *rand256); int hci_remove_remote_oob_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 bdaddr_type); void hci_adv_instances_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev); struct adv_info *hci_find_adv_instance(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance); struct adv_info *hci_get_next_instance(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance); int hci_add_adv_instance(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance, u32 flags, u16 adv_data_len, u8 *adv_data, u16 scan_rsp_len, u8 *scan_rsp_data, u16 timeout, u16 duration); int hci_remove_adv_instance(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance); void hci_adv_instances_set_rpa_expired(struct hci_dev *hdev, bool rpa_expired); void hci_adv_monitors_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev); void hci_free_adv_monitor(struct adv_monitor *monitor); int hci_add_adv_monitor(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct adv_monitor *monitor); int hci_remove_adv_monitor(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 handle); bool hci_is_adv_monitoring(struct hci_dev *hdev); void hci_event_packet(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb); void hci_init_sysfs(struct hci_dev *hdev); void hci_conn_init_sysfs(struct hci_conn *conn); void hci_conn_add_sysfs(struct hci_conn *conn); void hci_conn_del_sysfs(struct hci_conn *conn); #define SET_HCIDEV_DEV(hdev, pdev) ((hdev)->dev.parent = (pdev)) /* ----- LMP capabilities ----- */ #define lmp_encrypt_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][0] & LMP_ENCRYPT) #define lmp_rswitch_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][0] & LMP_RSWITCH) #define lmp_hold_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][0] & LMP_HOLD) #define lmp_sniff_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][0] & LMP_SNIFF) #define lmp_park_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][1] & LMP_PARK) #define lmp_inq_rssi_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][3] & LMP_RSSI_INQ) #define lmp_esco_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][3] & LMP_ESCO) #define lmp_bredr_capable(dev) (!((dev)->features[0][4] & LMP_NO_BREDR)) #define lmp_le_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][4] & LMP_LE) #define lmp_sniffsubr_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][5] & LMP_SNIFF_SUBR) #define lmp_pause_enc_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][5] & LMP_PAUSE_ENC) #define lmp_ext_inq_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][6] & LMP_EXT_INQ) #define lmp_le_br_capable(dev) (!!((dev)->features[0][6] & LMP_SIMUL_LE_BR)) #define lmp_ssp_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][6] & LMP_SIMPLE_PAIR) #define lmp_no_flush_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][6] & LMP_NO_FLUSH) #define lmp_lsto_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][7] & LMP_LSTO) #define lmp_inq_tx_pwr_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][7] & LMP_INQ_TX_PWR) #define lmp_ext_feat_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][7] & LMP_EXTFEATURES) #define lmp_transp_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][2] & LMP_TRANSPARENT) #define lmp_edr_2m_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][3] & LMP_EDR_2M) #define lmp_edr_3m_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][3] & LMP_EDR_3M) #define lmp_edr_3slot_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][4] & LMP_EDR_3SLOT) #define lmp_edr_5slot_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0][5] & LMP_EDR_5SLOT) /* ----- Extended LMP capabilities ----- */ #define lmp_csb_master_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[2][0] & LMP_CSB_MASTER) #define lmp_csb_slave_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[2][0] & LMP_CSB_SLAVE) #define lmp_sync_train_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[2][0] & LMP_SYNC_TRAIN) #define lmp_sync_scan_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[2][0] & LMP_SYNC_SCAN) #define lmp_sc_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[2][1] & LMP_SC) #define lmp_ping_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[2][1] & LMP_PING) /* ----- Host capabilities ----- */ #define lmp_host_ssp_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[1][0] & LMP_HOST_SSP) #define lmp_host_sc_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[1][0] & LMP_HOST_SC) #define lmp_host_le_capable(dev) (!!((dev)->features[1][0] & LMP_HOST_LE)) #define lmp_host_le_br_capable(dev) (!!((dev)->features[1][0] & LMP_HOST_LE_BREDR)) #define hdev_is_powered(dev) (test_bit(HCI_UP, &(dev)->flags) && \ !hci_dev_test_flag(dev, HCI_AUTO_OFF)) #define bredr_sc_enabled(dev) (lmp_sc_capable(dev) && \ hci_dev_test_flag(dev, HCI_SC_ENABLED)) #define scan_1m(dev) (((dev)->le_tx_def_phys & HCI_LE_SET_PHY_1M) || \ ((dev)->le_rx_def_phys & HCI_LE_SET_PHY_1M)) #define scan_2m(dev) (((dev)->le_tx_def_phys & HCI_LE_SET_PHY_2M) || \ ((dev)->le_rx_def_phys & HCI_LE_SET_PHY_2M)) #define scan_coded(dev) (((dev)->le_tx_def_phys & HCI_LE_SET_PHY_CODED) || \ ((dev)->le_rx_def_phys & HCI_LE_SET_PHY_CODED)) /* Use LL Privacy based address resolution if supported */ #define use_ll_privacy(dev) ((dev)->le_features[0] & HCI_LE_LL_PRIVACY) /* Use ext scanning if set ext scan param and ext scan enable is supported */ #define use_ext_scan(dev) (((dev)->commands[37] & 0x20) && \ ((dev)->commands[37] & 0x40)) /* Use ext create connection if command is supported */ #define use_ext_conn(dev) ((dev)->commands[37] & 0x80) /* Extended advertising support */ #define ext_adv_capable(dev) (((dev)->le_features[1] & HCI_LE_EXT_ADV)) /* ----- HCI protocols ----- */ #define HCI_PROTO_DEFER 0x01 static inline int hci_proto_connect_ind(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, __u8 type, __u8 *flags) { switch (type) { case ACL_LINK: return l2cap_connect_ind(hdev, bdaddr); case SCO_LINK: case ESCO_LINK: return sco_connect_ind(hdev, bdaddr, flags); default: BT_ERR("unknown link type %d", type); return -EINVAL; } } static inline int hci_proto_disconn_ind(struct hci_conn *conn) { if (conn->type != ACL_LINK && conn->type != LE_LINK) return HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM; return l2cap_disconn_ind(conn); } /* ----- HCI callbacks ----- */ struct hci_cb { struct list_head list; char *name; void (*connect_cfm) (struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status); void (*disconn_cfm) (struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status); void (*security_cfm) (struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status, __u8 encrypt); void (*key_change_cfm) (struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status); void (*role_switch_cfm) (struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status, __u8 role); }; static inline void hci_connect_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status) { struct hci_cb *cb; mutex_lock(&hci_cb_list_lock); list_for_each_entry(cb, &hci_cb_list, list) { if (cb->connect_cfm) cb->connect_cfm(conn, status); } mutex_unlock(&hci_cb_list_lock); if (conn->connect_cfm_cb) conn->connect_cfm_cb(conn, status); } static inline void hci_disconn_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 reason) { struct hci_cb *cb; mutex_lock(&hci_cb_list_lock); list_for_each_entry(cb, &hci_cb_list, list) { if (cb->disconn_cfm) cb->disconn_cfm(conn, reason); } mutex_unlock(&hci_cb_list_lock); if (conn->disconn_cfm_cb) conn->disconn_cfm_cb(conn, reason); } static inline void hci_auth_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status) { struct hci_cb *cb; __u8 encrypt; if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &conn->flags)) return; encrypt = test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags) ? 0x01 : 0x00; mutex_lock(&hci_cb_list_lock); list_for_each_entry(cb, &hci_cb_list, list) { if (cb->security_cfm) cb->security_cfm(conn, status, encrypt); } mutex_unlock(&hci_cb_list_lock); if (conn->security_cfm_cb) conn->security_cfm_cb(conn, status); } static inline void hci_encrypt_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status) { struct hci_cb *cb; __u8 encrypt; if (conn->state == BT_CONFIG) { if (!status) conn->state = BT_CONNECTED; hci_connect_cfm(conn, status); hci_conn_drop(conn); return; } if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags)) encrypt = 0x00; else if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->flags)) encrypt = 0x02; else encrypt = 0x01; if (!status) { if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_SDP) conn->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_LOW; if (conn->pending_sec_level > conn->sec_level) conn->sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level; } mutex_lock(&hci_cb_list_lock); list_for_each_entry(cb, &hci_cb_list, list) { if (cb->security_cfm) cb->security_cfm(conn, status, encrypt); } mutex_unlock(&hci_cb_list_lock); if (conn->security_cfm_cb) conn->security_cfm_cb(conn, status); } static inline void hci_key_change_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status) { struct hci_cb *cb; mutex_lock(&hci_cb_list_lock); list_for_each_entry(cb, &hci_cb_list, list) { if (cb->key_change_cfm) cb->key_change_cfm(conn, status); } mutex_unlock(&hci_cb_list_lock); } static inline void hci_role_switch_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status, __u8 role) { struct hci_cb *cb; mutex_lock(&hci_cb_list_lock); list_for_each_entry(cb, &hci_cb_list, list) { if (cb->role_switch_cfm) cb->role_switch_cfm(conn, status, role); } mutex_unlock(&hci_cb_list_lock); } static inline void *eir_get_data(u8 *eir, size_t eir_len, u8 type, size_t *data_len) { size_t parsed = 0; if (eir_len < 2) return NULL; while (parsed < eir_len - 1) { u8 field_len = eir[0]; if (field_len == 0) break; parsed += field_len + 1; if (parsed > eir_len) break; if (eir[1] != type) { eir += field_len + 1; continue; } /* Zero length data */ if (field_len == 1) return NULL; if (data_len) *data_len = field_len - 1; return &eir[2]; } return NULL; } static inline bool hci_bdaddr_is_rpa(bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 addr_type) { if (addr_type != ADDR_LE_DEV_RANDOM) return false; if ((bdaddr->b[5] & 0xc0) == 0x40) return true; return false; } static inline bool hci_is_identity_address(bdaddr_t *addr, u8 addr_type) { if (addr_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC) return true; /* Check for Random Static address type */ if ((addr->b[5] & 0xc0) == 0xc0) return true; return false; } static inline struct smp_irk *hci_get_irk(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 addr_type) { if (!hci_bdaddr_is_rpa(bdaddr, addr_type)) return NULL; return hci_find_irk_by_rpa(hdev, bdaddr); } static inline int hci_check_conn_params(u16 min, u16 max, u16 latency, u16 to_multiplier) { u16 max_latency; if (min > max || min < 6 || max > 3200) return -EINVAL; if (to_multiplier < 10 || to_multiplier > 3200) return -EINVAL; if (max >= to_multiplier * 8) return -EINVAL; max_latency = (to_multiplier * 4 / max) - 1; if (latency > 499 || latency > max_latency) return -EINVAL; return 0; } int hci_register_cb(struct hci_cb *hcb); int hci_unregister_cb(struct hci_cb *hcb); struct sk_buff *__hci_cmd_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 opcode, u32 plen, const void *param, u32 timeout); struct sk_buff *__hci_cmd_sync_ev(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 opcode, u32 plen, const void *param, u8 event, u32 timeout); int __hci_cmd_send(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 opcode, u32 plen, const void *param); int hci_send_cmd(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u16 opcode, __u32 plen, const void *param); void hci_send_acl(struct hci_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb, __u16 flags); void hci_send_sco(struct hci_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb); void *hci_sent_cmd_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u16 opcode); struct sk_buff *hci_cmd_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 opcode, u32 plen, const void *param, u32 timeout); u32 hci_conn_get_phy(struct hci_conn *conn); /* ----- HCI Sockets ----- */ void hci_send_to_sock(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb); void hci_send_to_channel(unsigned short channel, struct sk_buff *skb, int flag, struct sock *skip_sk); void hci_send_to_monitor(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb); void hci_send_monitor_ctrl_event(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 event, void *data, u16 data_len, ktime_t tstamp, int flag, struct sock *skip_sk); void hci_sock_dev_event(struct hci_dev *hdev, int event); #define HCI_MGMT_VAR_LEN BIT(0) #define HCI_MGMT_NO_HDEV BIT(1) #define HCI_MGMT_UNTRUSTED BIT(2) #define HCI_MGMT_UNCONFIGURED BIT(3) #define HCI_MGMT_HDEV_OPTIONAL BIT(4) struct hci_mgmt_handler { int (*func) (struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, u16 data_len); size_t data_len; unsigned long flags; }; struct hci_mgmt_chan { struct list_head list; unsigned short channel; size_t handler_count; const struct hci_mgmt_handler *handlers; void (*hdev_init) (struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev); }; int hci_mgmt_chan_register(struct hci_mgmt_chan *c); void hci_mgmt_chan_unregister(struct hci_mgmt_chan *c); /* Management interface */ #define DISCOV_TYPE_BREDR (BIT(BDADDR_BREDR)) #define DISCOV_TYPE_LE (BIT(BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC) | \ BIT(BDADDR_LE_RANDOM)) #define DISCOV_TYPE_INTERLEAVED (BIT(BDADDR_BREDR) | \ BIT(BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC) | \ BIT(BDADDR_LE_RANDOM)) /* These LE scan and inquiry parameters were chosen according to LE General * Discovery Procedure specification. */ #define DISCOV_LE_SCAN_WIN 0x12 #define DISCOV_LE_SCAN_INT 0x12 #define DISCOV_LE_TIMEOUT 10240 /* msec */ #define DISCOV_INTERLEAVED_TIMEOUT 5120 /* msec */ #define DISCOV_INTERLEAVED_INQUIRY_LEN 0x04 #define DISCOV_BREDR_INQUIRY_LEN 0x08 #define DISCOV_LE_RESTART_DELAY msecs_to_jiffies(200) /* msec */ #define DISCOV_LE_FAST_ADV_INT_MIN 100 /* msec */ #define DISCOV_LE_FAST_ADV_INT_MAX 150 /* msec */ void mgmt_fill_version_info(void *ver); int mgmt_new_settings(struct hci_dev *hdev); void mgmt_index_added(struct hci_dev *hdev); void mgmt_index_removed(struct hci_dev *hdev); void mgmt_set_powered_failed(struct hci_dev *hdev, int err); void mgmt_power_on(struct hci_dev *hdev, int err); void __mgmt_power_off(struct hci_dev *hdev); void mgmt_new_link_key(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct link_key *key, bool persistent); void mgmt_device_connected(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *conn, u32 flags, u8 *name, u8 name_len); void mgmt_device_disconnected(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 link_type, u8 addr_type, u8 reason, bool mgmt_connected); void mgmt_disconnect_failed(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 link_type, u8 addr_type, u8 status); void mgmt_connect_failed(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 link_type, u8 addr_type, u8 status); void mgmt_pin_code_request(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 secure); void mgmt_pin_code_reply_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 status); void mgmt_pin_code_neg_reply_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 status); int mgmt_user_confirm_request(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 link_type, u8 addr_type, u32 value, u8 confirm_hint); int mgmt_user_confirm_reply_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 link_type, u8 addr_type, u8 status); int mgmt_user_confirm_neg_reply_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 link_type, u8 addr_type, u8 status); int mgmt_user_passkey_request(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 link_type, u8 addr_type); int mgmt_user_passkey_reply_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 link_type, u8 addr_type, u8 status); int mgmt_user_passkey_neg_reply_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 link_type, u8 addr_type, u8 status); int mgmt_user_passkey_notify(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 link_type, u8 addr_type, u32 passkey, u8 entered); void mgmt_auth_failed(struct hci_conn *conn, u8 status); void mgmt_auth_enable_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status); void mgmt_ssp_enable_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 enable, u8 status); void mgmt_set_class_of_dev_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 *dev_class, u8 status); void mgmt_set_local_name_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 *name, u8 status); void mgmt_start_discovery_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status); void mgmt_stop_discovery_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status); void mgmt_device_found(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 link_type, u8 addr_type, u8 *dev_class, s8 rssi, u32 flags, u8 *eir, u16 eir_len, u8 *scan_rsp, u8 scan_rsp_len); void mgmt_remote_name(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 link_type, u8 addr_type, s8 rssi, u8 *name, u8 name_len); void mgmt_discovering(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 discovering); void mgmt_suspending(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 state); void mgmt_resuming(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 reason, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 addr_type); bool mgmt_powering_down(struct hci_dev *hdev); void mgmt_new_ltk(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct smp_ltk *key, bool persistent); void mgmt_new_irk(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct smp_irk *irk, bool persistent); void mgmt_new_csrk(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct smp_csrk *csrk, bool persistent); void mgmt_new_conn_param(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 bdaddr_type, u8 store_hint, u16 min_interval, u16 max_interval, u16 latency, u16 timeout); void mgmt_smp_complete(struct hci_conn *conn, bool complete); bool mgmt_get_connectable(struct hci_dev *hdev); void mgmt_set_connectable_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status); void mgmt_set_discoverable_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status); u8 mgmt_get_adv_discov_flags(struct hci_dev *hdev); void mgmt_advertising_added(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance); void mgmt_advertising_removed(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance); int mgmt_phy_configuration_changed(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sock *skip); u8 hci_le_conn_update(struct hci_conn *conn, u16 min, u16 max, u16 latency, u16 to_multiplier); void hci_le_start_enc(struct hci_conn *conn, __le16 ediv, __le64 rand, __u8 ltk[16], __u8 key_size); void hci_copy_identity_address(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 *bdaddr_type); #define SCO_AIRMODE_MASK 0x0003 #define SCO_AIRMODE_CVSD 0x0000 #define SCO_AIRMODE_TRANSP 0x0003 #endif /* __HCI_CORE_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef _LINUX_TASK_WORK_H #define _LINUX_TASK_WORK_H #include <linux/list.h> #include <linux/sched.h> typedef void (*task_work_func_t)(struct callback_head *); static inline void init_task_work(struct callback_head *twork, task_work_func_t func) { twork->func = func; } enum task_work_notify_mode { TWA_NONE, TWA_RESUME, TWA_SIGNAL, }; int task_work_add(struct task_struct *task, struct callback_head *twork, enum task_work_notify_mode mode); struct callback_head *task_work_cancel(struct task_struct *, task_work_func_t); void task_work_run(void); static inline void exit_task_work(struct task_struct *task) { task_work_run(); } #endif /* _LINUX_TASK_WORK_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef _LINUX_PTRACE_H #define _LINUX_PTRACE_H #include <linux/compiler.h> /* For unlikely. */ #include <linux/sched.h> /* For struct task_struct. */ #include <linux/sched/signal.h> /* For send_sig(), same_thread_group(), etc. */ #include <linux/err.h> /* for IS_ERR_VALUE */ #include <linux/bug.h> /* For BUG_ON. */ #include <linux/pid_namespace.h> /* For task_active_pid_ns. */ #include <uapi/linux/ptrace.h> #include <linux/seccomp.h> /* Add sp to seccomp_data, as seccomp is user API, we don't want to modify it */ struct syscall_info { __u64 sp; struct seccomp_data data; }; extern int ptrace_access_vm(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr, void *buf, int len, unsigned int gup_flags); /* * Ptrace flags * * The owner ship rules for task->ptrace which holds the ptrace * flags is simple. When a task is running it owns it's task->ptrace * flags. When the a task is stopped the ptracer owns task->ptrace. */ #define PT_SEIZED 0x00010000 /* SEIZE used, enable new behavior */ #define PT_PTRACED 0x00000001 #define PT_DTRACE 0x00000002 /* delayed trace (used on m68k, i386) */ #define PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT 3 /* PT_TRACE_* event enable flags */ #define PT_EVENT_FLAG(event) (1 << (PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT + (event))) #define PT_TRACESYSGOOD PT_EVENT_FLAG(0) #define PT_TRACE_FORK PT_EVENT_FLAG(PTRACE_EVENT_FORK) #define PT_TRACE_VFORK PT_EVENT_FLAG(PTRACE_EVENT_VFORK) #define PT_TRACE_CLONE PT_EVENT_FLAG(PTRACE_EVENT_CLONE) #define PT_TRACE_EXEC PT_EVENT_FLAG(PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC) #define PT_TRACE_VFORK_DONE PT_EVENT_FLAG(PTRACE_EVENT_VFORK_DONE) #define PT_TRACE_EXIT PT_EVENT_FLAG(PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT) #define PT_TRACE_SECCOMP PT_EVENT_FLAG(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP) #define PT_EXITKILL (PTRACE_O_EXITKILL << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT) #define PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP (PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT) /* single stepping state bits (used on ARM and PA-RISC) */ #define PT_SINGLESTEP_BIT 31 #define PT_SINGLESTEP (1<<PT_SINGLESTEP_BIT) #define PT_BLOCKSTEP_BIT 30 #define PT_BLOCKSTEP (1<<PT_BLOCKSTEP_BIT) extern long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request, unsigned long addr, unsigned long data); extern int ptrace_readdata(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long src, char __user *dst, int len); extern int ptrace_writedata(struct task_struct *tsk, char __user *src, unsigned long dst, int len); extern void ptrace_disable(struct task_struct *); extern int ptrace_request(struct task_struct *child, long request, unsigned long addr, unsigned long data); extern void ptrace_notify(int exit_code); extern void __ptrace_link(struct task_struct *child, struct task_struct *new_parent, const struct cred *ptracer_cred); extern void __ptrace_unlink(struct task_struct *child); extern void exit_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct list_head *dead); #define PTRACE_MODE_READ 0x01 #define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH 0x02 #define PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT 0x04 #define PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS 0x08 #define PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS 0x10 /* shorthands for READ/ATTACH and FSCREDS/REALCREDS combinations */ #define PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS) #define PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS) #define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS) #define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH | PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS) /** * ptrace_may_access - check whether the caller is permitted to access * a target task. * @task: target task * @mode: selects type of access and caller credentials * * Returns true on success, false on denial. * * One of the flags PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS and PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS must * be set in @mode to specify whether the access was requested through * a filesystem syscall (should use effective capabilities and fsuid * of the caller) or through an explicit syscall such as * process_vm_writev or ptrace (and should use the real credentials). */ extern bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode); static inline int ptrace_reparented(struct task_struct *child) { return !same_thread_group(child->real_parent, child->parent); } static inline void ptrace_unlink(struct task_struct *child) { if (unlikely(child->ptrace)) __ptrace_unlink(child); } int generic_ptrace_peekdata(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr, unsigned long data); int generic_ptrace_pokedata(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr, unsigned long data); /** * ptrace_parent - return the task that is tracing the given task * @task: task to consider * * Returns %NULL if no one is tracing @task, or the &struct task_struct * pointer to its tracer. * * Must called under rcu_read_lock(). The pointer returned might be kept * live only by RCU. During exec, this may be called with task_lock() held * on @task, still held from when check_unsafe_exec() was called. */ static inline struct task_struct *ptrace_parent(struct task_struct *task) { if (unlikely(task->ptrace)) return rcu_dereference(task->parent); return NULL; } /** * ptrace_event_enabled - test whether a ptrace event is enabled * @task: ptracee of interest * @event: %PTRACE_EVENT_* to test * * Test whether @event is enabled for ptracee @task. * * Returns %true if @event is enabled, %false otherwise. */ static inline bool ptrace_event_enabled(struct task_struct *task, int event) { return task->ptrace & PT_EVENT_FLAG(event); } /** * ptrace_event - possibly stop for a ptrace event notification * @event: %PTRACE_EVENT_* value to report * @message: value for %PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG to return * * Check whether @event is enabled and, if so, report @event and @message * to the ptrace parent. * * Called without locks. */ static inline void ptrace_event(int event, unsigned long message) { if (unlikely(ptrace_event_enabled(current, event))) { current->ptrace_message = message; ptrace_notify((event << 8) | SIGTRAP); } else if (event == PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC) { /* legacy EXEC report via SIGTRAP */ if ((current->ptrace & (PT_PTRACED|PT_SEIZED)) == PT_PTRACED) send_sig(SIGTRAP, current, 0); } } /** * ptrace_event_pid - possibly stop for a ptrace event notification * @event: %PTRACE_EVENT_* value to report * @pid: process identifier for %PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG to return * * Check whether @event is enabled and, if so, report @event and @pid * to the ptrace parent. @pid is reported as the pid_t seen from the * the ptrace parent's pid namespace. * * Called without locks. */ static inline void ptrace_event_pid(int event, struct pid *pid) { /* * FIXME: There's a potential race if a ptracer in a different pid * namespace than parent attaches between computing message below and * when we acquire tasklist_lock in ptrace_stop(). If this happens, * the ptracer will get a bogus pid from PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG. */ unsigned long message = 0; struct pid_namespace *ns; rcu_read_lock(); ns = task_active_pid_ns(rcu_dereference(current->parent)); if (ns) message = pid_nr_ns(pid, ns); rcu_read_unlock(); ptrace_event(event, message); } /** * ptrace_init_task - initialize ptrace state for a new child * @child: new child task * @ptrace: true if child should be ptrace'd by parent's tracer * * This is called immediately after adding @child to its parent's children * list. @ptrace is false in the normal case, and true to ptrace @child. * * Called with current's siglock and write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock) held. */ static inline void ptrace_init_task(struct task_struct *child, bool ptrace) { INIT_LIST_HEAD(&child->ptrace_entry); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&child->ptraced); child->jobctl = 0; child->ptrace = 0; child->parent = child->real_parent; if (unlikely(ptrace) && current->ptrace) { child->ptrace = current->ptrace; __ptrace_link(child, current->parent, current->ptracer_cred); if (child->ptrace & PT_SEIZED) task_set_jobctl_pending(child, JOBCTL_TRAP_STOP); else sigaddset(&child->pending.signal, SIGSTOP); } else child->ptracer_cred = NULL; } /** * ptrace_release_task - final ptrace-related cleanup of a zombie being reaped * @task: task in %EXIT_DEAD state * * Called with write_lock(&tasklist_lock) held. */ static inline void ptrace_release_task(struct task_struct *task) { BUG_ON(!list_empty(&task->ptraced)); ptrace_unlink(task); BUG_ON(!list_empty(&task->ptrace_entry)); } #ifndef force_successful_syscall_return /* * System call handlers that, upon successful completion, need to return a * negative value should call force_successful_syscall_return() right before * returning. On architectures where the syscall convention provides for a * separate error flag (e.g., alpha, ia64, ppc{,64}, sparc{,64}, possibly * others), this macro can be used to ensure that the error flag will not get * set. On architectures which do not support a separate error flag, the macro * is a no-op and the spurious error condition needs to be filtered out by some * other means (e.g., in user-level, by passing an extra argument to the * syscall handler, or something along those lines). */ #define force_successful_syscall_return() do { } while (0) #endif #ifndef is_syscall_success /* * On most systems we can tell if a syscall is a success based on if the retval * is an error value. On some systems like ia64 and powerpc they have different * indicators of success/failure and must define their own. */ #define is_syscall_success(regs) (!IS_ERR_VALUE((unsigned long)(regs_return_value(regs)))) #endif /* * <asm/ptrace.h> should define the following things inside #ifdef __KERNEL__. * * These do-nothing inlines are used when the arch does not * implement single-step. The kerneldoc comments are here * to document the interface for all arch definitions. */ #ifndef arch_has_single_step /** * arch_has_single_step - does this CPU support user-mode single-step? * * If this is defined, then there must be function declarations or * inlines for user_enable_single_step() and user_disable_single_step(). * arch_has_single_step() should evaluate to nonzero iff the machine * supports instruction single-step for user mode. * It can be a constant or it can test a CPU feature bit. */ #define arch_has_single_step() (0) /** * user_enable_single_step - single-step in user-mode task * @task: either current or a task stopped in %TASK_TRACED * * This can only be called when arch_has_single_step() has returned nonzero. * Set @task so that when it returns to user mode, it will trap after the * next single instruction executes. If arch_has_block_step() is defined, * this must clear the effects of user_enable_block_step() too. */ static inline void user_enable_single_step(struct task_struct *task) { BUG(); /* This can never be called. */ } /** * user_disable_single_step - cancel user-mode single-step * @task: either current or a task stopped in %TASK_TRACED * * Clear @task of the effects of user_enable_single_step() and * user_enable_block_step(). This can be called whether or not either * of those was ever called on @task, and even if arch_has_single_step() * returned zero. */ static inline void user_disable_single_step(struct task_struct *task) { } #else extern void user_enable_single_step(struct task_struct *); extern void user_disable_single_step(struct task_struct *); #endif /* arch_has_single_step */ #ifndef arch_has_block_step /** * arch_has_block_step - does this CPU support user-mode block-step? * * If this is defined, then there must be a function declaration or inline * for user_enable_block_step(), and arch_has_single_step() must be defined * too. arch_has_block_step() should evaluate to nonzero iff the machine * supports step-until-branch for user mode. It can be a constant or it * can test a CPU feature bit. */ #define arch_has_block_step() (0) /** * user_enable_block_step - step until branch in user-mode task * @task: either current or a task stopped in %TASK_TRACED * * This can only be called when arch_has_block_step() has returned nonzero, * and will never be called when single-instruction stepping is being used. * Set @task so that when it returns to user mode, it will trap after the * next branch or trap taken. */ static inline void user_enable_block_step(struct task_struct *task) { BUG(); /* This can never be called. */ } #else extern void user_enable_block_step(struct task_struct *); #endif /* arch_has_block_step */ #ifdef ARCH_HAS_USER_SINGLE_STEP_REPORT extern void user_single_step_report(struct pt_regs *regs); #else static inline void user_single_step_report(struct pt_regs *regs) { kernel_siginfo_t info; clear_siginfo(&info); info.si_signo = SIGTRAP; info.si_errno = 0; info.si_code = SI_USER; info.si_pid = 0; info.si_uid = 0; force_sig_info(&info); } #endif #ifndef arch_ptrace_stop_needed /** * arch_ptrace_stop_needed - Decide whether arch_ptrace_stop() should be called * @code: current->exit_code value ptrace will stop with * @info: siginfo_t pointer (or %NULL) for signal ptrace will stop with * * This is called with the siglock held, to decide whether or not it's * necessary to release the siglock and call arch_ptrace_stop() with the * same @code and @info arguments. It can be defined to a constant if * arch_ptrace_stop() is never required, or always is. On machines where * this makes sense, it should be defined to a quick test to optimize out * calling arch_ptrace_stop() when it would be superfluous. For example, * if the thread has not been back to user mode since the last stop, the * thread state might indicate that nothing needs to be done. * * This is guaranteed to be invoked once before a task stops for ptrace and * may include arch-specific operations necessary prior to a ptrace stop. */ #define arch_ptrace_stop_needed(code, info) (0) #endif #ifndef arch_ptrace_stop /** * arch_ptrace_stop - Do machine-specific work before stopping for ptrace * @code: current->exit_code value ptrace will stop with * @info: siginfo_t pointer (or %NULL) for signal ptrace will stop with * * This is called with no locks held when arch_ptrace_stop_needed() has * just returned nonzero. It is allowed to block, e.g. for user memory * access. The arch can have machine-specific work to be done before * ptrace stops. On ia64, register backing store gets written back to user * memory here. Since this can be costly (requires dropping the siglock), * we only do it when the arch requires it for this particular stop, as * indicated by arch_ptrace_stop_needed(). */ #define arch_ptrace_stop(code, info) do { } while (0) #endif #ifndef current_pt_regs #define current_pt_regs() task_pt_regs(current) #endif /* * unlike current_pt_regs(), this one is equal to task_pt_regs(current) * on *all* architectures; the only reason to have a per-arch definition * is optimisation. */ #ifndef signal_pt_regs #define signal_pt_regs() task_pt_regs(current) #endif #ifndef current_user_stack_pointer #define current_user_stack_pointer() user_stack_pointer(current_pt_regs()) #endif extern int task_current_syscall(struct task_struct *target, struct syscall_info *info); extern void sigaction_compat_abi(struct k_sigaction *act, struct k_sigaction *oact); #endif
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef _LINUX_PART_STAT_H #define _LINUX_PART_STAT_H #include <linux/genhd.h> struct disk_stats { u64 nsecs[NR_STAT_GROUPS]; unsigned long sectors[NR_STAT_GROUPS]; unsigned long ios[NR_STAT_GROUPS]; unsigned long merges[NR_STAT_GROUPS]; unsigned long io_ticks; local_t in_flight[2]; }; /* * Macros to operate on percpu disk statistics: * * {disk|part|all}_stat_{add|sub|inc|dec}() modify the stat counters and should * be called between disk_stat_lock() and disk_stat_unlock(). * * part_stat_read() can be called at any time. */ #define part_stat_lock() preempt_disable() #define part_stat_unlock() preempt_enable() #define part_stat_get_cpu(part, field, cpu) \ (per_cpu_ptr((part)->dkstats, (cpu))->field) #define part_stat_get(part, field) \ part_stat_get_cpu(part, field, smp_processor_id()) #define part_stat_read(part, field) \ ({ \ typeof((part)->dkstats->field) res = 0; \ unsigned int _cpu; \ for_each_possible_cpu(_cpu) \ res += per_cpu_ptr((part)->dkstats, _cpu)->field; \ res; \ }) static inline void part_stat_set_all(struct hd_struct *part, int value) { int i; for_each_possible_cpu(i) memset(per_cpu_ptr(part->dkstats, i), value, sizeof(struct disk_stats)); } #define part_stat_read_accum(part, field) \ (part_stat_read(part, field[STAT_READ]) + \ part_stat_read(part, field[STAT_WRITE]) + \ part_stat_read(part, field[STAT_DISCARD])) #define __part_stat_add(part, field, addnd) \ __this_cpu_add((part)->dkstats->field, addnd) #define part_stat_add(part, field, addnd) do { \ __part_stat_add((part), field, addnd); \ if ((part)->partno) \ __part_stat_add(&part_to_disk((part))->part0, \ field, addnd); \ } while (0) #define part_stat_dec(gendiskp, field) \ part_stat_add(gendiskp, field, -1) #define part_stat_inc(gendiskp, field) \ part_stat_add(gendiskp, field, 1) #define part_stat_sub(gendiskp, field, subnd) \ part_stat_add(gendiskp, field, -subnd) #define part_stat_local_dec(gendiskp, field) \ local_dec(&(part_stat_get(gendiskp, field))) #define part_stat_local_inc(gendiskp, field) \ local_inc(&(part_stat_get(gendiskp, field))) #define part_stat_local_read(gendiskp, field) \ local_read(&(part_stat_get(gendiskp, field))) #define part_stat_local_read_cpu(gendiskp, field, cpu) \ local_read(&(part_stat_get_cpu(gendiskp, field, cpu))) #endif /* _LINUX_PART_STAT_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * Dynamic queue limits (dql) - Definitions * * Copyright (c) 2011, Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> * * This header file contains the definitions for dynamic queue limits (dql). * dql would be used in conjunction with a producer/consumer type queue * (possibly a HW queue). Such a queue would have these general properties: * * 1) Objects are queued up to some limit specified as number of objects. * 2) Periodically a completion process executes which retires consumed * objects. * 3) Starvation occurs when limit has been reached, all queued data has * actually been consumed, but completion processing has not yet run * so queuing new data is blocked. * 4) Minimizing the amount of queued data is desirable. * * The goal of dql is to calculate the limit as the minimum number of objects * needed to prevent starvation. * * The primary functions of dql are: * dql_queued - called when objects are enqueued to record number of objects * dql_avail - returns how many objects are available to be queued based * on the object limit and how many objects are already enqueued * dql_completed - called at completion time to indicate how many objects * were retired from the queue * * The dql implementation does not implement any locking for the dql data * structures, the higher layer should provide this. dql_queued should * be serialized to prevent concurrent execution of the function; this * is also true for dql_completed. However, dql_queued and dlq_completed can * be executed concurrently (i.e. they can be protected by different locks). */ #ifndef _LINUX_DQL_H #define _LINUX_DQL_H #ifdef __KERNEL__ #include <asm/bug.h> struct dql { /* Fields accessed in enqueue path (dql_queued) */ unsigned int num_queued; /* Total ever queued */ unsigned int adj_limit; /* limit + num_completed */ unsigned int last_obj_cnt; /* Count at last queuing */ /* Fields accessed only by completion path (dql_completed) */ unsigned int limit ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp; /* Current limit */ unsigned int num_completed; /* Total ever completed */ unsigned int prev_ovlimit; /* Previous over limit */ unsigned int prev_num_queued; /* Previous queue total */ unsigned int prev_last_obj_cnt; /* Previous queuing cnt */ unsigned int lowest_slack; /* Lowest slack found */ unsigned long slack_start_time; /* Time slacks seen */ /* Configuration */ unsigned int max_limit; /* Max limit */ unsigned int min_limit; /* Minimum limit */ unsigned int slack_hold_time; /* Time to measure slack */ }; /* Set some static maximums */ #define DQL_MAX_OBJECT (UINT_MAX / 16) #define DQL_MAX_LIMIT ((UINT_MAX / 2) - DQL_MAX_OBJECT) /* * Record number of objects queued. Assumes that caller has already checked * availability in the queue with dql_avail. */ static inline void dql_queued(struct dql *dql, unsigned int count) { BUG_ON(count > DQL_MAX_OBJECT); dql->last_obj_cnt = count; /* We want to force a write first, so that cpu do not attempt * to get cache line containing last_obj_cnt, num_queued, adj_limit * in Shared state, but directly does a Request For Ownership * It is only a hint, we use barrier() only. */ barrier(); dql->num_queued += count; } /* Returns how many objects can be queued, < 0 indicates over limit. */ static inline int dql_avail(const struct dql *dql) { return READ_ONCE(dql->adj_limit) - READ_ONCE(dql->num_queued); } /* Record number of completed objects and recalculate the limit. */ void dql_completed(struct dql *dql, unsigned int count); /* Reset dql state */ void dql_reset(struct dql *dql); /* Initialize dql state */ void dql_init(struct dql *dql, unsigned int hold_time); #endif /* _KERNEL_ */ #endif /* _LINUX_DQL_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 #ifndef _LINUX_SCHED_ISOLATION_H #define _LINUX_SCHED_ISOLATION_H #include <linux/cpumask.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/tick.h> enum hk_flags { HK_FLAG_TIMER = 1, HK_FLAG_RCU = (1 << 1), HK_FLAG_MISC = (1 << 2), HK_FLAG_SCHED = (1 << 3), HK_FLAG_TICK = (1 << 4), HK_FLAG_DOMAIN = (1 << 5), HK_FLAG_WQ = (1 << 6), HK_FLAG_MANAGED_IRQ = (1 << 7), HK_FLAG_KTHREAD = (1 << 8), }; #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_ISOLATION DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(housekeeping_overridden); extern int housekeeping_any_cpu(enum hk_flags flags); extern const struct cpumask *housekeeping_cpumask(enum hk_flags flags); extern bool housekeeping_enabled(enum hk_flags flags); extern void housekeeping_affine(struct task_struct *t, enum hk_flags flags); extern bool housekeeping_test_cpu(int cpu, enum hk_flags flags); extern void __init housekeeping_init(void); #else static inline int housekeeping_any_cpu(enum hk_flags flags) { return smp_processor_id(); } static inline const struct cpumask *housekeeping_cpumask(enum hk_flags flags) { return cpu_possible_mask; } static inline bool housekeeping_enabled(enum hk_flags flags) { return false; } static inline void housekeeping_affine(struct task_struct *t, enum hk_flags flags) { } static inline void housekeeping_init(void) { } #endif /* CONFIG_CPU_ISOLATION */ static inline bool housekeeping_cpu(int cpu, enum hk_flags flags) { #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_ISOLATION if (static_branch_unlikely(&housekeeping_overridden)) return housekeeping_test_cpu(cpu, flags); #endif return true; } #endif /* _LINUX_SCHED_ISOLATION_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * include/linux/writeback.h */ #ifndef WRITEBACK_H #define WRITEBACK_H #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/workqueue.h> #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/flex_proportions.h> #include <linux/backing-dev-defs.h> #include <linux/blk_types.h> #include <linux/blk-cgroup.h> struct bio; DECLARE_PER_CPU(int, dirty_throttle_leaks); /* * The 1/4 region under the global dirty thresh is for smooth dirty throttling: * * (thresh - thresh/DIRTY_FULL_SCOPE, thresh) * * Further beyond, all dirtier tasks will enter a loop waiting (possibly long * time) for the dirty pages to drop, unless written enough pages. * * The global dirty threshold is normally equal to the global dirty limit, * except when the system suddenly allocates a lot of anonymous memory and * knocks down the global dirty threshold quickly, in which case the global * dirty limit will follow down slowly to prevent livelocking all dirtier tasks. */ #define DIRTY_SCOPE 8 #define DIRTY_FULL_SCOPE (DIRTY_SCOPE / 2) struct backing_dev_info; /* * fs/fs-writeback.c */ enum writeback_sync_modes { WB_SYNC_NONE, /* Don't wait on anything */ WB_SYNC_ALL, /* Wait on every mapping */ }; /* * A control structure which tells the writeback code what to do. These are * always on the stack, and hence need no locking. They are always initialised * in a manner such that unspecified fields are set to zero. */ struct writeback_control { long nr_to_write; /* Write this many pages, and decrement this for each page written */ long pages_skipped; /* Pages which were not written */ /* * For a_ops->writepages(): if start or end are non-zero then this is * a hint that the filesystem need only write out the pages inside that * byterange. The byte at `end' is included in the writeout request. */ loff_t range_start; loff_t range_end; enum writeback_sync_modes sync_mode; unsigned for_kupdate:1; /* A kupdate writeback */ unsigned for_background:1; /* A background writeback */ unsigned tagged_writepages:1; /* tag-and-write to avoid livelock */ unsigned for_reclaim:1; /* Invoked from the page allocator */ unsigned range_cyclic:1; /* range_start is cyclic */ unsigned for_sync:1; /* sync(2) WB_SYNC_ALL writeback */ /* * When writeback IOs are bounced through async layers, only the * initial synchronous phase should be accounted towards inode * cgroup ownership arbitration to avoid confusion. Later stages * can set the following flag to disable the accounting. */ unsigned no_cgroup_owner:1; unsigned punt_to_cgroup:1; /* cgrp punting, see __REQ_CGROUP_PUNT */ #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_WRITEBACK struct bdi_writeback *wb; /* wb this writeback is issued under */ struct inode *inode; /* inode being written out */ /* foreign inode detection, see wbc_detach_inode() */ int wb_id; /* current wb id */ int wb_lcand_id; /* last foreign candidate wb id */ int wb_tcand_id; /* this foreign candidate wb id */ size_t wb_bytes; /* bytes written by current wb */ size_t wb_lcand_bytes; /* bytes written by last candidate */ size_t wb_tcand_bytes; /* bytes written by this candidate */ #endif }; static inline int wbc_to_write_flags(struct writeback_control *wbc) { int flags = 0; if (wbc->punt_to_cgroup) flags = REQ_CGROUP_PUNT; if (wbc->sync_mode == WB_SYNC_ALL) flags |= REQ_SYNC; else if (wbc->for_kupdate || wbc->for_background) flags |= REQ_BACKGROUND; return flags; } static inline struct cgroup_subsys_state * wbc_blkcg_css(struct writeback_control *wbc) { #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_WRITEBACK if (wbc->wb) return wbc->wb->blkcg_css; #endif return blkcg_root_css; } /* * A wb_domain represents a domain that wb's (bdi_writeback's) belong to * and are measured against each other in. There always is one global * domain, global_wb_domain, that every wb in the system is a member of. * This allows measuring the relative bandwidth of each wb to distribute * dirtyable memory accordingly. */ struct wb_domain { spinlock_t lock; /* * Scale the writeback cache size proportional to the relative * writeout speed. * * We do this by keeping a floating proportion between BDIs, based * on page writeback completions [end_page_writeback()]. Those * devices that write out pages fastest will get the larger share, * while the slower will get a smaller share. * * We use page writeout completions because we are interested in * getting rid of dirty pages. Having them written out is the * primary goal. * * We introduce a concept of time, a period over which we measure * these events, because demand can/will vary over time. The length * of this period itself is measured in page writeback completions. */ struct fprop_global completions; struct timer_list period_timer; /* timer for aging of completions */ unsigned long period_time; /* * The dirtyable memory and dirty threshold could be suddenly * knocked down by a large amount (eg. on the startup of KVM in a * swapless system). This may throw the system into deep dirty * exceeded state and throttle heavy/light dirtiers alike. To * retain good responsiveness, maintain global_dirty_limit for * tracking slowly down to the knocked down dirty threshold. * * Both fields are protected by ->lock. */ unsigned long dirty_limit_tstamp; unsigned long dirty_limit; }; /** * wb_domain_size_changed - memory available to a wb_domain has changed * @dom: wb_domain of interest * * This function should be called when the amount of memory available to * @dom has changed. It resets @dom's dirty limit parameters to prevent * the past values which don't match the current configuration from skewing * dirty throttling. Without this, when memory size of a wb_domain is * greatly reduced, the dirty throttling logic may allow too many pages to * be dirtied leading to consecutive unnecessary OOMs and may get stuck in * that situation. */ static inline void wb_domain_size_changed(struct wb_domain *dom) { spin_lock(&dom->lock); dom->dirty_limit_tstamp = jiffies; dom->dirty_limit = 0; spin_unlock(&dom->lock); } /* * fs/fs-writeback.c */ struct bdi_writeback; void writeback_inodes_sb(struct super_block *, enum wb_reason reason); void writeback_inodes_sb_nr(struct super_block *, unsigned long nr, enum wb_reason reason); void try_to_writeback_inodes_sb(struct super_block *sb, enum wb_reason reason); void sync_inodes_sb(struct super_block *); void wakeup_flusher_threads(enum wb_reason reason); void wakeup_flusher_threads_bdi(struct backing_dev_info *bdi, enum wb_reason reason); void inode_wait_for_writeback(struct inode *inode); void inode_io_list_del(struct inode *inode); /* writeback.h requires fs.h; it, too, is not included from here. */ static inline void wait_on_inode(struct inode *inode) { might_sleep(); wait_on_bit(&inode->i_state, __I_NEW, TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE); } #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_WRITEBACK #include <linux/cgroup.h> #include <linux/bio.h> void __inode_attach_wb(struct inode *inode, struct page *page); void wbc_attach_and_unlock_inode(struct writeback_control *wbc, struct inode *inode) __releases(&inode->i_lock); void wbc_detach_inode(struct writeback_control *wbc); void wbc_account_cgroup_owner(struct writeback_control *wbc, struct page *page, size_t bytes); int cgroup_writeback_by_id(u64 bdi_id, int memcg_id, unsigned long nr_pages, enum wb_reason reason, struct wb_completion *done); void cgroup_writeback_umount(void); /** * inode_attach_wb - associate an inode with its wb * @inode: inode of interest * @page: page being dirtied (may be NULL) * * If @inode doesn't have its wb, associate it with the wb matching the * memcg of @page or, if @page is NULL, %current. May be called w/ or w/o * @inode->i_lock. */ static inline void inode_attach_wb(struct inode *inode, struct page *page) { if (!inode->i_wb) __inode_attach_wb(inode, page); } /** * inode_detach_wb - disassociate an inode from its wb * @inode: inode of interest * * @inode is being freed. Detach from its wb. */ static inline void inode_detach_wb(struct inode *inode) { if (inode->i_wb) { WARN_ON_ONCE(!(inode->i_state & I_CLEAR)); wb_put(inode->i_wb); inode->i_wb = NULL; } } /** * wbc_attach_fdatawrite_inode - associate wbc and inode for fdatawrite * @wbc: writeback_control of interest * @inode: target inode * * This function is to be used by __filemap_fdatawrite_range(), which is an * alternative entry point into writeback code, and first ensures @inode is * associated with a bdi_writeback and attaches it to @wbc. */ static inline void wbc_attach_fdatawrite_inode(struct writeback_control *wbc, struct inode *inode) { spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); inode_attach_wb(inode, NULL); wbc_attach_and_unlock_inode(wbc, inode); } /** * wbc_init_bio - writeback specific initializtion of bio * @wbc: writeback_control for the writeback in progress * @bio: bio to be initialized * * @bio is a part of the writeback in progress controlled by @wbc. Perform * writeback specific initialization. This is used to apply the cgroup * writeback context. Must be called after the bio has been associated with * a device. */ static inline void wbc_init_bio(struct writeback_control *wbc, struct bio *bio) { /* * pageout() path doesn't attach @wbc to the inode being written * out. This is intentional as we don't want the function to block * behind a slow cgroup. Ultimately, we want pageout() to kick off * regular writeback instead of writing things out itself. */ if (wbc->wb) bio_associate_blkg_from_css(bio, wbc->wb->blkcg_css); } #else /* CONFIG_CGROUP_WRITEBACK */ static inline void inode_attach_wb(struct inode *inode, struct page *page) { } static inline void inode_detach_wb(struct inode *inode) { } static inline void wbc_attach_and_unlock_inode(struct writeback_control *wbc, struct inode *inode) __releases(&inode->i_lock) { spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); } static inline void wbc_attach_fdatawrite_inode(struct writeback_control *wbc, struct inode *inode) { } static inline void wbc_detach_inode(struct writeback_control *wbc) { } static inline void wbc_init_bio(struct writeback_control *wbc, struct bio *bio) { } static inline void wbc_account_cgroup_owner(struct writeback_control *wbc, struct page *page, size_t bytes) { } static inline void cgroup_writeback_umount(void) { } #endif /* CONFIG_CGROUP_WRITEBACK */ /* * mm/page-writeback.c */ #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK void laptop_io_completion(struct backing_dev_info *info); void laptop_sync_completion(void); void laptop_mode_sync(struct work_struct *work); void laptop_mode_timer_fn(struct timer_list *t); #else static inline void laptop_sync_completion(void) { } #endif bool node_dirty_ok(struct pglist_data *pgdat); int wb_domain_init(struct wb_domain *dom, gfp_t gfp); #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_WRITEBACK void wb_domain_exit(struct wb_domain *dom); #endif extern struct wb_domain global_wb_domain; /* These are exported to sysctl. */ extern int dirty_background_ratio; extern unsigned long dirty_background_bytes; extern int vm_dirty_ratio; extern unsigned long vm_dirty_bytes; extern unsigned int dirty_writeback_interval; extern unsigned int dirty_expire_interval; extern unsigned int dirtytime_expire_interval; extern int vm_highmem_is_dirtyable; extern int block_dump; extern int laptop_mode; int dirty_background_ratio_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); int dirty_background_bytes_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); int dirty_ratio_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); int dirty_bytes_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); int dirtytime_interval_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); int dirty_writeback_centisecs_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); void global_dirty_limits(unsigned long *pbackground, unsigned long *pdirty); unsigned long wb_calc_thresh(struct bdi_writeback *wb, unsigned long thresh); void wb_update_bandwidth(struct bdi_writeback *wb, unsigned long start_time); void balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited(struct address_space *mapping); bool wb_over_bg_thresh(struct bdi_writeback *wb); typedef int (*writepage_t)(struct page *page, struct writeback_control *wbc, void *data); int generic_writepages(struct address_space *mapping, struct writeback_control *wbc); void tag_pages_for_writeback(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t start, pgoff_t end); int write_cache_pages(struct address_space *mapping, struct writeback_control *wbc, writepage_t writepage, void *data); int do_writepages(struct address_space *mapping, struct writeback_control *wbc); void writeback_set_ratelimit(void); void tag_pages_for_writeback(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t start, pgoff_t end); void account_page_redirty(struct page *page); void sb_mark_inode_writeback(struct inode *inode); void sb_clear_inode_writeback(struct inode *inode); #endif /* WRITEBACK_H */
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7421 7422 7423 7424 7425 7426 7427 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only /* * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module * * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations. * * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com> * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com> * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> * * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd. * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp> * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies */ #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/kd.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h> #include <linux/tracehook.h> #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/sched/signal.h> #include <linux/sched/task.h> #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <linux/xattr.h> #include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/unistd.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/mman.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/pagemap.h> #include <linux/proc_fs.h> #include <linux/swap.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/dcache.h> #include <linux/file.h> #include <linux/fdtable.h> #include <linux/namei.h> #include <linux/mount.h> #include <linux/fs_context.h> #include <linux/fs_parser.h> #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h> #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h> #include <linux/tty.h> #include <net/icmp.h> #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */ #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */ #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h> #include <net/net_namespace.h> #include <net/netlabel.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <asm/ioctls.h> #include <linux/atomic.h> #include <linux/bitops.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */ #include <net/netlink.h> #include <linux/tcp.h> #include <linux/udp.h> #include <linux/dccp.h> #include <linux/sctp.h> #include <net/sctp/structs.h> #include <linux/quota.h> #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */ #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */ #include <linux/parser.h> #include <linux/nfs_mount.h> #include <net/ipv6.h> #include <linux/hugetlb.h> #include <linux/personality.h> #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/posix-timers.h> #include <linux/syslog.h> #include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/msg.h> #include <linux/shm.h> #include <linux/bpf.h> #include <linux/kernfs.h> #include <linux/stringhash.h> /* for hashlen_string() */ #include <uapi/linux/mount.h> #include <linux/fsnotify.h> #include <linux/fanotify.h> #include "avc.h" #include "objsec.h" #include "netif.h" #include "netnode.h" #include "netport.h" #include "ibpkey.h" #include "xfrm.h" #include "netlabel.h" #include "audit.h" #include "avc_ss.h" struct selinux_state selinux_state; /* SECMARK reference count */ static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP static int selinux_enforcing_boot __initdata; static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str) { unsigned long enforcing; if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing)) selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0; return 1; } __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup); #else #define selinux_enforcing_boot 1 #endif int selinux_enabled_boot __initdata = 1; #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str) { unsigned long enabled; if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled)) selinux_enabled_boot = enabled ? 1 : 0; return 1; } __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup); #endif static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE; static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str) { unsigned long checkreqprot; if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) { selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0; if (checkreqprot) pr_warn("SELinux: checkreqprot set to 1 via kernel parameter. This is deprecated and will be rejected in a future kernel release.\n"); } return 1; } __setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup); /** * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled * * Description: * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled. * */ static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void) { return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount)); } /** * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled * * Description: * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling * is always considered enabled. * */ static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void) { return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()); } static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event) { if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) { sel_netif_flush(); sel_netnode_flush(); sel_netport_flush(); synchronize_net(); } return 0; } static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event) { if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) { sel_ib_pkey_flush(); call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL); } return 0; } /* * initialise the security for the init task */ static void cred_init_security(void) { struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred; struct task_security_struct *tsec; tsec = selinux_cred(cred); tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; } /* * get the security ID of a set of credentials */ static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec; tsec = selinux_cred(cred); return tsec->sid; } /* * get the objective security ID of a task */ static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task) { u32 sid; rcu_read_lock(); sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task)); rcu_read_unlock(); return sid; } static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry); /* * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is * invalid. The @dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode. */ static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry, bool may_sleep) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); might_sleep_if(may_sleep); if (selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) && isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) { if (!may_sleep) return -ECHILD; /* * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be * found; in that case, continue using the old label. */ inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry); } return 0; } static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode) { return selinux_inode(inode); } static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu) { int error; error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu); if (error) return ERR_PTR(error); return selinux_inode(inode); } /* * Get the security label of an inode. */ static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode) { __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true); return selinux_inode(inode); } static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); return selinux_inode(inode); } /* * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode. */ static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true); return selinux_inode(inode); } static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; if (!isec) return; sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; /* * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste * time taking a lock doing nothing. * * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once. * It should not be possible for this function to be called with * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here. */ if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) { spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); list_del_init(&isec->list); spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); } } static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; sb->s_security = NULL; kfree(sbsec); } struct selinux_mnt_opts { const char *fscontext, *context, *rootcontext, *defcontext; }; static void selinux_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts) { struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts; kfree(opts->fscontext); kfree(opts->context); kfree(opts->rootcontext); kfree(opts->defcontext); kfree(opts); } enum { Opt_error = -1, Opt_context = 0, Opt_defcontext = 1, Opt_fscontext = 2, Opt_rootcontext = 3, Opt_seclabel = 4, }; #define A(s, has_arg) {#s, sizeof(#s) - 1, Opt_##s, has_arg} static struct { const char *name; int len; int opt; bool has_arg; } tokens[] = { A(context, true), A(fscontext, true), A(defcontext, true), A(rootcontext, true), A(seclabel, false), }; #undef A static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg) { int i; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) { size_t len = tokens[i].len; if (len > l || memcmp(s, tokens[i].name, len)) continue; if (tokens[i].has_arg) { if (len == l || s[len] != '=') continue; *arg = s + len + 1; } else if (len != l) continue; return tokens[i].opt; } return Opt_error; } #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n" static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid, struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, const struct cred *cred) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred); int rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); if (rc) return rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL); return rc; } static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid, struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, const struct cred *cred) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred); int rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); if (rc) return rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL); return rc; } static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb) { /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */ return !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") || (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() && (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))); } static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; /* * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new * SECURITY_FS_USE_* definition! */ BUILD_BUG_ON(SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX != 7); switch (sbsec->behavior) { case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR: case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS: case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK: case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE: return 1; case SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS: return selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(sb); /* Never allow relabeling on context mounts */ case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT: case SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE: default: return 0; } } static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; struct dentry *root = sb->s_root; struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root); int rc = 0; if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */ if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) { pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no " "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; goto out; } rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) { if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type " "%s) has no security xattr handler\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); else pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type " "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, -rc); goto out; } } sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED; /* * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared. */ if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb)) sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT; else sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT; /* Initialize the root inode. */ rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root); /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g. inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly populates itself. */ spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); while (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = list_first_entry(&sbsec->isec_head, struct inode_security_struct, list); struct inode *inode = isec->inode; list_del_init(&isec->list); spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); inode = igrab(inode); if (inode) { if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode)) inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL); iput(inode); } spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); } spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); out: return rc; } static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag, u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid) { char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK; /* check if the old mount command had the same options */ if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) || (old_sid != new_sid)) return 1; /* check if we were passed the same options twice, * aka someone passed context=a,context=b */ if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) if (mnt_flags & flag) return 1; return 0; } static int parse_sid(struct super_block *sb, const char *s, u32 *sid) { int rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, s, sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid" "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", s, sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc); return rc; } /* * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point * labeling information. */ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts, unsigned long kern_flags, unsigned long *set_kern_flags) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root; struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts; struct inode_security_struct *root_isec; u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0; u32 defcontext_sid = 0; int rc = 0; mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock); if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) { if (!opts) { /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, after the initial policy is loaded and the security server is ready to handle calls. */ goto out; } rc = -EINVAL; pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options " "before the security server is initialized\n"); goto out; } if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) { /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to * place the results is not allowed */ rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } /* * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs. * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data * we need to skip the double mount verification. * * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options * will be used for both mounts) */ if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) && !opts) goto out; root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root); /* * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids. * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more * than once with different security options. */ if (opts) { if (opts->fscontext) { rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &fscontext_sid); if (rc) goto out; if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, fscontext_sid)) goto out_double_mount; sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT; } if (opts->context) { rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &context_sid); if (rc) goto out; if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, context_sid)) goto out_double_mount; sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT; } if (opts->rootcontext) { rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &rootcontext_sid); if (rc) goto out; if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, rootcontext_sid)) goto out_double_mount; sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT; } if (opts->defcontext) { rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &defcontext_sid); if (rc) goto out; if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, defcontext_sid)) goto out_double_mount; sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT; } } if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) { /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */ if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !opts) goto out_double_mount; rc = 0; goto out; } if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0) sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS; if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore")) sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS; if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")) sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR; if (!sbsec->behavior) { /* * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this * filesystem type. */ rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, sb); if (rc) { pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n", __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc); goto out; } } /* * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command * line and security labels must be ignored. */ if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns && strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") && strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") && strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts")) { if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid || defcontext_sid) { rc = -EACCES; goto out; } if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT; rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, current_sid(), current_sid(), SECCLASS_FILE, NULL, &sbsec->mntpoint_sid); if (rc) goto out; } goto out_set_opts; } /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */ if (fscontext_sid) { rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred); if (rc) goto out; sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid; } /* * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior. * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set * the superblock context if not already set. */ if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) { sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE; *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS; } if (context_sid) { if (!fscontext_sid) { rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, cred); if (rc) goto out; sbsec->sid = context_sid; } else { rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, cred); if (rc) goto out; } if (!rootcontext_sid) rootcontext_sid = context_sid; sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid; sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT; } if (rootcontext_sid) { rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, cred); if (rc) goto out; root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid; root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; } if (defcontext_sid) { if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) { rc = -EINVAL; pr_warn("SELinux: defcontext option is " "invalid for this filesystem type\n"); goto out; } if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) { rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid, sbsec, cred); if (rc) goto out; } sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid; } out_set_opts: rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb); out: mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock); return rc; out_double_mount: rc = -EINVAL; pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different " "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); goto out; } static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb, const struct super_block *newsb) { struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security; struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security; char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK; char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK; if (oldflags != newflags) goto mismatch; if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid) goto mismatch; if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid) goto mismatch; if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid) goto mismatch; if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) { struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root); struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root); if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid) goto mismatch; } return 0; mismatch: pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, " "different security settings for (dev %s, " "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name); return -EBUSY; } static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, struct super_block *newsb, unsigned long kern_flags, unsigned long *set_kern_flags) { int rc = 0; const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security; struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security; int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT); int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT); int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT); /* * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later */ if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) return 0; /* * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to * place the results is not allowed. */ if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) return -EINVAL; /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */ BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)); /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */ if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) { if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS; return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb); } mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock); newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags; newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid; newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid; newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior; if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE && !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) { rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, newsb); if (rc) goto out; } if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) { newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE; *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS; } if (set_context) { u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid; if (!set_fscontext) newsbsec->sid = sid; if (!set_rootcontext) { struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root); newisec->sid = sid; } newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid; } if (set_rootcontext) { const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root); struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root); newisec->sid = oldisec->sid; } sb_finish_set_opts(newsb); out: mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock); return rc; } static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts) { struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts; if (token == Opt_seclabel) /* eaten and completely ignored */ return 0; if (!opts) { opts = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL); if (!opts) return -ENOMEM; *mnt_opts = opts; } if (!s) return -ENOMEM; switch (token) { case Opt_context: if (opts->context || opts->defcontext) goto Einval; opts->context = s; break; case Opt_fscontext: if (opts->fscontext) goto Einval; opts->fscontext = s; break; case Opt_rootcontext: if (opts->rootcontext) goto Einval; opts->rootcontext = s; break; case Opt_defcontext: if (opts->context || opts->defcontext) goto Einval; opts->defcontext = s; break; } return 0; Einval: pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); return -EINVAL; } static int selinux_add_mnt_opt(const char *option, const char *val, int len, void **mnt_opts) { int token = Opt_error; int rc, i; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) { if (strcmp(option, tokens[i].name) == 0) { token = tokens[i].opt; break; } } if (token == Opt_error) return -EINVAL; if (token != Opt_seclabel) { val = kmemdup_nul(val, len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!val) { rc = -ENOMEM; goto free_opt; } } rc = selinux_add_opt(token, val, mnt_opts); if (unlikely(rc)) { kfree(val); goto free_opt; } return rc; free_opt: if (*mnt_opts) { selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts); *mnt_opts = NULL; } return rc; } static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid) { char *context = NULL; u32 len; int rc; rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, &context, &len); if (!rc) { bool has_comma = context && strchr(context, ','); seq_putc(m, '='); if (has_comma) seq_putc(m, '\"'); seq_escape(m, context, "\"\n\\"); if (has_comma) seq_putc(m, '\"'); } kfree(context); return rc; } static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; int rc; if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) return 0; if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) return 0; if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) { seq_putc(m, ','); seq_puts(m, FSCONTEXT_STR); rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->sid); if (rc) return rc; } if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) { seq_putc(m, ','); seq_puts(m, CONTEXT_STR); rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->mntpoint_sid); if (rc) return rc; } if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) { seq_putc(m, ','); seq_puts(m, DEFCONTEXT_STR); rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->def_sid); if (rc) return rc; } if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) { struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root; struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root); seq_putc(m, ','); seq_puts(m, ROOTCONTEXT_STR); rc = show_sid(m, isec->sid); if (rc) return rc; } if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) { seq_putc(m, ','); seq_puts(m, SECLABEL_STR); } return 0; } static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode) { switch (mode & S_IFMT) { case S_IFSOCK: return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE; case S_IFLNK: return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE; case S_IFREG: return SECCLASS_FILE; case S_IFBLK: return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE; case S_IFDIR: return SECCLASS_DIR; case S_IFCHR: return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE; case S_IFIFO: return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE; } return SECCLASS_FILE; } static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol) { return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP); } static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol) { return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP); } static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol) { int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass(); switch (family) { case PF_UNIX: switch (type) { case SOCK_STREAM: case SOCK_SEQPACKET: return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET; case SOCK_DGRAM: case SOCK_RAW: return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET; } break; case PF_INET: case PF_INET6: switch (type) { case SOCK_STREAM: case SOCK_SEQPACKET: if (default_protocol_stream(protocol)) return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET; else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP) return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET; else return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; case SOCK_DGRAM: if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol)) return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET; else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP || protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6)) return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET; else return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; case SOCK_DCCP: return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET; default: return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; } break; case PF_NETLINK: switch (protocol) { case NETLINK_ROUTE: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET; case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET; case NETLINK_NFLOG: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET; case NETLINK_XFRM: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET; case NETLINK_SELINUX: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET; case NETLINK_ISCSI: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET; case NETLINK_AUDIT: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET; case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET; case NETLINK_CONNECTOR: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET; case NETLINK_NETFILTER: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET; case NETLINK_DNRTMSG: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET; case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET; case NETLINK_GENERIC: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET; case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET; case NETLINK_RDMA: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET; case NETLINK_CRYPTO: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET; default: return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET; } case PF_PACKET: return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET; case PF_KEY: return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET; case PF_APPLETALK: return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET; } if (extsockclass) { switch (family) { case PF_AX25: return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET; case PF_IPX: return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET; case PF_NETROM: return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET; case PF_ATMPVC: return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET; case PF_X25: return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET; case PF_ROSE: return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET; case PF_DECnet: return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET; case PF_ATMSVC: return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET; case PF_RDS: return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET; case PF_IRDA: return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET; case PF_PPPOX: return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET; case PF_LLC: return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET; case PF_CAN: return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET; case PF_TIPC: return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET; case PF_BLUETOOTH: return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET; case PF_IUCV: return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET; case PF_RXRPC: return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET; case PF_ISDN: return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET; case PF_PHONET: return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET; case PF_IEEE802154: return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET; case PF_CAIF: return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET; case PF_ALG: return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET; case PF_NFC: return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET; case PF_VSOCK: return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET; case PF_KCM: return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET; case PF_QIPCRTR: return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET; case PF_SMC: return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET; case PF_XDP: return SECCLASS_XDP_SOCKET; #if PF_MAX > 45 #error New address family defined, please update this function. #endif } } return SECCLASS_SOCKET; } static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry, u16 tclass, u16 flags, u32 *sid) { int rc; struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb; char *buffer, *path; buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); if (!buffer) return -ENOMEM; path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE); if (IS_ERR(path)) rc = PTR_ERR(path); else { if (flags & SE_SBPROC) { /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling. * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */ while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') { path[1] = '/'; path++; } } rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name, path, tclass, sid); if (rc == -ENOENT) { /* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */ *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; rc = 0; } } free_page((unsigned long)buffer); return rc; } static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry, u32 def_sid, u32 *sid) { #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255 char *context; unsigned int len; int rc; len = INITCONTEXTLEN; context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS); if (!context) return -ENOMEM; context[len] = '\0'; rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len); if (rc == -ERANGE) { kfree(context); /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */ rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); if (rc < 0) return rc; len = rc; context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS); if (!context) return -ENOMEM; context[len] = '\0'; rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len); } if (rc < 0) { kfree(context); if (rc != -ENODATA) { pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); return rc; } *sid = def_sid; return 0; } rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state, context, rc, sid, def_sid, GFP_NOFS); if (rc) { char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id; unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino; if (rc == -EINVAL) { pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context); } else { pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino); } } kfree(context); return 0; } /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL; struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); u32 task_sid, sid = 0; u16 sclass; struct dentry *dentry; int rc = 0; if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED) return 0; spin_lock(&isec->lock); if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED) goto out_unlock; if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE) isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) { /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, after the initial policy is loaded and the security server is ready to handle calls. */ spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); if (list_empty(&isec->list)) list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head); spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); goto out_unlock; } sclass = isec->sclass; task_sid = isec->task_sid; sid = isec->sid; isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING; spin_unlock(&isec->lock); switch (sbsec->behavior) { case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE: break; case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR: if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) { sid = sbsec->def_sid; break; } /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one. Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */ if (opt_dentry) { /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */ dentry = dget(opt_dentry); } else { /* * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try * that first. We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in * two, depending upon that... */ dentry = d_find_alias(inode); if (!dentry) dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode); } if (!dentry) { /* * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we * may find inodes that have no dentry on the * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these * will get fixed up the next time we go through * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could * be used again by userspace. */ goto out_invalid; } rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid, &sid); dput(dentry); if (rc) goto out; break; case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK: sid = task_sid; break; case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS: /* Default to the fs SID. */ sid = sbsec->sid; /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */ rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, task_sid, sid, sclass, NULL, &sid); if (rc) goto out; break; case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT: sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid; break; default: /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */ sid = sbsec->sid; if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) && (!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) || selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks())) { /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on * procfs inodes */ if (opt_dentry) { /* Called from d_instantiate or * d_splice_alias. */ dentry = dget(opt_dentry); } else { /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to * find a dentry. Some filesystems really want * a connected one, so try that first. */ dentry = d_find_alias(inode); if (!dentry) dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode); } /* * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we * may find inodes that have no dentry on the * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as * these will get fixed up the next time we go through * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes * could be used again by userspace. */ if (!dentry) goto out_invalid; rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass, sbsec->flags, &sid); if (rc) { dput(dentry); goto out; } if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) && (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) { rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sid, &sid); if (rc) { dput(dentry); goto out; } } dput(dentry); } break; } out: spin_lock(&isec->lock); if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) { if (rc) { isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID; goto out_unlock; } isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; isec->sid = sid; } out_unlock: spin_unlock(&isec->lock); return rc; out_invalid: spin_lock(&isec->lock); if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) { isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID; isec->sid = sid; } spin_unlock(&isec->lock); return 0; } /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */ static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig) { u32 perm = 0; switch (sig) { case SIGCHLD: /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */ perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD; break; case SIGKILL: /* Cannot be caught or ignored */ perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL; break; case SIGSTOP: /* Cannot be caught or ignored */ perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP; break; default: /* All other signals. */ perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL; break; } return perm; } #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63. #endif /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred, int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns) { struct common_audit_data ad; struct av_decision avd; u16 sclass; u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap); int rc; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP; ad.u.cap = cap; switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) { case 0: sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS; break; case 1: sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS; break; default: pr_err("SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap); BUG(); return -EINVAL; } rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state, sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd); if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) { int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state, sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0); if (rc2) return rc2; } return rc; } /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode. The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct inode *inode, u32 perms, struct common_audit_data *adp) { struct inode_security_struct *isec; u32 sid; validate_creds(cred); if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return 0; sid = cred_sid(cred); isec = selinux_inode(inode); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp); } /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the pathname if needed. */ static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct dentry *dentry, u32 av) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct common_audit_data ad; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true); return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); } /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the pathname if needed. */ static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, const struct path *path, u32 av) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry); struct common_audit_data ad; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; ad.u.path = *path; __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true); return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); } /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */ static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, u32 av) { struct common_audit_data ad; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; ad.u.file = file; return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad); } #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid); #endif /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to access an inode in a given way. Check access to the descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to check a particular permission to the file. Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, u32 av) { struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file); struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); int rc; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; ad.u.file = file; if (sid != fsec->sid) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad); if (rc) goto out; } #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred)); if (rc) return rc; #endif /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */ rc = 0; if (av) rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); out: return rc; } /* * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned. */ static int selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass, u32 *_new_isid) { const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) { *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid; } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) && tsec->create_sid) { *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid; } else { const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir); return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass, name, _new_isid); } return 0; } /* Check whether a task can create a file. */ static int may_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, u16 tclass) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); struct inode_security_struct *dsec; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; u32 sid, newsid; struct common_audit_data ad; int rc; dsec = inode_security(dir); sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; sid = tsec->sid; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad); if (rc) return rc; rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass, &newsid); if (rc) return rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad); if (rc) return rc; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, newsid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); } #define MAY_LINK 0 #define MAY_UNLINK 1 #define MAY_RMDIR 2 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */ static int may_link(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int kind) { struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); u32 av; int rc; dsec = inode_security(dir); isec = backing_inode_security(dentry); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; av = DIR__SEARCH; av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME); rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad); if (rc) return rc; switch (kind) { case MAY_LINK: av = FILE__LINK; break; case MAY_UNLINK: av = FILE__UNLINK; break; case MAY_RMDIR: av = DIR__RMDIR; break; default: pr_warn("SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n", __func__, kind); return 0; } rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad); return rc; } static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) { struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); u32 av; int old_is_dir, new_is_dir; int rc; old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir); old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry); old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry); new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = old_dentry; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad); if (rc) return rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, old_isec->sid, old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad); if (rc) return rc; if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, old_isec->sid, old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad); if (rc) return rc; } ad.u.dentry = new_dentry; av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH; if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad); if (rc) return rc; if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) { new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry); new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry); rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, new_isec->sid, new_isec->sclass, (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad); if (rc) return rc; } return 0; } /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */ static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct super_block *sb, u32 perms, struct common_audit_data *ad) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); sbsec = sb->s_security; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad); } /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */ static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask) { u32 av = 0; if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) { if (mask & MAY_EXEC) av |= FILE__EXECUTE; if (mask & MAY_READ) av |= FILE__READ; if (mask & MAY_APPEND) av |= FILE__APPEND; else if (mask & MAY_WRITE) av |= FILE__WRITE; } else { if (mask & MAY_EXEC) av |= DIR__SEARCH; if (mask & MAY_WRITE) av |= DIR__WRITE; if (mask & MAY_READ) av |= DIR__READ; } return av; } /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */ static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file) { u32 av = 0; if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) av |= FILE__READ; if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) { if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND) av |= FILE__APPEND; else av |= FILE__WRITE; } if (!av) { /* * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use. */ av = FILE__IOCTL; } return av; } /* * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct * open permission. */ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file) { u32 av = file_to_av(file); struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); if (selinux_policycap_openperm() && inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC) av |= FILE__OPEN; return av; } /* Hook functions begin here. */ static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), cred_sid(mgr), SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL); } static int selinux_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from, const struct cred *to) { u32 mysid = current_sid(); u32 fromsid = cred_sid(from); u32 tosid = cred_sid(to); int rc; if (mysid != fromsid) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL); if (rc) return rc; } return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL, NULL); } static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from, const struct cred *to) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, cred_sid(from), cred_sid(to), SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER, NULL); } static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from, const struct cred *to, struct file *file) { u32 sid = cred_sid(to); struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file); struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry; struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; int rc; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; ad.u.path = file->f_path; if (sid != fsec->sid) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad); if (rc) return rc; } #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid); if (rc) return rc; #endif if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; isec = backing_inode_security(dentry); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file), &ad); } static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) { u32 sid = current_sid(); u32 csid = task_sid(child); if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); } static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, task_sid(parent), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); } static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL); } static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, const kernel_cap_t *effective, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *permitted) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL); } /* * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook, * which was removed). * * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook. */ static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, unsigned int opts) { return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns); } static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); int rc = 0; if (!sb) return 0; switch (cmds) { case Q_SYNC: case Q_QUOTAON: case Q_QUOTAOFF: case Q_SETINFO: case Q_SETQUOTA: case Q_XQUOTAOFF: case Q_XQUOTAON: case Q_XSETQLIM: rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL); break; case Q_GETFMT: case Q_GETINFO: case Q_GETQUOTA: case Q_XGETQUOTA: case Q_XGETQSTAT: case Q_XGETQSTATV: case Q_XGETNEXTQUOTA: rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL); break; default: rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */ break; } return rc; } static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON); } static int selinux_syslog(int type) { switch (type) { case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */ case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL); case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */ case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */ /* Set level of messages printed to console */ case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL: return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE, NULL); } /* All other syslog types */ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL); } /* * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not. * * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all * processes that allocate mappings. */ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) { int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0; rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true); if (rc == 0) cap_sys_admin = 1; return cap_sys_admin; } /* binprm security operations */ static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void) { u32 sid = 0; struct task_struct *tracer; rcu_read_lock(); tracer = ptrace_parent(current); if (tracer) sid = task_sid(tracer); rcu_read_unlock(); return sid; } static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec, const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec) { int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS); int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt); int rc; u32 av; if (!nnp && !nosuid) return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */ if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) return 0; /* No change in credentials */ /* * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability, * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the * policy allows the corresponding permission between * the old and new contexts. */ if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) { av = 0; if (nnp) av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION; if (nosuid) av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL); if (!rc) return 0; } /* * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs, * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset * of the permissions of the current SID. */ rc = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid); if (!rc) return 0; /* * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid. * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller. * nosuid: Permission denied to file. */ if (nnp) return -EPERM; return -EACCES; } static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec; struct task_security_struct *new_tsec; struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file); int rc; /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not * the script interpreter */ old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred); isec = inode_security(inode); /* Default to the current task SID. */ new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid; new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid; /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */ new_tsec->create_sid = 0; new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0; new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0; if (old_tsec->exec_sid) { new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid; /* Reset exec SID on execve. */ new_tsec->exec_sid = 0; /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */ rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec); if (rc) return rc; } else { /* Check for a default transition on this program. */ rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL, &new_tsec->sid); if (rc) return rc; /* * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed * transition. */ rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec); if (rc) new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid; } ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; ad.u.file = bprm->file; if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad); if (rc) return rc; } else { /* Check permissions for the transition. */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad); if (rc) return rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, new_tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad); if (rc) return rc; /* Check for shared state */ if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE, NULL); if (rc) return -EPERM; } /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */ if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) { u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid(); if (ptsid != 0) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, ptsid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); if (rc) return -EPERM; } } /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */ bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless the noatsecure permission is granted between the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL); bprm->secureexec |= !!rc; } return 0; } static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd) { return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0; } /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, struct files_struct *files) { struct file *file, *devnull = NULL; struct tty_struct *tty; int drop_tty = 0; unsigned n; tty = get_current_tty(); if (tty) { spin_lock(&tty->files_lock); if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) { struct tty_file_private *file_priv; /* Revalidate access to controlling tty. Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular open file may belong to another process and we are only interested in the inode-based check here. */ file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct tty_file_private, list); file = file_priv->file; if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE)) drop_tty = 1; } spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock); tty_kref_put(tty); } /* Reset controlling tty. */ if (drop_tty) no_tty(); /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */ n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred); if (!n) /* none found? */ return; devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred); if (IS_ERR(devnull)) devnull = NULL; /* replace all the matching ones with this */ do { replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0); } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0); if (devnull) fput(devnull); } /* * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec */ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { struct task_security_struct *new_tsec; struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim; int rc, i; new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred); if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid) return; /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */ flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files); /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */ current->pdeath_signal = 0; /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit. * * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK. */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL); if (rc) { /* protect against do_prlimit() */ task_lock(current); for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) { rlim = current->signal->rlim + i; initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i; rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur); } task_unlock(current); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS)) update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU)); } } /* * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials * due to exec */ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); u32 osid, sid; int rc; osid = tsec->osid; sid = tsec->sid; if (sid == osid) return; /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID. * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and * flush and unblock signals. * * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID. */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL); if (rc) { clear_itimer(); spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock); if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) { flush_sigqueue(&current->pending); flush_sigqueue(&current->signal->shared_pending); flush_signal_handlers(current, 1); sigemptyset(&current->blocked); recalc_sigpending(); } spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock); } /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck * wait permission to the new task SID. */ read_lock(&tasklist_lock); __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent); read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); } /* superblock security operations */ static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); if (!sbsec) return -ENOMEM; mutex_init(&sbsec->lock); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head); spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock); sbsec->sb = sb; sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE; sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; sb->s_security = sbsec; return 0; } static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb) { superblock_free_security(sb); } static inline int opt_len(const char *s) { bool open_quote = false; int len; char c; for (len = 0; (c = s[len]) != '\0'; len++) { if (c == '"') open_quote = !open_quote; if (c == ',' && !open_quote) break; } return len; } static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts) { char *from = options; char *to = options; bool first = true; int rc; while (1) { int len = opt_len(from); int token; char *arg = NULL; token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg); if (token != Opt_error) { char *p, *q; /* strip quotes */ if (arg) { for (p = q = arg; p < from + len; p++) { char c = *p; if (c != '"') *q++ = c; } arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, q - arg, GFP_KERNEL); if (!arg) { rc = -ENOMEM; goto free_opt; } } rc = selinux_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts); if (unlikely(rc)) { kfree(arg); goto free_opt; } } else { if (!first) { // copy with preceding comma from--; len++; } if (to != from) memmove(to, from, len); to += len; first = false; } if (!from[len]) break; from += len + 1; } *to = '\0'; return 0; free_opt: if (*mnt_opts) { selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts); *mnt_opts = NULL; } return rc; } static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts) { struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; u32 sid; int rc; if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) return 0; if (!opts) return 0; if (opts->fscontext) { rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &sid); if (rc) return rc; if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid)) goto out_bad_option; } if (opts->context) { rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &sid); if (rc) return rc; if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid)) goto out_bad_option; } if (opts->rootcontext) { struct inode_security_struct *root_isec; root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root); rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &sid); if (rc) return rc; if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid)) goto out_bad_option; } if (opts->defcontext) { rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &sid); if (rc) return rc; if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid)) goto out_bad_option; } return 0; out_bad_option: pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options " "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); return -EINVAL; } static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct common_audit_data ad; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root; return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad); } static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct common_audit_data ad; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root; return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad); } static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL); else return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON); } static int selinux_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, const struct path *to_path) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return path_has_perm(cred, to_path, FILE__MOUNTON); } static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb, FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL); } static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc) { const struct selinux_mnt_opts *src = src_fc->security; struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts; if (!src) return 0; fc->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL); if (!fc->security) return -ENOMEM; opts = fc->security; if (src->fscontext) { opts->fscontext = kstrdup(src->fscontext, GFP_KERNEL); if (!opts->fscontext) return -ENOMEM; } if (src->context) { opts->context = kstrdup(src->context, GFP_KERNEL); if (!opts->context) return -ENOMEM; } if (src->rootcontext) { opts->rootcontext = kstrdup(src->rootcontext, GFP_KERNEL); if (!opts->rootcontext) return -ENOMEM; } if (src->defcontext) { opts->defcontext = kstrdup(src->defcontext, GFP_KERNEL); if (!opts->defcontext) return -ENOMEM; } return 0; } static const struct fs_parameter_spec selinux_fs_parameters[] = { fsparam_string(CONTEXT_STR, Opt_context), fsparam_string(DEFCONTEXT_STR, Opt_defcontext), fsparam_string(FSCONTEXT_STR, Opt_fscontext), fsparam_string(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, Opt_rootcontext), fsparam_flag (SECLABEL_STR, Opt_seclabel), {} }; static int selinux_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param) { struct fs_parse_result result; int opt, rc; opt = fs_parse(fc, selinux_fs_parameters, param, &result); if (opt < 0) return opt; rc = selinux_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security); if (!rc) { param->string = NULL; rc = 1; } return rc; } /* inode security operations */ static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); u32 sid = current_sid(); spin_lock_init(&isec->lock); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list); isec->inode = inode; isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE; isec->task_sid = sid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID; return 0; } static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) { inode_free_security(inode); } static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, const struct qstr *name, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) { u32 newsid; int rc; rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()), d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode), &newsid); if (rc) return rc; return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen); } static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, struct qstr *name, const struct cred *old, struct cred *new) { u32 newsid; int rc; struct task_security_struct *tsec; rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old), d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode), &newsid); if (rc) return rc; tsec = selinux_cred(new); tsec->create_sid = newsid; return 0; } static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name, void **value, size_t *len) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; u32 newsid, clen; int rc; char *context; sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; newsid = tsec->create_sid; rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, qstr, inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode), &newsid); if (rc) return rc; /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */ if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); isec->sid = newsid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; } if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (name) *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX; if (value && len) { rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid, &context, &clen); if (rc) return rc; *value = context; *len = clen; } return 0; } static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) { return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE); } static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) { return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK); } static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) { return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK); } static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) { return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE); } static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask) { return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR); } static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) { return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR); } static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev) { return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode)); } static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry) { return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry); } static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ); } static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, bool rcu) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct common_audit_data ad; struct inode_security_struct *isec; u32 sid; validate_creds(cred); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; sid = cred_sid(cred); isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu); if (IS_ERR(isec)) return PTR_ERR(isec); return avc_has_perm_flags(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad, rcu ? MAY_NOT_BLOCK : 0); } static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result) { struct common_audit_data ad; struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); int rc; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE; ad.u.inode = inode; rc = slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state, current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, audited, denied, result, &ad); if (rc) return rc; return 0; } static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); u32 perms; bool from_access; bool no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK; struct inode_security_struct *isec; u32 sid; struct av_decision avd; int rc, rc2; u32 audited, denied; from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS; mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND); /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ if (!mask) return 0; validate_creds(cred); if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return 0; perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask); sid = cred_sid(cred); isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, no_block); if (IS_ERR(isec)) return PTR_ERR(isec); rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, no_block ? AVC_NONBLOCKING : 0, &avd); audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc, from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0, &denied); if (likely(!audited)) return rc; /* fall back to ref-walk if we have to generate audit */ if (no_block) return -ECHILD; rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc); if (rc2) return rc2; return rc; } static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid; __u32 av = FILE__WRITE; /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */ if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) { ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE | ATTR_FORCE); if (!ia_valid) return 0; } if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID | ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET)) return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); if (selinux_policycap_openperm() && inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) && !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE)) av |= FILE__OPEN; return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av); } static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) { return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR); } static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); unsigned int opts = audit ? CAP_OPT_NONE : CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT; if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts)) return false; if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true)) return false; return true; } static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 newsid, sid = current_sid(); int rc = 0; if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); if (rc) return rc; /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the ordinary setattr permission. */ return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR); } if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) return (inode_owner_or_capable(inode) ? 0 : -EPERM); sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode)) return -EPERM; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; isec = backing_inode_security(dentry); rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad); if (rc) return rc; rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc == -EINVAL) { if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) { struct audit_buffer *ab; size_t audit_size; /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the * context contains a nul and we should audit that */ if (value) { const char *str = value; if (str[size - 1] == '\0') audit_size = size - 1; else audit_size = size; } else { audit_size = 0; } ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR); audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context="); audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size); audit_log_end(ab); return rc; } rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid); } if (rc) return rc; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, newsid, isec->sclass, FILE__RELABELTO, &ad); if (rc) return rc; rc = security_validate_transition(&selinux_state, isec->sid, newsid, sid, isec->sclass); if (rc) return rc; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, newsid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); } static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct inode_security_struct *isec; u32 newsid; int rc; if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */ return; } if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) { /* If we haven't even been initialized, then we can't validate * against a policy, so leave the label as invalid. It may * resolve to a valid label on the next revalidation try if * we've since initialized. */ return; } rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid); if (rc) { pr_err("SELinux: unable to map context to SID" "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n", inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc); return; } isec = backing_inode_security(dentry); spin_lock(&isec->lock); isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); isec->sid = newsid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; spin_unlock(&isec->lock); return; } static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); } static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); } static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) { if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); if (rc) return rc; /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the ordinary setattr permission. */ return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR); } if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) return 0; /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label. You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */ return -EACCES; } static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask, unsigned int obj_type) { int ret; u32 perm; struct common_audit_data ad; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; ad.u.path = *path; /* * Set permission needed based on the type of mark being set. * Performs an additional check for sb watches. */ switch (obj_type) { case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT: perm = FILE__WATCH_MOUNT; break; case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB: perm = FILE__WATCH_SB; ret = superblock_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__WATCH, &ad); if (ret) return ret; break; case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE: perm = FILE__WATCH; break; default: return -EINVAL; } /* blocking watches require the file:watch_with_perm permission */ if (mask & (ALL_FSNOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS)) perm |= FILE__WATCH_WITH_PERM; /* watches on read-like events need the file:watch_reads permission */ if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_ACCESS_PERM | FS_CLOSE_NOWRITE)) perm |= FILE__WATCH_READS; return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, perm); } /* * Copy the inode security context value to the user. * * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook. */ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) { u32 size; int error; char *context = NULL; struct inode_security_struct *isec; /* * If we're not initialized yet, then we can't validate contexts, so * just let vfs_getxattr fall back to using the on-disk xattr. */ if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) || strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; /* * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise, * use the in-core value under current policy. * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the * in-core context value, not a denial. */ isec = inode_security(inode); if (has_cap_mac_admin(false)) error = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, isec->sid, &context, &size); else error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid, &context, &size); if (error) return error; error = size; if (alloc) { *buffer = context; goto out_nofree; } kfree(context); out_nofree: return error; } static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode); struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; u32 newsid; int rc; if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (!value || !size) return -EACCES; rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) return rc; spin_lock(&isec->lock); isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); isec->sid = newsid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; spin_unlock(&isec->lock); return 0; } static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) { const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX); if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) return 0; if (buffer && len <= buffer_size) memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len); return len; } static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode); *secid = isec->sid; } static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) { u32 sid; struct task_security_struct *tsec; struct cred *new_creds = *new; if (new_creds == NULL) { new_creds = prepare_creds(); if (!new_creds) return -ENOMEM; } tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds); /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */ selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid); tsec->create_sid = sid; *new = new_creds; return 0; } static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) { /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower * xattrs up. Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs. */ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0) return 1; /* Discard */ /* * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported * by selinux. */ return -EOPNOTSUPP; } /* kernfs node operations */ static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, struct kernfs_node *kn) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen; int rc; char *context; rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); if (rc == -ENODATA) return 0; else if (rc < 0) return rc; clen = (u32)rc; context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL); if (!context) return -ENOMEM; rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen); if (rc < 0) { kfree(context); return rc; } rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, context, clen, &parent_sid, GFP_KERNEL); kfree(context); if (rc) return rc; if (tsec->create_sid) { newsid = tsec->create_sid; } else { u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode); struct qstr q; q.name = kn->name; q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name); rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, parent_sid, secclass, &q, &newsid); if (rc) return rc; } rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid, &context, &clen); if (rc) return rc; rc = kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen, XATTR_CREATE); kfree(context); return rc; } /* file security operations */ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */ if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE)) mask |= MAY_APPEND; return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask)); } static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file); struct inode_security_struct *isec; u32 sid = current_sid(); if (!mask) /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ return 0; isec = inode_security(inode); if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state)) /* No change since file_open check. */ return 0; return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask); } static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) { struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file); u32 sid = current_sid(); fsec->sid = sid; fsec->fown_sid = sid; return 0; } /* * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd * operation to an inode. */ static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, u32 requested, u16 cmd) { struct common_audit_data ad; struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file); struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl; u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred); int rc; u8 driver = cmd >> 8; u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP; ad.u.op = &ioctl; ad.u.op->cmd = cmd; ad.u.op->path = file->f_path; if (ssid != fsec->sid) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, ssid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad); if (rc) goto out; } if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return 0; isec = inode_security(inode); rc = avc_has_extended_perms(&selinux_state, ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, requested, driver, xperm, &ad); out: return rc; } static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); int error = 0; switch (cmd) { case FIONREAD: case FIBMAP: case FIGETBSZ: case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS: case FS_IOC_GETVERSION: error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR); break; case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS: case FS_IOC_SETVERSION: error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR); break; /* sys_ioctl() checks */ case FIONBIO: case FIOASYNC: error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0); break; case KDSKBENT: case KDSKBSENT: error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG, CAP_OPT_NONE, true); break; /* default case assumes that the command will go * to the file's ioctl() function. */ default: error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd); } return error; } static int default_noexec __ro_after_init; static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); int rc = 0; if (default_noexec && (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) { /* * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a * private file mapping that will also be writable. * This has an additional check. */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL); if (rc) goto error; } if (file) { /* read access is always possible with a mapping */ u32 av = FILE__READ; /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */ if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)) av |= FILE__WRITE; if (prot & PROT_EXEC) av |= FILE__EXECUTE; return file_has_perm(cred, file, av); } error: return rc; } static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) { int rc = 0; if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) { u32 sid = current_sid(); rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT, MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL); } return rc; } static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) { struct common_audit_data ad; int rc; if (file) { ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; ad.u.file = file; rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file), FILE__MAP, &ad); if (rc) return rc; } if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state)) prot = reqprot; return file_map_prot_check(file, prot, (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED); } static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state)) prot = reqprot; if (default_noexec && (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) { int rc = 0; if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk && vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL); } else if (!vma->vm_file && ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack && vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) || vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL); } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) { /* * We are making executable a file mapping that has * had some COW done. Since pages might have been * written, check ability to execute the possibly * modified content. This typically should only * occur for text relocations. */ rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD); } if (rc) return rc; } return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED); } static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK); } static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); int err = 0; switch (cmd) { case F_SETFL: if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) { err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE); break; } fallthrough; case F_SETOWN: case F_SETSIG: case F_GETFL: case F_GETOWN: case F_GETSIG: case F_GETOWNER_UIDS: /* Just check FD__USE permission */ err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0); break; case F_GETLK: case F_SETLK: case F_SETLKW: case F_OFD_GETLK: case F_OFD_SETLK: case F_OFD_SETLKW: #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32 case F_GETLK64: case F_SETLK64: case F_SETLKW64: #endif err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK); break; } return err; } static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) { struct file_security_struct *fsec; fsec = selinux_file(file); fsec->fown_sid = current_sid(); } static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, struct fown_struct *fown, int signum) { struct file *file; u32 sid = task_sid(tsk); u32 perm; struct file_security_struct *fsec; /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */ file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner); fsec = selinux_file(file); if (!signum) perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */ else perm = signal_to_av(signum); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, fsec->fown_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); } static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file)); } static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file) { struct file_security_struct *fsec; struct inode_security_struct *isec; fsec = selinux_file(file); isec = inode_security(file_inode(file)); /* * Save inode label and policy sequence number * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission * can determine whether revalidation is necessary. * Task label is already saved in the file security * struct as its SID. */ fsec->isid = isec->sid; fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state); /* * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted. * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the * new inode label or new policy. * This check is not redundant - do not remove. */ return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file)); } /* task security operations */ static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags) { u32 sid = current_sid(); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL); } /* * prepare a new set of credentials for modification */ static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) { const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old); struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); *tsec = *old_tsec; return 0; } /* * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds */ static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) { const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old); struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); *tsec = *old_tsec; } static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) { *secid = cred_sid(c); } /* * set the security data for a kernel service * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled */ static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) { struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); u32 sid = current_sid(); int ret; ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, secid, SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE, KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE, NULL); if (ret == 0) { tsec->sid = secid; tsec->create_sid = 0; tsec->keycreate_sid = 0; tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0; } return ret; } /* * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the * objective context of the specified inode */ static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode); struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); u32 sid = current_sid(); int ret; ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE, KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS, NULL); if (ret == 0) tsec->create_sid = isec->sid; return ret; } static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) { struct common_audit_data ad; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD; ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad); } static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file) { struct common_audit_data ad; struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct file_security_struct *fsec; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; /* init_module */ if (file == NULL) return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL); /* finit_module */ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; ad.u.file = file; fsec = selinux_file(file); if (sid != fsec->sid) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad); if (rc) return rc; } isec = inode_security(file_inode(file)); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad); } static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, bool contents) { int rc = 0; switch (id) { case READING_MODULE: rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(contents ? file : NULL); break; default: break; } return rc; } static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) { int rc = 0; switch (id) { case LOADING_MODULE: rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL); default: break; } return rc; } static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL); } static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL); } static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL); } static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) { *secid = task_sid(p); } static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL); } static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL); } static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL); } static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred, unsigned int flags) { u32 av = 0; if (!flags) return 0; if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE) av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT; if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ) av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred), SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL); } static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) { struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource; /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */ if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max) return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL); return 0; } static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL); } static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL); } static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL); } static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info, int sig, const struct cred *cred) { u32 secid; u32 perm; if (!sig) perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */ else perm = signal_to_av(sig); if (!cred) secid = current_sid(); else secid = cred_sid(cred); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); } static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); u32 sid = task_sid(p); spin_lock(&isec->lock); isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); isec->sid = sid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; spin_unlock(&isec->lock); } /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto) { int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL; struct iphdr _iph, *ih; offset = skb_network_offset(skb); ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph); if (ih == NULL) goto out; ihlen = ih->ihl * 4; if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph)) goto out; ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr; ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr; ret = 0; if (proto) *proto = ih->protocol; switch (ih->protocol) { case IPPROTO_TCP: { struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) break; offset += ihlen; th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph); if (th == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = th->source; ad->u.net->dport = th->dest; break; } case IPPROTO_UDP: { struct udphdr _udph, *uh; if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) break; offset += ihlen; uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph); if (uh == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = uh->source; ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest; break; } case IPPROTO_DCCP: { struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh; if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) break; offset += ihlen; dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph); if (dh == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport; ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport; break; } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP) case IPPROTO_SCTP: { struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh; if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) break; offset += ihlen; sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph); if (sh == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = sh->source; ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest; break; } #endif default: break; } out: return ret; } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto) { u8 nexthdr; int ret = -EINVAL, offset; struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6; __be16 frag_off; offset = skb_network_offset(skb); ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h); if (ip6 == NULL) goto out; ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr; ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr; ret = 0; nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr; offset += sizeof(_ipv6h); offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off); if (offset < 0) goto out; if (proto) *proto = nexthdr; switch (nexthdr) { case IPPROTO_TCP: { struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph); if (th == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = th->source; ad->u.net->dport = th->dest; break; } case IPPROTO_UDP: { struct udphdr _udph, *uh; uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph); if (uh == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = uh->source; ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest; break; } case IPPROTO_DCCP: { struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh; dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph); if (dh == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport; ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport; break; } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP) case IPPROTO_SCTP: { struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh; sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph); if (sh == NULL) break; ad->u.net->sport = sh->source; ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest; break; } #endif /* includes fragments */ default: break; } out: return ret; } #endif /* IPV6 */ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad, char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto) { char *addrp; int ret; switch (ad->u.net->family) { case PF_INET: ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto); if (ret) goto parse_error; addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr : &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr); goto okay; #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) case PF_INET6: ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto); if (ret) goto parse_error; addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr : &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr); goto okay; #endif /* IPV6 */ default: addrp = NULL; goto okay; } parse_error: pr_warn( "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb()," " unable to parse packet\n"); return ret; okay: if (_addrp) *_addrp = addrp; return 0; } /** * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet * @skb: the packet * @family: protocol family * @sid: the packet's peer label SID * * Description: * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL) * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different * peer labels. * */ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid) { int err; u32 xfrm_sid; u32 nlbl_sid; u32 nlbl_type; err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid); if (unlikely(err)) return -EACCES; err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid); if (unlikely(err)) return -EACCES; err = security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state, nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid); if (unlikely(err)) { pr_warn( "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid()," " unable to determine packet's peer label\n"); return -EACCES; } return 0; } /** * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID * @skb_sid: the packet's SID * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID * * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then @conn_sid is simply a copy * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure. * */ static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid) { int err = 0; if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL) err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid); else *conn_sid = sk_sid; return err; } /* socket security operations */ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec, u16 secclass, u32 *socksid) { if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) { *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid; return 0; } return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL, socksid); } static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL) return 0; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sk = sk; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad); } static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); u32 newsid; u16 secclass; int rc; if (kern) return 0; secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid); if (rc) return rc; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL); } static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock)); struct sk_security_struct *sksec; u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; int err = 0; if (!kern) { err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid); if (err) return err; } isec->sclass = sclass; isec->sid = sid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; if (sock->sk) { sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; sksec->sclass = sclass; sksec->sid = sid; /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */ if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET; err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family); } return err; } static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security; sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid; sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid; return 0; } /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind. Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind permission check between the socket and the port number. */ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; u16 family; int err; err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND); if (err) goto out; /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */ family = sk->sk_family; if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) { char *addrp; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; u16 family_sa; unsigned short snum; u32 sid, node_perm; /* * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect() * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET. */ if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family)) return -EINVAL; family_sa = address->sa_family; switch (family_sa) { case AF_UNSPEC: case AF_INET: if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) return -EINVAL; addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address; if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) { /* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY */ if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY)) goto err_af; family_sa = AF_INET; } snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port); addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr; break; case AF_INET6: if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) return -EINVAL; addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port); addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr; break; default: goto err_af; } ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum); ad.u.net->family = family_sa; if (snum) { int low, high; inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high); if (inet_port_requires_bind_service(sock_net(sk), snum) || snum < low || snum > high) { err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid); if (err) goto out; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad); if (err) goto out; } } switch (sksec->sclass) { case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET: node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; break; case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET: node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; break; case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET: node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; break; case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET: node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; break; default: node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; break; } err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid); if (err) goto out; if (family_sa == AF_INET) ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr; else ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad); if (err) goto out; } out: return err; err_af: /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */ if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) return -EINVAL; return -EAFNOSUPPORT; } /* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3) * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/SCTP.rst */ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; int err; err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT); if (err) return err; if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family)) return -EINVAL; /* connect(AF_UNSPEC) has special handling, as it is a documented * way to disconnect the socket */ if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) return 0; /* * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission * for the port. */ if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET || sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET || sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) { struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; unsigned short snum; u32 sid, perm; /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect() * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET. */ switch (address->sa_family) { case AF_INET: addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address; if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) return -EINVAL; snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port); break; case AF_INET6: addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) return -EINVAL; snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port); break; default: /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT. */ if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) return -EINVAL; else return -EAFNOSUPPORT; } err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid); if (err) return err; switch (sksec->sclass) { case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET: perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT; break; case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET: perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT; break; case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET: perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT; break; } ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum); ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad); if (err) return err; } return 0; } /* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { int err; struct sock *sk = sock->sk; err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen); if (err) return err; return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address); } static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) { return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN); } static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) { int err; struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct inode_security_struct *newisec; u16 sclass; u32 sid; err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT); if (err) return err; isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock)); spin_lock(&isec->lock); sclass = isec->sclass; sid = isec->sid; spin_unlock(&isec->lock); newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock)); newisec->sclass = sclass; newisec->sid = sid; newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; return 0; } static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size) { return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE); } static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags) { return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ); } static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) { return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR); } static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) { return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR); } static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) { int err; err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT); if (err) return err; return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname); } static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) { return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT); } static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) { return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN); } static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; int err; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sk = other; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid, sksec_other->sclass, UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad); if (err) return err; /* server child socket */ sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid; err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid); if (err) return err; /* connecting socket */ sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid; return 0; } static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) { struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sk = other->sk; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad); } static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid, struct common_audit_data *ad) { int err; u32 if_sid; u32 node_sid; err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid); if (err) return err; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, peer_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad); if (err) return err; err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid); if (err) return err; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, peer_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad); } static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family) { int err = 0; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; char *addrp; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; ad.u.net->family = family; err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL); if (err) return err; if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) { err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RECV, &ad); if (err) return err; } err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad); if (err) return err; err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad); return err; } static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { int err; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; u16 family = sk->sk_family; u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; char *addrp; u8 secmark_active; u8 peerlbl_active; if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6) return 0; /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) family = PF_INET; /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function * as fast and as clean as possible. */ if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer()) return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family); secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) return 0; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; ad.u.net->family = family; err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL); if (err) return err; if (peerlbl_active) { u32 peer_sid; err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid); if (err) return err; err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif, addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad); if (err) { selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0); return err; } err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad); if (err) { selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0); return err; } } if (secmark_active) { err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RECV, &ad); if (err) return err; } return err; } static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen, unsigned len) { int err = 0; char *scontext; u32 scontext_len; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL; if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET || sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET || sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid; if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) return -ENOPROTOOPT; err = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len); if (err) return err; if (scontext_len > len) { err = -ERANGE; goto out_len; } if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len)) err = -EFAULT; out_len: if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen)) err = -EFAULT; kfree(scontext); return err; } static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) { u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL; u16 family; struct inode_security_struct *isec; if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) family = PF_INET; else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) family = PF_INET6; else if (sock) family = sock->sk->sk_family; else goto out; if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) { isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock)); peer_secid = isec->sid; } else if (skb) selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid); out: *secid = peer_secid; if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL) return -EINVAL; return 0; } static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec; sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority); if (!sksec) return -ENOMEM; sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET; selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec); sk->sk_security = sksec; return 0; } static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; sk->sk_security = NULL; selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec); kfree(sksec); } static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; newsksec->sid = sksec->sid; newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid; newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass; selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec); } static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid) { if (!sk) *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET; else { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; *secid = sksec->sid; } } static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent)); struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 || sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) isec->sid = sksec->sid; sksec->sclass = isec->sclass; } /* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT chunk. This happens when an incoming * connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association * already present). */ static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; u8 peerlbl_active; u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; u32 conn_sid; int err = 0; if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass()) return 0; peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); if (peerlbl_active) { /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve(). */ err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, ep->base.sk->sk_family, &peer_sid); if (err) return err; if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; } if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) { sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET; /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks), * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary * peer SID for getpeercon(3). */ sksec->peer_sid = peer_sid; } else if (sksec->peer_sid != peer_sid) { /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce * consistency among the peer SIDs. */ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sk = ep->base.sk; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid, sksec->sclass, SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad); if (err) return err; } /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store * the information in ep. This will be used by SCTP TCP type * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then * plug this into the new socket. */ err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peer_sid, &conn_sid); if (err) return err; ep->secid = conn_sid; ep->peer_secid = peer_sid; /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */ return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(ep, skb); } /* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting * based on their @optname. */ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0; void *addr_buf; struct sockaddr *addr; struct socket *sock; if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass()) return 0; /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */ sock = sk->sk_socket; addr_buf = address; while (walk_size < addrlen) { if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrlen) return -EINVAL; addr = addr_buf; switch (addr->sa_family) { case AF_UNSPEC: case AF_INET: len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); break; case AF_INET6: len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); break; default: return -EINVAL; } if (walk_size + len > addrlen) return -EINVAL; err = -EINVAL; switch (optname) { /* Bind checks */ case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR: case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR: case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD: err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len); break; /* Connect checks */ case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX: case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY: case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP: case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT: err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len); if (err) return err; /* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked, * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked() * is called here. The situations handled are: * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2), * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new * primary address is selected. * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via * selinux_socket_connect(). */ err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr); break; } if (err) return err; addr_buf += len; walk_size += len; } return 0; } /* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call * the non-sctp clone version. */ if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass()) return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk); newsksec->sid = ep->secid; newsksec->peer_sid = ep->peer_secid; newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass; selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk); } static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; int err; u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family; u32 connsid; u32 peersid; err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid); if (err) return err; err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid); if (err) return err; req->secid = connsid; req->peer_secid = peersid; return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family); } static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, const struct request_sock *req) { struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; newsksec->sid = req->secid; newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid; /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet. So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which time it will have been created and available. */ /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only * thread with access to newsksec */ selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family); } static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { u16 family = sk->sk_family; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) family = PF_INET; selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid); } static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid) { const struct task_security_struct *__tsec; u32 tsid; __tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); tsid = __tsec->sid; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL); } static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void) { atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount); } static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void) { atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount); } static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl) { fl->flowi_secid = req->secid; } static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security) { struct tun_security_struct *tunsec; tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL); if (!tunsec) return -ENOMEM; tunsec->sid = current_sid(); *security = tunsec; return 0; } static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security) { kfree(security); } static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void) { u32 sid = current_sid(); /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense, * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE, NULL); } static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security) { struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL); } static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security) { struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling * protocols were being used */ sksec->sid = tunsec->sid; sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET; return 0; } static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security) { struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; u32 sid = current_sid(); int err; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL); if (err) return err; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL); if (err) return err; tunsec->sid = sid; return 0; } #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *indev, u16 family) { int err; char *addrp; u32 peer_sid; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; u8 secmark_active; u8 netlbl_active; u8 peerlbl_active; if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer()) return NF_ACCEPT; secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled(); peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) return NF_ACCEPT; if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0) return NF_DROP; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex; ad.u.net->family = family; if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0) return NF_DROP; if (peerlbl_active) { err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex, addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad); if (err) { selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1); return NF_DROP; } } if (secmark_active) if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, peer_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad)) return NF_DROP; if (netlbl_active) /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH * protection */ if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0) return NF_DROP; return NF_ACCEPT; } static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state) { return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET); } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state) { return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6); } #endif /* IPV6 */ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family) { struct sock *sk; u32 sid; if (!netlbl_enabled()) return NF_ACCEPT; /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */ sk = skb->sk; if (sk) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec; if (sk_listener(sk)) /* if the socket is the listening state then this * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent. * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is * as any IP option based labeling should be copied * from the initial connection request (in the IP * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a * security label in the packet itself this is the * best we can do. */ return NF_ACCEPT; /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */ sksec = sk->sk_security; sid = sksec->sid; } else sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0) return NF_DROP; return NF_ACCEPT; } static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state) { return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET); } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state) { return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET6); } #endif /* IPV6 */ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, u16 family) { struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb); struct sk_security_struct *sksec; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; char *addrp; u8 proto = 0; if (sk == NULL) return NF_ACCEPT; sksec = sk->sk_security; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->netif = ifindex; ad.u.net->family = family; if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto)) return NF_DROP; if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad)) return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto)) return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); return NF_ACCEPT; } static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *outdev, u16 family) { u32 secmark_perm; u32 peer_sid; int ifindex = outdev->ifindex; struct sock *sk; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; char *addrp; u8 secmark_active; u8 peerlbl_active; /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function * as fast and as clean as possible. */ if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer()) return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family); secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) return NF_ACCEPT; sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb); #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks * when the packet is on it's final way out. * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do; * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per * connection. */ if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL && !(sk && sk_listener(sk))) return NF_ACCEPT; #endif if (sk == NULL) { /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */ if (skb->skb_iif) { secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT; if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid)) return NF_DROP; } else { secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; } } else if (sk_listener(sk)) { /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In * this particular case the correct security label is assigned * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output() * for similar problems. */ u32 skb_sid; struct sk_security_struct *sksec; sksec = sk->sk_security; if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid)) return NF_DROP; /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final" * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely * pass the packet. */ if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) { switch (family) { case PF_INET: if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED) return NF_ACCEPT; break; case PF_INET6: if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED) return NF_ACCEPT; break; default: return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); } } if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid)) return NF_DROP; secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; } else { /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the * associated socket. */ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; peer_sid = sksec->sid; secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; } ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->netif = ifindex; ad.u.net->family = family; if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL)) return NF_DROP; if (secmark_active) if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, peer_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad)) return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); if (peerlbl_active) { u32 if_sid; u32 node_sid; if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid)) return NF_DROP; if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, peer_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad)) return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid)) return NF_DROP; if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, peer_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad)) return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); } return NF_ACCEPT; } static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state) { return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET); } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state) { return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6); } #endif /* IPV6 */ #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { int rc = 0; unsigned int msg_len; unsigned int data_len = skb->len; unsigned char *data = skb->data; struct nlmsghdr *nlh; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; u16 sclass = sksec->sclass; u32 perm; while (data_len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) { nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)data; /* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink * users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus * length fields; our solution is to follow what * netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at * messages with length fields that are clearly junk */ if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || nlh->nlmsg_len > data_len) return 0; rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm); if (rc == 0) { rc = sock_has_perm(sk, perm); if (rc) return rc; } else if (rc == -EINVAL) { /* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */ pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink" " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s" " pid=%d comm=%s\n", sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, secclass_map[sclass - 1].name, task_pid_nr(current), current->comm); if (enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) && !security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state)) return rc; rc = 0; } else if (rc == -ENOENT) { /* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */ rc = 0; } else { return rc; } /* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */ msg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len); if (msg_len >= data_len) return 0; data_len -= msg_len; data += msg_len; } return rc; } static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass) { isec->sclass = sclass; isec->sid = current_sid(); } static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms, u32 perms) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); isec = selinux_ipc(ipc_perms); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad); } static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg) { struct msg_security_struct *msec; msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg); msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; return 0; } /* message queue security operations */ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; isec = selinux_ipc(msq); ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_MSGQ); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__CREATE, &ad); return rc; } static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); isec = selinux_ipc(msq); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad); } static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd) { int err; int perms; switch (cmd) { case IPC_INFO: case MSG_INFO: /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL); case IPC_STAT: case MSG_STAT: case MSG_STAT_ANY: perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE; break; case IPC_SET: perms = MSGQ__SETATTR; break; case IPC_RMID: perms = MSGQ__DESTROY; break; default: return 0; } err = ipc_has_perm(msq, perms); return err; } static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct msg_security_struct *msec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; isec = selinux_ipc(msq); msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg); /* * First time through, need to assign label to the message */ if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) { /* * Compute new sid based on current process and * message queue this message will be stored in */ rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid); if (rc) return rc; } ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key; /* Can this process write to the queue? */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__WRITE, &ad); if (!rc) /* Can this process send the message */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad); if (!rc) /* Can the message be put in the queue? */ rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad); return rc; } static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct msg_security_struct *msec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = task_sid(target); int rc; isec = selinux_ipc(msq); msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad); if (!rc) rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad); return rc; } /* Shared Memory security operations */ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; isec = selinux_ipc(shp); ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SHM); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, SHM__CREATE, &ad); return rc; } static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); isec = selinux_ipc(shp); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); } /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */ static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd) { int perms; int err; switch (cmd) { case IPC_INFO: case SHM_INFO: /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL); case IPC_STAT: case SHM_STAT: case SHM_STAT_ANY: perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE; break; case IPC_SET: perms = SHM__SETATTR; break; case SHM_LOCK: case SHM_UNLOCK: perms = SHM__LOCK; break; case IPC_RMID: perms = SHM__DESTROY; break; default: return 0; } err = ipc_has_perm(shp, perms); return err; } static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg) { u32 perms; if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY) perms = SHM__READ; else perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE; return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms); } /* Semaphore security operations */ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; isec = selinux_ipc(sma); ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SEM); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key; rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, SEM__CREATE, &ad); return rc; } static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); isec = selinux_ipc(sma); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); } /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */ static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd) { int err; u32 perms; switch (cmd) { case IPC_INFO: case SEM_INFO: /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL); case GETPID: case GETNCNT: case GETZCNT: perms = SEM__GETATTR; break; case GETVAL: case GETALL: perms = SEM__READ; break; case SETVAL: case SETALL: perms = SEM__WRITE; break; case IPC_RMID: perms = SEM__DESTROY; break; case IPC_SET: perms = SEM__SETATTR; break; case IPC_STAT: case SEM_STAT: case SEM_STAT_ANY: perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE; break; default: return 0; } err = ipc_has_perm(sma, perms); return err; } static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter) { u32 perms; if (alter) perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE; else perms = SEM__READ; return ipc_has_perm(sma, perms); } static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) { u32 av = 0; av = 0; if (flag & S_IRUGO) av |= IPC__UNIX_READ; if (flag & S_IWUGO) av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE; if (av == 0) return 0; return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av); } static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp); *secid = isec->sid; } static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) { if (inode) inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry); } static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) { const struct task_security_struct *__tsec; u32 sid; int error; unsigned len; rcu_read_lock(); __tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p)); if (current != p) { error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), __tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL); if (error) goto bad; } if (!strcmp(name, "current")) sid = __tsec->sid; else if (!strcmp(name, "prev")) sid = __tsec->osid; else if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) sid = __tsec->exec_sid; else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) sid = __tsec->create_sid; else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid; else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid; else { error = -EINVAL; goto bad; } rcu_read_unlock(); if (!sid) return 0; error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, value, &len); if (error) return error; return len; bad: rcu_read_unlock(); return error; } static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) { struct task_security_struct *tsec; struct cred *new; u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid; int error; char *str = value; /* * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all. */ if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL); else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL); else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL); else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL); else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL); else error = -EINVAL; if (error) return error; /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */ if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') { if (str[size-1] == '\n') { str[size-1] = 0; size--; } error = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) { if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) { struct audit_buffer *ab; size_t audit_size; /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the * context contains a nul and we should audit that */ if (str[size - 1] == '\0') audit_size = size - 1; else audit_size = size; ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR); audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context="); audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size); audit_log_end(ab); return error; } error = security_context_to_sid_force( &selinux_state, value, size, &sid); } if (error) return error; } new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) return -ENOMEM; /* Permission checking based on the specified context is performed during the actual operation (execve, open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the operation. See selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec for the execve checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */ tsec = selinux_cred(new); if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) { tsec->exec_sid = sid; } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) { tsec->create_sid = sid; } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) { if (sid) { error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL); if (error) goto abort_change; } tsec->keycreate_sid = sid; } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) { tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid; } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) { error = -EINVAL; if (sid == 0) goto abort_change; /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */ error = -EPERM; if (!current_is_single_threaded()) { error = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, sid); if (error) goto abort_change; } /* Check permissions for the transition. */ error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL); if (error) goto abort_change; /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok. Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */ ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid(); if (ptsid != 0) { error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); if (error) goto abort_change; } tsec->sid = sid; } else { error = -EINVAL; goto abort_change; } commit_creds(new); return size; abort_change: abort_creds(new); return error; } static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name) { return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0); } static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) { return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid, secdata, seclen); } static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) { return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL); } static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) { kfree(secdata); } static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); spin_lock(&isec->lock); isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID; spin_unlock(&isec->lock); } /* * called with inode->i_mutex locked */ static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) { int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0); /* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */ return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc; } /* * called with inode->i_mutex locked */ static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) { return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0); } static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) { int len = 0; len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, true); if (len < 0) return len; *ctxlen = len; return 0; } #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec; struct key_security_struct *ksec; ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); if (!ksec) return -ENOMEM; tsec = selinux_cred(cred); if (tsec->keycreate_sid) ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid; else ksec->sid = tsec->sid; k->security = ksec; return 0; } static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k) { struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security; k->security = NULL; kfree(ksec); } static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, enum key_need_perm need_perm) { struct key *key; struct key_security_struct *ksec; u32 perm, sid; switch (need_perm) { case KEY_NEED_VIEW: perm = KEY__VIEW; break; case KEY_NEED_READ: perm = KEY__READ; break; case KEY_NEED_WRITE: perm = KEY__WRITE; break; case KEY_NEED_SEARCH: perm = KEY__SEARCH; break; case KEY_NEED_LINK: perm = KEY__LINK; break; case KEY_NEED_SETATTR: perm = KEY__SETATTR; break; case KEY_NEED_UNLINK: case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE: case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE: case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK: return 0; default: WARN_ON(1); return -EPERM; } sid = cred_sid(cred); key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); ksec = key->security; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL); } static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) { struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security; char *context = NULL; unsigned len; int rc; rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ksec->sid, &context, &len); if (!rc) rc = len; *_buffer = context; return rc; } #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS static int selinux_watch_key(struct key *key) { struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security; u32 sid = current_sid(); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, NULL); } #endif #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val) { struct common_audit_data ad; int err; u32 sid = 0; struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec; struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey; err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid); if (err) return err; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY; ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix; ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val; ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY, INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad); } static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name, u8 port_num) { struct common_audit_data ad; int err; u32 sid = 0; struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec; struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport; err = security_ib_endport_sid(&selinux_state, dev_name, port_num, &sid); if (err) return err; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT; strncpy(ibendport.dev_name, dev_name, sizeof(ibendport.dev_name)); ibendport.port = port_num; ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT, INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad); } static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec) { struct ib_security_struct *sec; sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL); if (!sec) return -ENOMEM; sec->sid = current_sid(); *ib_sec = sec; return 0; } static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec) { kfree(ib_sec); } #endif #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size) { u32 sid = current_sid(); int ret; switch (cmd) { case BPF_MAP_CREATE: ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE, NULL); break; case BPF_PROG_LOAD: ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD, NULL); break; default: ret = 0; break; } return ret; } static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode) { u32 av = 0; if (fmode & FMODE_READ) av |= BPF__MAP_READ; if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE) av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE; return av; } /* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see * if it is a bpf related object. And apply correspinding checks on the bpf * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode. * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files. */ static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid) { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; struct bpf_prog *prog; struct bpf_map *map; int ret; if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) { map = file->private_data; bpfsec = map->security; ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL); if (ret) return ret; } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) { prog = file->private_data; bpfsec = prog->aux->security; ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL); if (ret) return ret; } return 0; } static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode) { u32 sid = current_sid(); struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; bpfsec = map->security; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL); } static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) { u32 sid = current_sid(); struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; bpfsec = prog->aux->security; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL); } static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map) { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL); if (!bpfsec) return -ENOMEM; bpfsec->sid = current_sid(); map->security = bpfsec; return 0; } static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security; map->security = NULL; kfree(bpfsec); } static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL); if (!bpfsec) return -ENOMEM; bpfsec->sid = current_sid(); aux->security = bpfsec; return 0; } static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security; aux->security = NULL; kfree(bpfsec); } #endif static int selinux_lockdown(enum lockdown_reason what) { struct common_audit_data ad; u32 sid = current_sid(); int invalid_reason = (what <= LOCKDOWN_NONE) || (what == LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX) || (what >= LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX); if (WARN(invalid_reason, "Invalid lockdown reason")) { audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR, "lockdown_reason=invalid"); return -EINVAL; } ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_LOCKDOWN; ad.u.reason = what; if (what <= LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX) return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_LOCKDOWN, LOCKDOWN__INTEGRITY, &ad); else return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_LOCKDOWN, LOCKDOWN__CONFIDENTIALITY, &ad); } struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct), .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct), .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), }; #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type) { u32 requested, sid = current_sid(); if (type == PERF_SECURITY_OPEN) requested = PERF_EVENT__OPEN; else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_CPU) requested = PERF_EVENT__CPU; else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL) requested = PERF_EVENT__KERNEL; else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT) requested = PERF_EVENT__TRACEPOINT; else return -EINVAL; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, requested, NULL); } static int selinux_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event) { struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec; perfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*perfsec), GFP_KERNEL); if (!perfsec) return -ENOMEM; perfsec->sid = current_sid(); event->security = perfsec; return 0; } static void selinux_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event) { struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security; event->security = NULL; kfree(perfsec); } static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event) { struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security; u32 sid = current_sid(); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__READ, NULL); } static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event) { struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security; u32 sid = current_sid(); return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__WRITE, NULL); } #endif /* * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order: * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below, * 2. hooks that both access structures allocated by other hooks, and allocate * structures that can be later accessed by other hooks (mostly "cloning" * hooks), * 3. hooks that only allocate structures that can be later accessed by other * hooks ("allocating" hooks). * * Please follow block comment delimiters in the list to keep this order. * * This ordering is needed for SELinux runtime disable to work at least somewhat * safely. Breaking the ordering rules above might lead to NULL pointer derefs * when disabling SELinux at runtime. */ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction), LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder), LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable), LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on), LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog), LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory), LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts), LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, selinux_move_mount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify, selinux_path_notify), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file), LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate), LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd), LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv), LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate), LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop), LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate), LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel), LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect), LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, selinux_socket_socketpair), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established), LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet), LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc), LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec), LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open), #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet, selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity), #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key, selinux_watch_key), #endif #endif #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known), LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match), LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_open, selinux_perf_event_open), LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_free, selinux_perf_event_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_read, selinux_perf_event_read), LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write), #endif LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, selinux_lockdown), /* * PUT "CLONING" (ACCESSING + ALLOCATING) HOOKS HERE */ LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, selinux_fs_context_dup), LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_add_mnt_opt, selinux_add_mnt_opt), #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone), #endif /* * PUT "ALLOCATING" HOOKS HERE */ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security, selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security), #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc), LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc, selinux_perf_event_alloc), #endif }; static __init int selinux_init(void) { pr_info("SELinux: Initializing.\n"); memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state)); enforcing_set(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot); checkreqprot_set(&selinux_state, selinux_checkreqprot_boot); selinux_avc_init(&selinux_state.avc); mutex_init(&selinux_state.status_lock); mutex_init(&selinux_state.policy_mutex); /* Set the security state for the initial task. */ cred_init_security(); default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC); avc_init(); avtab_cache_init(); ebitmap_cache_init(); hashtab_cache_init(); security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux"); if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET)) panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n"); if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET)) panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n"); if (selinux_enforcing_boot) pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n"); else pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n"); fs_validate_description("selinux", selinux_fs_parameters); return 0; } static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused) { selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, NULL, 0, NULL); } void selinux_complete_init(void) { pr_debug("SELinux: Completing initialization.\n"); /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */ pr_debug("SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n"); iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL); } /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label all processes and objects when they are created. */ DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = { .name = "selinux", .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE, .enabled = &selinux_enabled_boot, .blobs = &selinux_blob_sizes, .init = selinux_init, }; #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = { { .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute, .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4, .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST, }, { .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward, .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4, .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD, .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, }, { .hook = selinux_ipv4_output, .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4, .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT, .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, }, #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) { .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute, .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6, .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST, }, { .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward, .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6, .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD, .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, }, { .hook = selinux_ipv6_output, .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6, .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT, .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, }, #endif /* IPV6 */ }; static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net) { return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops)); } static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net) { nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops)); } static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = { .init = selinux_nf_register, .exit = selinux_nf_unregister, }; static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void) { int err; if (!selinux_enabled_boot) return 0; pr_debug("SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n"); err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops); if (err) panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err); return 0; } __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void) { pr_debug("SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n"); unregister_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops); } #endif #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE #define selinux_nf_ip_exit() #endif #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state) { if (selinux_initialized(state)) { /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */ return -EINVAL; } if (selinux_disabled(state)) { /* Only do this once. */ return -EINVAL; } selinux_mark_disabled(state); pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n"); /* * Unregister netfilter hooks. * Must be done before security_delete_hooks() to avoid breaking * runtime disable. */ selinux_nf_ip_exit(); security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks)); /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */ avc_disable(); /* Unregister selinuxfs. */ exit_sel_fs(); return 0; } #endif
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * Block data types and constants. Directly include this file only to * break include dependency loop. */ #ifndef __LINUX_BLK_TYPES_H #define __LINUX_BLK_TYPES_H #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/bvec.h> #include <linux/ktime.h> struct bio_set; struct bio; struct bio_integrity_payload; struct page; struct io_context; struct cgroup_subsys_state; typedef void (bio_end_io_t) (struct bio *); struct bio_crypt_ctx; struct block_device { dev_t bd_dev; int bd_openers; struct inode * bd_inode; /* will die */ struct super_block * bd_super; struct mutex bd_mutex; /* open/close mutex */ void * bd_claiming; void * bd_holder; int bd_holders; bool bd_write_holder; #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS struct list_head bd_holder_disks; #endif struct block_device * bd_contains; u8 bd_partno; struct hd_struct * bd_part; /* number of times partitions within this device have been opened. */ unsigned bd_part_count; spinlock_t bd_size_lock; /* for bd_inode->i_size updates */ struct gendisk * bd_disk; struct backing_dev_info *bd_bdi; /* The counter of freeze processes */ int bd_fsfreeze_count; /* Mutex for freeze */ struct mutex bd_fsfreeze_mutex; } __randomize_layout; /* * Block error status values. See block/blk-core:blk_errors for the details. * Alpha cannot write a byte atomically, so we need to use 32-bit value. */ #if defined(CONFIG_ALPHA) && !defined(__alpha_bwx__) typedef u32 __bitwise blk_status_t; #else typedef u8 __bitwise blk_status_t; #endif #define BLK_STS_OK 0 #define BLK_STS_NOTSUPP ((__force blk_status_t)1) #define BLK_STS_TIMEOUT ((__force blk_status_t)2) #define BLK_STS_NOSPC ((__force blk_status_t)3) #define BLK_STS_TRANSPORT ((__force blk_status_t)4) #define BLK_STS_TARGET ((__force blk_status_t)5) #define BLK_STS_NEXUS ((__force blk_status_t)6) #define BLK_STS_MEDIUM ((__force blk_status_t)7) #define BLK_STS_PROTECTION ((__force blk_status_t)8) #define BLK_STS_RESOURCE ((__force blk_status_t)9) #define BLK_STS_IOERR ((__force blk_status_t)10) /* hack for device mapper, don't use elsewhere: */ #define BLK_STS_DM_REQUEUE ((__force blk_status_t)11) #define BLK_STS_AGAIN ((__force blk_status_t)12) /* * BLK_STS_DEV_RESOURCE is returned from the driver to the block layer if * device related resources are unavailable, but the driver can guarantee * that the queue will be rerun in the future once resources become * available again. This is typically the case for device specific * resources that are consumed for IO. If the driver fails allocating these * resources, we know that inflight (or pending) IO will free these * resource upon completion. * * This is different from BLK_STS_RESOURCE in that it explicitly references * a device specific resource. For resources of wider scope, allocation * failure can happen without having pending IO. This means that we can't * rely on request completions freeing these resources, as IO may not be in * flight. Examples of that are kernel memory allocations, DMA mappings, or * any other system wide resources. */ #define BLK_STS_DEV_RESOURCE ((__force blk_status_t)13) /* * BLK_STS_ZONE_RESOURCE is returned from the driver to the block layer if zone * related resources are unavailable, but the driver can guarantee the queue * will be rerun in the future once the resources become available again. * * This is different from BLK_STS_DEV_RESOURCE in that it explicitly references * a zone specific resource and IO to a different zone on the same device could * still be served. Examples of that are zones that are write-locked, but a read * to the same zone could be served. */ #define BLK_STS_ZONE_RESOURCE ((__force blk_status_t)14) /* * BLK_STS_ZONE_OPEN_RESOURCE is returned from the driver in the completion * path if the device returns a status indicating that too many zone resources * are currently open. The same command should be successful if resubmitted * after the number of open zones decreases below the device's limits, which is * reported in the request_queue's max_open_zones. */ #define BLK_STS_ZONE_OPEN_RESOURCE ((__force blk_status_t)15) /* * BLK_STS_ZONE_ACTIVE_RESOURCE is returned from the driver in the completion * path if the device returns a status indicating that too many zone resources * are currently active. The same command should be successful if resubmitted * after the number of active zones decreases below the device's limits, which * is reported in the request_queue's max_active_zones. */ #define BLK_STS_ZONE_ACTIVE_RESOURCE ((__force blk_status_t)16) /** * blk_path_error - returns true if error may be path related * @error: status the request was completed with * * Description: * This classifies block error status into non-retryable errors and ones * that may be successful if retried on a failover path. * * Return: * %false - retrying failover path will not help * %true - may succeed if retried */ static inline bool blk_path_error(blk_status_t error) { switch (error) { case BLK_STS_NOTSUPP: case BLK_STS_NOSPC: case BLK_STS_TARGET: case BLK_STS_NEXUS: case BLK_STS_MEDIUM: case BLK_STS_PROTECTION: return false; } /* Anything else could be a path failure, so should be retried */ return true; } /* * From most significant bit: * 1 bit: reserved for other usage, see below * 12 bits: original size of bio * 51 bits: issue time of bio */ #define BIO_ISSUE_RES_BITS 1 #define BIO_ISSUE_SIZE_BITS 12 #define BIO_ISSUE_RES_SHIFT (64 - BIO_ISSUE_RES_BITS) #define BIO_ISSUE_SIZE_SHIFT (BIO_ISSUE_RES_SHIFT - BIO_ISSUE_SIZE_BITS) #define BIO_ISSUE_TIME_MASK ((1ULL << BIO_ISSUE_SIZE_SHIFT) - 1) #define BIO_ISSUE_SIZE_MASK \ (((1ULL << BIO_ISSUE_SIZE_BITS) - 1) << BIO_ISSUE_SIZE_SHIFT) #define BIO_ISSUE_RES_MASK (~((1ULL << BIO_ISSUE_RES_SHIFT) - 1)) /* Reserved bit for blk-throtl */ #define BIO_ISSUE_THROTL_SKIP_LATENCY (1ULL << 63) struct bio_issue { u64 value; }; static inline u64 __bio_issue_time(u64 time) { return time & BIO_ISSUE_TIME_MASK; } static inline u64 bio_issue_time(struct bio_issue *issue) { return __bio_issue_time(issue->value); } static inline sector_t bio_issue_size(struct bio_issue *issue) { return ((issue->value & BIO_ISSUE_SIZE_MASK) >> BIO_ISSUE_SIZE_SHIFT); } static inline void bio_issue_init(struct bio_issue *issue, sector_t size) { size &= (1ULL << BIO_ISSUE_SIZE_BITS) - 1; issue->value = ((issue->value & BIO_ISSUE_RES_MASK) | (ktime_get_ns() & BIO_ISSUE_TIME_MASK) | ((u64)size << BIO_ISSUE_SIZE_SHIFT)); } /* * main unit of I/O for the block layer and lower layers (ie drivers and * stacking drivers) */ struct bio { struct bio *bi_next; /* request queue link */ struct gendisk *bi_disk; unsigned int bi_opf; /* bottom bits req flags, * top bits REQ_OP. Use * accessors. */ unsigned short bi_flags; /* status, etc and bvec pool number */ unsigned short bi_ioprio; unsigned short bi_write_hint; blk_status_t bi_status; u8 bi_partno; atomic_t __bi_remaining; struct bvec_iter bi_iter; bio_end_io_t *bi_end_io; void *bi_private; #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_CGROUP /* * Represents the association of the css and request_queue for the bio. * If a bio goes direct to device, it will not have a blkg as it will * not have a request_queue associated with it. The reference is put * on release of the bio. */ struct blkcg_gq *bi_blkg; struct bio_issue bi_issue; #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_CGROUP_IOCOST u64 bi_iocost_cost; #endif #endif #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION struct bio_crypt_ctx *bi_crypt_context; #endif union { #if defined(CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INTEGRITY) struct bio_integrity_payload *bi_integrity; /* data integrity */ #endif }; unsigned short bi_vcnt; /* how many bio_vec's */ /* * Everything starting with bi_max_vecs will be preserved by bio_reset() */ unsigned short bi_max_vecs; /* max bvl_vecs we can hold */ atomic_t __bi_cnt; /* pin count */ struct bio_vec *bi_io_vec; /* the actual vec list */ struct bio_set *bi_pool; /* * We can inline a number of vecs at the end of the bio, to avoid * double allocations for a small number of bio_vecs. This member * MUST obviously be kept at the very end of the bio. */ struct bio_vec bi_inline_vecs[]; }; #define BIO_RESET_BYTES offsetof(struct bio, bi_max_vecs) /* * bio flags */ enum { BIO_NO_PAGE_REF, /* don't put release vec pages */ BIO_CLONED, /* doesn't own data */ BIO_BOUNCED, /* bio is a bounce bio */ BIO_WORKINGSET, /* contains userspace workingset pages */ BIO_QUIET, /* Make BIO Quiet */ BIO_CHAIN, /* chained bio, ->bi_remaining in effect */ BIO_REFFED, /* bio has elevated ->bi_cnt */ BIO_THROTTLED, /* This bio has already been subjected to * throttling rules. Don't do it again. */ BIO_TRACE_COMPLETION, /* bio_endio() should trace the final completion * of this bio. */ BIO_CGROUP_ACCT, /* has been accounted to a cgroup */ BIO_TRACKED, /* set if bio goes through the rq_qos path */ BIO_FLAG_LAST }; /* See BVEC_POOL_OFFSET below before adding new flags */ /* * We support 6 different bvec pools, the last one is magic in that it * is backed by a mempool. */ #define BVEC_POOL_NR 6 #define BVEC_POOL_MAX (BVEC_POOL_NR - 1) /* * Top 3 bits of bio flags indicate the pool the bvecs came from. We add * 1 to the actual index so that 0 indicates that there are no bvecs to be * freed. */ #define BVEC_POOL_BITS (3) #define BVEC_POOL_OFFSET (16 - BVEC_POOL_BITS) #define BVEC_POOL_IDX(bio) ((bio)->bi_flags >> BVEC_POOL_OFFSET) #if (1<< BVEC_POOL_BITS) < (BVEC_POOL_NR+1) # error "BVEC_POOL_BITS is too small" #endif /* * Flags starting here get preserved by bio_reset() - this includes * only BVEC_POOL_IDX() */ #define BIO_RESET_BITS BVEC_POOL_OFFSET typedef __u32 __bitwise blk_mq_req_flags_t; /* * Operations and flags common to the bio and request structures. * We use 8 bits for encoding the operation, and the remaining 24 for flags. * * The least significant bit of the operation number indicates the data * transfer direction: * * - if the least significant bit is set transfers are TO the device * - if the least significant bit is not set transfers are FROM the device * * If a operation does not transfer data the least significant bit has no * meaning. */ #define REQ_OP_BITS 8 #define REQ_OP_MASK ((1 << REQ_OP_BITS) - 1) #define REQ_FLAG_BITS 24 enum req_opf { /* read sectors from the device */ REQ_OP_READ = 0, /* write sectors to the device */ REQ_OP_WRITE = 1, /* flush the volatile write cache */ REQ_OP_FLUSH = 2, /* discard sectors */ REQ_OP_DISCARD = 3, /* securely erase sectors */ REQ_OP_SECURE_ERASE = 5, /* write the same sector many times */ REQ_OP_WRITE_SAME = 7, /* write the zero filled sector many times */ REQ_OP_WRITE_ZEROES = 9, /* Open a zone */ REQ_OP_ZONE_OPEN = 10, /* Close a zone */ REQ_OP_ZONE_CLOSE = 11, /* Transition a zone to full */ REQ_OP_ZONE_FINISH = 12, /* write data at the current zone write pointer */ REQ_OP_ZONE_APPEND = 13, /* reset a zone write pointer */ REQ_OP_ZONE_RESET = 15, /* reset all the zone present on the device */ REQ_OP_ZONE_RESET_ALL = 17, /* SCSI passthrough using struct scsi_request */ REQ_OP_SCSI_IN = 32, REQ_OP_SCSI_OUT = 33, /* Driver private requests */ REQ_OP_DRV_IN = 34, REQ_OP_DRV_OUT = 35, REQ_OP_LAST, }; enum req_flag_bits { __REQ_FAILFAST_DEV = /* no driver retries of device errors */ REQ_OP_BITS, __REQ_FAILFAST_TRANSPORT, /* no driver retries of transport errors */ __REQ_FAILFAST_DRIVER, /* no driver retries of driver errors */ __REQ_SYNC, /* request is sync (sync write or read) */ __REQ_META, /* metadata io request */ __REQ_PRIO, /* boost priority in cfq */ __REQ_NOMERGE, /* don't touch this for merging */ __REQ_IDLE, /* anticipate more IO after this one */ __REQ_INTEGRITY, /* I/O includes block integrity payload */ __REQ_FUA, /* forced unit access */ __REQ_PREFLUSH, /* request for cache flush */ __REQ_RAHEAD, /* read ahead, can fail anytime */ __REQ_BACKGROUND, /* background IO */ __REQ_NOWAIT, /* Don't wait if request will block */ /* * When a shared kthread needs to issue a bio for a cgroup, doing * so synchronously can lead to priority inversions as the kthread * can be trapped waiting for that cgroup. CGROUP_PUNT flag makes * submit_bio() punt the actual issuing to a dedicated per-blkcg * work item to avoid such priority inversions. */ __REQ_CGROUP_PUNT, /* command specific flags for REQ_OP_WRITE_ZEROES: */ __REQ_NOUNMAP, /* do not free blocks when zeroing */ __REQ_HIPRI, /* for driver use */ __REQ_DRV, __REQ_SWAP, /* swapping request. */ __REQ_NR_BITS, /* stops here */ }; #define REQ_FAILFAST_DEV (1ULL << __REQ_FAILFAST_DEV) #define REQ_FAILFAST_TRANSPORT (1ULL << __REQ_FAILFAST_TRANSPORT) #define REQ_FAILFAST_DRIVER (1ULL << __REQ_FAILFAST_DRIVER) #define REQ_SYNC (1ULL << __REQ_SYNC) #define REQ_META (1ULL << __REQ_META) #define REQ_PRIO (1ULL << __REQ_PRIO) #define REQ_NOMERGE (1ULL << __REQ_NOMERGE) #define REQ_IDLE (1ULL << __REQ_IDLE) #define REQ_INTEGRITY (1ULL << __REQ_INTEGRITY) #define REQ_FUA (1ULL << __REQ_FUA) #define REQ_PREFLUSH (1ULL << __REQ_PREFLUSH) #define REQ_RAHEAD (1ULL << __REQ_RAHEAD) #define REQ_BACKGROUND (1ULL << __REQ_BACKGROUND) #define REQ_NOWAIT (1ULL << __REQ_NOWAIT) #define REQ_CGROUP_PUNT (1ULL << __REQ_CGROUP_PUNT) #define REQ_NOUNMAP (1ULL << __REQ_NOUNMAP) #define REQ_HIPRI (1ULL << __REQ_HIPRI) #define REQ_DRV (1ULL << __REQ_DRV) #define REQ_SWAP (1ULL << __REQ_SWAP) #define REQ_FAILFAST_MASK \ (REQ_FAILFAST_DEV | REQ_FAILFAST_TRANSPORT | REQ_FAILFAST_DRIVER) #define REQ_NOMERGE_FLAGS \ (REQ_NOMERGE | REQ_PREFLUSH | REQ_FUA) enum stat_group { STAT_READ, STAT_WRITE, STAT_DISCARD, STAT_FLUSH, NR_STAT_GROUPS }; #define bio_op(bio) \ ((bio)->bi_opf & REQ_OP_MASK) #define req_op(req) \ ((req)->cmd_flags & REQ_OP_MASK) /* obsolete, don't use in new code */ static inline void bio_set_op_attrs(struct bio *bio, unsigned op, unsigned op_flags) { bio->bi_opf = op | op_flags; } static inline bool op_is_write(unsigned int op) { return (op & 1); } /* * Check if the bio or request is one that needs special treatment in the * flush state machine. */ static inline bool op_is_flush(unsigned int op) { return op & (REQ_FUA | REQ_PREFLUSH); } /* * Reads are always treated as synchronous, as are requests with the FUA or * PREFLUSH flag. Other operations may be marked as synchronous using the * REQ_SYNC flag. */ static inline bool op_is_sync(unsigned int op) { return (op & REQ_OP_MASK) == REQ_OP_READ || (op & (REQ_SYNC | REQ_FUA | REQ_PREFLUSH)); } static inline bool op_is_discard(unsigned int op) { return (op & REQ_OP_MASK) == REQ_OP_DISCARD; } /* * Check if a bio or request operation is a zone management operation, with * the exception of REQ_OP_ZONE_RESET_ALL which is treated as a special case * due to its different handling in the block layer and device response in * case of command failure. */ static inline bool op_is_zone_mgmt(enum req_opf op) { switch (op & REQ_OP_MASK) { case REQ_OP_ZONE_RESET: case REQ_OP_ZONE_OPEN: case REQ_OP_ZONE_CLOSE: case REQ_OP_ZONE_FINISH: return true; default: return false; } } static inline int op_stat_group(unsigned int op) { if (op_is_discard(op)) return STAT_DISCARD; return op_is_write(op); } typedef unsigned int blk_qc_t; #define BLK_QC_T_NONE -1U #define BLK_QC_T_SHIFT 16 #define BLK_QC_T_INTERNAL (1U << 31) static inline bool blk_qc_t_valid(blk_qc_t cookie) { return cookie != BLK_QC_T_NONE; } static inline unsigned int blk_qc_t_to_queue_num(blk_qc_t cookie) { return (cookie & ~BLK_QC_T_INTERNAL) >> BLK_QC_T_SHIFT; } static inline unsigned int blk_qc_t_to_tag(blk_qc_t cookie) { return cookie & ((1u << BLK_QC_T_SHIFT) - 1); } static inline bool blk_qc_t_is_internal(blk_qc_t cookie) { return (cookie & BLK_QC_T_INTERNAL) != 0; } struct blk_rq_stat { u64 mean; u64 min; u64 max; u32 nr_samples; u64 batch; }; #endif /* __LINUX_BLK_TYPES_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * Routines to manage notifier chains for passing status changes to any * interested routines. We need this instead of hard coded call lists so * that modules can poke their nose into the innards. The network devices * needed them so here they are for the rest of you. * * Alan Cox <Alan.Cox@linux.org> */ #ifndef _LINUX_NOTIFIER_H #define _LINUX_NOTIFIER_H #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/rwsem.h> #include <linux/srcu.h> /* * Notifier chains are of four types: * * Atomic notifier chains: Chain callbacks run in interrupt/atomic * context. Callouts are not allowed to block. * Blocking notifier chains: Chain callbacks run in process context. * Callouts are allowed to block. * Raw notifier chains: There are no restrictions on callbacks, * registration, or unregistration. All locking and protection * must be provided by the caller. * SRCU notifier chains: A variant of blocking notifier chains, with * the same restrictions. * * atomic_notifier_chain_register() may be called from an atomic context, * but blocking_notifier_chain_register() and srcu_notifier_chain_register() * must be called from a process context. Ditto for the corresponding * _unregister() routines. * * atomic_notifier_chain_unregister(), blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(), * and srcu_notifier_chain_unregister() _must not_ be called from within * the call chain. * * SRCU notifier chains are an alternative form of blocking notifier chains. * They use SRCU (Sleepable Read-Copy Update) instead of rw-semaphores for * protection of the chain links. This means there is _very_ low overhead * in srcu_notifier_call_chain(): no cache bounces and no memory barriers. * As compensation, srcu_notifier_chain_unregister() is rather expensive. * SRCU notifier chains should be used when the chain will be called very * often but notifier_blocks will seldom be removed. */ struct notifier_block; typedef int (*notifier_fn_t)(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long action, void *data); struct notifier_block { notifier_fn_t notifier_call; struct notifier_block __rcu *next; int priority; }; struct atomic_notifier_head { spinlock_t lock; struct notifier_block __rcu *head; }; struct blocking_notifier_head { struct rw_semaphore rwsem; struct notifier_block __rcu *head; }; struct raw_notifier_head { struct notifier_block __rcu *head; }; struct srcu_notifier_head { struct mutex mutex; struct srcu_struct srcu; struct notifier_block __rcu *head; }; #define ATOMIC_INIT_NOTIFIER_HEAD(name) do { \ spin_lock_init(&(name)->lock); \ (name)->head = NULL; \ } while (0) #define BLOCKING_INIT_NOTIFIER_HEAD(name) do { \ init_rwsem(&(name)->rwsem); \ (name)->head = NULL; \ } while (0) #define RAW_INIT_NOTIFIER_HEAD(name) do { \ (name)->head = NULL; \ } while (0) /* srcu_notifier_heads must be cleaned up dynamically */ extern void srcu_init_notifier_head(struct srcu_notifier_head *nh); #define srcu_cleanup_notifier_head(name) \ cleanup_srcu_struct(&(name)->srcu); #define ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_INIT(name) { \ .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(name.lock), \ .head = NULL } #define BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_INIT(name) { \ .rwsem = __RWSEM_INITIALIZER((name).rwsem), \ .head = NULL } #define RAW_NOTIFIER_INIT(name) { \ .head = NULL } #define SRCU_NOTIFIER_INIT(name, pcpu) \ { \ .mutex = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(name.mutex), \ .head = NULL, \ .srcu = __SRCU_STRUCT_INIT(name.srcu, pcpu), \ } #define ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(name) \ struct atomic_notifier_head name = \ ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_INIT(name) #define BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(name) \ struct blocking_notifier_head name = \ BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_INIT(name) #define RAW_NOTIFIER_HEAD(name) \ struct raw_notifier_head name = \ RAW_NOTIFIER_INIT(name) #ifdef CONFIG_TREE_SRCU #define _SRCU_NOTIFIER_HEAD(name, mod) \ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct srcu_data, name##_head_srcu_data); \ mod struct srcu_notifier_head name = \ SRCU_NOTIFIER_INIT(name, name##_head_srcu_data) #else #define _SRCU_NOTIFIER_HEAD(name, mod) \ mod struct srcu_notifier_head name = \ SRCU_NOTIFIER_INIT(name, name) #endif #define SRCU_NOTIFIER_HEAD(name) \ _SRCU_NOTIFIER_HEAD(name, /* not static */) #define SRCU_NOTIFIER_HEAD_STATIC(name) \ _SRCU_NOTIFIER_HEAD(name, static) #ifdef __KERNEL__ extern int atomic_notifier_chain_register(struct atomic_notifier_head *nh, struct notifier_block *nb); extern int blocking_notifier_chain_register(struct blocking_notifier_head *nh, struct notifier_block *nb); extern int raw_notifier_chain_register(struct raw_notifier_head *nh, struct notifier_block *nb); extern int srcu_notifier_chain_register(struct srcu_notifier_head *nh, struct notifier_block *nb); extern int atomic_notifier_chain_unregister(struct atomic_notifier_head *nh, struct notifier_block *nb); extern int blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(struct blocking_notifier_head *nh, struct notifier_block *nb); extern int raw_notifier_chain_unregister(struct raw_notifier_head *nh, struct notifier_block *nb); extern int srcu_notifier_chain_unregister(struct srcu_notifier_head *nh, struct notifier_block *nb); extern int atomic_notifier_call_chain(struct atomic_notifier_head *nh, unsigned long val, void *v); extern int blocking_notifier_call_chain(struct blocking_notifier_head *nh, unsigned long val, void *v); extern int raw_notifier_call_chain(struct raw_notifier_head *nh, unsigned long val, void *v); extern int srcu_notifier_call_chain(struct srcu_notifier_head *nh, unsigned long val, void *v); extern int atomic_notifier_call_chain_robust(struct atomic_notifier_head *nh, unsigned long val_up, unsigned long val_down, void *v); extern int blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust(struct blocking_notifier_head *nh, unsigned long val_up, unsigned long val_down, void *v); extern int raw_notifier_call_chain_robust(struct raw_notifier_head *nh, unsigned long val_up, unsigned long val_down, void *v); #define NOTIFY_DONE 0x0000 /* Don't care */ #define NOTIFY_OK 0x0001 /* Suits me */ #define NOTIFY_STOP_MASK 0x8000 /* Don't call further */ #define NOTIFY_BAD (NOTIFY_STOP_MASK|0x0002) /* Bad/Veto action */ /* * Clean way to return from the notifier and stop further calls. */ #define NOTIFY_STOP (NOTIFY_OK|NOTIFY_STOP_MASK) /* Encapsulate (negative) errno value (in particular, NOTIFY_BAD <=> EPERM). */ static inline int notifier_from_errno(int err) { if (err) return NOTIFY_STOP_MASK | (NOTIFY_OK - err); return NOTIFY_OK; } /* Restore (negative) errno value from notify return value. */ static inline int notifier_to_errno(int ret) { ret &= ~NOTIFY_STOP_MASK; return ret > NOTIFY_OK ? NOTIFY_OK - ret : 0; } /* * Declared notifiers so far. I can imagine quite a few more chains * over time (eg laptop power reset chains, reboot chain (to clean * device units up), device [un]mount chain, module load/unload chain, * low memory chain, screenblank chain (for plug in modular screenblankers) * VC switch chains (for loadable kernel svgalib VC switch helpers) etc... */ /* CPU notfiers are defined in include/linux/cpu.h. */ /* netdevice notifiers are defined in include/linux/netdevice.h */ /* reboot notifiers are defined in include/linux/reboot.h. */ /* Hibernation and suspend events are defined in include/linux/suspend.h. */ /* Virtual Terminal events are defined in include/linux/vt.h. */ #define NETLINK_URELEASE 0x0001 /* Unicast netlink socket released */ /* Console keyboard events. * Note: KBD_KEYCODE is always sent before KBD_UNBOUND_KEYCODE, KBD_UNICODE and * KBD_KEYSYM. */ #define KBD_KEYCODE 0x0001 /* Keyboard keycode, called before any other */ #define KBD_UNBOUND_KEYCODE 0x0002 /* Keyboard keycode which is not bound to any other */ #define KBD_UNICODE 0x0003 /* Keyboard unicode */ #define KBD_KEYSYM 0x0004 /* Keyboard keysym */ #define KBD_POST_KEYSYM 0x0005 /* Called after keyboard keysym interpretation */ extern struct blocking_notifier_head reboot_notifier_list; #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ #endif /* _LINUX_NOTIFIER_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* Red Black Trees (C) 1999 Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@suse.de> linux/include/linux/rbtree.h To use rbtrees you'll have to implement your own insert and search cores. This will avoid us to use callbacks and to drop drammatically performances. I know it's not the cleaner way, but in C (not in C++) to get performances and genericity... See Documentation/core-api/rbtree.rst for documentation and samples. */ #ifndef _LINUX_RBTREE_H #define _LINUX_RBTREE_H #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/stddef.h> #include <linux/rcupdate.h> struct rb_node { unsigned long __rb_parent_color; struct rb_node *rb_right; struct rb_node *rb_left; } __attribute__((aligned(sizeof(long)))); /* The alignment might seem pointless, but allegedly CRIS needs it */ struct rb_root { struct rb_node *rb_node; }; #define rb_parent(r) ((struct rb_node *)((r)->__rb_parent_color & ~3)) #define RB_ROOT (struct rb_root) { NULL, } #define rb_entry(ptr, type, member) container_of(ptr, type, member) #define RB_EMPTY_ROOT(root) (READ_ONCE((root)->rb_node) == NULL) /* 'empty' nodes are nodes that are known not to be inserted in an rbtree */ #define RB_EMPTY_NODE(node) \ ((node)->__rb_parent_color == (unsigned long)(node)) #define RB_CLEAR_NODE(node) \ ((node)->__rb_parent_color = (unsigned long)(node)) extern void rb_insert_color(struct rb_node *, struct rb_root *); extern void rb_erase(struct rb_node *, struct rb_root *); /* Find logical next and previous nodes in a tree */ extern struct rb_node *rb_next(const struct rb_node *); extern struct rb_node *rb_prev(const struct rb_node *); extern struct rb_node *rb_first(const struct rb_root *); extern struct rb_node *rb_last(const struct rb_root *); /* Postorder iteration - always visit the parent after its children */ extern struct rb_node *rb_first_postorder(const struct rb_root *); extern struct rb_node *rb_next_postorder(const struct rb_node *); /* Fast replacement of a single node without remove/rebalance/add/rebalance */ extern void rb_replace_node(struct rb_node *victim, struct rb_node *new, struct rb_root *root); extern void rb_replace_node_rcu(struct rb_node *victim, struct rb_node *new, struct rb_root *root); static inline void rb_link_node(struct rb_node *node, struct rb_node *parent, struct rb_node **rb_link) { node->__rb_parent_color = (unsigned long)parent; node->rb_left = node->rb_right = NULL; *rb_link = node; } static inline void rb_link_node_rcu(struct rb_node *node, struct rb_node *parent, struct rb_node **rb_link) { node->__rb_parent_color = (unsigned long)parent; node->rb_left = node->rb_right = NULL; rcu_assign_pointer(*rb_link, node); } #define rb_entry_safe(ptr, type, member) \ ({ typeof(ptr) ____ptr = (ptr); \ ____ptr ? rb_entry(____ptr, type, member) : NULL; \ }) /** * rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe - iterate in post-order over rb_root of * given type allowing the backing memory of @pos to be invalidated * * @pos: the 'type *' to use as a loop cursor. * @n: another 'type *' to use as temporary storage * @root: 'rb_root *' of the rbtree. * @field: the name of the rb_node field within 'type'. * * rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe() provides a similar guarantee as * list_for_each_entry_safe() and allows the iteration to continue independent * of changes to @pos by the body of the loop. * * Note, however, that it cannot handle other modifications that re-order the * rbtree it is iterating over. This includes calling rb_erase() on @pos, as * rb_erase() may rebalance the tree, causing us to miss some nodes. */ #define rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(pos, n, root, field) \ for (pos = rb_entry_safe(rb_first_postorder(root), typeof(*pos), field); \ pos && ({ n = rb_entry_safe(rb_next_postorder(&pos->field), \ typeof(*pos), field); 1; }); \ pos = n) /* * Leftmost-cached rbtrees. * * We do not cache the rightmost node based on footprint * size vs number of potential users that could benefit * from O(1) rb_last(). Just not worth it, users that want * this feature can always implement the logic explicitly. * Furthermore, users that want to cache both pointers may * find it a bit asymmetric, but that's ok. */ struct rb_root_cached { struct rb_root rb_root; struct rb_node *rb_leftmost; }; #define RB_ROOT_CACHED (struct rb_root_cached) { {NULL, }, NULL } /* Same as rb_first(), but O(1) */ #define rb_first_cached(root) (root)->rb_leftmost static inline void rb_insert_color_cached(struct rb_node *node, struct rb_root_cached *root, bool leftmost) { if (leftmost) root->rb_leftmost = node; rb_insert_color(node, &root->rb_root); } static inline void rb_erase_cached(struct rb_node *node, struct rb_root_cached *root) { if (root->rb_leftmost == node) root->rb_leftmost = rb_next(node); rb_erase(node, &root->rb_root); } static inline void rb_replace_node_cached(struct rb_node *victim, struct rb_node *new, struct rb_root_cached *root) { if (root->rb_leftmost == victim) root->rb_leftmost = new; rb_replace_node(victim, new, &root->rb_root); } #endif /* _LINUX_RBTREE_H */
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * net/dst.h Protocol independent destination cache definitions. * * Authors: Alexey Kuznetsov, <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru> * */ #ifndef _NET_DST_H #define _NET_DST_H #include <net/dst_ops.h> #include <linux/netdevice.h> #include <linux/rtnetlink.h> #include <linux/rcupdate.h> #include <linux/bug.h> #include <linux/jiffies.h> #include <linux/refcount.h> #include <net/neighbour.h> #include <asm/processor.h> struct sk_buff; struct dst_entry { struct net_device *dev; struct dst_ops *ops; unsigned long _metrics; unsigned long expires; #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM struct xfrm_state *xfrm; #else void *__pad1; #endif int (*input)(struct sk_buff *); int (*output)(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); unsigned short flags; #define DST_NOXFRM 0x0002 #define DST_NOPOLICY 0x0004 #define DST_NOCOUNT 0x0008 #define DST_FAKE_RTABLE 0x0010 #define DST_XFRM_TUNNEL 0x0020 #define DST_XFRM_QUEUE 0x0040 #define DST_METADATA 0x0080 /* A non-zero value of dst->obsolete forces by-hand validation * of the route entry. Positive values are set by the generic * dst layer to indicate that the entry has been forcefully * destroyed. * * Negative values are used by the implementation layer code to * force invocation of the dst_ops->check() method. */ short obsolete; #define DST_OBSOLETE_NONE 0 #define DST_OBSOLETE_DEAD 2 #define DST_OBSOLETE_FORCE_CHK -1 #define DST_OBSOLETE_KILL -2 unsigned short header_len; /* more space at head required */ unsigned short trailer_len; /* space to reserve at tail */ /* * __refcnt wants to be on a different cache line from * input/output/ops or performance tanks badly */ #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT atomic_t __refcnt; /* 64-bit offset 64 */ #endif int __use; unsigned long lastuse; struct lwtunnel_state *lwtstate; struct rcu_head rcu_head; short error; short __pad; __u32 tclassid; #ifndef CONFIG_64BIT atomic_t __refcnt; /* 32-bit offset 64 */ #endif }; struct dst_metrics { u32 metrics[RTAX_MAX]; refcount_t refcnt; } __aligned(4); /* Low pointer bits contain DST_METRICS_FLAGS */ extern const struct dst_metrics dst_default_metrics; u32 *dst_cow_metrics_generic(struct dst_entry *dst, unsigned long old); #define DST_METRICS_READ_ONLY 0x1UL #define DST_METRICS_REFCOUNTED 0x2UL #define DST_METRICS_FLAGS 0x3UL #define __DST_METRICS_PTR(Y) \ ((u32 *)((Y) & ~DST_METRICS_FLAGS)) #define DST_METRICS_PTR(X) __DST_METRICS_PTR((X)->_metrics) static inline bool dst_metrics_read_only(const struct dst_entry *dst) { return dst->_metrics & DST_METRICS_READ_ONLY; } void __dst_destroy_metrics_generic(struct dst_entry *dst, unsigned long old); static inline void dst_destroy_metrics_generic(struct dst_entry *dst) { unsigned long val = dst->_metrics; if (!(val & DST_METRICS_READ_ONLY)) __dst_destroy_metrics_generic(dst, val); } static inline u32 *dst_metrics_write_ptr(struct dst_entry *dst) { unsigned long p = dst->_metrics; BUG_ON(!p); if (p & DST_METRICS_READ_ONLY) return dst->ops->cow_metrics(dst, p); return __DST_METRICS_PTR(p); } /* This may only be invoked before the entry has reached global * visibility. */ static inline void dst_init_metrics(struct dst_entry *dst, const u32 *src_metrics, bool read_only) { dst->_metrics = ((unsigned long) src_metrics) | (read_only ? DST_METRICS_READ_ONLY : 0); } static inline void dst_copy_metrics(struct dst_entry *dest, const struct dst_entry *src) { u32 *dst_metrics = dst_metrics_write_ptr(dest); if (dst_metrics) { u32 *src_metrics = DST_METRICS_PTR(src); memcpy(dst_metrics, src_metrics, RTAX_MAX * sizeof(u32)); } } static inline u32 *dst_metrics_ptr(struct dst_entry *dst) { return DST_METRICS_PTR(dst); } static inline u32 dst_metric_raw(const struct dst_entry *dst, const int metric) { u32 *p = DST_METRICS_PTR(dst); return p[metric-1]; } static inline u32 dst_metric(const struct dst_entry *dst, const int metric) { WARN_ON_ONCE(metric == RTAX_HOPLIMIT || metric == RTAX_ADVMSS || metric == RTAX_MTU); return dst_metric_raw(dst, metric); } static inline u32 dst_metric_advmss(const struct dst_entry *dst) { u32 advmss = dst_metric_raw(dst, RTAX_ADVMSS); if (!advmss) advmss = dst->ops->default_advmss(dst); return advmss; } static inline void dst_metric_set(struct dst_entry *dst, int metric, u32 val) { u32 *p = dst_metrics_write_ptr(dst); if (p) p[metric-1] = val; } /* Kernel-internal feature bits that are unallocated in user space. */ #define DST_FEATURE_ECN_CA (1U << 31) #define DST_FEATURE_MASK (DST_FEATURE_ECN_CA) #define DST_FEATURE_ECN_MASK (DST_FEATURE_ECN_CA | RTAX_FEATURE_ECN) static inline u32 dst_feature(const struct dst_entry *dst, u32 feature) { return dst_metric(dst, RTAX_FEATURES) & feature; } static inline u32 dst_mtu(const struct dst_entry *dst) { return dst->ops->mtu(dst); } /* RTT metrics are stored in milliseconds for user ABI, but used as jiffies */ static inline unsigned long dst_metric_rtt(const struct dst_entry *dst, int metric) { return msecs_to_jiffies(dst_metric(dst, metric)); } static inline u32 dst_allfrag(const struct dst_entry *dst) { int ret = dst_feature(dst, RTAX_FEATURE_ALLFRAG); return ret; } static inline int dst_metric_locked(const struct dst_entry *dst, int metric) { return dst_metric(dst, RTAX_LOCK) & (1 << metric); } static inline void dst_hold(struct dst_entry *dst) { /* * If your kernel compilation stops here, please check * the placement of __refcnt in struct dst_entry */ BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct dst_entry, __refcnt) & 63); WARN_ON(atomic_inc_not_zero(&dst->__refcnt) == 0); } static inline void dst_use_noref(struct dst_entry *dst, unsigned long time) { if (unlikely(time != dst->lastuse)) { dst->__use++; dst->lastuse = time; } } static inline void dst_hold_and_use(struct dst_entry *dst, unsigned long time) { dst_hold(dst); dst_use_noref(dst, time); } static inline struct dst_entry *dst_clone(struct dst_entry *dst) { if (dst) dst_hold(dst); return dst; } void dst_release(struct dst_entry *dst); void dst_release_immediate(struct dst_entry *dst); static inline void refdst_drop(unsigned long refdst) { if (!(refdst & SKB_DST_NOREF)) dst_release((struct dst_entry *)(refdst & SKB_DST_PTRMASK)); } /** * skb_dst_drop - drops skb dst * @skb: buffer * * Drops dst reference count if a reference was taken. */ static inline void skb_dst_drop(struct sk_buff *skb) { if (skb->_skb_refdst) { refdst_drop(skb->_skb_refdst); skb->_skb_refdst = 0UL; } } static inline void __skb_dst_copy(struct sk_buff *nskb, unsigned long refdst) { nskb->_skb_refdst = refdst; if (!(nskb->_skb_refdst & SKB_DST_NOREF)) dst_clone(skb_dst(nskb)); } static inline void skb_dst_copy(struct sk_buff *nskb, const struct sk_buff *oskb) { __skb_dst_copy(nskb, oskb->_skb_refdst); } /** * dst_hold_safe - Take a reference on a dst if possible * @dst: pointer to dst entry * * This helper returns false if it could not safely * take a reference on a dst. */ static inline bool dst_hold_safe(struct dst_entry *dst) { return atomic_inc_not_zero(&dst->__refcnt); } /** * skb_dst_force - makes sure skb dst is refcounted * @skb: buffer * * If dst is not yet refcounted and not destroyed, grab a ref on it. * Returns true if dst is refcounted. */ static inline bool skb_dst_force(struct sk_buff *skb) { if (skb_dst_is_noref(skb)) { struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb); WARN_ON(!rcu_read_lock_held()); if (!dst_hold_safe(dst)) dst = NULL; skb->_skb_refdst = (unsigned long)dst; } return skb->_skb_refdst != 0UL; } /** * __skb_tunnel_rx - prepare skb for rx reinsert * @skb: buffer * @dev: tunnel device * @net: netns for packet i/o * * After decapsulation, packet is going to re-enter (netif_rx()) our stack, * so make some cleanups. (no accounting done) */ static inline void __skb_tunnel_rx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, struct net *net) { skb->dev = dev; /* * Clear hash so that we can recalulate the hash for the * encapsulated packet, unless we have already determine the hash * over the L4 4-tuple. */ skb_clear_hash_if_not_l4(skb); skb_set_queue_mapping(skb, 0); skb_scrub_packet(skb, !net_eq(net, dev_net(dev))); } /** * skb_tunnel_rx - prepare skb for rx reinsert * @skb: buffer * @dev: tunnel device * @net: netns for packet i/o * * After decapsulation, packet is going to re-enter (netif_rx()) our stack, * so make some cleanups, and perform accounting. * Note: this accounting is not SMP safe. */ static inline void skb_tunnel_rx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, struct net *net) { /* TODO : stats should be SMP safe */ dev->stats.rx_packets++; dev->stats.rx_bytes += skb->len; __skb_tunnel_rx(skb, dev, net); } static inline u32 dst_tclassid(const struct sk